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Abstract 
 
In the aviation industry and academic literature, there are a number of methods to 
compute and benchmark the perceived quality of the airline schedule.  However, these are open 
to criticism in the sense that they solely use the airline’s schedules as the input for the quality 
computation rather than the consumer’s perspective. Injecting dynamic consumer preference 
metrics on top of the existing network evaluation methods is the aim of this research. 
 
Therefore, the research brings a new and innovative passenger-oriented perspective on 
airline network and schedule design, an outlook regarding the “quality” of supply rather than 
the sole “quantity” of the supply. The model also helps to compute schedule-service quality 
indexes by understanding consumers’ priorities and preferences through a survey. Using the 
schedule data of main legacy and low cost carriers in the Middle East, Europe and Africa the 
model produces a “realistic market share” estimation for each airline serving particular routes.  
 
The model’s outputs provide guidelines to effectively shape the airline planners’ 
investment decisions in the sense that, the airline executives will be enabled to numerically 
assess the estimated realistic market share change of a potential investment and to benchmark 
the performance of their products against competitors. Moreover, the research contributes to 
the academic literature by conceptualising the comparative and competitive advantages of 
airline schedules and network designs from a consumer-centric perspective. 
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Definitions & Gloassary 
 
  
 An extensive range of terminology, notation and definitions are used throughout this 
study. While Chapter 2 includes the general  concepts and definitions covered in the Research, 
Chapter 8 focuses on capacity related concepts and Chapter 9 covers quality-related notations 
and terminology. The following table summarise the parameters introduced throughout the 
study. 
 
Table A: The parameters introduced in the Chapters of the Research 
Parameter Explanation Details 
f Frequency –  refers to the number of flights operated by a 
carrier in a market 
Ch. 2 / p. 
s Available seat – refers to total number of physical seats 
supplied in a market 
Ch. 2 / p. 
sf The installed physical seat capacity for each frequency Ch. 2 / p. 
sconn Connecting seat factor – maximum percentage of the 
physical  capacity that could be allocated for a connecting 
destination. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
scode Codeshare seat factor – the maximum percentage available 
for sale to a given marketing carrier. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
ttotal The total travel time elapsed between the departure from the 
origin and arrival at the destination. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
tflight The total time spent on the flight. Ch. 2 / p. 
tconn Connecting Time – The total time spent at the hub airports 
for connecting itineraries 
Ch. 2 / p. 
MCT Minimum Connecting Time – refers to the minimum time 
required to connect two flights at the hub airport. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
MaxCT Maximum Connecting Time – refers to the maximum time 
permitted to connect two flights at the hub airport. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
qdep Departure Time Quality is the perceived attractiveness of 
the departure time from the origin of a given itinerary. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
qarr Arrival Time Quality is the perceived attractiveness of the 
arrival time to the destination of a given itinerary. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
%tf Flight Time Ratio – refers to the flight time ratio of the entire 
journey. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
%tc Connect Time Ratio – refers to the share of connecting time 
among ttotal. 
Ch. 2 / p.  
MCT Surplus A connecting passengers surplus time at the connecting 
airport 
Ch. 2 / p. 
tbuffer Buffer Time – refers to the connecting passengers’ additional 
time demand on top of the MCT. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
tstress Stress Time – refers to the connecting passengers’ stress 
time at the hub airport. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
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twaste Waste Time – refers to the connecting passengers’ wasted 
time at the hub airport. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
tinconvenient Total inconvenient time – refers to either stress or waste time 
for connecting passengers. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
%inconvenient_time Inconvenient time percentage – refers to the share of 
inconvenient time within the total journey time. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
fsplit Flight Time Split Ratio – refers to the journey time splits of 
the legs of a connecting itinerary. 
Ch. 2 / p. 
udo The value of a direct and operating service Ch. 4 / p. 
udc The value of a direct and codeshare service Ch. 4 / p. 
uco The value of a connecting and operating service Ch. 4 / p. 
ucc The value of a connecting and codeshare service Ch. 4 / p. 
%f_i Physical Frequency Share – refers to the percentage of 
physical frequencies of airline i in a given market 
Ch. 8. / p. 
%s_i Physical Seat Share – refers to the percentage of physical 
seats of airline i in a given market 
Ch. 8. / p. 
%a_s Consumer Centric Supply Share – refers to percentage of 
consumer centric capacity of an airline 
Ch. 8 / p. 
qsplit The additional score that an itinerary would gain if the 
journey is split with a connection either at the very early or 
very late stage of travel. 
Ch. 9 / p. 
qconvenience Time Convenience – refers to the time quality of an itinerary 
calculated by summing qdep, qarr and qsplit   
Ch. 9 / p.  
qindex The quality index of an itinerary determined by 1) routing 
type (whether direct or connecting), 2) operation type 
(whether operating or codeshare) and 3) qconvenience 
Ch. 9 / p. 
qindex_normalised The normalised value of qindex with respect to %inconvenient_time Ch. 9 / p. 
qa_index_normalised The final quality score of an itinerary which is calculated by 
adjusting qindex_normalised with respect to competing itineraries’ 
ttotal values 
Ch. 9 / p. 
ms The estimated realistic market share Ch. 9 / p. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
 
“If there is one thing which has defined human nature throughout history it 
is our fidgety, irrepressible impulse to move, to discover and cross new 
frontiers, to adapt to new environments, to appease that same unquenchable 
curiosity which prompted our earliest ancestors to swing down from the 
treetops and start exploring the jungle floor six million years ago.” (Jones 
W. , 2017, p. 1) 
 
The history of transport is closely linked with the history of civilisation. While earlier 
ancestors travelled with the aim of survival, the later descendants’ travel purposes had gone 
beyond physiological needs. Rising sophistication led civilisations to grow and expand, and so 
did the concept of travel as a means to trade and explore.  Travelling contributed to economic 
welfare and created comparative advantages for humankind. Therefore, improvements in 
transportation contributed to the standards of human society which enhanced our ancestors 
from living in tribal classes into collectives referred to as cities or states. Facilitated by transport 
systems, the evolution of major cities and all permanent human settlements can be traced to the 
comparative advantage of places with respect to goods trade (Nolan, 2015). The interaction 
between collectives due to economic, political and cultural needs had been eased through 
transport which gradually formed the basis of today’s modern societies.  
 
Rodrigue et al. (2017) defines the ability to transport people and cargo faster, in high 
volumes over long distances and more conveniently as a very complicated process and relates 
it to the spatial evolution of economic ecosystems and corresponding technological 
developments. He summarises this evolution in four major stages: the pre-industrial era, the 
industrial revolution, Fordism and post-Fordism (globalisation). During the pre-industrial era, 
no forms of motorised vehicles were present; transport technology was limited to harnessing 
animal labour for land transport and wind for maritime transport. The increase in production 
during the industrial revolution made necessary the creation of a well-organised transport 
system. With the adoption of the steam engine in locomotives, transportation became more 
accessible, quicker and cheaper (Manolopoulou, 2017). The industrial revolution was followed 
by the Fordist era, which for Rodrigue et al. (2017) was epitomised by the adoption of the 
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assembly line as the dominant form of industrial production, an innovation that benefited 
transportation substantially. The internal combustion engine made road vehicles operate faster 
and more comfortably. This era has also witnessed the emergence of leisure travel. The new 
middle class, composed of factory owners and managers, now had the time to travel thanks to 
industrialised production with efficient and faster machinery (Byttebier, 2017).  Today, we are 
at the post-Fordism era that is marked and shaped by the drivers of globalisation. In recent 
decades, the rise of globalisation led individuals to go beyond their local ecosystem and to 
become interconnected with the outside world. This escalated the demand for faster and more 
efficient modes of transportation. Today, for many of us, travelling is an indispensable aspect 
of our lives. The mobility provided by transportation is part of our daily routine. To name a 
few, we travel for work, holiday, studies, visiting beloved ones and etc.  
 
The growth of commercial aviation from the mid-20th century was inevitable. In 1956, 
airlines in the United States carried more passengers than railroad; in 1957 more passengers 
travelled across the North Atlantic by air than by boat. A decade later, passenger traffic by boat 
between Europe and North America ceased while air traffic exhibited 6 to 10 per cent growth 
per year (Hirschel, Prem, & Madelung, 2004). Air transport offered flexibility, and it was easier 
to build new airports rather than investing in massive infrastructure for railway tracks (Schmitt 
& Gollnick, 2016).  
 
Over the decades, demand for air travel increased at a higher pace than global GDP 
growth. According to Boston Consulting Group's report (2006), historical growth rates for the 
airline industry indicate that demand for air travel indeed grew at a multiple of GDP rise where 
approximately 1.5 to 2 times per cent GDP growth was common. The demand for air travel has 
risen due to various internal and external factors. Parameters such as population, income, trade 
and consumers’ tastes composed the external influences for the surge in air travel demand. On 
the other hand, industry-specific developments such as the increase in the number of aircraft, 
deregulation and the rise of low-cost carriers have contributed to the induced growth of the 
industry which emerged as a response to carriers’ and governments’ actions. 
 
Today, aviation is a giant industry that is expected to further grow in the coming 
decades. According to Morris (2017), as of 2017, aviation analysts estimate the total number 
of passenger and cargo aircraft in service to be 23,600 while there exist 2,500 more in storage. 
Aviation represents 2.7 trillion US dollars of global economic impact including direct, indirect, 
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induced and tourism catalytic contributions supporting 62.7 million jobs (IATA, 2017). The 
airline industry is more than half the size of the global financial services industry, which 
accounts for 6.2% of GDP. In fact, if air transport were a country, its GDP would rank 21st in 
the world, similar to that of Switzerland or Sweden (Air Transport Action Group, 2016).  
 
As per the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations (UN) 
body, thanks to the democratisation of international air travel, the real cost of flying has fallen 
by 60% over the past 40 years making it more accessible to more people. ICAO also estimates 
that, by 2030, the number of domestic and international passengers will reach 6 billion, 
travelling on approximately 50 million flights. These figures are almost double levels of the 
early 2010s (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2012). The growth in air travel is 
expected to create a significant demand for air vessels too. Boeing, one of the leading aircraft 
manufacturers, estimates a need for over 39,600 aircraft valued at more than 5.9 trillion USD 
over next 20 years (Boeing, 2015). 
 
In the earlier years of aviation, flying was a luxury for travellers and accessible only to 
a small group of wealthy people. The growth and changes in the industry triggered air transport 
to commoditise and reach a broader segment of society. 
 
“Back when airplane travel became mainstream, it was considered a luxury. 
When I first began flying, the experience started when you got to the 
airport. You even ‘dressed up' for the occasion. There was camaraderie 
among passengers because people felt lucky to be able to fly. Over time, 
the industry has eroded into a mode of mass transportation. Now, most 
travellers spend the majority of their time glued to electronic devices or 
counting down the hours and minutes until they reach their final 
destination.” (Goldman, 2012, p. 1) 
 
The flying experience in the mid-20th century was entirely different from today's 
standards. There were no personal TV screens, in-flight entertainment facilities or wifi. For 
Strutner (2014), seats had three to six inches more legroom than they do today – 1950s 
economy class looked more like how business class does today. First class was about as 
spacious as a modern hotel room. Flying was an over-the-top luxury experience. The fare for 
such a luxury service was extremely high inhibiting the broader segment of individuals from 
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flying. In 1934, the privilege of flying a transcontinental flight from Newark, New Jersey to 
Glendale, California was priced at 160 USD. Adjusting this with inflation, a one-way fare on 
a flight making three stops along the way was equivalent to 2,700 USD today (Deia, 2013). An 
average person in the 1950s would pay up to 5% of his yearly salary for a chance to fly from 
Chicago to Phoenix. Thanks to the democratisation of airline industry, this figure has decreased 
to approximately 1% (Brownlee, 2013). Since deregulation, airfares drop steadily and have 
fallen by 50% in the past 30 years (Thomson, 2013). 
 
Today, the air transport product is commoditised and accessible to a higher volume of 
people than in previous years. Between the late 1940s and the early 1970s, it could be said that 
flight was transformed from "a scientific phenomenon to a public utility at the disposal of the 
entire world." (IATA, 2017, p. 1) The total number of passengers utilising air transportation in 
a calendar year is roughly half of the world’s total population size today. Although it may be 
claimed through this statistic that one in two individuals experience the privilege of flying in a 
year, such an argument would be flawed as one person can fly more than once annually. Indeed, 
no world database keeps track of the number of unique individuals travelling by air. Therefore, 
whilst the exact absolute and percentile figures of individuals travelling by air in a year is 
uncertain, it is a fact that today, air transport is accessible to a higher range of individuals than 
in previous decades.  
 
The surge in the demand and availability of air transport is among the principal motives 
contributing to the aviation industry’s commoditisation. The number of actively operating 
carriers has increased significantly. When IATA was founded in Havana, Cuba in 1945, it had 
only 57 member airlines from 31 nations, mostly in Europe and North America. Today it has 
some 275 members from 117 nations in every part of the globe (IATA, 2017). Deregulation is 
one of the principal motives that significantly contributed to the growth of air travel demand. 
For Berghöfer and Lucey (2014), the increased competition is a result of global deregulation 
of the industry that took place in the 1980s. Deregulation encouraged low-cost carriers to 
emerge as a new pattern in the industry. The expansion of low-cost carriers (LCC) subsequently 
facilitated competition in the market and took average ticket fares down deeming air travel to 
be more affordable for an extended segment of people. The US Department of Transportation's 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics compiled the average domestic airfare of US airports from 
1995 to 2015 considering inflation, and it proved that with a few ups and downs, over the last 
20 years the average cost of a flight has generally decreased with regards to purchasing power  
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(Roach & Hoeller, 2015). The expansion of the industry was not limited to the number of 
airlines but also covered average fleet size and the average seat capacity of each aircraft. While 
early aircraft were able to host fewer passengers, today jets can carry vast volumes of travellers. 
For instance, the Airbus A380-800 can accommodate 525 passengers in a three-class 
configuration; this can go up to 853 passengers depending on the seating layout of the jet.   
 
Commoditisation of air transport and the inevitable rise in the supply and demand for 
air travel presented a broader spectrum of product choices for potential travellers. The fierce 
competition between carriers motivated them to differentiate their product to become a choice 
for their target customers. Airline executives spend time in defining key values offered to 
potential travellers to distinguish themselves from competitors. Airlines failing to compete 
effectively were deemed to disappear in the market. Since 1990, 189 airlines have filed for 
bankruptcy in America. Even the flag carriers of some nation states have collapsed (Hirby, 
2016). According to former President of IATA, airlines have only been able to generate 
sufficient revenues and profit to pay their suppliers and service their debt. Maintaining a 
reasonable operating margin, a problem in the commoditisation of airline services and an 
incredibly fragmented industry structure, is key to poor airline profitability (Tyler, 2013). For 
Hanlon (2007, s. 5), "the airline industry may often have achieved high rates of traffic growth, 
but this has not generally been accompanied by high rates of profitability, quite the opposite. 
Airline profit margins have been well below average compared with firms in other industries, 
and in some years there have been some heavy losses indeed”. Therefore airlines set different 
business principles and products to become competitive in the market. For instance, while in 
general terms, LCCs offer basic transportation from origin to destination, full-service carriers 
sell a journey “experience” through their pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight amenities. 
Although LCCs intend to achieve relatively lower operational costs in comparison to full-
service carriers, their expected revenue per passenger is lower.  Therefore, what determines the 
value of an air ticket is nothing more than what the market demands and how the airlines design 
their product in response to this demand in comparison to their rivals.  
 
1.2. Rationale 
 
As a response to intensifying competition, airlines invest in various areas to increase 
the likelihood of becoming a choice for travellers. In broad terms, they invest to categorical 
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factors that are influential in consumers’ travel decisions. The first is the airline’s brand and 
the corresponding value proposition offered to their customers. In this context, most airlines 
continuously invest in their brand and image for being recognised as “the safest”, “the 
cheapest”, “the most punctual”, “best service” or any other slogans that their business 
proposition prescribe. An airline’s brand is an intangible asset that can have a substantial 
impact on profits and consequently market value (Sharma, 2017). The second category is the 
product or experience while taking consumers from origin to destination. Factors such as 
service level onboard, seat comfort, crew hospitality, on-time-performance, in-flight 
entertainment systems, loyalty programs, journey duration, flight connections etc. are all 
components of the product which together form the journey experience. The third category of 
consumer choice is the fare which is ultimately the output of the market dynamics and the first 
two categories of consumer choice, airlines’ brand and product. Especially for the price-
sensitive segment, the comparative advantage in the fare can be the driver of choice. Although 
their weightings may not be equal, all three of these categories are blended in the thought 
process of travellers when making their purchasing decisions. It is possible, in one extreme, for 
a business traveller and a loyal passenger to neglect the fare parameter but rather focus on 
product convenience or their favourite airline’s itinerary; in the other extreme, a student with a 
limited budget may prioritise fare over other factors to meet budget constraints. Therefore, all 
of these parameters are evaluated together according to travellers' circumstances individually 
when making the purchasing decision for their itinerary.  
 
The developments that are primarily triggered by the commoditisation of air travel have 
led to a shift in the business models of the airlines. Full-service carriers have unbundled many 
of their services to improve efficiency while the LCCs have expanded into larger airports, 
offered connections through their introduced hub-and-spoke network structure and hence 
shifted to more direct competition with legacy carriers (Henrickson & Wilson, 2016). In other 
words, the business models of the legacy and the LCCs have converged. The convergence of 
the business models happened in two forms; (1) two initially distinct models evolved into one 
hybrid, i.e. showing features of both initial forms, (2) one business model transformed into the 
other. Such a hybrid model implies that competing airlines target almost the same customer 
segments with more or less the same strategies, structures, and assets. As competition continues 
to intensify, the remaining players compete with equivalent or even almost similar tools and 
armoury portfolios – a typical "Red Ocean" setting. The hybridisation of business models 
implies that airlines now target a broader customer spectrum (Albers S. , 2015). 
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The commoditisation of air transport product and subsequent convergence in business 
models have encouraged airlines to focus more on their core product: simply transporting 
passengers from their origin to destination. For Mason (2008), the schedule is the core element 
of air travel. Although brand and product related parameters as well as fare, have always taken 
a central role in the decision-making process of the consumers and will continue to do so, the 
core product features of air travel have become further apparent in consumer choice. When a 
passenger purchases a flight ticket, which is almost entirely electronic today, what they obtain 
is merely a printout of the core product: the departure and arrival airport, date & time of the 
flight, the aircraft model and the reservation class information. For prospective consumers 
intending to buy a flight ticket, reservation systems and distribution channels display those core 
attributes along with their fares on screen. In other words, airlines put their schedules on the 
shelf, and they mainly sell this "core" attribute of their service. 
 
As the competition between airlines deepened, the core product features of each flight 
alternative have become even more crucial in consumers’ itinerary decisions. There exists 
plenty of parameters that together compose the “schedule attractiveness” of the carriers that 
collectively determine consumers’ level of appreciation towards the itinerary’s core features. 
When making their travel decisions, consumers skim the available flight options serving on the 
same route, and form an initial judgement concerning the schedule convenience of each product 
available in the market. As an example, consumers do not equally welcome a flight operated 
in the middle of the night when compared to another alternative service departing at a more 
convenient time of the day. Besides, most of the time a direct flight is the preferred option 
when compared to a connecting one in which consumers are required to change plane at an 
intermediary airport.  
 
The complete set of scheduled products and timetable with the entire flight destinations 
make up the airlines network structure. The products available for sale “on the shelf” are 
displayed among the network arrangement of the carrier. Therefore, while consumers seek the 
attractiveness of an itinerary’s schedule, airlines intend to maximise the level of their network’s 
attractiveness to become a choice for their customers. On the other hand, the network efficiency 
of the airlines should not only watch for the customer satisfaction but also the commercial 
viability. The airlines would not be able to survive if they do not generate adequate revenues 
through their services.  
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 From the consumers' standpoint, the perceived schedule quality of a particular itinerary 
designates the schedule efficiency of the air transport product. The relative superiority of one 
itinerary over another can be determined by comparing the numerical values of schedule quality 
whose methodology is introduced and elaborated upon in this research. From the airlines' 
standpoint, the set of all available products founded in their timetable embody the network 
structure of the carrier. The methodology offered in this research enables carriers to assess their 
overall "network efficiency". Network efficiency of a carrier is composed of the schedule 
efficiencies of all products that the airline offers. The terms of schedule efficiency and network 
efficiency are used interchangeably throughout the study. 
 
1.3. Aim and Objectives 
 
AIM: TO DEVELOP A PASSENGER CENTRIC METHODOLOGY FOR 
ANALYSING THE SCHEDULE AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE OF AIR 
SERVICES 
  
This research intended to develop a model to examine the performance of the airline 
industry's core product, the schedule, from the consumers’ perspective. It aimed to introduce a 
methodology to assess the efficiency of basic schedule information displayed on air travel 
tickets and analyse its impact on consumers' itinerary decision-making process. 
Comprehending the dynamics of consumers’ judgments concerning schedule quality of the 
competing itineraries was the focal interest of the study. Factors that are influential in 
consumers' decision-making process other than schedule convenience were not included within 
the scope of the research. By eliminating the impact of other parameters, the sole effect of the 
air travel’s core element, the sechedule, was assessed.  
 
OBJECTIVE 1: TO DETERMINE A CONSUMER CENTRIC CAPACITY 
SHARE ESTIMATION MODEL 
 
The research intended to revisit the methodology to compute airline capacity supply in 
a market from a different, consumer-centric, perspective. When discussing capacity, usually 
the physical capacity is referred to. The physical supply of different carriers in the form of 
frequency and available seats serving on the same route is known by employing several data 
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and market intelligence information. As different forms of itineraries emerged that further 
complicated air travel, the determination of physical capacity is no longer a straightforward 
process. Additionally, although there may exist some itineraries on the shelf waiting to be sold, 
they may not be considered as viable capacities for consumers due to some of their comparative 
disadvantages. For this reason, further enhancements were required to adjust the reported 
capacities to both re-calculate the physical capacity and to incorporate passengers’ 
convenience. For instance, although a product offering a connecting time of 20 hours at an 
intermediary airport may theoretically be counted as a valid product, it may not be preferred 
by consumers should other itineraries prove to be a more convenient option. Therefore, a 
redefinition of capacity supply was made as part of this study to incorporate passenger 
preference. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2: TO QUANTIFY AIRLINE SCHEDULE QUALITY 
 
Consumers’ preferences and priorities determine their perception towards the 
attractiveness of the schedules offered. In order to formulate the link between schedule 
convenience and customers’ itinerary choice, the metrics and parameters that shape the quality 
perception need to be addressed. Each factor influencing schedule quality forms an insight 
regarding the “schedule attractiveness" of each product available on the market. Justifying the 
schedule quality of each itinerary with objective and concrete metrics was the second objective 
of this research. For this reason, the influential parameters that form the basis of customers' 
schedule quality judgments were established and tested with their quantitative impacts. 
Therefore, a universal and realistic schedule quality methodology was to be developed for each 
product serving on a route.   
 
OBJECTIVE 3: TO DETERMINE A REALISTIC MARKET SHARE 
ESTIMATION TOOL (REMSET) 
 
Through their business strategies including their network organisation, airlines compete 
to obtain a higher share of the market in which they are present. Market share is an absolute 
indication and output of a company's economic performance and its level of appreciation by 
the consumers. A company's market share performance is related to the various components of 
the firm's strategic profile (Pleshko & Helens, 2002). It is also a key indicator of market 
competitiveness, i.e. how well a firm is doing against its competitors (Farris, Bendle, Pfeifer, 
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& Reibstein, 2010). Vargo and Lusch (2004) urged scholars and practitioners to interpret 
market share as a measure of how well a company has been able to predict market dynamics 
and the needs of the targeted customers. Buzzell and Gale (1987) empirically tested the market 
share – profitability relationship. The study of 57 Fortune 500 companies revealed a definite 
link between ROI and market share. Therefore, this research is dedicated to analysing network 
efficiency and schedule convenience from a consumer-centric perspective by assessing market 
share estimations.  
 
The network efficiency of a carrier could be assessed through its products’ market share 
performance. An objective of this research is to introduce a realistic market share estimation 
tool (abbreviated as REMSET) as an output of schedule convenience and airlines network 
effectiveness. The proposed tool utilises consumer-centric supply/quantity (explained in 
Objective 1) and quality (as explained in Objective 2) to produce the forecasted market shares 
for each carriers’ service in a particular market. Developing a market share estimation 
methodology through consumer-centric “supply” and “quality” is a distinctive contribution of 
this study to academic knowledge.  The validity and credibility of the results of the REMSET 
model were cross-checked and tested using actual market share data of the operating airlines.  
 
OBJECTIVE 4: TO DEVELOP A TOOL FOR INDUSTRY PRACTITIONERS 
TO ASSESS SCHEDULE, NETWORK AND HUB COMPETITIVENESS IN THEIR 
ROUTE AND CAPACITY PLANNING 
 
Comprehending schedule efficiency and realistic market shares offers extensive 
benefits for airline managers.  Executives can use this information to assess the competitiveness 
of their product. Therefore the methodological outputs of this research enable airline managers 
to scale their products better and position themselves among competitors. This process can also 
assist in developing efficient revenue management strategies while determining the right fare 
levels for air services. Using the research’s models, airline executives can analyse the 
efficiency of their network investments. For example, they can measure the marginal market 
share impact of an additional frequency to a destination. Alternatively, they can judge the effect 
of deferring or bringing forward the departure time of a particular flight or signing a codeshare 
deal with another carrier. Besides, industry practitioners can assess the hub performance and 
connecitivity indexes of the airports as a hub from a consumer-centric perspective.  
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1.4. Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This research has brought significant contributions to academic literature. It has 
replaced the obsolete and traditionally used network efficiency performance metrics with a 
contemporary approach incorporating passengers’ perspectives. Quantifying the schedule 
quality of airlines was another significant contribution of this study into the literature. The 
research justifies the abstract phenomenon of good quality in airline schedules and translates 
them into numerical values (Objective 2). Furthermore, it brings a new and consumer-centric 
approach to the capacity determination (Objective 1).  
 
Using quantitative (supply) and qualitative information, the research brings a fresh 
perspective towards airlines’ network efficiency and realistic market share estimation models 
(Objective 3). Blending the consumer-centric supply data with the qualitative metrics has 
produced a consumer-centric market share estimation tool. Therefore, a unique passenger 
perspective has been inserted into the existing market share estimation models that is likely to 
better reflect the market dynamics. In this context, the contribution of the research is not only 
limited to academia but is also highly significant to industry. Since the study offers a distinctive 
tool, the REMSET, for airline executives to benchmark their product and assess their network 
investment analysis (Objective 4), the research outputs (including consumer-centric supply, 
quality and market share estimation for each carrier competing on a particular route) have 
practical implications in compliance with the industry practitioners’ expectations.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
This study used a detailed methodology to determine quantitative schedule quality, 
capacity share and realistic market share estimation. The scope, coverage, and methodology 
introduced throughout the research is global and can be implemented by any airline in any 
region. In other words, the methodology for estimating all airlines realistic market shares, 
quality scores and supply shares is universal and readily applicable to any company. For 
instance, the computation of market share forecasts for all airlines competing on the New York 
– Vancouver route is no different than the procedure for calculating the market shares of 
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carriers operating the Frankfurt – Cairo route. Furthermore, the process for assessing the same 
metrics on a route for Airline A is identical to the method applied to Airline B.  
 
As an initial step, the gaps and weaknesses in the current network efficiency, capacity 
supply and quality determination models presented in the literature were extensively analysed 
to identify areas of improvement.  Proposed enhancements to the currently available models 
were used to develop a consumer-oriented methodology. In this context, it was mandatory to 
understand the values and perceptions of consumers regarding the core attributes of the air 
transport product. Therefore, a passenger survey was utilised to understand the consumers and 
determine how to incorporate their perspectives into the proposed methodologies of this 
research. Before implementing the survey, papers were submitted and presented to the Air 
Transport Research Society (ATRS) 2013 conference held in Italy and ATRS 2014 held in 
France. Through these presentations, valuable feedback was received from the society's 
participants. These presentations and feedback assisted the fine-tuning of the survey design. 
The passenger survey was utilised in 9 different airports to more than a thousand respondents.  
The survey responses were carefully analysed and the research's proposed models were 
finalised using the invaluable information gathered from the survey results. The survey 
methodology and results were presented to the ATRS conferences held in Greece and Belgium 
in 2015 and 2017 respectively. The feedback received from the ATRS society confirmed that 
the study had addressed a substantial gap in the current literature. 
 
Although the research’s proposed methodology is universal and can be applied to any 
carrier in the world, it focused on major airlines in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. This 
funnelling was performed for two reasons. First, limiting the study to major carriers in Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa offered an extensive volume of international origin and destination 
pairs with sufficient number of airlines competing in the route. The volume of international 
traffic is highest in the selected regions. Specifically, North America and Asia report the 
primary volume of domestic traffic. As per IATA figures, the United States domestic market 
holds 14.5% of the world's total capacity share (including international flights) while the same 
figure is 9.1% for China. The capacity share of the Indian domestic market is 1.4% while the 
value is again 1.4% and 1.1% for Russia and Japan respectively (IATA, 2018). Therefore, 
eliminating the Americas and Asia Pacific from the research's focus brought a higher level of 
international perspective to the study. Second, obtaining the current and past schedule 
information of all carriers operating in the world was challenging. After determining the major 
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airlines to be included in the study within Europe, the Middle East and Africa, the schedule 
information of those carriers from 2005 to 2016 was retrieved. The model was applied over the 
schedule data to obtain quality scores, capacity shares and realistic market share estimations 
for each market from 2005 to 2016.   
 
1.6. Excluded Scope 
 
Network efficiency and consumer-centric supply and realistic market share estimation 
is a phenomenon of schedules derived directly from the timetable of carriers. Since charter 
flights are not sold publicly in distribution channels, but only available to a limited number of 
customers, non-scheduled and charter flights were not studied as part of this research. 
Passengers travelling on charter flights have relatively less authority on their itinerary selection 
because their travel agencies or tour operators are the ultimate decision makers for those flights. 
Moreover, charter flights are not listed in publicly available timetables published each season 
enabling individual consumers to know and prefer those flights. Therefore, charter flights could 
not be included to the realistic market share estimation process. On the other hand, even if the 
airline operates a part charter flight, implying that a portion of the available seats is available 
for sale to individual consumers, and the operation is published for sale in the global 
distribution systems, it was still kept outside the scope of the research since the definition of 
scheduled flights enforces the repetitiveness of the services on at least a weekly basis for the 
whole scheduling season. Hence, the criteria for the inclusion to the scope of this research 
required flights to be scheduled services operated and repeated at least weekly for the whole 
scheduling season.  
 
Deviation from the published timetable, in terms of cancellation and flight delays wa 
not included within the scope of this study. On-time performance measures the extent to which 
carriers adhere to their schedules. When making their itinerary decision, passengers cannot 
foresee whether or not their chosen flight is to be delayed. The airlines may hold a reputation 
concerning their on-time-performance, but this would only impact the brand perception of the 
consumer towards the carrier, which also impacts consumer choice. However, the context of 
schedule efficiency and consumer-centric realistic market share applies to airlines’ published 
plans, not to service delivery levels and therefore any deviation from the schedule was excluded 
from the scope of the study.   
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1.7. Research Outline & Structure 
 
This research is divided into 13 distinct chapters. Following this Introduction Chapter, 
fundamental aviation concepts used throughout the study are covered in Chapter 2. Aviation is 
a complex discipline with significant number of terms, abbreviations and terminologies. The 
concepts Chapter assists in clarifying the research's language, especially for those who are less 
familiar with the industry, by elaborating on these terms through specific examples. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 serves as a definitive pre-requisite to comprehend the previous literature as well as 
the research’s aim, objectives, proposed methodologies and key contributions to the 
knowledge. 
 
Following the concepts Chapter, two detailed literature survey chapters are presented 
in order to develop a general understanding of the critical areas of the research. The first 
literature review Chapter (Chapter 3) offers a general outlook to the aviation industry and its 
growth with a focus on the commoditisation process. It discusses the deregulation of the 
industry and its impact on the emergence of new business models as well as introducing airline 
network models and their characteristics. The chapter also explains airline planning cycles in 
detail and addresses how airline networks and schedules are designed. The chapter also takes 
a closer look at airlines' market share estimation models, with a particular focus on Quality of 
Service Index (QSI). This information assists in developing an understanding concerning the 
network features and current market share assessment models. The chapter progresses 
comprehensively and elaborates on the weaknesses of the current market share estimation 
models present in the literature. 
 
The second literature review chapter (Chapter 4) focuses entirely on consumer choice 
in air travel. The literature is scanned to develop an understanding concerning the underlying 
dynamics of travellers' itinerary selection process. Since the research focuses on airline 
networks and schedule attractiveness, consumers’ perception towards airline schedules are the 
focus of this Chapter. The Chapter also addresses theoretical background related to consumer 
choice in air transport in a comprehensive manner to ensure that all relevant aspects of the 
travellers' itinerary decision-making algorithm is encompassed in the research methodologies.    
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 Chapter 5 addresses the data sources that were used throughout the study. The data 
sources are introduced, analysed and discussed in detail within this Chapter. Since the research 
covers major airlines in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, the airlines whose schedule 
information were included in the dataset are clarified in the chapter. In order to elucidate the 
fields and attributes within the data, sample data were selected and introduced within the 
Chapter. In addition, the cross-check mechanisms that were utilised to validate the employed 
data are also covered. Furthermore, the sources of all other primary and secondary data are 
elaborated upon in detail. As the volume of the data that is being dealt with in the research is 
in the scale of millions, a web database environment to perform faster and reliable 
computations was developed which is also described in the chapter.  
 
 Chapter 6 discusses the survey design and implementation processes used throughout 
the study. The chapter covers the survey questions in detail along with the answer options and 
clarifies the implementation strategy. The survey results are thoroughly analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
 The following two Chapters (Chapter 8 and 9) outline the methodology that formulates 
the research outputs, which is among the significant contributions of this study to knowledge. 
The methodology is covered in two major chapters: supply and quality score determination. 
Chapter 8 covers the consumer-focused capacity share calculation model that was customised 
by taking consumer feedback received through the survey responses. This Chapter identifies 
supply determination for whole flight types and routings by also studying specific examples. 
Chapter 9 comprehensively covers the schedule quality determination model. Since the 
determination of quality scores is among the key contributions of this research, the Chapter 
iterates through each step of the process using representative and real examples from the 
airlines schedules. Moreover, the Chapter also details how the capacity shares and quality 
scores are blended to form the REMSET model. The Chapter is followed by a case study 
demonstrating step-by-step market share estimation process using real schedule data.  
 
Chapter 10 discusses results employing the procedures introduced in Chapter 8 and 9 
using real schedule information from 2005 to 2016. The chapter selected a sample of markets 
to further examine how the calculated realistic market share of the competing airlines serving 
in the designated routes was reported. All computations were performed electronically over the 
web environment since all schedule information and methodologies were uploaded onto the 
researchers’ website, www.phdsukru.com. As part of the Chapter, the computed realistic 
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market share estimations are compared with the actual market shares whose data was retrieved 
from alternative resources. The accuracy and credibility of the proposed model is evaluated by 
benchmarking the calculated figures with the actual performances. Moreover, being able to 
assess historical development in the outputs enabled the measurement of return on capacity 
investment in terms of realistic market share. Therefore, the REMSET model offers an 
indispensable tool for airline planners to assess the efficiency of their network investments. 
 
Chapter 11 is a scenario analysis section intending to observe and quantify the impact 
of a marginal change in airline schedule on the calculated supply share, quality scores and the 
subsequent realistic market share forecast. The Chapter elaborates on how airline planners can 
use the introduced methodology for commercial practices while designing their network and 
schedule structure. This Chapter uses the identical markets referred in Chapter 10 and observes 
the deviation with the outputs under different scenarios. For this reason, the results covered in 
Chapter 10 are referred to as the base cases. In addition, the Chapter addresses the economic 
impact of codeshare agreements since the realistic market shares before and after such 
agreements can be assessed.  Therefore the Chapter demonstrates how airline executives can 
utilise the proposed models and methodologies for the commercial benefits of their firms. 
Moreover, Chapter 12 covers a benchmark analysis of the selected hubs by studying the 
research outputs for specific regional markets. Chapter 12 assesses the connection quality and 
connectivity indexes of the selected hub airports by employing the research’s methodologies.  
 
The final Chapter concludes this research. The Chapter suggests how the study has 
contributed to academic knowledge and addresses the limitations of the research. Moreover it 
discusses the fulfilment of the research aim and objectives in addition to identifying and 
recommending further research areas that would complement the study.   
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Chapter 2 – Concepts 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The airline industry is one of the most multinational sectors in the world. It is the motor 
force of the global economy, whose operations go beyond national boundaries. The industry 
receives significant attention from stakeholders and has a central role in ordinary individuals’ 
daily routine as almost anyone has a story about their travel experience. According to the 
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) report (2018), more than 4 billion 
passengers all over the world were carried by airlines in 2017. Such extensive coverage and 
the global nature of the business have led to the production of its own glossary to ease 
communication across the actors of the industry. The sector is full of specific definitions, terms, 
phrases and abbreviations. Although certain terminologies are commonly used within our daily 
language, most of them are technical terms with some being misused and thus requiring 
clarification.  In the course of this research, several additional concepts are also introduced. For 
these reasons, this chapter focuses on explaining the general terminology with detailed 
examples in order to familiarise with the concepts. Starting with the core industry-wide terms 
relating to airline schedules and networks in Section 2.2, supply and time-related concepts are 
explained in Section 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. Moreover, this Chapter also serves as an 
introduction to the literature review as the academic background of many key terminologies 
referred herein is further elaborated upon in the proceeding literature review Chapters.    
2.2. Core Concepts 
 
Each journey initiates with the formation of an itinerary. An itinerary is the travel plan 
including intended destinations and further various information concerning the journey. The 
itinerary is composed of the travel schedule including details of the booking such as date, time 
and route (Staudacher & Freese, 2012). The instructions and policies concerning the 
cancellation or change requests with the bookings may also be included in the itinerary. The 
itineraries are stored in the Passenger Name Record (PNR) which contains information 
provided by travellers during the booking process. PNR data includes the passenger name, 
contact details, itineraries, date of reservation, the form of payment used, the unique identifier 
of the ticketing agent as well as service-specific information (Busser, 2009). The PNR is 
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eventually a database record in the Computer Reservation Systems (CRS), which may consist 
of single or multiple flight legs that start at the origin and terminate at the destination. The 
origin is the place where passengers start their journey, and the destination is the final arrival 
point.   
 
Each itinerary is built through legs or segments referring to a single flight. A leg refers 
to a flight from the origin to the destination (O&D).  Each leg is identified through a flight 
number that is composed of the carriers’ two-letter designation code and a number (Pieraccini 
& Rabiner, 2012). Flight numbers uniquely identify scheduled services on an O&D, and 
therefore identical flight numbers are not utilised by airlines within a day to ensure the flights’ 
distinctiveness. Flight segments on an itinerary indicate the routing of the passengers and can 
be in one of four different forms:  
i) Round-trip refers to journeys travelling back to the origin after the passenger 
spend time at the destination. Round-trip flights encapsulate outbound and 
inbound flights denoting the outward movement from the origin and the 
inward towards the origin respectively (Ali, 2015).  Although there might be 
a stopover or connecting city in between, round-trip journeys involve a single 
O&D where the passengers’ ultimate goal is to reach final destination and 
arrive back to their origination point.  
 
ii) One-way trip does not include a movement from the destination back to the 
origin and thus includes the outbound flight segment only.  
 
iii) Open jaw trip involves three cities with no air travel information in the PNR 
between two of them (Monaghan, 2001). Passengers with an open jaw 
itinerary may have a separate one-way ticket on another PNR between the 
destination of the inbound flight and the origin of the outbound flight. They 
might also have travelled by other modes of transportation (such as bus, train, 
car or ferry) between the points whose routing information is absent on the 
PNR. 
 
iv) Circle flight trip covers itineraries with two or more extended stopovers and 
returning to the originating city (Mancini, 2013). Unlike round-trip journeys, 
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circle flights do not have a single destination. Passengers travel to multiple 
destinations in such itineraries.   
The flights can either be domestic service or international.  International flights are 
those which take off in one country and land at a destination in another country, whereas 
domestic flights are those whereby two destinations within the same country are connected 
(Smith & Stewart, 2014). In international flights, passengers need to go through passport, 
customs and other relevant formalities before boarding the aircraft. 
 
The schedule conveniences are assessed at the O&D level since consumers perform 
schedule related evaluations independently for each segment.  A passenger intending to take a 
round-trip journey may go through different evaluation and justification processes for the 
outbound and inbound segments separately. As each leg’s schedule characteristics can differ 
significantly, consumers make purchase decisions separately and discretely for each segment 
on an itinerary. For instance, the outbound flight of an itinerary may have an appreciable 
departure and arrival time whereas the return journey could be offered at the least preferred 
timezone of the day. To overcome such imbalances in an itinerary, the airlines may offer 
attractive return fares to encourage passengers to make decisions for the entire itinerary, not 
for the individual legs. Through this strategy, the carriers blur the decision making on 
individual segments. Besides, many airlines require a round-trip (or at least an open-jaw trip) 
to access the cheaper fares which typically also has a minimum stay requirement to freeze out 
short duration business passengers. However, with the rise of Online Travel Agencies 
consumers have begun to find attractive one-way fares and make leg-based and directional 
itinerary decisions. By bundling different carriers’ segments into one itinerary for competitive 
fares, online travel agencies like Expedia, Orbitz and etc can offer consumers good prospects 
for finding affordable one-way flights. (Smarter Travel, 2018) Therefore, the schedule 
efficiency evaluations are to be conducted disjointedly at the directional level for the outbound 
and inbound flights. 
 
A flight from origin to destination is called non-stop if the aircraft does not make a 
break in an intermediary city and the passengers are not required to change aircraft at a midway 
airport. For Labrensis (2015), many people assume non-stop and direct flights are 
interchangeable terms, but there exist divergences between the two. A non-stop flight flies from 
one airport to the other without stopping. On the other hand, a direct flight can stop in a city in 
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between the O&D due to commercial and technical reasons, with passengers remaining 
onboard without being required to change aircraft. Technical stops are usually for refuelling 
purpose. Landings for unforeseeable technical incidents, such as engine failure, are unplanned 
occurrences and as a result are not part of airline schedules. On the other hand, if a carrier 
intends to make a stop due to commercial reasons, so long as the flight numbers are unchanged 
and the passengers are not required to leave the aircraft, the itinerary is considered to be a direct 
service.  
 
A connecting flight is a collection of two or more segments with different flight 
numbers from origin to destination. Passengers are typically required to change aircraft at an 
intermediary or hub airport where a vast system of spoke flights are accommodated. For this 
reason, a connecting flight also implies a non-direct service. When passengers with connecting 
itineraries board the aircraft at the origin, they fly to the hub airport first where they take the 
next flight routed to the destination. In domestic hubs, mostly domestic operations are handled 
whereas in international hubs; flights to other countries are performed. The majority of hubs 
handle both domestic and international traffic. The distance traversed through connecting 
flights is generally higher compared to its direct flight alternative. Most of the time, hub 
locations are not located somewhere along the O&D’s direct route. The passenger is thus 
required to travel a greater distance with the connecting flights. In this context, the detour factor 
refers to the ratio between the distances travelled with a connecting flight to its direct substitute. 
Higher detour factor figures represent longer routings and thus greater journey times. If the 
connecting hub is along the direct O&D route, then the detour factor converges to 1. Passengers 
travelling with direct services are classified as direct passengers while those on connecting 
services are named either transit or transfer. A transfer passenger refers to travellers who are 
required to change planes and subsequently flight numbers at the hub airport. Alternatively, 
passengers who are continuing with the same aircraft and flight number from hub to the 
destination are named transit passengers.  
 
Interline flights refer to an agreement between individual airlines to handle passengers 
travelling with itineraries that require multiple airlines (Wald, Fay, & Gleich, 2010). The phrase 
relates to the capability of one carrier to sell a journey, or part of a journey, on the services of 
another carrier, together with the procedures for the settlement of the revenue owed to the 
carrying airline (Szakal, 2013). If the flight is performed with the carrier that the ticket is 
booked from, this is called an online or operating flight. Conversely, a non-operating or 
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codeshare flight refer to a form of interline partnership where a trip is “marketed” by one 
airline, but operated by another (Garrow, 2010). In codeshare flights, the operating carrier 
which physically performing the flight is different from the marketing carrier, the airline with 
which the booking is made. With this method, the marketing carriers are entitled to sell seats 
of the operating carriers' flight by placing its designator and flight number. For Gerlach et al. 
(2013) code sharing enables airlines to jointly market their capacity by assigning their 
designators to a flight, and provides an appropriate framework to build more efficient and 
profitable route networks.   
 
The routing of a flight is either direct or connecting whereas the type of an itinerary is 
either online/operating or codeshare/non-operating. Table 2.1 presents examples from the 
concepts discussed above. 
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Table 2.1: Examples of Round-trip, One-way, Open-jaw and Circle Flights with Further Conceptual Clarifications. 
Case Remarks 
Itinerary 1: Mr John Wood is scheduled to fly from Hamburg to Munich on 17 
September 2016 and back from Munich to Hamburg the next day.  
A round-trip, non-stop, direct domestic flight with two 
legs/segments. 
Itinerary 2: Miss Elena Baker is scheduled to fly Rome to New York via Heathrow with 
no aircraft change on 12 January to enrol at her university with no return flight booked. 
A one-way, direct international flight. 
Itinerary 3: Ms Susan Hector books from Airline X but travels with Airline Y. The first 
leg is from Dubai to Brussels. The second leg is from Amsterdam to Dubai. 
An open-jaw interline flight. Itinerary contains three cities 
with no travel info between Brussels and Amsterdam. 
Itinerary 4: Mr Adam Baker flies from Tokyo to Osaka on 19 April and Osaka to 
Beijing on 21 April and back from Beijing to Tokyo on 23 April.  
A circle flight itinerary with three segments.  
PNR : 
 
Mr David Johnson, phone 212 7235599 
XY 123 / C cabin from Bangkok to Hong Kong on 23 May 2014 departing at 15:05 pm 
XY 55 / C cabin from Honk Kong to Osaka on 23 May 2014 departing at 22:45 pm 
AB 78 / Y cabin from Osaka to Hong Kong on 28 May 2014 departing at 03:15 am 
AB 713 / Y cabin from Hong Kong to Bangkok on 28 May 2014 departing at 11:40 am 
 
Booked through Agency A on 18 May 2014, paid cash. 
 
A round-trip connecting flight with following details. 
Passenger Name: Mr David Johnson 
Passenger Contact Number: 212 7235599 
Origin: Bangkok 
Destination: Osaka 
Number of legs/segments: 4 
Number of airlines in the PNR: 2 (XY and AB) 
Outbound journey: Bangkok to Osaka via Hong Kong 
Outbound cabin: C referring to business class 
Inbound journey: Osaka to Bangkok via Hong Kong 
Inbound cabin: Y referring to economy class 
Inbound departure: 23 May 2014 at 15:05 pm 
Outbound departure: 28 May 2014 03:15 am 
Booked on: 18 May 2014 
Booked via: Travel Agency A 
Mode of payment: Cash 
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2.3. Supply Related Concepts 
 
 Matching the demand and the supply is a critical success criterion for the airline 
industry. Carriers seek to set the optimum capacity in order to meet demand effectively through 
capacity planning processes which involve the determination of frequency and available seats 
for each O&D pair. In this context, flight frequency (f) is one of the essential elements that 
affect airline demand (Du, 2008). It refers to the number of flights operated by a carrier on an 
O&D. Weekly frequency is the common phrase within the industry while stating the number 
of services offered by the carriers. An airline seat is a seat on an aircraft in which passengers 
are accommodated for the duration of their journey. Available seat (s) on the other hand refers 
to the total number of physical seats supplied on an O&D through these frequencies. Frequency 
and seat numbers together form the carriers’ capacity or the supply from origin to destination.  
 
The number of physical seats may differ depending on the aircraft type. In economic 
terms, the installed capacity for each frequency is referred to as the available capacity per 
frequency (sf) (Petrick-Felber, 2014). The number of seats available on an aircraft is a factor 
influencing the total capacity supply in a market. As the size of an aircraft increase, the number 
of available seats for sale rises too. The number of weekly available seats for a certain O&D 
can be denoted as follows: 
𝑠𝑜&𝑑 = 𝑓𝑜&𝑑. 𝑠𝑓(𝑜&𝑑) 
 
Where fo&d and so&d denote the weekly frequency and seat per frequency respectively. The 
calculation of f and s for direct flights is straightforward and can be determined directly from 
the timetable, given the aircraft’s seat capacity. However, the capacity determination for 
connecting flights is tricky as the full capacity of neither leg is completely allocated for a 
specific O&D.  
 
Let’s assume a connecting journey from Dubai to London via Amsterdam.  In case, 
both segments of the itinerary (Dubai-Amsterdam and Amsterdam-London) are performed 
with 150-seat aircraft and the entire capacity of each leg is allocated to passengers travelling 
from Dubai to London, s for the Dubai-London market would be equal to 150. However, this 
would not be a realistic assumption, as the aircraft includes direct travelling passengers in 
addition to other passengers connecting to/from various destinations. The Dubai-Amsterdam 
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flight may include travellers flying to Amsterdam whereas it may also include passengers 
connecting to other destinations such as Paris. Additionally, the Amsterdam-London flight may 
host passengers travelling directly to London or connecting elsewhere. Therefore, the 
frequency and seat supply calculation for connecting flights, which is covered in Chapter 8, is 
not a straight-forward process. However, in this Chapter a coefficient named connecting seat 
factor, symbolised with sconn, is introduced. sconn is a value between 0 and 1, denoting the 
maximum percentage of capacity that could be allocated for a connecting destination. In case 
sconn is 0, it is implied that no seats are allocated for connecting passengers on a flight. On the 
other extreme if it is 1, the full capacity of the aircraft is allotted to connecting travellers.  
 
sconn can be defined globally for all O&Ds or determined individually for each market 
pair, and each airline j denoted as sconn-odj. A global value of sconn assumes that each flight can 
host the same maximum percentage capacity for connecting passengers all over the world. On 
the other hand, sconn-odj implies a customisation for the maximum connecting capacity 
percentage for each market and airline combination. As there exists no definitive capacity 
allocation for each market, the calculation of sconn-odj would be a weak estimate as each airline 
may have differing strategies for each route while determining the maximum share of 
connecting passengers on a flight. Moreover, an airline’s capacity allocation strategy is not a 
publicly available information. Hence, any effort to compute sconn-odj would require enormous 
effort, as there exists vast number of O&D pairs and airlines operating in these routes. Although 
airlines can set different values on different segments according to their network optimisation 
algorithms and methods such as mixed-integral linear programming, stochastic simulations or 
neural networks could be deployed, a single sconn value is used as part of this research’s 
REMSET model as the study intends to develop a global methodology for capacity shares 
(Objective 1). Moreover, setting different sconn values for different airlines and markets would 
bias the research outputs depending on the selected sconn_odj value. For this reason, this research 
avoids sconn-odj and utilises a globally defined sconn value. In the above-mentioned Dubai-London 
case, if sconn is set to 10%, the capacity between Dubai to London via Amsterdam would be 15 
seats for connecting passengers.  
 
Codeshare agreements are another business strategy used by airline planners to extend 
their network and widen their product portfolio. Marketing airlines contract with operating 
carriers to secure seats on their flights and increase their products available for sale “on-the-
shelf”. The information concerning the existence of codeshare agreements between the airlines 
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is known as they are readily observed in CRS systems. However, there exists no publicly 
available database disclosing the details of those bilateral codeshare agreements. Hence, the 
total number of available seats offered by the operating carrier to the marketing airlines’ 
designation is unknown to third parties. However, there exists credible insight and market 
intelligence concerning the assigned percentage of the aircraft’s seat capacity that is open for 
sale by other carriers. Therefore, the codeshare seat factor denoted by scode is introduced to 
refer the maximum percentage available for sale to other carriers. If a codeshare agreement 
exists between two carriers, the value of scode becomes greater than zero and smaller than 1. 
The higher value of scode implies greater assigned capacity for the marketing airline. Therefore, 
total available seats for a codeshare carrier at an O&D become 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑥 𝑠𝑂&𝐷. Similar to sconn, 
scode can be defined at the individual level for each O&D pair for all airlines. However, this 
would be impractical as there are no publicly available details of codeshare contracts enabling 
access to information at the O&D scale. Furthermore, it would be extremely complex to employ 
such an approach considering the existence of hundreds of thousands of O&D pairs. Therefore, 
via scode, a global metric is used throughout the research illustrating the average available 
capacity percentage on all operating flights. This percentage could be corroborated and justified 
by market insight and intelligence. Furthermore, an operating flight can be contracted with 
multiple marketing carriers. In such cases, each marketing partner is assumed to access 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑥 𝑠𝑂&𝐷 seats from the operating carriers’ inventory.  
 
Vast benefits of codeshare agreements have facilitated further growth of interline 
settlements among carriers. According to Uradnik (2011), codeshare flights now account for 
more than half of daily departures from the United States. The expansion of commercial 
cooperation through codeshare contracts has aided manifold forms of collaboration among 
carriers to arise. For instance, under a hard-block space codeshare agreement, a pre-specified 
space is purchased by the marketing airline whereby the carrier purchases and pays for a fixed 
amount of seats on the operating partners’ aircraft irrespective of whether the capacity is sold 
or not. In a soft-block space agreement scheme, the marketing carrier only pays for the seat 
sold on the operating flight (Iatrou & Oretti, 2016). In case an (operating) airline engages into 
a hard-block space agreement for a specific flight, the physical number of seats available for 
sale for this flight reduces to (1 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒). 𝑠𝑓 assuming only one codeshare partner exist for the 
partnered flight. Conversely, in a soft block space arrangement scheme, since the operating 
carrier is unsure about the final sales figure of the marketing airline, they can disclose more 
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than (1 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒). 𝑠𝑓 seat inventory on the CRS systems. Therefore, the sum of seats available 
for sale by the marketing and the operating carriers may exceed the actual physical capacity of 
the operated aircraft. Besides, the operating carrier may sign codeshare agreements with more 
than one partner and enable each marketing carrier to sell 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 . 𝑠𝑓 spaces which raise the total 
seats on the shelf more than the physical capacity of the flight. As there exists no public 
information concerning the seat allocation details of the codeshare arrangements, this research 
assumes the cooperation in soft-block space format where the presence of the codeshare 
contract does not limit the maximum number of seats available for sale for the operating carrier.   
 
2.4. Time-Related Concepts 
 
 As per IATA statistics (2018), on average more than 8 million passengers travel each 
day on over 100 thousand flights. These figures are enormous so extensive organisation and 
planning is a prerequisite for achieving a coordinated and well-organised industry. Airlines 
operate their flights on pre-defined timetables and schedules. For Yu (2012), a flight schedule 
defines a feasible plan of what cities to fly to and at what times. Airline scheduling encapsulates 
a high volume of industry-specific time-related terminology which is elaborated in section 
2.4.1. As Objective 2 of this research concerns quantifing the schedule convenience and 
itinerary quality that is to be utilised as an input to the REMSET, further time-related concepts 
which are specific to this research are introduced in Section 2.4.2.   
 
 2.4.1. General Schedule Related Concepts 
 
Airlines base their business planning processes upon their schedules. Scheduling is the 
task of generating a timetable that achieves the most effective utilisation of airline resources. 
Scheduled flights are operated regularly and planned well in advance to address the existing 
demand on an O&D. On the other hand, charter flights are planned for specific demand that is 
out of scheduled flights’ scope. Usually, timetables for scheduled flights are prepared twice a 
year in summer and winter term, with airlines adhering to these pre-fixed timetables with 
minimal alterations.  
 
 As explained in Chapter 1, since the schedule convenience refers to carriers’ timetable 
attractiveness from the consumer perspective, charter flights are excluded from the research’s 
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scope as the concept only applies to journeys operating over a pre-planned timetable. The basic 
time-related attributes of an itinerary derived straight from the airline schedules are introduced 
below:  
• Total Journey Time (ttotal) is the total travel time elapsed between the departure from 
the origin and arrival at the destination. This parameter includes any time spent at 
the intermediary points or hub airports, if any.  
 
• Total Flight Time (tflight) is the total time spent on the flight. This parameter excludes 
the connecting time at the hub airport and includes the off-block, pushback and taxi 
time of the aircraft.  
 
• Connecting Time (tconn) refers to the total time spent at the hub airports for 
connecting itineraries. tconn is zero for direct flights. Thus, the equation for total 
journey time is ttotal = tflight + tconn for connecting services whereas it is ttotal = tflight for 
direct and non-stop itineraries.   
For Tu (2007), departure time on the timetable is the estimated push back time of the 
aircraft from the gate at the origin airport whereas the arrival time is the scheduled time to 
arrive at the gate at the destination airport. For direct flights, ttotal is merely the elapsed time 
between passenger’s departure time at the origin and arrival time at the destination. For 
connecting flights, tconn is the elapsed time between the arrival time of the first flight to the hub 
airport and departure time of the second flight from the hub airport to the destination. It should 
be noted that changes in connection times are typically off-set by changes in fare to balance 
the demand. For instance, passengers opting to make a rather longer connection through a hub 
onto a less congested, later flight to the same destination with the same carrier will typically be 
offered a significantly lower total fare to do so. 
 
Each airport authority enforces a minimum time, which is called the minimum 
connection time (MCT), to enable flight connections. MCT is pre-determined by the airport 
management and compiled by airlines to ensure a feasible flight connection. For Wu (2016), 
the time required to process connecting passengers and baggage at an airport determines the 
MCT of an airline at the airport, which in turn influences the available connections between 
the inbound and the outbound flights at hub airports. Therefore, for a connection to occur, tconn 
must be higher than the MCT. The MCTs set by the airport management have a direct impact 
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on passenger convenience as a rushed MCT might put pressure on passengers to catch the 
connecting flight while a relaxed MCT could unnecessarily extend the tconn and subsequently 
the ttotal. Moreover, passengers looking forward to enjoying airport amenities might appreciate 
longer MCT durations. Despite these facts, for Graham (2003) most of the time airports still 
tend to offer one overall product, which has to appeal to a very heterogeneous collection of 
passengers. In this context, MCTs set by airport authorities are one-for-all parameters 
determining journey convenience of connecting passengers. 
 
Having ttotal, tflight and tconn at hand, an indicator named flight time ratio (%tf) is 
introduced to reveal the flight time ratio of a journey. The %tf equals to 1 for direct flights. For 
connecting services, the figure is less than one, and it descends as tconn extends. On the contrary, 
connect time ratio (%tc) is the share of connecting time among ttotal which is 0 for direct flights. 
By definition, %tf and %tc together add up to 1. In the examples below (Table 2.2), time-related 
attributes of two competing itineraries from Dubai to Heathrow for British Airways (BA) and 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) are contrasted. The schedule information is obtained directly 
from the 2016 summer schedule of the carriers.   
 
Table 2.2: Example of tflight, tconn, ttotal, %%tf, and %tc for BA and KL Flights. 
BA106 – direct flight, departing 01:35 UAE local 
time, arriving 06:15 UK local time. 
 
tflight = 7 hours 40 minutes 
tconn  = 0 minute 
ttotal = 7 hours 40 minutes 
%tf = 1 and %tc  = 0 
 
 
KL428 from Dubai to Amsterdam, departing 00:50 
local UAE time, arriving 06:00 Netherlands local time 
connected to KL1001 from Amsterdam to London, 
departing 07:20 Netherlands local time and arriving in 
London at 07:40 UK local time. 
 
tflight = 8 hours 30 minutes 
       1st leg is 7 hours and 10 minutes 
       2nd leg is 1 hour and 20 minutes 
tconn  = 1 hour and 20 minutes 
ttotal = 9 hours 50 minutes 
%tf = 0,864 and %tc  = 0,136 
  
The BA flight offers a shorter ttotal as the carrier performs a direct non-stop service. A 
passenger choosing the KL itinerary completes the journey in 9 hours and 50 minutes where 
80 minutes of this duration is planned to be spent at the Amsterdam airport.  
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For a particular flight leg, the duration between the scheduled departure and arrival time 
is known as the block time. Any deviation from the scheduled time and actual time results with 
delay. For Cook (2007), an airline’s planned departure time can be different from the schedule, 
namely having a different estimated off-block time. Thus he distinguishes between delay 
relative to the flight plan and delay relative to the schedule. Moreover, delay in departure time 
does not have to be identical with the delay in arrival time. Airlines can either close or extend 
the total delay time depending on performance through taxi times or during the flight. 
According to the Transportation Research Board (2014), airlines may add minutes to their 
block time schedules to accommodate for actual historical times, which include some delay 
resulting from flight restrictions, congestion and a variety of other factors. Therefore, different 
airlines can determine varying block times for the same O&D pair as shown in the example 
below (Table 2.3) for the same Dubai–Heathrow route obtained directly from the airline 2016 
summer schedules.  
Table 2.3: Example of tflight, tconn, ttotal, %tf, and %tc  for BA and Emirates (EK) Flights.  
BA106 – direct flight, departing 01:35 UAE local time, 
arriving 06:15 UK local time. 
tflight = 7 hours 40 minutes 
tconn  = 0 minute 
ttotal = 7 hours 40 minutes 
%tf = 1 and %tc  = 0 
 
EK5 – direct flight, departing 15:45 UAE local time, 
arriving 20:15 UK local time. 
tflight = 7 hours 30 minutes 
tconn  = 0 minute 
ttotal = 7 hours 30 minutes 
%tf = 1 and %tc  = 0 
 
Although, both BA106 and EK5 fly the same route directly and without making any 
stops at an intermediary point, due to the more extended block time set, British Airways' total 
journey time exceeds Emirates' by 10 minutes. Therefore, even if rival carriers fly the same 
routes, their total journey time proposition may differ depending on their scheduling. 
 
Any delay could extend the ttotal which could affect travellers’ journey experience 
negatively. However, such a delay would most probably be unforeseeable in advance and 
therefore cannot be studied as part of the airline schedule convenience. Carriers’ adherence to 
their timetables indicates how well they deliver the service promised. Although this is a crucial 
factor of airline choice, it is beyond the scope of the research. During their decision-making 
process, passengers evaluate alternative competing products “on-the-shelf”, by judging the 
attractiveness of their planned schedules. At the moment of booking, travellers are less likely 
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to predict if any delay with their flights will happen. Although passengers may have perceptions 
regarding the airline’s reputation for on-time performance, this should be evaluated under the 
airline’s brand attractiveness, which is again out of the scope for this research. If any historical 
divergence from the schedule and frequent delays are reflected to the block times in the 
schedule, this does fall within the scope of the research as it would be reflected in the airline 
timetable. 
 
2.4.2. Research Specific Time-Related Concepts 
The previous section addressed the traditional time-related concepts used in the industry 
which are generic and have a straightforward computation methodology. This section 
introduces additional time-related terminology affecting the schedule convenience. These 
concepts relate to network attractiveness and their role in the REMSET model are elaborated 
in the following Chapters.  
 
ttotal, tflight and tconn are objective quantitative measures determined strictly by the airline 
timetables. However, the perceived quality of a particular flight concerning the departure and 
arrival time is subjective and can change from one passenger to another. Travellers may depict 
varying degrees of preference for different time zones of the day. The study of Forister (2009) 
finds that there exists significant variation in the desirability of departure times across the day 
and that consumers have strong but statistically insignificant preferences departing closer to 
their desired departure time. Therefore the following attributes are introduced to illustrate the 
attractiveness of the departure and arrival time of an itinerary. 
 
• Departure Time Quality (qdep): The perceived attractiveness of the departure time 
from the origin of a given itinerary.  
 
• Arrival Time Quality (qarr): The perceived attractiveness of the arrival time to the 
destination of a given itinerary.  
qdep and qarr are subjective factors and their influence on consumer choice are tested 
through the passenger survey. Another subjective time-related concept of a connecting itinerary 
is the maximum connection time (MaxCT). MaxCT specifies the maximum time a passenger is 
willing to wait for the connecting flight (Groesche, 2009). Not all connections meeting the 
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MCT criterion are attractive for travellers. Transfer passengers may not appreciate longer 
waiting times at the hub airports. While the MCT defines the lower limit of generating a 
successful connection at the airport hub, MaxCT sets the upper bound. Thus, in order to attain 
a successful connection, 𝑀𝐶𝑇 ≤  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 must be satisfied. Unlike the MCTs, the 
MaxCT value of a hub airport is not a pre-defined value but depends on consumer’s individuaş 
tolerance, deeming it to be a subjective factor. Therefore, while airport authorities determine 
the MCT, passengers define their acceptable MaxCT in their thought process. Although some 
airport authorities may be subject to regulations setting the upper limit for tconn, they would not 
be in favour of such an approach, as it would limit their passenger flow and hence revenues. 
The passenger survey intended to assess the MaxCT tolerance of the consumers. 
 
Although a connection is technically viable as long as the tconn is greater than or equal 
to the MCT and smaller than or equal to the MaxCT, the passengers’ appreciation for 
connections may vary depending on the length of tconn. A connection may be stressful if the 
tconn is very close to the MCT. Although such an itinerary would meet the airport’s MCT 
criterion, it might not be found attractive by passengers as any delays with the incoming flight 
or any complication or inconvenience experienced at the connecting airport would increase the 
risk of missing the second flight.  In this context, a surplus time can be formulated as follows: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝑀𝐶𝑇 
 
Since tconn cannot be smaller than the MCT, the MCT surplus is always greater than or 
equal to zero. For Ziller (2008), journeys with limited connection times can leave passengers 
scrambling to secure a seat on a later flight, appreciating the existence of a non-zero MCT 
surplus. For this reason, it is assumed that passengers may prefer a buffer time (tbuffer) on top of 
the MCT to relax their journey at the intermediary airport. This assumption was tested with the 
passenger survey. If the tconn is less than the MCT plus tbuffer, the journey is deemed to be 
stressful. For direct flights, the stress time (tstress) is assumed to be zero, as the passengers do 
not experience any visit to an intermediary airport. For the connecting flight, the tstress is 
calculated to be the difference of tconn and (MCT +  tbuffer), formulated as follows: 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 ≥ (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟)
[𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛] 𝑂𝑅 [𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 − 𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠], 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 < (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟) 
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By definition, the minimum value of tstress can be 0, implying that the passengers would 
experience a hassle-free trip, whereas the maximum value of the parameter can be equal to 
tbuffer, inferring a complete lack of buffer time in case no MCT surplus time exists.  
 
On the other hand, overextending tbuffer might lead to wasted time (twaste) to occur. The 
excess tconn value may leave more than adequate time to catch the connecting flight and even 
enjoy the amenities of the hub airport. For direct flights, wasted time is zero, as passengers do 
not travel through any hub airport. For connecting itineraries, any tconn that is more than the 
MCT plus buffer time is deemed to be “wasted” and can be formulated as follows:  
𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
= {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 ≤ (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟)
[𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 − (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟)] 𝑂𝑅 [𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 > (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟) 
 
 
By definition, if tconn is not equal to the sum of the MCT and buffer time demanded by 
passengers, then passengers would experience either a tstress or twaste. If the tstress of a journey is 
a non-zero value, then the twaste equals zero. Conversely, in case a journey includes a wasted 
time, then it lacks stress time.  The minimum numerical value of twaste is 0, referring to a tight 
journey, where its maximum value can be (MaxCT - tbuffer). Therefore, it is inferred that the 
tstress and twaste are mutually exclusive concepts. An itinerary’s connection time is either stressful 
or wasted depending on tconn, excluding the rare perfect case in which 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 𝑀𝐶𝑇 +  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟. 
In the perfect case, both tstress and twaste are minimised to 0 since the value MCT surplus equals 
to tbuffer. The relational table in this context is summarised as follows: 
 
Table 2.4: Perfect, Stress and Waste Cases Along with Their tstress and twaste Values. 
Case tstress twaste 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 𝑀𝐶𝑇 +  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 → Perfect case 
𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 
0 0 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 < 𝑀𝐶𝑇 +  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 → Stress case 
𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 <  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 
(𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟)
− 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 
0 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 > 𝑀𝐶𝑇 +  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 → Waste case 
𝑀𝐶𝑇 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 >  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 
0 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛 − (𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟) 
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Both stress time and wasted time are anticipated to be negative experiences for 
passengers. They together form the unappreciated duration of the journey defined as the total 
inconvenient time (tinconvenient), which is equal either to tstress or twaste. 
 
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = {
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 > 0
𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 > 0 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 =  0 
 
 
 
It is noteworthy to restate that for direct services, tinconvenient  equals to zero as both tstress 
and twaste parameters are not applicable for such flights. Moreover, tinconvenient also equals to zero 
for the perfect case for the connecting itineraries. The existence of tinconvenient in an itinerary has 
a negative impact on consumer convenience, implying that journeys with higher tinconvenient lead 
to consumer dissatisfaction. Thus, it is possible to introduce a parameter called inconvenient 
time percentage (%inconvenient_time) assessing the share of inconvenient time within the total 
journey time, formulated as follows: 
%𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
⁄   
 
The concepts of tstress, twaste and subsequently %inconvenient_time can also be reformulated in 
terms of utility. In case the utility graph is plotted with respect to the MCT Surplus, the shape 
of the curve would be non-linear as for instance the negative utility of a tight connection (a 
positive tstress equal to x) especially for onward long-haul connections is far less convenient 
than a positive twaste which is equal to x. As per the Prospect Theory, individuals tend to be risk 
averse in a domain of gains and “losing hurts more than a comparable gain pleases” 
(McDermott, 2001), the losses or the penalty sourced due to a potential misconnection would 
infer a relative loss inversion, providing evidence for the asymmetry of such utility curve. 
Therefore depending on the specific circumstances of the passengers, the utility curve’s shape 
can be changed. Although, the effect of tstress and twaste on consumer utility may change from 
one passenger to another and the demand for tbuffer may vary depending on the specific 
conditions of the traveller (like a passenger connecting to long haul onward flight may demand 
for a higher tbuffer in comparison to another traveller connecting to a short-haul flight) it is 
expected that, tinconvenient which is either sourced from a non-negative tstress or twaste has a negative 
effect on passengers’ utility.  
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To maximise their utility and to experience a comfortable journey, consumers seek to 
minimise %inconvenient_time. They may not compute this parameter while choosing their flights; 
however they do conduct a justification in broader terms while booking their itinerary. 
Inconvenient time percentage and flight time ratio is inversely correlated. As %tf increases 
among competing itineraries, MCT surplus and thus %inconvenient_time are minimised. Also, as %tc 
escalates %inconvenient_time increases too if tconn is greater than the tbuffer. In case tconn is between 
MCT and 𝑀𝐶𝑇 +  𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟, %inconvenient_time decreases despite the surge in %tc as both tstress and 
twaste decrease in that band. 
 
In the table below (Table 2.5), three connecting flight cases are introduced with an in-
depth analysis of the above-mentioned time-related parameters.   
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Table 2.5: tstress, twaste, Tinconvenient, %bad time for Different Flight Cases under Following Assumptions: tbuffer = 30 minutes, MaxCT = 300 Minutes 
(5 Hours). Under These Assumptions, tstress can have Any Value Between 0 to 30 Minutes, while twaste can be between 0 to 270 Minutes.  
Case Remarks 
Direct Flights tstress = 0, twaste = 0, tinconvenient = 0, %inconvenient_time = 0% 
KL428 from Dubai to Amsterdam, departing 00:50 local UAE time, arriving 06:00 
Netherlands local time connected to KL1001 from Amsterdam to London, departing 
07:20 Netherlands local time and arriving to London at 07:40, UK local time. 
tconn  = 80 minutes 
MCT for Amsterdam Schiphol Airport = 50 minutes 
MCT surplus = 30 minutes 
 
MCT surplus = tbuffer → Perfect connection case 
tstress = 0, twaste = 0, tinconvenient = 0 
ttotal = 9 hours 50 minutes and %inconvenient_time = 0% 
LH631 from Dubai to Frankfurt, departing 01:00 local UAE time, arriving 06:00 
Germany local time connected to LH924 from Frankfurt to London, departing 07:00 
Germany local time and arriving to London at 07:40, UK local time. 
tconn  = 60 minutes 
MCT for Frankfurt Airport = 45 minutes 
MCT surplus = 15 minutes 
 
MCT surplus < tbuffer → Stress case 
tstress = 30 – 15 = 15 minutes,  
twaste = 0, tinconvenient = 15 minutes 
ttotal = 9 hours 40 minutes (580 minutes)  
%inconvenient_time = 15 / 580 = 2.58% 
QR1003 from Dubai to Doha, departing 05:30 local UAE time, arriving 05:40 Qatar 
local time connected to QR3 from Doha to London, departing 07:55 Qatar local time 
and arriving to London at 13:15, UK local time. 
tconn = 2 hours and 15 minutes = 135 minutes 
MCT for Doha Airport = 45 minutes 
MCT surplus = 90 minutes 
 
MCT surplus > tbuffer → Waste case 
tstress = 0, twaste = 90 – 30 = 60 minutes, tinconvenient = 60 min 
ttotal = 10 hours 45 minutes (645 minutes)  
%inconvenient_time = 60 / 645 = 9.3% 
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For connecting flights, the instance when the journey is interrupted with the connection 
for the next flight is a critical convenience factor. For instance, for two competing connecting 
itineraries with the same flight time of 10 hours, the passengers may have a preference for the 
option taking 9 hours in the first leg and 1 hour for the second over an alternative with 5 hours 
of flight time on both legs. If the flight is disrupted either at the very early or at the very late 
phases of the journey, this could be a more convenient choice over other alternatives enabling 
a relaxed time to sleep, watch a movie onboard or work. Therefore, a parameter named flight 
time split ratio (fsplit) is introduced. fsplit can be calculated by dividing the duration of the longer 
flight leg to the shorter one. In case, the flight is equally split between legs, fsplit equals to 1. 
 
This chapter has addressed the fundamental concepts of airline schedules and research 
specific terminology concerning the supply and time-related concepts. Parameters such as 
tbuffer, tstress, twaste, tinconvenient, %inconvenient_time, fsplit are unique time-related concepts introduced in 
this research. The impact of these parameters on consumer choice was assessed in the passenger 
survey, and was used for determining the schedule quality of competing airlines’ itineraries in 
order to fulfil Objective 2. Additionally, sconn and scode are supply related factors unique to this 
study and function as prerequisites in determining the consumer-centric supply of the 
competing airlines to attain Objective 1. From this perspective, the concepts introduced in this 
Chapter are vital ingredients of the REMSET. This Chapter also served as an introduction to 
the literature review which is covered in the proceeding Chapters.   
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Chapter 3: Literature Review – Overview of the Airline Industry, Business 
Models, Network Types and Planning Processes 
 
“Airlines spell glamour, high profits and big business. Television viewers watch airline 
programmes spellbound. The charismatic heads of certain airlines are known to everyone. But 
few know the real story” quotes Rigas Doganis in his book The Airline Business in the 21st 
Century (2001, s. foreword). Indeed the airline industry generates an enormous volume of 
revenue but only limited profitability. As per IATA figures (2018), in 2017 the global revenue 
of the industry was calculated to be 754 billion USD of which only 34.5 billion USD was 
estimated to be the sum of global net profit of airlines, contributing only to 4.6% net margin. 
Hitt et al. (2007) note if all of the profits and losses ever reported by all publicly traded 
passenger airline companies in the United States were summed up, the total would be negative. 
Since the industry generates smaller profit margins, every fine detail needs to be carefully 
planned and organised by the airline decision makers. For this reason, understanding the 
academic theory and applications relating to the airline industry can be a critical factor of 
success for carriers. The industry offers extensive areas of academic research enabling 
academics to develop the sector with their invaluable contribution. 
 
As this research aimed to develop a methodology analysing the schedule and network 
performance of air services from a consumer-centric perspective, reviewing previous academic 
knowledge was essential to develop an understanding concerning the dynamics of the airline 
industry.  For this reason, this Chapter undertakes an in-depth literature review regarding the 
general framework of the research’s focus areas involving airline schedules, networks and 
planning processes. At the same time, this Chapter also concentrates on the current market 
performance estimation models available in academia and identifies the gaps that are intended 
to be filled by this research.  
 
The Chapter is structured into five sections. The first section analyses the airline 
industry in general by discussing the developments in recent history and develops an 
understanding of today’s business environment. In the second section, different airline business 
models are discussed and benchmarked. The third section investigates airlines network types 
available in the academic literature and introduces several approaches to assess network 
performance of the carriers. The fourth section reviews the literature on airline planning 
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processes in detail, with each of the sub-planning phases. In the final section, current literature 
regarding the airline market performance evaluation and quality service is covered.  
 
3.1: Overview of the Airline Industry 
 
Access to air transportation has boomed over the years. As a result of globalisation, 
macroeconomic developments, increases in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), intensifying 
competition, deregulation and rising degrees of people and business mobility, the demand for 
air travel has soared substantially. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, the number of air travellers has 
increased from 310 million in 1970 to almost 4 billion in 2017.  
 
Figure 3.1: Number of Air Travellers since 1970. Source: Derived from World Bank Data.
 
The industry has seen a compounded annual average growth rate (CAGR) of 4.8% from 
1980 to 1999.  At the beginning of 2000s, the aviation sector marked stagnation for growth due 
to the economic slowdown as well as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The SARS 
virus in 2003 exacerbated the situation, leading the industry to face the most difficult times in 
its history (Cento, 2009). Since 2004, the industry recovered and even accelerated with a 5.7% 
CAGR, with the only exception in 2009 due to the financial recession. Historically the growth 
of aviation has continued despite rising oil prices. Although jet fuel prices make up a significant 
share of airlines’ costs, the industry has continued to see a growth trend. According to the US 
Energy Information Administration, the average crude oil price was 20 USD per barrel in 1990, 
31 USD in 2003, 60 USD in 2006, even above 100 USD after 2008 with a sharp decline to 45 
USD in 2016 which moved back to above 70 USD in mid-2018.    
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3.1.1. Commoditisation of Air Travel 
Comparing the CAGR for air travel demand, which is above 5%, with the world’s 
population surge of 1.5% CAGR since 1970, it is inferred that the propensity to travel by air 
has been increasing globally. Changes with the propensity to fly have a direct impact on global 
air travel demand. Using the World Bank data, the propensity metric was derived by dividing 
the total number of air travellers with the world’s total population, as plotted in Figure 3.2 
below. Whilst in the early 1970s less than one in every ten people had access to air transport 
product, from 2010 onwards, this figure increased and exceeded four, confirming the 
continuous rise for air travel demand and its subsequent commoditisation trend. 
 
Figure 3.2: Propensity to Travel since 1970. Y-axis Demonstrates Flight Per Capita Per Year. 
Source: Derived From IMF and World Bank Data.  
 
Early surveys of air passengers, such as Lansing and Blood's work (1984), demonstrated 
that as personal incomes rise, more is spent on all non-essentials including all modes of travel. 
Additionally, air transport, which is the costlier but more comfortable and convenient option, 
has become more competitive compared to surface travel leading to a shift in demand from 
surface modes to air. The boom in air travel demand has not been a result of spontaneous and 
unforeseen developments. The commoditisation process of air travel was ponderous but stable.  
According to Harrison (2013), since the early stages of commercial air travel, the growth in 
passenger traffic represents the culmination of changes in the industry. Positive 
macroeconomic developments, deregulation, increasing competition, the emergence and rise 
of low-cost carriers together with the proliferation of the internet allowing price transparency 
and product accessibility, have contributed air travel to penetrate into the mass market.  
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The report of IATA published in (2008) confirms the commoditisation trend of air travel 
from the perspective of demand elasticity. The study implies that lower travel prices greatly 
stimulate traffic and raise revenues. On the other hand, for an airline on a given O&D, increases 
in airfares are likely to result in a more than proportionate decrease in air travel. Apart from 
the fare impact on air travel demand, these findings confirm that air prices are elastic, 
responsive to market dynamics and thus imply that air travel is not a luxury good. However, it 
should be noted that in the literature there exists a wide range of (air travel) demand elasticity 
calculations. The results differ depending on the date of the research, market focus and 
methodology. Intervistas’ report (2007)  has a compelling compilation of previous studies on 
air travel demand elasticities. The report states the consensus among most aviation economists 
has been that demand for airline services is generally both price and income elastic. When 
consumers are choosing between airlines or destinations, there exists price elasticity; but as the 
report argued, "if all competitors on a route, or if a wide range of routes all experiences the 
same proportionate price increase, the demand for airline services becomes less elastic. As a 
price increase is extended to ever larger groups of competing airlines or competing 
destinations, and then the overall demand for air travel is revealed to be somewhat inelastic” 
(Intervistas, 2007, s. vi). This quote is a strong statement in the sense that affordability of the 
air product is indeed the top cause of the commoditisation of air travel. If the pricing structures 
move beyond travellers’ level of affordability, the process is likely to be reversed, and the 
consumption decelerates. 
 
Although increasing propensity to fly and commoditisation trends are globally valid 
facts, these processes are not actualised in an even manner. Albers et al. (2009) estimate that 
the 25 wealthiest countries by GDP per capita account for 51% of world’s GDP, 15% of world’s 
population, 69% of international passenger volume and 70% of total passenger volume. 
Demand growth scheme varies due to differing economic, political and regional trends. The 
table below (Table 3.1) which was derived from the World Bank data demonstrates that 
different regions of the world experienced different growth schemes from 1991 to 2013.  
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Table 3.1: Annual Number of Passengers and CAGR Figures for Different Regions of the 
Globe as of 1991 and 2017. Table Derived from the World Bank Data. (Available at 
https://data.worldbank.org/) 
 
Regions 
Annual Number of Passengers 
1991 2017 CAGR Growth 
United States 452,015,904 849,403,000 2.36% 
EU 193,389,200 763,824,571 5.22% 
OECD Countries 820,591,904 2,217,332,475 3.75% 
BRIC Countries 178,151,100 876,826,306 6.08% 
Latin America & Caribbean 54,218,500 223,748,010 5.39% 
Middle East & North Africa 36,420,700 251,171,228 7.41% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13,966,200 50,643,817 4.89% 
World 1,133,228,204 3,978,849,402 4.76% 
 
As observed in Table 3.1, between 1991 and 2013, the pace of growth in air travel 
scored higher in emerging and relatively lower-income economies compared to wealthier and 
larger economies. This finding can be argued to support the commoditisation trend of air travel. 
Morphet (2011) argues that because of the varying speeds of factors affecting air travel demand 
from one country to another, the ranking within the top 20 countries by air trips will change 
over the decades. She points out that developing markets have enjoyed a more significant 
growth percentage in air travel demand, with the trend likely to continue over the coming years. 
Airbus’ report on Global Market Forecast (2012) suggests that traffic growth between 
advanced and emerging air transport markets will grow at an average CAGR rate of 5.1%, 
above the world average growth rate of 4.7%, and not far off the 6.6% annual growth rate 
forecast between emerging markets.  
 
3.1.2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Impact on Airline Industry 
Increases in GDP is the driver of growth for air travel demand. According to Lyneis 
(2000), air travel demand can be affected by internal and external factors, with GDP nominated 
as a predominant external factor. Another study by Heinzl et al. (2007) also confirms that, 
being a representative variable of economic activity, GDP is a factor that shapes the demand 
for air travel. Figure 3.3 shows that the number of air travellers increased when global GDP 
has risen, with growth halting when GDP growth was stalled. Since 2000, GDP growth scored 
a CAGR of 3.5%, while the number of passengers has surged by 4.7% on average per annum. 
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Figure 3.3: Number of Passengers and World Cumulative GDP in Constant LCU in Million 
Usd. Data Derived from IMF. (Available at https://www.imf.org/en/Data) 
 
Rising economic activities as well as per capita income push the demand for air travel 
forward as more company employees need to fly for their businesses and more individuals can 
book flights for their vacations. Swan (2009) argues that on average, 1% of GDP is spent on 
air travel in developed and developing countries.  According to The Global Airline Industry 
(Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009), historically the annual growth in air travel realised 
around twice the annual growth of the GDP. In its Economic Outlook, Boeing (2014) estimates 
3.2% for GDP growth and 5.0% for air travel demand  growth per annum until 2033 while 
Airbus forecasts the same figures as 3.2% and 4.7% respectively (Airbus, 2014). These 
estimates imply 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅 (𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) ⁄ 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅 (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) ratio to be between 1.5 to 
1.6, meaning the demand is forecasted to grow between 1.5 and 1.6 times more than the 
predicted GDP development.  
 
Gillen et al. (2007) find the elasticity of air travel demand, with respect to per capita 
GDP, to vary from 0.8 to 2.6 depending on the reference country of computation. In their study, 
the median value of air travel elasticity was calculated as 1.14 whereas the average was found 
to be 1.5.  In other words, similar to what Boeing and Airbus estimates, if the GDP of a country 
surges by 1%, the air travel demand is expected to grow by 1.5% on average.   
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The contribution of GDP to the aviation industry is not one-sided; the benefits and 
effects are reciprocal. While air traffic demand has grown together with economies, air 
transportation is itself also a crucial facilitator of economic growth. According to IATA’s 
report on Aviation Economic Benefits (2011), the connectivity of air services has a statistically 
significant relationship with labour productivity levels, where a 10% rise in connectivity boosts 
labour productivity by 0.07%. According to ATAG’s report (2013), aviation supports 8.7 
million jobs and more than 600 billion USD of GDP worldwide directly. As per the report, 
including the industry’s indirect, induced and tourism catalytic impacts, it supports 58.1 million 
jobs and 2.4 trillion USD economic value.   
 
3.1.3. Deregulation of the Airline Industry 
Air travel became a preferred and available mode of transportation in the 20th century. 
Jets were integrated into the market in the late 1950s, and the industry achieved an accelerating 
growth pace thereafter. However, the growth in air travel triggered several issues to be dealt 
with from the regulatory perspective. Due to the complex nature of the airline industry, the 
surge in the demand began placing strains on government authorities. While rising labour and 
fuel costs created severe obstacles for the growth of the industry, an increasing degree of 
internationalisation with booming cross-border demand and supply was achieved. Such an 
extensive internationalisation led to the introduction of certain regulations. In the mid-20th 
century, initial frameworks were set by the institutions and governments in order to regulate 
the aviation industry. At the Chicago Convention in 1944, fifty-two member states agreed the 
regulation of (1) capacity and frequency, (2) airfares, (3) freight levels and (4) the application 
of traffic rights or “air traffic freedoms” at the Chicago Convention in 1944. The convention 
had also established the International Aviation Organization (ICAO) to coordinate worldwide 
technical and operational standards (Cento, 2009). The regulatory elements obstructed new 
entries, competition and pricing freedom. Nation states had extensive control over its civil 
aviation policies. In an attempt to provide a counterweight to the dominance of governments 
and ICAO, an institutional body, representing the collective interest of airlines named the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) was established in 1945. IATA had the 
authority to set the ticket prices that seemed to encourage a price-controlling or fixing culture 
(Greg, Jody, Thomas, & Nordenflycht, 2009). Governments and multinational institutions were 
protecting the industry to the benefit of nation states and legacy carriers.  
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For some scholars, it would not be fair to argue that governments imposed regulations 
solely to support the hidden agenda of their national interests. Most scholars agree that the 
purpose of government regulation is to create a stable industry (Kaps, 1997). According to the 
public-interest theory of regulation, regulation is established primarily for the benefit of society 
at the expense of regulated firms. In this view, “the government is the mechanism by which 
individuals in the economy express their demands to cure market failures such as public goods, 
monopolies, and spill-over problems” (Chmura, 1984, s. 1). To avoid the deleterious impact of 
destructive competition and to avoid economic chaos, governments established a regulatory 
framework for the public interest (Dempsey & Goetz, 1992). 
 
The other view towards regulation holds that regulation enhances the wealth of some 
parties at the expense of society’s interests. Stigler (1971) suggests that regulation is acquired, 
designed and operated by the industry for its benefit. It is claimed in this argument that firms 
including airline companies and aircraft manufacturers benefited from regulation. For Levine 
(1976), regulation was an obstacle for achieving further growth in the airline industry, harming 
passengers in the sense that through protection, airlines were enjoying a competition-free 
business environment. Friedman (1995) argues that the growth in regulation is responsible for 
the slowdown in economic growth. Christainsen (1981) and Haverman studied the effect of 
regulation on labour productivity and found that 10% of the slowdown in labour productivity 
was due to the expansion of federal regulation in the mid-1970s.  
 
The acceleration and growth of the aviation industry initiated the deregulation process 
which began in the USA after 1978. For Borrenstein (1992), deregulation meant a rejection of 
the inefficient regulation of the past 50 years. Without deregulation, the global airline industry 
would hardly observe commoditisation limiting the propensity to fly. Deregulation in the 
United States has been part of a larger global airline liberalisation trend, especially in Asia, 
Latin America and the European Union (Smith & Cox, 2006). Before 1978, due to the 
increasingly complex nature of air travel, governments introduced a set of regulations to ensure 
the stability of the industry. The regulations were usually protecting national carriers, 
discouraging new entries and even enabling governments to directly or indirectly control 
airfares. High-cost national and full-service airlines benefited from regulatory measures 
implemented by governments. "Since the profitability of the sector was marginal the case was 
made that the economic rents from the protectionism afforded by governments to their national 
airlines were overwhelmingly enjoyed by the staff in a combination of high ratios of wages to 
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GDP per head and low productivity by comparison with" (Barrett, 2004, s. 138). Almost all 
states had regulatory mechanisms requiring the governmental approval of rates for international 
air transportation. In order to foster public interest values, which balance the competing 
interests of airlines, consumers and other national policies, the governments had the authority 
to suspend, modify and establish tariffs (Dempsey, 1987). However, these regulations led to 
the onset of high inflation, low economic growth, falling productivity, rising labour costs and 
higher fuel costs that devastated the airlines and only deepened the problems (Thierer, 1998). 
Regulations hindered competition and protected national carriers. Those protectionist policies 
averted the legacy carriers to focus on efficiency and cost control.  
 
 Protectionism in the aviation industry was not only an internal policy of governments. 
It was also part of international politics in the sense of traffic rights, airline designations, 
capacity and fare controls.  The governments were protecting their national carriers through 
bilateral agreements with other governments. In his book, Doganis (2001) mentions the gradual 
transition of bilateral agreements towards liberalisation instigated by deregulation. During the 
1980s through the pioneering of the US, the trend was spread to different regions of the world, 
especially to Europe, but the process was gradual and bilateral. During the 1990s international 
liberalisation and open markets, bilaterals were not adequate to create the desired boom in the 
industry. Bilateralism was still the restricting factor. At the ICAO Air Transport Colloquium 
in 1992, it was discussed that “the bartering process of bilateralism tends to reduce 
opportunities available to the level considered acceptable by the most restrictive party” 
(Samuel, 1992, s. 30). The 1990s witnessed the extension of initially limited versions of open 
skies agreements in which the nation states progressively removed limitations on flight rights. 
At later stages, further extensions of the facilitation of liberalisation were achieved. Although 
protectionist tendencies are still valid, especially in the eastern regions of the world, 
deregulation has widely opened up the industry.  
 
Through deregulation and liberalisation, the industry has achieved significant progress 
in market access, capacity, designation and tariffs. The deregulation of the US air travel 
industry aimed to ensure the maximisation of consumer benefits through the extension of fair 
competition among airlines.  Airlines were able to access new markets, offer capacities on 
different O&D pairs by considering demand schemes rather than following government’s 
restrictions. From the consumer perspective, one of the most significant achievements of 
deregulation is lower airfares. According to Robson (1998) airfares have consistently fallen 
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under deregulation, with some economists finding that fares are 22 per cent lower today than 
they would have been if the industry stayed under government control. Winston and Morrison, 
in their study (1995), calculated the annual savings to air travellers attained with deregulation 
at 12.4 billion USD. They also found that passengers saved an additional 10.3 billion USD each 
year in reduced travel time because of the availability of more convenient flights and more 
efficient route systems offered by airlines. Crandall and Ellig (1997) estimated that when 
figures are adjusted for changes in quality and amenities, passengers save 19.4 billion USD per 
year directly from airline deregulation.  
 
3.2: Airline Business Models 
 
The liberalisation process created a competitive pressure on airlines, with their 
efficiency beginning to be the ultimate differentiating factor. In the aftermath of deregulation, 
a large number of new entries and mass exits were observed throughout the industry. The 
survivor airlines had no choice but to focus on increasing their efficiencies. Khan (1988) states 
that new entrant and the ability of efficient airlines to quote much lower fares than the 
incumbents were a clear reflection of the extent to which the latter's costs had become inflated 
behind the protective wall of regulation. Even if a limited number of airlines served particular 
routes, more accessible market entry options were inhibited by increasing tariffs to obtain 
excessive profits, for fear of new entrants (Doganis, 2009). As consumers were now more 
price-sensitive, the airlines had no choice other than regaining profitability through cost control 
and efficiency.  
 
Cento (2006) identifies three pronounced types of airline business models that are the 
most dominant in the post-deregulation era: the Full-service carriers (FSC), the LCCs and the 
charter carrier models. Through market deregulation, the FSC model transformed from the 
former state-owned flag carrier model, into a new and efficient model utilising the hub and 
spoke networks. LCCs appeared in the industry after deregulation, offering value for a new 
segment of air travellers by having superior cost advantages. While FSCs and LCCs both 
operate scheduled services, charter carriers address ad-hoc demands not captured by the 
scheduled services, by a hiring arrangement with a particular customer (Doganis, 2001). 
Therefore charter carriers do not adopt a long-standing business strategy in line with regular 
air travel demand.  
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The following sections discuss the FSC and LCC business model with a comparative 
perspective. Charter carriers are not emphasised within these sections as their non-scheduled 
business principle is beyond the scope of this research. A recent airline business type called 
“hybrid carriers” is also covered in section 3.3.5. However, the hybrid type is not categorised 
as a separate business model as its business principle is argued to be a combination of the 
existing FSC and LCC models.  
 
3.2.1. Full-Service Carriers (FSCs) 
FSCs, also termed as "legacy carriers", provide a wide range of all included services 
covering pre-flight, onboard and post-flight phases. FSCs operate the traditional airline 
business model, in which the services are bundled, an all-inclusive fare is quoted, and the major 
proportion of revenue is generated through the mainstream flow of flight revenues with limited 
a share of ancillary share. FSCs incur additional costs on global distribution, in-flight catering, 
ground facilities and the frequent flyer programme. These additional costs are more than 
recovered through higher revenues and yields (Aggarwal, 2011). According to Cento (2009), a 
FSC is defined as a carrier developed from the former state-owned flag carrier, through the 
market deregulation process, into an airline company with its core business focused on 
passengers and cargo. FSCs can employ a hub and spoke or point-to-point network model, and 
usually participate in a global alliance. They engage in customer relationship management and 
yield management to maximise revenues. They also utilise a multi-channel sales strategy to 
diversify the areas that would enable the carrier to generate additional sales flow, usually by 
participating in the global distribution systems. Full-service carriers with extensive flight 
networks can be named as full-service network carriers (FSNC).  
 
3.2.2. Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs) 
The emergence and rise of the LCC business model stemmed from the necessity for 
airline executives to create affordable, efficient and competitive carriers. The low-cost business 
model proved successful, and their capacity shares have continuously been increasing. Figure 
3.4 depicts the total worldwide number of active, founded and exited low-cost carriers from 
1971 to 2013.  The data indicates that the real jump in the number of low-cost airlines was from 
2001 to 2006. Forsyth et al. argue in their book that (2013) while liberalisation was a necessary 
condition for the growth of the LCCs, the patterns of entry and exit are not closely correlated 
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with key events in the liberalisation process. They also suggest that the LCCs are not one 
variety; rather there exists two definable stylized successful business models – the "truly low 
cost model" and "the full service airline competitor model”, where the latter is the FSCs 
response to a LCC threat implying that the rise of the LCC business model posed a concern for 
FSCs, who had to restructure their business to adopt the changing industry environment.  
 
Figure 3.4: Number of Founded, Exited and Active Low-cost Airlines Adopted From the Low-
cost Carrier Worldwide (2013) 
 
According to Airline Profiler data (Israel, 2014), by 2013 the worldwide market share 
of the LCCs increased to 22% of the whole available seat capacity. The article reports that no-
frills carriers' performance on certain metrics are higher than FSCs, justifying the FSCs concern 
over the LCC threat. According to Najda (2013), low-cost carriers can successfully neutralise 
the dominance of its competitors by competing on price. Some of the major carriers started 
their own subsidiaries under the low-cost banner to compete on price, with the objective of 
regaining their lost market share (Francis, 2006).  The scope of market share loss is substantial 
for FSCs. OAG data cited in The Telegraph (2014) demonstrate that low-cost carriers make up 
36% of the whole European aviation market, directly taking away from the share of traditional 
legacy carriers.  
 
Gross et al. state that literature tends to agree that a general definition of LCC is 
ambiguous because there is no globally distinct and unique business model of an LCC, but 
instead a range of product and business differences when comparing them (Gross, Landvogt, 
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& Lück, 2013). For Mason and Morrison (2008), the difficulty of defining the low-cost airline 
business model is a sign of the coexistence of several business models that are categorised 
under the LCC label. In principle, as a common characteristic, LCCs develop one or more bases 
to maximise their destination coverage and defend their market that encourage them to focus 
on cities and point-to-point services rather than operating traditional hubs (Bamber, Gittel, 
Kochan, & Andrew, 2009). By offering point-to-point services, LCCs are able to schedule 
services at the right time of the day to compete with FSCs without being subject to the 
imperatives of a flight connection system. Low-cost carriers promote á la carte pricing; in 
addition to the basic cost of the flight, passengers pay separately for almost every additional 
component such as catering, seat selection, checked bag and etc (Tuttle, 2013). 
 
The central aspect for all LCCs is their low-cost approach in each step of their process 
chain. On the markets they serve, LCCs focus on cost reduction and minimisation to implement 
a price leadership strategy. The differences in the operating costs between FSCs and LCCs are 
quite relevant (IATA, 2006). Their cost structure can be quantified by aggregating the cost 
savings of their unbundled services, point-to-point network arrangement and wage savings – 
as they usually pay less than traditional airlines. Meehan as cited in Cook & Goodwin (2008) 
finds the labour cost per available seat mile was 2.8 dollar cents for the LCCs while the figure 
was 3.5 cents for the legacy carriers by 2005 - with savings made by excluding numerous add-
on services from the product.  They reduce their unit cost structures by eliminating services, 
increasing the number of seats at the expense of passenger comfort and standardising their 
cabin amenities. Major business principles of LCCs are compared with FSCs in Table 3.2. 
 
The emergence of the LCCs in the market and their consequent consolidation 
contributed to the commoditisation process of air travel. According to DLR’s report (2008, s. 
10) "on the sales and demand side, the pricing policy of the low-cost carriers is usually very 
dynamic, with heavy discounts for tickets booked long in advance, which leads to the 
generation of new demand from low-yield passengers and heavy bargainers who  would not 
have flown otherwise". LCCs’ affordable fare structures, offering much lower prices than 
legacy carriers, enabled more price sensitive passengers to access air travel. The LCCs’ success 
coincides with attracting travellers who are interested in affordable airfares to destinations 
previously not offered, some of whom are first-time air travellers and would not have flown 
otherwise (Franke, 2004). For the LCC segment, low fares have become paramount and have 
overtaken comfort; service and punctuality as the primary decision driver for at least short-haul 
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travel (Thanasupsin, Chaichana, & Pliankarom, 2010). In his article, Whitelegg (2005) states 
that through cost advantage, LCC's profit accumulation is a result of 15-18 per cent gap 
between break-even and actual load factors; as long as this gap is maintained it can continue to 
charge low fares. Cheaper fares appeal to more passengers encouraging them to travel more, 
which reduce unit costs per passenger even further. This cyclic process enables the LCCs to 
charge even lower fares.  
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Legacy / Full-service Carriers and Low-cost Carriers – Compiled by the Author 
Attribute Legacy / Full-Service Carriers Low-Cost Carriers 
Network Type 
Usually Hub and spoke networks are employed to achieve 
efficiency (see next section for details)  
Point to point network (see next section for details) 
Connectivity 
Most passengers connect at the hub(s) for a continuing 
flight(s) to destination 
Direct flights are offered with limited frequencies 
Pricing 
In return for full service, travellers are ready to pay higher 
fares. Business travellers pay a premium for services such 
as late booking. Seat inventory reserved for late booking 
(Lott, 2006). 
Cheaper especially when the tickets are purchased well 
in advance – towards the date of departure as seats are 
filled, the fares converge to legacy carriers.  
Fleet type 
Variety of aircraft types are utilised to serve different 
markets 
Limited – fewer number of aircraft types are used to 
ensure standardisation and cost advantage 
Source of revenues 
Primarily passengers revenue – ancillary revenue forms a 
limited portion of the whole revenue gain 
In addition to passenger revenue, ancillary revenue 
composes an integral revenue source 
Loyalty programs Employed as a method to ensure customer retention 
Resist using a loyalty program as it is known to increase 
cost 
Service 
Full service is offered although the degree and quality of 
free amenities vary 
Reduced “frills” and seating space on board: elimination 
of food and beverages reduces passenger service costs, 
while reduced seating space increases the capacity 
produced by each flight, in turn lowering its unit costs 
(Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009). 
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Coenders et al. (2011) in their study assert that LCCs attract not only price-sensitive 
passengers but also the business travellers. According to their study, LCCs generally offer a 
product for more price-conscious business travellers that better meet their requirements. Hence, 
the lower fare is not the sole factor for some of the consumer’s preference for the LCCs. As 
Kim and Lee (2011) state in their article, customer satisfaction is crucial for newly emerging 
LCCs in order to be competitive and establish successfully. According to their study, for LCCs, 
it is not only the fare but also tangible items and responsiveness of perceived service quality 
which are significant antecedents of customer satisfaction. Likewise, economic recessions 
encourage more business travellers to prefer LCCs too. Neal and Kassens-Noor (2011) studied 
the impact of economic recession on air travel for business purposes. They find that during 
national recessions, legacy and low-cost carriers’ market niches converge. This observation 
confirms that the target market of the LCCs is not limited to the price-sensitive segment but 
also shifts to a wider spectrum, since the LCC product can meet the expectations of various 
passenger profiles under certain circumstances. Therefore, LCCs take various revenue-
maximising measures for different customer profiles depending on the market conditions and 
competition. For this reason, although fares charged by the LCCs are lower on average, just 
before the flight date or seasonal periods such as around sporting events, the fare for a seat on 
LCCs can be higher than the comparable fare charged by a legacy carrier (Gilbert & Perl, 
2012). 
 
3.3: Airline Network Types 
 
As competition between airlines has intensified, and more customer segments have 
begun to access air travel, the existence of the itinerary as a core product feature has become 
more evident. The schedule, or the airline's published timetable, has always played a central 
role in creating preferences for one itinerary over the other. The schedule does not merely cover 
flight departure and arrival times but also a wide range of other details, including the flight 
routing (direct or connecting), type (operating or codeshare), aircraft category, stopovers and 
departure and arrival airports as well as the terminals. To varying degrees, all these parameters 
are critical in consumers' decision making. From the airline's perspective, the network structure 
consists of the complete set of its scheduled services and timetable for the entire flight-
destination portfolio. A carrier's network determines its capacity, particularly flight frequency 
and seat supply, in the market route at the origin and destination pair (O&D). Moreover, O&D 
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pairs' routing (direct or connecting) and type (online or codeshare) are determined through the 
network strategy. The network structure of an airline, therefore, encompasses not only its 
physical flights but also its partnerships with the other carriers. 
 
As discussed earlier, airline executives must effectively design their network structure 
to remain competitive in the market. A carrier’s network is an influential factor in the planning 
cycles of the firm and is therefore a vital element of the airline's cost structure. It is the airline's 
network that determines the flight routes and frequency as well as the aircraft utilised for each 
service. Indeed, all of the network's capacity-related factors influence the company's cost base, 
including the necessary staff, crew, sales offices, handling agreements, catering contracts and 
etc. As its network structure substantially determines the airline's cost base, efficient design of 
the network is a crucial parameter of commercial success. 
 
As stated in Straight and Level – Practical Airline Economics (Holloway, 2008, s. 366), 
an "airlines' network is an overt manifestation of strategic behaviour". The way in which 
airlines construct their network and develop journey paths for their passengers is an outcome 
of how they are structurally organised. Networks compose the brand identity of an airline and 
define the product and core services, as well as being an integral driver of corporate revenue 
and cost scheme. Through their network strategies, airlines inject a competitive perspective 
into their products. Lederer (1993) models and defines airline competition as a non-cooperative 
challenge, where in order to connect one node into another, carriers select network designs and 
prices for transportation.  
 
The impact of deregulation on the legacy carriers has led to a business paradigm shift. 
After deregulation, airlines were free to determine their optimal network type. In most cases, 
this was predominantly a hub and spoke network, allowing the exploitation of density 
economies (Pels, 2008). The process of liberalisation has altered the way networks were 
effectively structured. Before deregulation, direct and fully connected networks were 
principally utilised. In order to provide convenient service to the public, regulators encouraged 
non-stop, point-to-point services. Point to point airlines chose to fly direct as long as the 
demand was met. However, after deregulation, airlines became free to choose their networks 
and fares as part of their efficiency priorities. This process has led to Hub and Spoke (HS) 
systems in place of point-to-point (PP) transport systems to rise and concentrated the traffic on 
spoke routes, increasing the flight frequencies (Morrison & Winston, 1995). HS networks are 
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competitive and effective route networks. In addition to the transportation industry, HS 
networks are employed in other sectors such as telecommunications. In HS network 
configuration, the operator companies (in the case of aviation, the airlines) can use larger 
vehicles (aircraft) and thus reduce costs per unit through accumulating flows on a hub. It results 
in lower total network cost and therefore the firm gains a competitive edge.  
 
3.3.1. Hub and Spoke (HS) vs Point-to-Point (PP) Networks 
HS networks entail the concentration of traffic on intermediate hub airports where 
passengers can change planes on their way to final destination whereas in PP systems, 
passengers travel directly from origin to destination without transferring at a central hub (See 
Figure 3.5). On the other hand, within the context of HS distribution paradigm, the traffic 
moves along the spokes which are connected to the hub that is located at the centre (Babcock, 
2002). Travellers who are moving between airports and not served with point-to-point modes 
of transportation options need to change planes on the way to their destination. Thus by 
connecting at the hub, passengers can travel between any two cities in the routing system or 
"from anywhere to everywhere” (Hansson, Ringbeck, & Franke, 2002). HS networks can 
resemble a delivery system: the decision maker (the airline), positions the facilities 
(destinations and flights) and determines the principles of allocation to these facilities (the 
passenger flow) (O'Kelly & Bryan, 1998). 
 
Figure 3.5: An Illustration of PP Transportations Systems (on the Left) and HS Network (on 
the Right) – Compiled by the Author. 
 
 
For a network of n cities, in PP systems, to connect every node into each other, a total 
of 𝑛 𝑥 (𝑛 − 1) 2⁄  connections are required to cover all nodes. On the other hand, for an HS 
network, to connect each node into the other, a single connection to a hub is sufficient, hence 
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requiring only a total of (𝑛 − 1) connections throughout the network. For an airline, these 
figures refer to the minimum number of flights needed to undertake a journey from any origin 
to any destination within the network. Since the required number of flights is smaller in HS 
systems as long as 𝑛 > 2, an efficiency is gained for the airline utilising HS systems. To operate 
effectively, any flight flown by the airline must either start or terminate at a hub. Thus, in a HS 
principle, the hub is characterised with numerous flights while the spokes have only fewer 
flights that are directed to the hub (Abdelghany & Abdelghany, 2009). 
 
In HS systems, the actual source of the efficiency gain is sourced from the phenomenon 
known as economies of scope and density. Economies of scope are observed when passengers 
travelling in many different O&D markets are combined, for at least part of their journeys, on 
a single aircraft by channelling the traffic over the hubs. On the other hand, economies of 
density refers to the reduction of unit cost in response to density. The unit cost per passenger 
declines on a route as the traffic volume on the route rises. Through the additional effect of 
larger aircraft assignment, cost per available seat falls, and the fixed costs of the airline 
operations at the endpoints of the route can be spread over more passengers as traffic density 
rises (Lee, 2007). Flores-Fillol (2009) argues that HS network structures prevail in the presence 
of lower operating costs. Bailey et al. (1985) also show that by using HS networks, airlines can 
decrease costs compared to direct routings by exploiting economies of scale through the use of 
larger aircraft. They mention in their book that when deregulation occurred, airlines had excess 
wide-body jets available, which they found cheaper to fill through marginal pricing implying 
the reflection of the cost advantage to passengers. Brueckner and Spiller (1991) in their study 
model economies of scale and analyse the public welfare effects of competition between 
airlines due to cost externalities. 
 
Airline network investment cost is smaller in HS systems. For any given level of 
frequency and number of destinations, the HS system requires the fewest number of aircraft 
and investment (Button, 2002). It is inefficient for airlines to offer direct flights from each city 
to the other within its network given the limited resources, scarce fleet and insufficient market 
conditions. Besides, insertion of a new route into an airline's network is less costly in a HS 
system as the new destination is required to be connected to the hub airport only. However, in 
the PP model, the new route needs to be connected to multiple nodes wherever the demand 
exists. For a PP carrier, the injection of a new route into the airline’s portfolio would only be 
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possible in case the local demand exceeds the critical mass to establish a direct link between 
cities.  
 
Literature agrees that HS network can be a useful tool to protect an airline’s local 
markets leading to hubs. For Pels (2008), HS airlines do not entail a motivation to enter each 
other’s local markets with a direct flight, limiting the degree of competition. Entry with an 
indirect flight is possible via their hub, but it would be a connecting flight rather than a direct 
link, which is an imperfect substitute. He argues, “competition, mainly takes place in ‘thick' 
markets between hubs, or between large airports. Deregulation, therefore, did not lead to 
increased competition in many markets. Instead, many markets were characterised by 
concentration (Pels, 2008, s. 74).” Pels refers to Zhang’s work (1996) where he argues 
invading a competitor’s market can lead to lower profits for the HS airlines. These findings 
confirm that, through the employment of HS networks, airlines create a tool to secure their 
local market. Hendricks et al. (1997) claim that HS networks are likely to be utilised when 
carriers do not compete aggressively. Oum et al. (1993) analyse the strategic use of HS 
networks to discourage entry. Aguirregabiria and Ho’s study (2010) re-confirms all studies 
mentioned above and finds that HS networks can be an effective strategy to deter the entry of 
competitors. However, it is noteworthy to state that by transferring via a connection at a hub, 
an airline can always offer a connecting product on another airline’s home market. As long as 
the capacity exists in both routes (from origin to hub and from hub to destination), the 
connecting airline can offer a more competitive value proposition than the direct service 
provider to gain a competitive advantage.  It should be noted that the demand may also exist in 
thin markets where there are no or limited direct flights. In this case, the transfer flights would 
be the main available product in the market.  
 
Given the level of competition observed in the industry today, many airlines, especially 
in Europe and the Middle East, are intensely competing via their HS networks. Airlines are 
effectively designing their networks as a strategic tool in response to their competitors' actions. 
Table 3.3 presents a comparison of the HS and PP network models on several attributes.  
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Table 3.3: Comparison of HS and PP Network Systems Cited from (Cook & Goodwin, 2008) 
Attribute Hub and spoke (HS) Point to point (PP) 
Scope 
Optimized by connecting service to wide 
geographical area and many destinations 
Each route serves a single city pair. Individual 
routes may be dispersed. 
Connectivity 
Most passengers connect at the hub(s) for a 
continuing flight(s) to destination 
No connections provided (although incidental or 
"rolling hub" connections are standard). 
Dependence 
Each route highly dependent on other routes for 
connecting passengers 
Routes operate independently, traffic is not 
affected by demand from other routes 
Demand 
Varying demand in any given city-pair may be 
offset by demand from other markets 
Only varying frequency and pricing available to 
counter demand variance 
Market Size Efficiently serves cities of hugely varying size 
Requires high-density markets with at least one 
end-point being a high demand origin/destination 
Frequency Supports high daily frequency to all destinations 
Generally lower frequency depending on the 
market type and density 
Pricing 
Frequency and coverage appeal to business 
travellers providing a margin for higher business 
fares 
Both business and leisure passengers are 
generally price-seeking 
Cost of flight from City A to City B 
Hub connection increases the cost per available 
seat  
Lowest cost per available seat per city pair 
Network cost of connecting n 
number of destinations 
Cheaper as (n-1) flights will connect each city into 
each other via the hub 
More expensive as n.(n-1)/2 flights need to be 
performed to connect each city into another  
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The employment of the HS or PP network model has a direct impact on consumer 
convenience in terms of ttotal. Kawasaki (2008) examines an airline's adoption of an HS or PP 
network when considering network effects from the demand side and the heterogeneity of the 
passengers' time value. He finds that if the time value for leisure passengers is sufficiently small 
and the operating cost is medium, or the time value for leisure passengers is high and operating 
cost is small, the monopoly airline adopts an HS network; otherwise, a PP network is adopted. 
It is deduced from this finding that, apart from fare constraints, time-convenience of the 
itineraries is among the primary motivations for consumers to choose direct flights. For 
Berechman & Shy (1996), a fully connected network provides an extra benefit for travellers 
because of the reduction in total travel time.  However, HS networks could allow the airlines 
to increase their schedule frequency. The increased frequency thus reduces the tconn. According 
to Brueckner and Zhang (2001), some passengers who could make a connecting trip under the 
HS network may find the existing flights not sufficiently convenient given their long duration. 
For Schipper (1999), the ratio between the direct and indirect flight in terms of time or 
kilometre, and the cost of tconn at the hub airport may cause in an inevitable loss of passenger 
demand for indirect transfers through the hub.  
 
Burghouwt (2007) argues that airline networks are path dependent, which refers to the 
dependence of economic behaviour of a firm on its specific history. Path dependency implies 
that if a strategy is successful, the companies tend to sustain their actions and behaviours. 
Mintzberg (1994) claims that, this process is likely to be incremental rather than radical. 
Otherwise, in case of failure, companies may adopt a different strategy according to the 
resources and knowledgebase they have. The nature of the HS systems is argued to be path 
dependent as HS networks encourage the insertion of frequencies and destinations to the 
existing hubs. Each inserted flight add up to the economies of scale and network economics of 
the airline. Thus, cumulative causation of hub connectivity favours large nodes over smaller 
nodes in the development of HS networks (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). In contrast, for an LCC’s 
network, since the motivation is based on lowering the unit costs rather than the network 
economics, different path dependency may be implied covering short-term dynamics.  
 
As a consequence of the cost advantage, the attraction of transfer passengers is 
facilitated for airlines employing strong HS networks. According to O’Connor (2001), by 
developing traffic along the feeder spokes, an HS airline increases its transfer passenger traffic 
along its longer hauls. Moreover, it facilitates the flow of spoke traffic onto its long-haul flights 
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by controlling the arrival times of the feeder flights at the hub airport. On the other hand, HS 
networks enable airlines to access a broader spectrum of markets. Whilst an airline employing 
PP network can only offer a product between the O&D pairs it flies direct; an HS airline can 
offer all relevant O&D pairs within its network as long as they are connected to each other 
through the hub. To quantify the magnitude of broader market access for the HS carriers, Table 
3.4 compares the total number of directional products for airlines employing PP and HS 
network systems assuming that they fly to n destinations. The same procedure is also repeated 
for (n+1) destinations in order to demonstrate the marginal effect on the number of O&D pairs 
. 
Table 3.4: Number of Directional (to and From) O&D Pairs (Products) Served in PP and HS 
Systems. The Number of O&D Pairs Would Be Halved if Directionality is ignored.  
Destinations Number of Products for PP Carrier Number of Products for HS Carrier 
n 2 (n-1) n (n-1) 
n + 1 2 (n+1-1) = 2n (n+1)(n+1-1) = (n+1) n 
Difference = 1 2n – (2(n-1)) = 2 (n+1)n – (n(n-1)) = 2n 
 
For an airline flying to n destinations, while 2(n-1) directional O&D pairs can be 
generated through PP networks, this figure scores as n(n-1) at the HS systems. As long as n>2, 
n(n-1) is always greater than 2(n-1). Therefore, given the same number of destinations in the 
network, HS airlines offer more product options to travellers in comparison to the PP carriers. 
When a new route is added into a flight portfolio, as Table 3.4 suggests, only two new O&D 
pairs are introduced in the PP systems, which are from origin to the new destination and back. 
In HS systems, the additional number of O&D pairs are 2n as the flight would be connected to 
each n destinations in the network and all the existing n destinations would be connected to the 
new route on the way back, summing up to 2n. Since HS airlines offer a connection between 
each spoke and therefore accesses to a broader market, they attract more transfer passengers. 
The graph below (Figure 3.6) depicts the total number of O&D connections for different 
number of destinations served by the HS and PP network systems assuming that all destinations 
are properly connected to the other destinations in the HS network.  
 
 
 
 
 60 
Figure 3.6: Directional Number of O&D Pair Connections vs The Number of Destinations in 
A Network for PP and HS Carriers. The Function of PP Network is 2 𝑥 (𝑛 − 1), and The 
Function of HS Network is 𝑛 𝑥 (𝑛 − 1) 
 
 
It is observed in Figure 3.6 that, as the number of destinations in a network increases, the 
number of products (O&D pairs) offered through the HS networks outperforms PP networks 
in an exponential manner.  
 
3.3.2. Network Assessment Methods 
Modelling complex networks is a challenge for airlines in the sense that the topology 
of the network governs the connectivity dynamics and the connectivity determines the 
functional and economic feasibility of their network structure. For this reason, it is crucial to 
analyse network geometry and concentration. The number of airports and number of weekly 
flight frequencies that an airline serves usually expresses and measures the physical size of the 
airline network (Janic, 2000). The following sections elaborate the existing literature 
concerning the networks’ size and index assessment.   
3.3.2.1. Network Topology Indices 
The topology index of a network refers to its connectivity based on its geometry. In 
order to assess the networks’ performance and to benchmark them, the global properties of 
such systems need to be captured and modelled as graphs whose nodes represent dynamical 
units. This process translates the interaction between dynamical units that usually depends on 
time, space, and many other details into a binary number (Boccalettia, Latorab, Morenod,, 
Chavez, & Hwang, 2006). In Table 3.5 below, some of the widely used topological 
measurements are introduced.  
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Table 3.5: Network Topology Indexes Derived from the Network Experience – New Value from Smart Business Networks (Vervest, van Liere, & 
Zheng, 2009) 
Measurement Description Formulation Variables Source 
Degree 
The degree of a given node is given by 
the number of its links 
𝑘(𝑣) 
k(v) is the number of links of 
node v 
(Barabasi & Oltvai, 
2004) 
Closeness 
It indicates a node’s proximity to the 
other nodes 
𝐶(𝑣) =  
1
∑ 𝑑𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝜖 𝑉
 
dvt is the shortest path (geodesic 
distance) between nodes v and t. 
n is the number of nodes in the 
network 
(Newman, 2010) 
Betweenness 
(Circuitry) 
It indicates a node’s ability to stand 
between the others, to control the flows 
among them 
𝐵(𝑣) =  ∑
𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣)
𝜎𝑠𝑡
𝑠≠𝑡 ≠𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
 
𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣) and 𝜎𝑠𝑡 are respectively, 
the number of geodesic distances 
between s and t that passes 
through node v, and the overall 
number of geodesic distances 
between s and t  
(Freeman, 1977) 
Diameter 
It measures the maximum value of the 
geodesic distances between all nodes 
𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠,𝑡 𝜖 𝑉,𝑠 ≠𝑡𝑑𝑠𝑡 
𝑑𝑠𝑡 is the geodesic distance 
between nodes s and t 
Boccalettia et al. 
(2006) 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
It measures the cliquishness of a node 𝐶𝑙(𝑣) =  
𝑙𝑣
max 𝑙𝑣
 
𝑙𝑣 and max 𝑙𝑣 respectively, the 
number of existing and 
maximum possible links between 
the nodes directly connected to 
node v. 
(Watts & Strogatz, 
1998) 
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3.3.2.2. Network Concentration Indexes 
The degree of concentration is a measure to assess airlines’ network connectivity. 
Different from topology indexes, concentration indexes measure the centrality figures of the 
networks. In the literature, several procedures to calculate the degree of concentration were 
introduced. Toh and Higgins (1985) compute a hub index by dividing the number of outlying 
cities served by the hub to the number of spokes radiating from it. This index's value is always 
greater than 1, and a central network with an active hub reports an index value closer to 1. 
Although this index provides an insightful intuition regarding the airline’s network centrality, 
the methodology needs to know beforehand not only the airports in the network but also which 
of these airports is a hub (Paul, 2010). According to Reynolds-Feighan (2001), HS airlines’ 
network has a high concentration level of air traffic in both space and time. In contrast, the 
traffic flows of PP airlines are spatially and temporally dispersed. 
 
3.3.2.2.1. Gini Concentration Index 
Reynolds-Feighan (2001) recommends the Gini index as the most appropriate 
concentration measure for airline networks. The Gini index is a statistical indicator evaluating 
the inequality among values of a frequency distribution. Alderighi et al. (2007) formulate the 
Gini concentration index for airlines as: 
 
𝐺 =
1
2𝑛2
 ?̅? ∑ ∑|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗|
𝑗𝑖
 
 
where the yi and yj is the air traffic at airport i or j defined in terms of frequency ranked in 
increasing order; ?̅? =  ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖  is the mean of the weekly frequency, and n is the number of 
destinations in the network. According to Burghouwt et al. (2003), the Gini index increases 
with the number of airports in an airline network, and in a fully connected single hub HS 
network, the maximum Gini index inferring extreme concentration can be equal to: 
 
?̂? = 1 −
2
𝑛
 
To calculate the degree of network concentration (NC) for a specific airline a in percentage 
terms where 100% refers to full concentration and 0% represents full dispersion, G needs to be 
divided to the maximum Gini, ?̂?. Hence the NC figure of an airline may range between 0 and 
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1, where higher NC represents an uneven spread of frequency over the network population. If 
an equal number of frequencies exist in each n destinations of the airline’s network, NC 
converges to 0. An NC result that is equal to 1 implies a network where the flow is concentrated 
in a hub on a single radial scheme. The degree of concentration does not necessarily need to be 
measured by the frequency only. Bughouwt et al (2003) employ the Gini index based on total 
seats supplied and defines y as the air traffic at i and j as the total number of seats supplied per 
week.  
 
 3.3.2.2.2. Entropy Index 
 Different entropy-based measures were introduced in the literature, but the entropy 
index usually refers to the Theil’s index as mentioned in Economics and Information Theory 
(1967). The index formulated below is a robust measure of inequality and its inverse is a 
measure of equality or centrality. 
𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖 log
1
𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
In the above formulation n refers to the number of destinations in the network and 𝑠𝑖 
denotes the ratio of capacity at airport i to the airline’s total capacity. Conceicao and Ferreira 
(2000) highlight that Theil's entropy measure is superior to the Gini index in the sense that it 
provides a much better understanding of the concentration that exists within a clustered group. 
 
 3.3.2.2.3. Hirschman Herfindahl Index 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) index is defined by Tirole (1988) as 𝐻𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1   
where n is the number of destinations in the network and 𝑠𝑖 is the ratio of capacity at airport i 
to the airline’s total capacity. Studies such as Papatheodorou and Arvanitis (2009) and 
Borenstein (1992) use the HH index to measure the concentration in the airline industry by 
comparing capacity shares at the airports. However, Wojahn (2001) shows that the 
interpretation of the HH index is scale dependent and thus has limited use for network 
concentration.  
 
 The other possibility of employing HH indices is to compare city-pair specific routes 
as Borenstein (Borenstein, 1992) performs. This measure allows benchmarking of 
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concentration and competition on these routes. From this perspective, by making use of the city 
pair HH indices, hubbing concentration indexes (HC) can be generated as suggested by Martin 
and Voltes-Dorta (2009). They argue that with the HC index, the difference between a hub and 
a critical origin or destination is taken into account. HC relates concentration to two significant 
verdicts: the importance of hubbing in the network and the concentration of the hubbed traffic 
on each O&D market. To compute the HC, initially, the hubbing behaviour of the connecting 
passengers on the market between i and j needs to be computed as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∑ 𝑠𝑘,𝑖𝑗
2
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
 
Where  𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the share of connecting passengers between i and j, and 𝑠𝑘,𝑖𝑗
2  is the square of 
traffic share of airport k on the market i, j. From this perspective, 𝐻𝑖𝑗 is a variant of HH index 
and represents the routing concentration on market i and j. The HC index is computed by 
weighting the hubbing behaviour according to this route’s relevance, within airline’s network 
denoted by 𝑞𝑖𝑗 in relation to the overall traffic Q shown in the formula below 
 
𝐻𝐶 = ∑ ∑
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑄
𝑗𝑖
𝐻𝑖𝑗 
 
The value of HC can range between 0 and 1 where a single HS network would yield to HC 
index of 1 where in the other extreme, no connections to any flights would result with HC value 
of 0 (Paul, 2010). 
 
 3.3.2.2.4. Freeman Network Centrality Index 
Freeman index measures the network’s inequality shape with respect to a perfect star 
network. A perfect star network symbolises a pure hub and spoke network. Freeman index 
attempts to measure the centrality of nodes where a central node is structurally important. Cento 
(2009) uses the term betweenness centrality to elucidate centrality concept since for transit 
connections, being in a “between” position from origin to destination ascends the attraction of 
the node’s hub attribute. Alderighi et al. (2007) state that betweenness centrality represents the 
economic behaviour of passengers as it provides an understanding whether the hub lies on 
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geodesics through the airline's network and thus preferential for consumers for their journeys. 
According to their study, a centrality index for point xi denoted by CB(xi) requires an analysis 
of the geodesic linking pairs of other points. Geodesic distance is defined as the shortest path 
between two points. “If ggk is the number of geodesics linking points xj and xk in a network, 
and gjk(xi) is the number of such paths that contain point xi, then the betweenness  
𝑏𝑗𝑘(𝑥𝑖) =  
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑥𝑖) 
𝑔𝑗𝑘 
 
 
is the proportion of geodesics linking xj and xk that contain xi. To determine the centrality of 
point xi, sum all these values for all unordered pairs of points where j < k and i ≠ j ≠ k 
 
𝐶𝐵(𝑥𝑖) =  ∑ ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑖<𝑘
𝑛
𝑖<𝑘
(𝑥𝑖) 
 
The maximum CB(xi) can only be achieved in a star network where each node is connected to 
a single hub, which can be equal to 
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)
2
 . Therefore, the relative centrality of any point 
in the network whose value can range between 0 and 1 can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝐶′𝐵(𝑥𝑖) =  
2𝐶𝐵(𝑥𝑖) 
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)
  
 
that provides a measure of the general centrality of xi” (Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 
2007, s. 535). The Freeman centrality index for the whole network can be computed as follows  
 
𝐶𝐵 =  
∑ [𝐶′𝐵(x ∗) −  𝐶
′
𝐵(𝑥𝑖)]
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛 − 1
 
 
Where x* represents the node with the highest centrality.   
 
Alderighi et al. (2007) introduce the Freeman centrality index as being superior to Gini 
concentration index as the geodesic paths minimise network costs and hence maximise social 
utility. It is worth stating that the Gini index ranges between 0 and 1 and in the case of a pure 
hub and spoke system, it results in 0.5 and scores 0 in the case of a pure PP network. The Gini 
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index is incapable of detecting the difference between HS and PP networks. According to Cento 
(2009), in several forms of multi-HS, the Gini index assumes the value of 0.5. While frequency 
and Gini value are correlated; there is no relation between the spatial morphology and the index 
figure.  
 
3.3.3. Location of Hubs 
In HS networks, demand and passenger traffic is increasingly constructed around 
‘spaces of flows’ rather than the reciprocal demands between cities. For Sassen (2001), the 
relative importance of the relationships between global cities and their surrounding hinterlands 
seems to have dramatically decreased with respect to the importance of the relationships that 
interlink global cities in highly specialised, transnational networks. For HS networks, the 
criteria for a city to be relevant for a network cannot solely be evaluated with its demand to a 
particular destination but rather through its contribution to the overall network. Thus cities 
derive their functional centrality from a privileged position in transnational networks 
(Derudder, Devriendt, & Witlox, 2006). The study of Jalliet et al. (1996) proposes that hub 
candidates depend more on their geographical position than their demand levels. Therefore, the 
central role of big hub airports exhibits a magnifying force for their host cities to expand and 
grow. Kasarda and Lindsay (2011) argue that airports are becoming the drivers of a new type 
of city defined as “aerotropolis”. In the aerotropolis city plan, the airport is a focal point in the 
economy, layout and infrastructure. They argue that emerging corridors, clusters, passenger 
and freight flows as well as the rise of airport induced businesses to encourage cities to develop 
around airports. This development includes not just hotels and restaurants, but also, more 
importantly, transport-focused or transport-dependent businesses. There is sufficient volume 
of examples in the world confirming the “aerotropolis” perspective in the sense that less 
inhabited cities can outperform highly populated cities’ performance due to the airport’s strong 
hub nature due to its location, centrality, connectivity and size.    
 
3.3.4. Disadvantages of HS Networks 
Although HS networks provide a huge cost advantage and increased market access 
opportunities for airlines, there are several disadvantages associated with the employment of 
such networks at strategic and financial levels which needs to be taken into account by the 
airline decision makers. Because of the hub airport’s vitality in HS business model, a 
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dependency relationship between the airline and airport emerges. For Graham (2001), the 
relationship between the airline and airport operator is fundamental for reciprocal success, and 
the on-going problem is that demand is outstripping capacity at a growing number of airports. 
Since hub airports compose a high share of airlines’ businesses, any capacity limitation in terms 
of slot availability, terminal infrastructure, runway limitations and etc. may have a significant 
impact on the airlines’ flexibility. As stated in the The Global Airline Industry (Belobaba, 
Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009), airport capacity is widely believed to be one of the most important 
long-term constraints on the growth of air traffic. Since connectivity is the key motor of HS 
business model, any restriction due to hub airport’s capacity, even at a small time interval of 
the day, would limit the airlines’ playground. In other words, even small changes at the hub 
airport could have unexpected consequences throughout the network. From this perspective, 
the hub may constitute a bottleneck or single point of failure in the network (Sorgenfrei, 2013). 
Additionally, Graham and Dennis (2006) find in their study that LCCs have been largely 
responsible for strong passenger growth at some European airports. It may be the case that 
airports aiming for higher passenger turnover may target LCCs compared to network carriers, 
designing their business priorities and investments based on the LCC principles, which may 
not necessarily comply with the requirements of HS airlines. 
 
Excess reliance on transfer passengers poses a vulnerability for the HS business model. 
Passenger demand and consumer preference may shift to direct travel options in case of a rise 
in competition and direct flight capacity. Congestion at the hub airports and a potential delay 
may result in severe inconveniences and thus pose a risk for consumers. A delay in the 
departure from a hub to link can cause chain effect delay across the network resulting in several 
O&D pairs missing their guaranteed arrival times (Hult, 2011). Offering direct services lets 
carriers schedule their products at the desired time of the day allowing them to effectively 
compete with other airlines without being subject to the imperatives of a flight connection 
system. Thus, as Doganis (2013) argues hubbing can have severe negative ramifications 
concerning network economics.  
 
Another drawback of the reliance on transfer passengers for HS business model relates 
to airlines’ yields. According to Dennis (2012, s. 6), “network airlines have benefited from the 
wide range of origins and destinations they can offer a service between and this is reflected in 
the pricing of connecting flights, whereby they typically offer a through journey (with a direct 
transfer but no stopover) for less than the sum of the individual fares”. This statement suggests 
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accepting one transfer passenger instead of two direct passengers results in less revenue 
generation for the airline in total, although the direct travelling passengers do not create a higher 
cost. Therefore, accepting transfer passengers in place of direct, local travelling passengers 
where direct flight demand exists represent an opportunity cost for the airline. Lower yield on 
transfer products is valid for airlines cooperating with an interline agreement. The traditional 
interline fare would be less than the sum of available fares on the individual sectors (IATA, 
2012), implying lower profitability which is also shared by the cooperating airlines. As a result, 
while the transfer market enables wider market access opportunities, higher degrees of 
dependence on transfer passengers creates concern on yields and the overall profitability of the 
carrier.    
 
3.3.5. Hybrid Carriers and Their Business Model 
There are numerous advantages and disadvantages of the HS and PP networks in 
comparison to each other. Additionally, the differences between the strategies of the LCCs and 
the FSCs are wide. To maximize their competitive advantage and benefit from the gains of 
both business strategies, a shift to a hybrid model has been observed across the industry. With 
carriers veering from the traditional and fundamental business strategies, models combining 
the cost-saving methodologies of a true LCC with the service, flexibility and route structure of 
a FSC have been introduced, where they were named as hybrid carriers (Sabre, 2012). The 
hybrid model aims to attain growth by attracting a broad spectrum of passengers through a 
customised business strategy. The DLR report (2008, s. 13) argues that “not least because the 
aviation market is a very dynamic one, a growing number of airlines, especially the smaller 
ones, are looking for market niches and thus adopting business models that do not exactly fit 
the typical business models”. This implies that depending on the individual circumstances of 
the business environment, carriers may choose to customize their business and network 
strategy, and may adopt a hybrid model rather than sticking to a clear-cut traditional full service 
or low-cost model. In order words, airlines implementing a hybrid business structure aim to 
reduce costs and ensure efficiency compared to a FSC but not more than what LCCs achieve, 
while on the service side, they offer more than LCCs but less than FSCs. On the network side, 
hybrid carriers are not bound by a full PP model but at the same time do not engage in a full-
connected HS system. For PP operators, utilising hybrid business model can help to reduce the 
route density problem (De Wit & Zuidberg, 2012) as such a model allows for capturing the 
increasing number of passengers already practising self-hubbing (O’Connell & Williams, 
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2005). Table 3.6 below summarises the fundamental characteristics and distinctions of the 
hybrid business model compared to the traditional ones. 
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Table 3.6: Comparison of Traditional Full Service, Traditional Low Cost and Hybrid Airlines Elaborated From (Mason & Morrison, 2008) and 
(Doganis, 2013) 
Attribute Hybrid Airlines Traditional Low Cost Traditional Full Service 
Network Type 
Combination of PP and HS – an extensive hub 
system is not established. 
Mostly PP Mostly HS 
Connectivity 
Both connecting and direct flights are offered.  
Direct flights' sector range can be longer than 
traditional low-cost carriers. 
Direct flights are offered with 
usually short sector lengths. 
Connection through hub(s) to the  
final destination 
Pricing 
Different fare bundles offering varying levels 
of service 
No fare bundling 
Mostly all-inclusive bundled fares, 
ancillary revenues do not 
represent a high share 
Fleet type Narrow body and wide body Narrow body 
Combination of narrow-body and 
wide-body 
Distribution 
channels 
Mostly online but global distribution systems 
(GDS) are also used to reach travel agencies 
Mostly online GDS and online 
Loyalty programs Can offer Frequent Flyer Programmes No 
Extensively used to ensure 
customer retention 
Service 
- Single Class Service 
- Frills depending on fare bundle 
- Can be a member of a global alliance 
- Single class service 
- No frills 
- Not a member of a global alliance 
- Multiple class service 
- Frills 
- Global alliance member 
  
71 
3.4: Airline Planning Process and Scheduling 
 
While the business and network strategy of an airline are fundamental parameters of 
their competitive advantages, realising an effective scheduling mechanism complementing the 
network strategy is an indispensable element of the airline’s success. Given the O&D pairs, 
frequency and fleet, the scheduling process covers the assignment of flights to the relevant day, 
time and aircraft type. Although this assignment seems like a technical procedure derived by 
several constraints, it becomes a factor of itinerary choice for consumers. While Bazargan 
(2004) views the scheduling process as a more technical process in which basic optimization 
methods are employed for utility maximization, Holloway (2008, s. 425) argues that the 
scheduling is a response to demand and claims that the “routing and scheduling decisions are 
attributes of the service an airline offers into each of its markets, and as such will themselves 
have an impact on demand” clearly emphasizing the prominence of schedule within the 
airline’s product mix. From this standpoint, scheduling forms a crucial feature of an airline’s 
service and is a vital step in their planning cycle.  
 
Network design and scheduling are two distinct but complementing processes for an 
airline’s planning phase. Based on the network strategy, taking the resources, limitations and 
passenger perspectives into consideration, airline planners compose the most feasible schedule 
for their network. According to Doganis (2009), aircraft selection, route development, network 
planning, scheduling and thus product planning are just some of the many decision areas which 
ultimately are dependent on an analysis of demand for passenger and freight transport. Demand 
drives the initialisation of the airline’s entire planning cycle. While network planning is the 
input triggering the scheduling process, the timetable is the final output presented to the 
passengers for their itinerary choices. Scheduling is a milestone for the carriers’ other planning 
processes as the timetable information is a prerequisite input for their next planning processes, 
including crew, marketing and operations planning. According to Yu and Thengwall (2002), 
the flight schedule is the starting point of all other airline planning and operations. These 
arguments confirm that scheduling is a strategic area of the airline business management as it 
composes the airline’s product, shapes the proceeding planning steps and even drives the 
demand. 
 
As highlighted previously, the timetable development is an outcome of the airlines’ 
resources, constraints, limitations as well as the passenger demand. In other words, scheduling 
is established on top of a series of other planning processes that are completed before the 
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schedule development. In the pre-scheduling phase, the airline executives take core strategyic 
and tactical decisions for their company. The major blocks of decisions during the pre-
scheduling phase can be outlined as 1) strategic business planning cycle where corporate 
objectives are defined, 2) network and route planning 3) fleet planning. The following sections 
briefly address each of these pre-scheduling decision blocks that are the prerequisites of 
timetable formation process. Figure 3.7 illustrates the processes affecting schedule 
development in addition to the processes affected by the timetable development.   
 
Figure 3.7: A Schematic Representation of the Schedule Development Process by Holloway 
(1992) as Cited in Straight and Level (2008) 
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3.4.1. Strategic Business Planning Cycle 
In the strategic business planning phase, airlines define corporate objectives and 
strategic goals. According to Clark (2012), planning an airline business is concerned with 
defining overall objectives and goals, evaluating the target demand and business environment, 
generating supply and monitoring the achievements. In Doganis’ book (2009), it is stated that 
the airline executives have to bear in mind some objectives in deciding what products to offer 
in the different markets.  
 
The objective of an airline should be built upon the vision and mission statement of the 
airline. The mission outlines the company’s business strategy and the vision is a reflection of 
future achievement intentions that are both customer-focused (Robinson, 2009). Whilst the 
vision of an airline should not often change over time, the mission can be modified in order to 
back the vision of the company in response to changing market dynamics. The mission need to 
be decomposed into objectives which set the principles of the airlines’ business planning. When 
setting the business principles of the airline, executives need to comprehend the market 
environment and key stakeholders’ expectations including the investors, customers, 
competitors, regulators, suppliers and etc.  
 
The mission and vision of a firm determine its corporate governance strategy. For Lu 
et al. (2012), being simultaneously the set of processes, customs, policies, law and institutions 
affecting the way a company is directed, corporate governance includes the relationships 
among the stakeholders of the company and may have a direct impact on the performance of 
the airlines. Ching and Lin (2007) and Carline et al. (2008) demonstrate that corporate 
governance is often correlated with organisational performance.   
 
Demand analysis and understanding customers are the prerequisites for the 
development of a successful business plan. The plan “must set out to attract and satisfy 
potential customers in the different market segments that it has identified. This means using its 
understanding of the needs and requirements of these different market segments. Such 
understanding will have been acquired through a range of market research activities” (Doganis, 
2009, s. 227). According to John Wensween, (2011), the primary functions of the airline's 
management are planning, organising, staffing, directing and controlling. He states, however, 
historically airlines have not done a good job when it comes to efficient networks planning.  
 
After the identification of the business model, an airline may proceed to its long-term 
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network arrangement determination and route planning, which is followed by the fleet plan. 
Alternatively, executives may choose to initially determine the fleet structure and subsequently 
make the network planning decisions. Most of the time, these processes are bundled with airline 
planners simultaneously conducting fleet planning and network planning processes of their 
company. The diagram below summarises the flow of airline corporate planning - obtained 
from the book Air Transportation Systems Engineering (Donohue, 2001). 
 
Figure 3.8: Airline Planning Process Flow 
 
3.4.2. Fleet (Capacity) Planning Cycle 
 The fleet or aircraft inventory of an airline is the primary asset. Fleet acquisition 
decisions are both costly and have a long-lasting impact on the life cycle of the carriers. 
According to the US General Accounting Office report (2004), executives perform long-range 
planning, with such planning designed to ensure the program has the most cost-effective mix 
of aircraft to meet long-term mission requirements. The fleet decision-making process is 
complicated as it involves many dimensions such as corporate strategy, ownership and 
operation cost, maintenance, aircraft finance, financial creditability and aircraft operational 
efficiency.  Not only internal, but company-specific factors and dynamics also affect fleet 
decisions. Shaw’s book (2007) notes that supplier related issues can impact the fleet planning 
process too. The aircraft market, availability of aircraft and the airline’s balance within aircraft 
supplier mix are some key detriments to be assessed from the supplier perspective.  
 
When deciding their fleet composition, airline executives may take a top-down 
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approach, in which the corporate strategy and objectives drive the capacity planning. 
Alternatively, they can adopt a bottom-up strategy in which after all routing and network 
planning decisions are made; capacity decisions are built upon. Whether the fleet decision is 
taken after a bottom-up or top-down method, or through their simultaneous combination, cost 
efficiency of the proposed capacity is among the crucial factors of choice. For Hirst (2008), 
"the complexity of the task of finding the best-suited aircraft type is more difficult than just 
simply getting ‘ticks in boxes'." For him, due to the intense competitive environment, the unit 
cost of operation is the most influential selection parameter followed by payload-range; the 
remaining parameters are less, but they are still critical. The fleet decision affects not only the 
cost structure of the company but also revenues in the sense that aircraft seat configurations, 
payload and cargo capacity have a direct impact on the revenue sources of the airline.  
 
The final output of the capacity planning process is the fleet plan and total available 
seat miles (or kilometre) figure. The most frequently used measure of airline capacity is 
available seat miles (ASM), which is the product of the total number of supplied seats and 
miles (Duetsch, 2002). If the stage length of a flight is 1,200 miles and the airline flies a 100-
seat aircraft, ASM is 120,000 seat-miles. The unit cost and revenue of operation should then 
be calculated per ASM (Bazargan, 2004). Cost per available seat miles (CASM) and revenue 
per available seat miles for flight i can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖
  ,    𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖
    
 
where  𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖  𝑥 𝑠𝑖, where 𝑚𝑖 is the mileage, 𝑠𝑖 is the total number of seats at flight i. Total 
cost refers to all fixed and variable costs that are associated to perform the flight i from origin 
to destination. Total revenue covers all flight revenues including flight, ancillary and cargo 
revenues that are generated through the flight i. These figures imply that the total cost and 
revenue of an airline is 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖  𝑥 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = ∑ 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖  𝑥 𝑚𝑖 𝑥 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where n is the total number of airline’s flights. With this information, the total profit function 
that the airline aims to maximise is: 
 
  
76 
∑ 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖 𝑥 𝑠𝑖 −
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖  𝑥 𝑚𝑖 𝑥 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
  
 
The following figure demonstrates a capacity planning cycle in which cost efficiency, revenue 
expectations and profitability are assessed.  
 
Figure 3.9: Fleet Planning Economic Evaluation Process Adapted from (McDonnell Douglas 
Aircraft Company, 1981) as cited in (Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009). 
 
 
 
The work of Merkert and Hensher (2011) highlight the importance of the efficiency 
perspective in aircraft selection in response to the industry’s liberalisation, LCC growth, oil 
price volatility and fluctuations in the global economy. They argue that on top of aircraft 
technical efficiency, airline size and critical fleet mix characteristics such as aircraft size and 
number of different aircraft families in the fleet is more relevant to an airline’s successful cost 
management. Through their fleet planning processes, airlines need to create economies of scale 
to obtain a competitive advantage. Undoubtedly, cost efficiency is a more significant concern 
for LCCs as their business philosophy is centred on this concept. Barbot et al. (2008) studies 
economies of scale, showing that LCCs are usually more technically efficient than FSCs. For 
Morrell (2011), aircraft operating costs are a significant input to the fleet planning process, 
whether for passenger aircraft or freighters. Since cargo is a noteworthy revenue source for 
airlines in addition to passenger revenues, there are studies in literature stating the crucial role 
of cargo capacity in the fleet mix. For example, the study of Hong and Zhang (2010) finds that 
passenger carriers with higher cargo capacity share are more efficient than those with lower 
cargo share.  
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 In order to rationalise their fleet plan, airline decision-makers shape the capacity 
determination based on the routes and O&D pairs. "Airlines' capacity planning also involves 
multi-level assessments of individual city pair routes, while potentially considering route 
interactions and network connectivity both online (within their own network) and inter-line 
(with their partners' networks), and in relation to competitors' networks" (Boeing, 2013) 
implying that that strategic network planning affect the fleet decision. Janic (2000) illustrate a 
procedure for the determination of optimal fleet size based on the number of routes operated 
by an airline. Although his demonstration is purely based on routes and does not cover 
competitive dynamics, the methodology is useful in terms of creating a reference standpoint. 
He observes the subset of K routes contained in the original network of L routes. Assuming 
that only one aircraft type is engaged to realize the flights on these routes in time T,  𝑓𝑘𝑗  (𝑇) 
denotes the number of scheduled flights realized by the aircraft type j on the route k in time T. 
Aircraft capacity represented by 𝑁𝑗, route length by 𝑑𝑘 ,  average block time by 𝑡𝑗(𝑑𝑘), 
utilization of aircraft j on the route k in the time T by 𝑈𝑗𝑘(𝑇), average anticipated delay per 
flight j on route k by 𝑤𝑗(𝑑𝑘), the number of aircraft to undertake the planned flights 𝑓𝑘𝑗  (𝑇) 
denoted by 𝐴𝑗𝑘(𝑇) can be forecasted as follows:  
 
∑ 𝑓𝑘𝑗  (𝑇)[𝑡𝑗(𝑑𝑘) +  𝑤𝑗(𝑑𝑘)]  ≤  𝐴𝑗𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
(𝑇)𝑈𝑗𝑘(𝑇)      (a)    
 
And 
 
𝐴𝑗𝑘(𝑇) ≥ 1/𝑈𝑗𝑘(𝑇) ∑ 𝑓𝑘𝑗  (𝑇)[𝑡𝑗(𝑑𝑘) +  𝑤𝑗(𝑑𝑘)]  
𝐾
𝑘=1
      (b)  
 
where 𝑡𝑗(𝑑𝑘) = 𝑑𝑘/𝑣𝑗(𝑑𝑘) and 𝑣𝑗(𝑑𝑘) is the average block speed of aircraft j on route 𝑑𝑘. The 
total size of the fleet can be computed by identifying all possible subsets of routes where 
aircraft of the same or similar types are engaged. Expression (b) implies that the number of 
routes in an airline network, anticipated delays and T are positively related with 𝐴𝑗𝑘(𝑇), 
implying that as they increase, so does the required number of aircraft. The number of aircraft 
can be expected to reduce with the rise in average utilisation (Pollack, 1979). Therefore, an 
airline’s operational parameters like aircraft utilisation and delay figures may impact their 
capacity planning cycle. 
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3.4.3. Network and Route Planning Cycle 
Network and route planning cycle cover the identification of flight routes as well as the 
identification of weekly capacity between the O&D pairs. While route planning covers the 
determination of a single O&D pair, network-planning processes encapsulate the planning of 
all O&D pairs as a whole, including non-operating flights. For Barnhart and Smith (2012), 
conceptually, the network planning models refer to a collection of models that are used to 
determine how many passengers want to fly, which itineraries they choose, and the revenue as 
well as cost implications of transporting passengers on their chosen flights.  
 
Figure 3.10: Phases and Processes of Network Management Adapted from Sterzenbach & 
Conrady (2003) 
 
 
 
Network planning covers all planning processes related to flight operations. This 
planning process includes a strategic outlook in addition to operational and revenue 
management aspect mapping to different time horizons as shown in Figure 3.10. Furthermore, 
network and route planning can be based on tactical principles if the decision maker is under 
tactical circumstances. Competitive dynamics, emerging opportunities and market intelligence 
can encourage an airline decision maker to take tactical initiatives. 
 
At the strategic network-planning phase, market analysis along with the capacity 
planning is conducted and the initial potential routes are identified. At this stage, the details of 
the network plan are flawed as there exists little information regarding the operational 
feasibility and profitability of the routes. In the operational network-planning phase, in order 
to get the plan into a more concrete status, the strategic plan is fine-tuned by taking resources 
and limitations into consideration. The criteria that are often referred to during an airline’s 
network design process ensures that the O&D demand is satisfied and the total operational 
costs are minimised (Teodorovic, Kalic, & Pavkovic, 1994). In the short term planning, 
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profitability figures are estimated to realise the flights. To accurately forecast profitability, 
demand, yield and cost of the operation need to be assessed. Demand and cost estimates are 
quite likely to be inaccurate in the face of changing the market environment in the long and 
mid-term plans deeming the profitability expectations to be computed towards nearer time 
horizons. 
3.4.3.1. Airline Profitability 
For airlines, profitability expectations and economic drivers affect route evaluations. In 
order for an airline to launch a new route into its network or increase the capacity of an existing 
one, it needs to generate profit. To launch a flight i on an O&D (unless the airline does not 
have a different strategic goal), the flight should be profitable by holding the following 
equation true:  
(𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 − 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖) > 0.  
 
As this equation dictates, the profitability evaluation of each flight i requires powerful 
tools to comprehend the yield and costs of every single route.  For Gleich and Wald, (2010), 
evaluating the profitability of a route is a challenging task, first because the accounting practice 
should allocate the revenue of different flights for connecting passengers. Passengers pay a 
single fare for a flight but travel on more than one leg. Secondly, good accounting practice 
should allocate costs to the flight legs that are incurred. Since some costs associated with a 
given route include fixed costs that have a value to several routes, the costs need to be 
apportioned to individual flight legs.   
 
With the rise and evolution of HS networks, not only the local passengers’ contribution 
to revenue and costs but also the connecting passengers’ impact has to be addressed when 
analysing route profitability. As stated previously, airlines can accomplish a cost advantage 
through the utilisation of HS networks, while the revenue of a single connecting passenger 
occupying two seats in two different flights is less than the total revenue which could 
potentially be obtained by capturing two different local passengers on the same seat.  Routing 
both flights and passengers through a connecting hub is more profitable for an airline if the 
cost savings from operating fewer flights with larger aircraft and more passengers per flight 
are greater than the revenue loss from passengers who reject a connecting service and choose 
a non-stop flight instead, if one exists (Morrison & Winston, 1986). For Nenem and Ozkan-
Gunay (2012), an airline can attract connecting passengers if it can offer a cost advantage 
through its network. The geographical position of the hub is a key element in this context, 
which can offer smaller detour factors and the capability of flying aircraft with lower unit cost. 
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In case the airline reflects this cost advantage to passengers, the connecting traffic can be 
attracted to carriers. “The hub airline’s ability to consolidate traffic from many different O&D 
markets on each flight leg into and out of the hub allows it to provide connecting service even 
to low-demand O&D markets that cannot otherwise support non-stop flights. Consolidation of 
O&D market demands further allows the hub airline to provide increased frequency of 
connecting departures, as it likely operates several connecting banks per day in each direction 
at its hub airport.” (Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009, s. 164)  
 
3.4.3.2. Route Profitability Analysis (RPA) and Network Profitability Analysis (NPA) 
Computing a single route’s profitability, by correctly and concretely mapping revenues 
and costs at the leg level, refers to Route Profitability Analysis (RPA). RPA assumes a PP 
network; the route result is thus determined independently from any connected flights where 
the revenues and costs of connecting passengers are prorated to individual flight legs. Therefore 
RPA assumes that only revenues and costs which are generated on the analysed flight will be 
at risk if a flight is eliminated (Lufthansa Consulting, 2008). However, in line with the 
development of HS network patterns, executive decision-making is more focused on evaluating 
the network as a whole rather than a single flight route basis (Frainley, 2002). To assess the 
performance of single flights and their overall contribution to the network, airlines apply 
methodologies such as Network Profitability Analysis (NPA). The assumption behind the 
implementation of the NPA is that the economic impact of a flight is not limited to its O&D 
pair, but it affects the whole network because of the existence of connecting passengers. For 
instance, by cancelling the analysed flight, the contribution of the connecting passengers is not 
incurred on either the cancelled flight or the connecting flights (Lufthansa Consulting, 2008). 
This implies that while RPA solely concentrates on the profitability of the onboard segment of 
a single flight, NPA determines the financial impact of a single flight on the overall economics 
and profitability of the airline’s whole network. In other words, if a route is making a loss in 
an airline's network based on the principles of RPA or traditional accounting practices, it can 
contribute positively on the overall profitability of the airline’s network with NPA evaluation. 
 
In both the RPA and the NPA methods, all cost and revenues are allocated to single 
flight legs. O&D revenues are prorated to segments by applying full fare ratios or by the 
mileage-based approach (Talluri & van Ryzin, 2004). As an example of mileage-based 
allocation, if the flight cost from A to C via hub B is x dollars, the distance from A to B is d1 
miles and B to C is d2 miles, the revenue to be prorated to flight from A to B and B to C are, 
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(𝑥 ∗ 𝑑1 (𝑑1 + 𝑑2)⁄ )  , (𝑥 ∗
𝑑2
(𝑑1 + 𝑑2)⁄ ) 
 
respectively. The allocation of the cost side is a more a complex procedure; all costs, which 
are not directly associated with one flight are split using the allocation keys and cost drivers. 
For instance, in the case of accepting available seat mile (ASM) as the allocation key for the 
crew cost, an individual flight x’s crew cost is calculated by;  
 
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤(𝑥) =
𝐴𝑆𝑀(𝑥)
∑ 𝐴𝑆𝑀(𝑖)𝑛𝑖
 𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤  
 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤 denotes the whole crew cost of the company, while n represents the total number 
of flights legs. In case the airlines decide to split the crew cost based on the block hour, the 
computation then changes as follows:   
 
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤(𝑥) =
𝑏ℎ(𝑥)
∑ 𝑏ℎ(𝑖)𝑛𝑖
 𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤 
 
where bh(x) represents the block hour duration of flight x and n represents the total number of 
flights performed. Although best practices exist, there are no globally accepted revenue and 
cost allocation keys and drivers. Therefore, the basic input for any RPA and NPA are the 
airline’s operating statistics (Baldanza, 2002). 
 
When allocating revenues and costs within RPA and NPA, the profit contribution (PC) 
approach is applied to distinguish multiple contribution levels. This design provides a 
management tool to analyse sources and areas of profitability in addition to the mere 
profitability of a flight (Niehaus, Ruehle, & Knigge, 2009). The number and types of applied 
PC levels can vary depending on the needs and reporting structure of the airline. The depiction 
below illustrates a design of the RPA with 4 PC levels. In this example, prorated flight revenues 
and onboard revenues are summed as the total flight revenue at the top. At the first PC level, 
the allocated passenger and flight related variable costs are written down and deducted from 
the revenues and PC1 is obtained. PC1 calculates whether the analysed flight revenue is higher 
than the variable costs of operating that flight.  
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Figure 3.11: RPA Analysis with 4 PC Levels Adapted From (Sterzenbach & Conrady, 2003) 
 
 
If PC 1 < 0, the flight is incapable of covering its variable operating costs, and hence not 
economically feasible. It should be noted that the costs addressed within the scope of PC1 only 
cover the flight and passenger related variable costs that are directly impacted by the number 
of passengers onboard, such as catering, passenger handling and fuel cost. Fixed costs 
involving staff, aircraft ownership or station cost are not included at the PC1 level. Direct fixed 
costs are included at PC2. Operated aircraft mainly drives the fixed costs included at PC2, 
making PC2 as the basis of decisions related to capacity and flight schedule. To assess the 
profitability of the handling and station operations, PC3 is used as an indicator, while by further 
including sales and marketing costs, PC4 is calculated. Finally, the route result is obtained by 
subtracting all administration costs from PC4. It is noteworthy to state that due to the reporting 
needs and organisational performance evaluation structure of the airline, PC levels at the RPA 
measures can be adjusted. Such an adjustment would not change a route’s profitability, as all 
costs concerning the flight leg is included for the final route result calculation.  
 
 The design of the NPA has a similar methodology and the PC approach to the RPA 
model. NPA evaluates a flight’s contribution impact to the entire network by applying 
incremental cost and revenue analysis. This suggests that in addition to the on-board revenues, 
the proration of connecting passengers’ O&D revenues (which are allocated to the single flight 
legs in the RPA) are integrated into the calculation (Niehaus, Ruehle, & Knigge, 2009). In 
other words, in the NPA model, the revenue that is prorated to the other leg of the connecting 
journey is recorded as an incremental revenue. The logic behind this approach is that, in case 
of a certain route's removal from the network, the total revenue loss would not be limited to 
the prorated revenue of that route but it also includes connecting passengers’ allocated revenue 
to other legs. On the cost side, only the incremental cost of connecting passengers is classified 
as incremental costs and included for NPA computation. The incremental costs and revenues 
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are commonly referred to as up and downline costs and revenues (Frainey, 2002). Figure 3.12 
demonstrates the design of NPA model built on top of the RPA with 4 PC levels.  
 
Figure 3.12: Design of An NPA Adapted from Maurer (2003)  
 
 
Including incremental up and downline revenues and costs results in double counting 
throughout the NPA. Up and downline revenues and costs of a flight are at the same time local 
revenues and costs for another connected flight. From this perspective, NPA is far from being 
a traditional accounting practice but rather strategic management reporting. This double 
counting is widely accepted in order to recognise the dynamics of a network with co-dependent 
flights. Since NPA is a strategic reporting tool that does not necessarily have to comply with 
traditional accounting reports, airlines can further enhance the model mentioned above by 
inserting “opportunity costs” into the analysis. Assuming the existence of demand, if the airline 
accepts connecting rather than local passengers, an opportunity cost arises for the airline. 
Therefore, NPA can be further elaborated by including spill costs as up and downline costs.  
 
3.4.4. Schedule Development Cycle 
With the fleet, route and network plans ready, creating the timetable, encompassing the 
information of which cities to fly to on which days and at what times, is the next step to plan. 
The airline-scheduling problem is extremely complex as it involves various limitations, rules 
and regulations that are linked with airports, aircraft, airlines and governments. From this 
perspective, the scheduling needs to be broken into manageable pieces. For Etschamaier and 
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Mathaisel (1985), the schedule formation phase is about developing a rough first schedule, 
which requires extensive modification to be both feasible and economically viable. The level 
of detail in constructing the timetable varies among airlines, but it will be a complete schedule 
for a full cycle, which is normally one week (Grandeau, Clarke, & Mathaisel, 1998). For Weide 
et al. (2010), an airline seeks to construct a schedule of flights where each flight is specified by 
an "origin, destination, departure date, time and duration" where market demand determines 
the O&D pairs and frequency of flights. The frequency of a flight from City A to City B per 
cycle can be calculated as;  
 
𝑑𝐴𝐵
𝐿𝐹 𝑥 𝑐𝐴𝐵
 
 
where 𝑑𝐴𝐵 represents the projected unidirectional demand between A and B, LF stands for the 
load factor and 𝑐𝐴𝐵 is the average aircraft seat capacity to be offered between A and B.  
 
 3.4.4.1. Relationship between Scheduling and Operating Costs 
 As highlighted in the earlier sections, the profit margin for the airline industry is very 
limited and indeed plenty of carriers are suffering from severe losses. The current airline 
industry is extremely competitive and operates under a diminutive profit margin; thus airlines 
are striving to introduce profitable flight schedules that maximize their revenues and exploit 
their resources. (Abdelghany, Abdelghany, & Azadian, 2017) Airlines need to present 
sustainable competitive pricing to effectively tap into growing markets and a crucial factor to 
sustain low prices is the maximisation of operational efficiency. (Lawton & Solomoko, 2005)   
For Sakthidran and Sivaraman (2018) LCCs are operating at better efficiency than 
FSCs. This suggests that some policies of the LCC model can be emulated by FSCs for better 
operational efficiency. This is in line with the observations of Gillen and Gados (2008) who 
argue that the LCC model is more suitable for higher staff productivity. Greer (2006) examined 
the productivity change using Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) on a representative sample data from ten major American airlines from 2000 
to 2004. The study demonstrated that most carriers made strides in productivity improvement 
more from operational efficiency improvement than from technology changes during this 
period. The presence of LCC competition can also impact the yields of a service airline in the 
hubbing strategies of the carriers. For instance, Tan and Samuel (2016) find in their study that, 
yields tend to decrease at the de-hubbed airport in the case when LCCs are present at the airport 
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and tend to increase in the case when LCC competition is lacking. As de-hubbing can also 
increase the operating costs for the airlines, indeed airlines may prefer to increase costs by 
de-hubbing to focus on service (or schedule) quality at the expense of higher operating costs.  
 
There exists a strong link between airlines’ operating costs and their strategic actions 
in terms of establishing joint ventures. The main motivation behind joint venture establishment 
is strategic behaviour to prevent rivalry and operational efficiency. Alliances enable partners 
to increase efficiency, reducing expenses by cutting back on fixed costs and wedding out 
redundant operations. By coordinating aircraft and schedules, members can reduce their fleet 
requirements or take more advantage of the capacity available, as operating a larger aircraft is 
more suitable for matching the aircraft size with the demand of a particular route. (Ustaomer, 
Durmaz, & Lei, 2005)  
 
 Alliances between airlines on international markets have become a dominant feature of 
the airline industry.  Many customers demand a ‘from anywhere to anywhere’ service, which 
is impossible for one airline to supply efficiently, and there are significant economies of density 
that can be achieved by merging networks.Airline cooperations and Joint ventures provide 
efficiencies in terms of density of passenger flows. Although economies of scale in operations 
seem to be relatively limited, there are very clear economies to be obtained from generating 
denser flows of passengers, which boosts seat utilization and enables the use of larger and 
lower unit cost aircraft. (Pearce & Doernhoefer, 2014) 
3.4.4.2. Internal and External Factors of Schedule Design 
When developing the timetable, internal and external factors exert limitations to the 
scheduling process. Figure 3.12 presents the general framework of schedule development 
phase. While internal factors are under an airline’s control determined by company-specific 
strategies and policies, external parameters are beyond the airline’s governance and hence pose 
a direct limitation to the scheduling cycle. Some of the major internal and external factors are 
presented in the following sections.  
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Figure 3.13: Conceptual Framework for the Schedule Development Process Referred to in 
(Wensween, 2011) 
 
  Aircraft Utilisation: Aircraft utilisation is the number of hours that an aircraft is used 
per day. As mentioned earlier, aircraft utilisation is an efficiency measure for airlines as more 
sellable capacity is generated with the available fleet by keeping them in the air longer. 
According to Vasigh et al. (2012, s. 105-106), "the airlines have a better chance of making a 
profit with higher aircraft utilisation since the fixed costs are spread out over a greater number 
of revenue hours. Efficient fleet utilisation is one of the key factors in an airlines' efficiency, 
productivity and profitability." When developing the schedule, the planners need to maximise 
aircraft utilisation as much as possible. Any inefficiency that leads to low aircraft utilisation 
may result in an increased unit cost.  
 
 Turnaround Time: The time from the arrival of the aircraft until its next departure is 
called turnaround time. For Van Den Briel et al. (2005), turnaround time is a major metric for 
airlines’ operations and schedule development since aircraft generate an economic value as 
long as it flies, rather than being kept on the ground. From this perspective, higher turnaround 
time reduces aircraft utilisation. Airline operations should minimise turnaround time by taking 
relevant measures at the airport in order for planners to ensure higher aircraft utilisation.   
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 Airport Constraints: The growth of air transport poses a significant challenge to some 
airports with limited capacity concerning demand (Czerny, Forsyth, Gillen, & Niemeier, 2008). 
In order to deal with limited airport capacity and excess demand, authorities employ systems 
such as slot allocation that is required to use the airport at a specific time. Such airport 
constraints constitute a great limitation for airline planners as their flexibility to offer 
frequencies that best meet demand and to maximise aircraft utilisation is restricted. Therefore, 
airport limitations can force planners to diverge from ideal schedules. For this reason, airport 
slots for the congested airports are now great assets for airlines that can even be traded. On the 
other hand, airport night curfews limit capacity (Forsyth, Gillen, Müller, & Niemeier, 2010). 
A night operation restricted airport, the curfew, is always an additional factor in finalising 
timetables. Likewise, some airports are subject to noise quota again restraining the available 
capacity to be offered by the airlines. 
 
 Traffic Rights: Traffic rights are exercised by the country’s designated airlines under 
the term of Air Services Agreement. Airlines are not free to fly to any destination. They need 
to be designated by their civil aviation authorities and approved by the relevant authorities at 
the intended destinations.  Through the Air Services Agreement, governments can regulate the 
frequency, seat capacity, designated airlines and permitted flight destinations. “The entry of a 
new airline into a route is impossible unless its national government is willing and able to 
negotiate the necessary traffic rights.” (Doganis, 2009) Although countries with liberal policies 
on civil aviation eliminate the limitations for air services, protectionism and constraints related 
with the destination country’s permissions and home country’s designations are still a concern 
for airlines, embodying a large restriction on effective schedule design.  
 
3.4.4.3. Flight Connections 
Carriers aiming to receive a reasonable share from the transfer market need to design 
their schedules enabling passengers to make the highest degrees of flight connections. In order 
to realise the maximum benefits of the transfer passenger market, a group of flights needs to 
be scheduled to arrive at a hub and other groups of flights should depart from the airport within 
a given window of time. For this reason, airlines construct a wave structure scheduling 
mechanism. Dennis (1994) refers to an incoming bank and outgoing bank of flights being 
linked together as a wave. According to Bootsma (1997, s. 32), “a wave-system structure 
consists of a number of connection waves, which are a complex of incoming and outgoing 
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flights, structured such that all incoming flights connect to all outgoing flights”. For Burghouwt 
and de Wit (2003), three elements determine the structure of a wave:  
 
1) The minimum connection time,  
2) The maximum connection time,  
3) The maximum number of flights that can be scheduled per time period.  
 
3.4.4.3.1. Minimum connection time (MCT) 
As addressed in Chapter 2, a connection must exceed the MCT that is determined by 
the airport management. This is the minimum time required for a passenger to leave the plane 
of the incoming flight at the hub, complete formalities and catch the next flight. The MCT 
window is required for the transfer of passengers and baggage between two flights as well as 
for the aircraft itself to be turned around (Burghouwt, 2007). Additionally, airports’ published 
MCT figures may include some allowance for delays and baggage processing. As per IATA 
(2017), in determining MCT intervals, “physical and operating characteristics of the particular 
airport, e.g. air traffic delays, ramp and baggage sorting area congestion, history of on-time 
performance, terminals, specific flight origin and/or destination region (such as Schengen 
countries), customs/immigration ‘pre-clearance’ situations, etc.” shall be taken into account. 
Any connection that fails to meet the MCT requirement cannot be counted as a viable 
connection. Transferring bags from one flight to another is a complicated process at the hub 
airport and has a direct impact on determining the MCT. It is even sometimes a more 
constraining process than the transfer of passengers. From this perspective, the airport capacity, 
capability and infrastructure have a direct effect on MCT. The MCT might depend on multiple 
parameters such as the configuration of the passenger terminal, the airline/airport parking 
strategy and the time needed for the passenger's security check (Janic, 2008). Smaller airports 
tend to have a smaller MCT while larger airports publish higher MCTs due to their restrictions, 
formalities and terminal infrastructure.  
 
From the passengers’ perspective, tight flight connections that are barely above the 
MCT can lead to tstress. By considering the worst-case scenarios, such as the delay of the 
incoming flight, extended security checks, walking distance within the terminals, to serve as a 
buffer, passengers may want to add some minutes (conceptualised as tbuffer as addressed in 
Chapter 2) more to the MCT. 
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3.4.4.3.2. Maximum connection time (MaxCT) 
Not all connections which meet the MCT criterion are attractive for passengers. For 
Dennis (2001), longer waiting times at the hub airports may not be acceptable for transfer 
passengers. As covered in Chapter 2, in order to eliminate unattractive connections, the 
maximum acceptable connection time (MaxCT) is employed whose value may vary by fare, 
length of haul, journey purpose and etc. Therefore, a connection is attained, or ‘hit’, if the 
second flight departs after the completion of the MCT and before the completion of MaxCT. 
Figure 3.13 presents an illustration of attaining a hit that is achieved in case the below 
conditions are met:  
 
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝑀𝐶𝑇 ≤ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  and 
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 ≥ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
 
Figure 3.14: Minimum and Maximum Connection Time Requirements. (Only the Second and 
Third Outbound Flights (Showed by Dotted Lines) are Hits and Feasible Connections. Adapted 
From (Seredynski, Rothlauf, & Groesche, 2004)) 
 
 
 
Goedeking (2010) discuss that due to the diverse region and working nature of airports 
and passenger profiles across the world, it would be disadvantageous to define globally 
accepted fixed MaxCTs. He proposes that a dynamic, auto-adaptive hit is the only way to 
ensure direct comparability of the connectivity of hubs located in diverse markets. However, 
given its simplicity in implementation, a fixed MaxCT is preferable when evaluating schedule 
scenarios. The examples of fixed MaxCTs are summarised in the table below. It is noteworthy 
to state that, MaxCT's shown in Table 3.7 got longer nowadays due to the increasing security 
requirements, raising the volume of transfer passengers and of course decreasing on-time 
performance.  
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Table 3.7: MaxCT Propositions in the Literature for the Different Type of Connections 
MaxCT Type of Connection Reference 
90 minutes All type of connections (Doganis & Dennis, 1989) 
180 minutes Continental flights 
(Bootsma, 1997) and 
(Burghouwt & DeWit, The 
Temporal Configuration of 
European Airline Networks, 
2003) 
300 minutes Continental to intercontinental flights 
(Burghouwt & DeWit, The 
Temporal Configuration of 
European Airline Networks, 
2003) 
720 minutes Intercontinental connections 
(Burghouwt & DeWit, The 
Temporal Configuration of 
European Airline Networks, 
2003) 
120 minutes Continental connections (Danesi, 2006) 
180 minutes 
Connections involving intercontinental 
flights 
(Danesi, 2006) 
 
 
3.4.4.3.3. The maximum number of flights that can be scheduled per time period 
For Dennis (2001) since no airport has unlimited capacity, an airline intending to add 
flights to a hub has two principal options. It can either schedule the flight to the edge of a wave 
or it can develop new waves. Adding flights to existing waves is advantageous because of the 
higher number of hits generated. However, due to limited airport capacity, additional 
connections created by an extra flight, which must be located at the earlier edges of a wave, 
would likely involve long tconn. If the additional flight is placed towards the tail of the wave, 
some connection hits are likely to be missed due to the MCT requirements and passenger 
preferences. Additionally, a wave could be at its maximum limits preventing airports from 
accepting further flights. In this case, the airline should develop new waves if there are other 
available waves, facilitating relevant hits. From this perspective, airport and airline schedules 
are restricted by the maximum flight accommodation level at a wave in addition to the potential 
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number of waves that can be generated within a day. According to Graham (2001), the capacity 
of the airport cannot be assessed by a single measure. The capacity of the runways, terminals, 
gates and so on all have to be considered. These can be measured on an hourly, daily, monthly 
and annual basis. This reality further restricts airline network planners and airport management.  
 
The term wave is a pattern of movements in a system where an outbound bank follows 
an inbound bank then again by a sequence of inbound and outbound banks. The proper up and 
down sequencing of inbound and outbound banks compose the wave structure. An example of 
inbound and outbound banks is demonstrated in Figure 3.15 below where each square 
represents an individual flight. 
 
Figure 3.15: Definition of Inbound and Outbound Banks from Networks in Aviation 
(Goedeking, 2010) 
 
 
As Figure 3.15 demonstrates, the inbound bank duration (BDI) refers to the time interval 
between the first and last flight of the inbound bank, whereas the outgoing bank duration (BDO) 
is the time interval for the outbound bank. The duration of the bank is; 
 
𝐵𝐷𝑇 = 𝐵𝐷𝐼 + 𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝐵𝐷𝑂 
 
Under optimum circumstances, in order to avoid any missed hit, the last flight of the inbound 
bank must connect with the first flight of the outbound bank. Therefore, the outbound bank 
needs to be (BDI + MCT) minutes after the start of the inbound wave. Additionally, to prevent 
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wait times longer than MaxCT, BDI and BDO must be designed in such a way that the initial 
flight of the inbound bank connects with the last flight of the outbound bank. For this reason, 
the following conditions need to hold true;  
 
𝐵𝐷𝐼 + 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 ≤ 𝐵𝐷𝑇         (1)   and    
𝐵𝐷𝐼 + 𝑀𝐶𝑇 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇      or     𝐵𝐷𝐼 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 − 𝑀𝐶𝑇  (2) 
Rewriting the first expression   
 
𝐵𝐷𝐼 + 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 ≤ 𝐵𝐷𝐼 + 𝑀𝐶𝑇 + 𝐵𝐷𝑂 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑇 − 𝑀𝐶𝑇 ≤ 𝐵𝐷𝑂 
 
It is implied that the maximum value of the BDI can be (MaxCT – MCT), while this number is 
at the same time the minimum optimum duration for the BDO (Intervistas, 2014). It should be 
noted that if all flights in the inbound bank can be connected to all flights in the outbound bank, 
the total number of generated hits are (Wittmer, Bieger, & Müller, 2011); 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) 𝑥 𝑛(𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) 
 
where 𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) is the total number of flights in the inbound bank and 𝑛(𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) is the 
total number of flights in the outbound bank. The final number of hits would change depending 
on : (Goedeking, 2010) 
 
- The number of flights in a bank 
- The number of banks in a day 
- Airport infrastructure like terminal capacity 
- The MCT requirement of the airport  
- MaxCT 
- The design of the wave: Parametric attributes of the wave-like BDI, BDO and BDT, 
as well as the shape of the wave like the overlap or independence of inbound and outbound 
banks affect the number of viable hits. 
- Directionality: In order for inbound flights to connect well to outbound flights, the 
origin of inbound flights and the destination of the outbound flights need to be relevant. For 
instance, for a hub in Europe, if an inbound bank is composed of US flights and outbound 
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flights are designed to depart for the US again, relevant connections would not be attained in 
the bank, reducing the number of achieved hits. 
 - Delay Expectations: MCT is an airport dictated parameter and sets the minimum 
duration of connecting time at the hub. However, in reality, the probability of a delay with the 
inbound flight's arrival to occur is not zero per cent. For Wu (2010, s. Section 2.5.4), 
"passengers who suffer delays lose time as well as the potential value of the delay time. In 
addition to the direct value of the lost time, delays cause disruptions to passenger itineraries, 
business activities and social arrangements". Thus, planning a connection at the limits without 
any tbuffer is risky and may cause inconveniences in the form of a step function in case a 
misconnection happens as the passengers would be obliged to travel with a new itinerary. 
Airline schedulers should estimate the expected delay for each flight and schedule the flights 
in reference to this information. For Dunbar et al. (2014), including additional delay 
information within the aircraft routing and scheduling in the form of scenarios has the potential 
to improve the overall solution robustness of the airline schedule. Therefore, airline schedulers 
need to consider several parameters to meet the requirements of an effective wave design in 
case they structure their business strategy for increasing transfer passenger traffic.  
 
3.4.4.3.4. Literature on Hub Airports’ Connectivity Measures 
 
The connectivity of the hubs is an essential parameter for airline planners. Besides, 
according to Malighetti et al. (2008), connectivity, which determines how easy an airport can 
reach the rest of the world, is one of the key attributes that airport managements consider. In 
the industry, there exist plenty of commonly used connectivity measures such as the models of 
ACI-Europe and Netscan. ACI’s connectivity index is calculated by weighting the schedule 
related parameters like the frequency, MCT and tconn (ACI Europe, 2017).  For Veldhuis (1997) 
the Netscan model considers the direct and indirect flights and use schedule, transfer time, 
MCT and great circle distance data to weight the connectivity units. Logothetis and Miyoshi 
(2018) introduced a new model for evaluating connectivity at hub airports which assessed both 
schedule and comfort related attributes of indirect flights. The authors also attempted to inject 
a quality perspective into the connectivity indexes which takes not only the detour factor and 
time-related parameters into consideration but also the aircraft type, seat supply and frequency 
factor. 
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3.4.5. Fleet Assignment Cycle 
The fleet assignment is the process of assigning the right aircraft type for each particular 
flight in the constructed schedule. The fleet assignment is a different process than fleet planning 
(Clark, 2012). While fleet planning is a process of identifying capacity requirements for the 
airline, the fleet assignment is about addressing the fleet inventory to the relevant flights in the 
constructed schedule. In practice, airlines have multiple aircraft types in their fleet. Within the 
fleet assignment, planners need to use the right aircraft for the most appropriate flights while 
meeting various operational constraints (Abara, 1989). Although the number of frequencies is 
decided during the schedule construction phase, total capacity offered to a market at the O&D 
level is finalised after the fleet assignment as the number of sf is finalised at this stage. 
 
During the fleet assignment phase, the schedulers need to assign the right aircraft to the 
right destination to ensure profitability by maximising revenue and minimising costs. Various 
studies ensuring cost minimisation through objective functions are present in the literature. 
Hane et al. (1996) first modelled a fleet assignment problem that was simplified by the 
assumption that each flight is flown every day of the week. This approach facilitated a 
reasonable solution of practically sized problems. In their objective function, they minimised 
the total cost of assigning fleet types to segments while ensuring that one fleet type covers each 
leg and the flow balance at a given node in the network is ensured. As a sequel to this work, 
Clarke et al. (1996) generalised the basic model by inserting maintenance and crew scheduling 
considerations while preserving the solvability and cost minimisation objective. Lohatepanont 
and Barnhart (2004) as cited in Bae (2010) dealt with the immense problem size and complexity 
to minimise cost by employing incremental approaches to schedule design, working with a 
subset of candidate flight segments for fleet assignment from a given flight schedule at each 
step. Li et al. (2006) further elaborated on the fleet assignment problem by including belly 
cargo considerations in their model. 
 
In previous literature, most of the fleet assignment problems considered leg based 
passenger flow. However, with the rise of HS networks and airline executives’ focus on 
connecting passengers, as Barnhart et al. (2002) argued, as all legs in a network are 
interdependent, failing to capture network effect may inhibit the optimal fleet assignment 
problem. For this reason, they incorporated itinerary based passenger flow into their fleet 
assignment model. Rexing et al. (2000) considered the appointment of aircraft on flights 
together with departure times to improve flight connection opportunities.  
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3.4.6. Load Factor and Yield Management 
When assigning aircraft to a flight, it is essential to ensure the highest levels of load 
factor. Flying aircraft with empty seats encapsulate a direct opportunity cost for the carriers. 
This requires a proper demand analysis and its incorporation into the fleet assignment process. 
Assigning larger aircraft to a low-demand market leads to low utilisation and consequently 
lower load factor. On the other hand, assigning small aircraft to a highly demanded leg results 
in passenger spill, implying that the demand exceeds the capacity offered. The spill cost is, 
therefore, the potential revenue of lost passengers due to insufficient aircraft capacity 
(Bazargan, 2004) and needs to be added to the fleet assignment problem. For Ozer & Phillips 
(2012), the load factor (LF) of flight i is defined as  
 
𝐿𝐹𝑖 =
𝑝𝑎𝑥𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖 
𝑠𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
=  
𝑝𝑎𝑥𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖 
𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖
 
 
where  𝑝𝑎𝑥𝑖 is the total number of passengers, 𝑠𝑖 is the number of available seats and 𝑚𝑖 is the 
mileage for flight i. Defining revenue yield (RY), as the revenue per passenger, the yield of 
flight i is then  
𝑅𝑌𝑖 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝑝𝑎𝑥𝑖  𝑥 𝑚𝑖
 
 
 Multiplying 𝑅𝑌𝑖 with 𝐿𝐹𝑖, 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 is obtained. 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖
  = 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖  
 
Remembering that profit per available seat mile is the subtraction of 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 and 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖, 
(Vasigh, Flemming, & Humphreys, 2015), the profitability of flight i is; 
 
(𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 −  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖) =  (𝐿𝐹𝑖 𝑥 𝑅𝑌𝑖) −  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖 
=  [(𝐿𝐹𝑖 𝑥 𝑅𝑌𝑖) −  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
] 
 
As the objective function, the following profit expression of the airline needs to be maximised,  
 
∑ [(𝐿𝐹𝑖 𝑥 𝑅𝑌𝑖)  −  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
]   
𝑛
𝑖=1
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where n is the total number of flight legs. The equation implies that spill passengers have to be 
minimised to keep LF and profitability high. The multiplication of LF with the RY is an issue 
of demand elasticity as the carrier can play with load factors by adjusting the fares accordingly. 
The process of balancing demand and yield relates to yield management. Pfeifer (1989) defines 
the yield management as “the process by which discount fares are allocated to scheduled flights 
for the purposes of balancing demand and increasing revenues”. Kimes (1989) argues that yield 
management guides the decision of how to allocate undifferentiated units of capacity to 
available demand in such a way as to maximise profit or revenue. For Smith et al. (1992) yield 
management is used to control capacity profitably, which can lead to a great increase in 
revenues. Boyd (1998) alleges that the implementation of a yield management system that 
balances demand and capacity can improve revenues between 2 to 8 per cent or even more. 
From this perspective, the coordination of the yield management department with the fleet 
assignment department is critical for the airlines’ profitability.  
 
3.4.7. Aircraft Routing / Tail Assignment Cycle 
 Aircraft routing is the process of addressing a particular aircraft to each flight segment. 
During the fleet assignment phase, it is not identified which specific aircraft from the fleet is 
assigned to each flight. From this perspective, aircraft routing is also named as “tail 
assignment” or “aircraft rotation”. For Wilson et al. (2009), “the aircraft routing problem 
involves finding paths from a specified start point to a specified destination. Routes are 
composed of straight-line segments joining intermediate ‘waypoints’ and the problem is to 
position these waypoints so that the resulting path avoids certain ‘hard’ constraints (such as 
geographical features and ‘no-fly zones’) and has low exposure to ‘soft’ constraints (such as 
risks from military missile threats or low fuel reserves)”. They define the optimality of a route 
based on minimising cost. Bartholomew-Biggs et al. (2003) studied the tail assignment 
problem as finding an optimal flight path traversing a minimal distance between a given O&D 
pair while avoiding obstacles in a geographical sense. From this perspective, aircraft routing 
has a direct impact on profitability as the optimal solution minimises unit cost through shorter 
distance travels and increased aircraft utilisation. For Gopalan and Talluri (1998), aircraft 
routing problem should minimise the operating cost with the following considerations: 
- Each flight needs to be covered by an aircraft. 
- The aircraft must have balanced utilisation loads. 
- Maintenance requirements must be met. 
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Since the maintenance facilities of an airline are located either at their hub or in another 
contracted destination, once an individual aircraft’s maintenance period is due, the aircraft has 
to be routed to that destination. Table 3.8 and Figure 3.16 demonstrate an example of a two-
day rotation of an aircraft.   
Table 3.8 and Figure 3.16: 2-day Rotation for a 738 Aircraft Originating Its Journey in Los 
Angeles at 5.00 Am in Day 1 and Returning to Los Angeles at 21.30 in Day 2. The Figure Is 
Adapted From (Airline Operations and Scheduling, 2004) 
 Flight Number Origin Departure Time Destination Arrival Time 
Day 1 
101 LAX 05:00 JFK 13:30 
129 JFK 15:05 ORD 16:05 
109 ORD 17:10 JFK 20:10 
Day 2 
140 JFK 06:20 IAD 07:20 
120 IAD 14:25 JFK 15:25 
127 JFK 19:00 LAX 21:30 
 
 
 
3.4.8. Interline and Codeshare Flight Planning 
Airlines launch new flight destinations or increase flight capacity to a certain 
destination so long as they have adequate resources in terms of capital and labour to operate. 
As mentioned in earlier sections, demand in this context is the ultimate driver triggering the 
appointment of organic (physical) capacity that refers to the airline’s self-resources. While 
assigning capacity to a particular O&D, the forecasted demand is estimated to be above the 
critical mass enabling the airline decision makers to take the flight from origin to destination 
with the airlines’ capacity. However, it may be the case that an airline would still prefer to be 
present in the markets whose estimated demand figures are below the critical mass qualifying 
to assign physical capacity. It may also be the case that even if the demand is sufficient enough 
to place an organic capacity to a route, the airline may not be able to offer physical capacity 
due to the limited resources of the carrier in terms of capital and labour or due to the regulatory 
LAX JFK ORD JFK IAD JFK LAX
Day 1 Day 2 
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framework such as the unavailability of traffic rights, airport slot restrictions and etc. For 
Holloway (2008), for carriers, the choice lies between using their aircraft and outsourcing 
capacity provision. Serving a solution for such limitations, many airlines are now extending 
their commercial networks by entering into codeshare agreements. For Robinson et al. (2013), 
because of the rising global competition between airlines, to differentiate their products and 
reach as many destinations as possible which in most cases is not economically viable, airlines 
partner with others and enter into code-share agreements. In a codeshare agreement,  the 
airlines share the two-lettered designation for the contracted flights. Stolzer et al. (2011) 
resemble the code-share agreements to a supplier agreement, that is, “the supplier provides 
products or services based on the service level or quality agreements”. As covered in Chapter 
2, marketing carriers can sell the seats on the operated flight as if those seats are at the 
marketing carrier’s own discretion. An operating carrier may allow more than one marketing 
carrier on a particular flight.  
 
Before the proliferation of code-share agreements, interline agreements were 
widespread. Shaw (2007) defines an interline connection whereby the inbound flight to a hub 
and the outbound from it are performed with different airlines. With interline agreements, 
consumers are permitted to travel across networks of multiple airlines with the convenience of 
a single itinerary, requiring operating and marketing carriers to integrate their IT systems 
effectively to grant passenger convenience.  
 
Various advantages of interline and codeshare agreements exist for both the operating 
and marketing carriers. While the marketing carrier extends its network coverage through the 
partnership with a lower cost figure in comparison to the cost of organic capacity assignment, 
the operating carrier establishes a new channel to sell their seats by means of another airline’s 
inventory. With the support of the marketing carrier, the operating carrier can increase the load 
factors. For Szakal (2013), the main advantage of interlining from the carriers' perspective is 
the revenue increase. The cooperating airlines have the opportunity to offer a highly 
competitive joint fare that attracts customers to their particular route.  In case the operating 
airline is somewhat smaller than the marketing carrier, such an agreement would build up the 
operating carrier’s image and credibility. From this perspective, regional carriers engage in 
such agreements aggressively. Almost all regional airlines operate under codeshare agreements 
(Lee, 2007). Through these contracts, regional airlines enable major carriers to offer additional 
capacity and market presence with their codes, which they would otherwise not likely be able 
to offer themselves profitably. In other words, the primary marketing carriers outsource some 
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of their flights to operating carriers through code-share agreements, offering a seamless trip for 
passengers travelling to offline destinations, which are not organically covered.  
 
Although generating network synergies is the principal motivation behind such 
cooperation between airlines, it should be noted that some airlines are fierce competitors on 
most parts of their respective networks too. However, because of the mutual business needs, 
they still can construct codeshare agreements on specific routes. Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996) formed the term ‘‘co-opetition’’ to define this kind of phenomenon. In this sense, 
interline and codeshare agreements prove that the airline industry is a good example of co-
opetition. On the other hand, Abdelghany and Abdelghany (2009) have a more cautious view 
on codeshare agreements stating that "most code-share agreements are implemented based on 
the assumption that the agreement will generate additional demand that will fill empty seats on 
the participating flights. However, in some case, this additional code-share demand would 
displace non-codeshare passengers on the operating carriers' flights". They believe such 
agreements might cause revenue loss for airlines. For this reason, airline decision makers need 
to investigate the trade-off between the incremental revenue from a code-share agreement and 
the revenue loss from displacing non-code-share passengers. In this context, the coverage of 
the codeshare agreements is a focal point of concern.  
 
3.5. Airline Market Share Evaluation and Quality Service Index (QSI) 
 
Due to the commoditisation process of air travel and rising flight options available for 
sale, the importance of schedule convenience in the decision-making process of consumers is 
increasing for all traveller segments. The schedule convenience is charged by the airlines and 
paid by the travellers. In addition to its impact on the fare, it is also apparent that an airline’s 
market share expectations are correlated with their products’ schedule convenience. The 
following Chapter provides a literature review concerning schedule convenience and passenger 
choice in detail. This section covers the market share estimation mechanisms currently 
available in current knowledge. As addressed in Chapter 1, market share is a particular 
parameter of market performance as higher market shares on a given O&D imply relatively 
stronger market presence and thus better economic performance.   
 
The “S-curve” relationship between airline market share and frequency share is 
accepted is depicted in Figure 3.16. The S-curve relation between the market share and the 
frequency infers that higher volumes of capacity shares lead to higher market share 
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performance. As an example, Belobaba et al. (2009) argue that in a two-airline competitive 
market, if one carrier serves 60% of the non-stop flights, it is likely to capture more than 60% 
of the market share. Conversely, the other airline will see less than 40% market share. Button 
and Drexler (2005) note, it is difficult to trace the origins and evolution of the S-curve model 
from published literature. Early theoretical development and empirical studies for the pre-
deregulation era demonstrate that higher-frequency shares are linked with disproportionately 
higher market shares (Taneja, 1976). For the S-curve theory, a frequency advantage-building 
airline is rewarded by a proportionately greater market share advantage. After deregulation, 
there are further references to the S-curve (Baseler, 2002). According to the IATA report 
(2006), with the S-Curve in mind, network managers have attempted to limit the damage in the 
markets in which they are disadvantaged either by matching competitors’ frequencies (often 
triggering unnecessary overcapacity) and by focusing on connecting traffic or by withdrawing 
altogether. For an HS carrier, the S-curve phenomenon may assist in strengthening its 
competitive position at a hub. By adding frequencies on the spokes, it is expected to receive 
more than a proportional share of traffic, and the trend may continue until the carrier dominates 
these markets (Ghobrial, 1991). Skinner et al. (1999) find that, a carrier dominant at a hub may 
use its S-curve advantage to drive out other competitors, and that carriers use the S-curve in 
their decisions to adjust in terms of adding or removing capacity. 
 
Figure 3.17: A Depiction of S-Curve. Market Share vs Frequency Share Adapted From (The 
Global Airline Industry, 2009) 
 
 
There are different views towards the S-curve phenomenon. According to O’Connor 
(2001), although the S-curve approach seems to be an argument against removal of entry 
controls, as new entrants would “overschedule in an effort to win an adequate share of the 
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market, while the established carriers would retaliate by expanding their schedules further”. 
Opponents of the theory would argue that a carrier losing money because of insufficient market 
share and thus “flying too many empty seats will seek to correct the problem by further 
expanding the number of seats it is offering”. Although there are various applications of the S-
curve in the literature, as the work of Cheung (2004) demonstrates, market dynamics facilitated 
primarily by the LCCs can shape the strategy of airlines incompatible with the S-curve theory. 
Not all observations accept the existence of the S-curve relationship (Holloway, 2008). For 
example, relatively smaller competitors with a strong brand and value proposition may be able 
to retain a market share premium.  
 
Capacity abundance cannot be argued to be the sole factor shaping consumer choice. 
Market share at O&D or airport level can be discussed through the impact of many other 
parameters on top of capacity and frequency supply. According to Goedeking (2010), after the 
analysis of the S-curve effect for 4,300 global and randomly selected O&Ds, the effect is 
argued to be so weak that it does not qualify as a strategic lever. In their book “Jumping the S-
Curve” (2011), Nunes and Breene describe the phenomenon of "the bigger, the better" as a 
legend since no correlation is found between a company’s relative size in an industry and 
business performance. They discuss that industry-leading scale is not a requirement for high 
performance.  
 
Given such impairment and potential lack of justification with the general rule of 
thumb, as in the case of the S-curve model, there is a real need for airlines to concretely and 
objectively define the metrics and quantify the convenience of their product with a competitive 
benchmark. This process is utterly complicated as airlines have multiple numbers of products 
between several O&Ds and its products’ schedule driven attraction can differ on different 
routes. If an airline is flying to n destinations from a single origin and the carrier has a PP 
network strategy, the number of potential indexes the airline has is in the complexity of O(n). 
On the other extreme, if the airline connects each of its destinations via HS network strategy, 
the carrier has to deal with O(n2) different convenience indexes for each O&D pairs. 
Additionally, it is also a challenging task to set up a product convenience consistency index for 
all O&D pairs. Due to the vast number of product valuations, which needs to be consistent with 
each other, a model that is widely accepted in the airline industry to valuate products was 
necessary. Such a global approach would create a standardised platform to benchmark products 
among competing airlines.  
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Serving these purposes, the Quality Service Index (referred to as QSI) has become a 
norm in the airline industry. The QSI method provides an option to somewhat benchmark the 
service level of different flight options by quantifying consumer behaviour. Although there are 
multiple ways of computing a service index, the general practice in the industry is to employ 
QSI to assess the schedule related attraction. According to Intervistas report (2012), QSI is a 
powerful tool to forecast expected market share in the industry as it predicts consumer 
behaviour by quantifying the relative attractiveness of different flight options. It can assist 
airlines in answering questions regarding expected passenger flow, their contribution to route 
profitability and market share. Simultaneously, QSI can be employed to evaluate changes in 
quality of air service over time and against other airports. QSI models, introduced by the U.S. 
institutions in 1957 in the era of airline regulation associate an O&D’s passenger share to its 
“quality” (Civil Aeronautics Board, 1970), where it is defined as a function of various itinerary 
service attributes and their corresponding preference weights.  
The QSI computation process starts with the determination of parameters that are 
influential in consumer’s choice, continues with assigning coefficients to each factor to 
generate the QSI score and completes by comparing the score of other flight alternatives 
(Weatherhill, 2008). The parameters that are often used during QSI calculation are weekly 
frequency, seat capacity - aircraft type, day/time of the flight and total journey time.  There 
exists software that enables airlines to automatically generate QSI scores for each airline for 
different O&D pairs. Thus, the present QSI calculation methodology is strictly mathematical 
with the inputs provided to the computation are unprocessed figures obtained directly from 
airline schedules. The coefficients that are appointed to decision factors are mathematical too. 
The QSI of flight x can be formulated with the following equation where n is the number of 
factors associated, α’s are the preference coefficients while X denotes the independent 
variables. 
𝑄𝑆𝐼(𝑥) = α1𝑋1  +  α2𝑋2 +  … + α𝑛𝑋𝑛 =  ∑ α𝑛𝑋𝑛
𝑛
 
 
where   ∑ 𝛼𝑛1 = 1. 
 
The market share expectation of a flight y can then be expressed as; 
 
Ey = 
𝑄𝑆𝐼 (𝑦)
∑ 𝑄𝑆𝐼 (𝑡)𝑡 ∈𝑇
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where t represents the total number of competing airlines present in the O&D route of flight y.  
The inputs denoted by X1 to Xn are obtained through the schedules of the airlines and  are purely 
related to capacity. Whilst, for instance, daily availability of the flight y can be a factor for QSI 
computation, non-schedule related factors such as seat comfort or airline brand cannot be 
included in this methodology.    
 
There are critics towards the traditional QSI computation model. Such methodological 
deficiencies can lead to fallacies in market share expectations that QSI generate. The arguments 
regarding the insufficiency of the current QSI method can be grouped into methodological and 
parameter related concerns. From the methodology point of view, Jacobs et al. (2012) stress 
two fundamental theoretical problems regarding the QSI. The first concern relates to the 
independent determination of coefficients α from others in the model, inhibiting observation 
of the interaction between factors. The second methodological issue stems from the fact that 
QSI models are not able to assess the underlying competitive dynamic that may exist among 
flight alternatives. Parameter related inability of the QSI method sources from the fact that the 
classic static mathematical approach is not able to catch the decision-making algorithm of the 
passengers due to several reasons. The listed parameters X may not entirely compose the whole 
factors that impact the decision of passengers. The value that a passenger might attach to a 
parameter can significantly differ from one passenger to another. Different passenger segments 
may have different needs and priorities that they seek the best alternative during the decision-
making process. Adopting a global static method, in this case, would not result in the most 
refined outputs.   
 
The Transportation Research Board’s report on Aviation Demand Forecasting (2002) 
suggests that QSI’s focus is centred on capacity. However, the volume of capacity cannot be 
the sole factor affecting an airline’s realistic market share. In addition to the number of seats 
provided by schedulers trying to fit the demand, the quality of the supplied capacity is relevant 
for realistic market share estimation too. For Clark (2012), it is essential to calibrate QSI 
calculation with historical data employing exponents. He argues that although simple QSI 
methods remain attractive due to their transparency and ease of use, more sophisticated 
approaches such as the logit model, which is a popular probabilistic model representing the 
discrete band of consumer choice behaviour, would provide better predictions.  
 
Cost is a major driver of success for each profit-oriented organisation. For Koester 
(2009), retaining an advantageous unit cost structure is a source of competitive advantage for 
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firms. For him, a lower unit cost of sale figure differentiates the company and influential in 
bringing in a higher market share. A lower cost structure scheme can raise market share as long 
as the advantage is reflected to passengers. This is indeed the major philosophy behind the 
success of the LCC model. The QSI that is solely built on the capacity model would not be 
capable of apprehending cost related drivers. As a theoretical example, the total cost of 
transporting a passenger from City A to City B directly for Airline X can be lower for Airline 
Y via City C, if the following equation holds true: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐵𝑥  𝑥 𝑚𝐴𝐵 > (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑦 𝑥 𝑚𝐴𝐶) +  (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑦 𝑥 𝑚𝐶𝐵)  
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the cost per available seat mile for airline t and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is the mileage between i 
and j. The above inequality can hold true if the cost structure of Airline Y is more advantageous 
than Airline X. Furthermore, airline Y can operate large aircraft compared to Airline X with the 
higher number of seats enabling them to reduce the cost of seat per mile significantly (Duetsch, 
2002). Therefore, it is probable that price sensitive passengers may prefer to take a connecting 
flight option via City C, rather than an existent point-to-point service between A and B. A static 
capacity perspective favouring direct flights in the QSI model may not fully reflect the market 
dynamics. 
 
Therefore, parameters other than capacity need to be injected into the QSI model. In 
this case, individual QSI(z) for each facet z is to be individually computed with their coefficient 
impact of µz. Any additional independent facets, such as the stimulation factors mentioned in 
the Intervistas report dated 2012, bring a new QSI calculation along which needs to be merged 
to compute the final QSI (A) with the weight factor µ. 
 
𝑄𝑆𝐼(𝐴) = ∑ µ𝑧 𝑄𝑆𝐼 (𝑧)𝑧 ∈𝑍   and ∑ µ𝑧 = 1 where 
𝑄𝑆𝐼(𝑧) = ∑ α𝑛𝑧𝑛𝑛   as introduced above. 
 
An example of this could be the airfares. Farkas (1996) demonstrates that yield and revenue 
management has a significant impact on traffic volume and mix. Although an airline might 
have capacity QSI, it can increase its realistic market share by reducing fares and aim to capture 
a higher passenger flow. Codeshare flights can be another example of a possible facet. The 
computation of a codeshare flight’s seat contribution on overall capacity as well as the 
traveller’s view on codeshare flights may severely influence the actual figures of a carrier’s 
market shares.   
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However, although including additional parameters would extend the QSI’s coverage 
beyond capacity, it is still subject to the abovementioned criticisms. From the theoretical 
perspective, on top of the subjective coefficient α, an additional bias factor µ is introduced 
where both coefficients compose an essential determinant of the final QSI(A). Additionally, 
assuming sub-QSI (z) forming QSI (A) with factor µz would be a flawed approach without any 
sensitivity analysis that captures the interrelation between QSI(z). From the methodological 
perspective, the validity of each QSI(z) from the standpoint of consumer behaviour requires 
justification.    
 
3.6. Identification of the Gaps in the Literature Review and Implications for This 
Research 
This chapter summarised the previous studies concerning the commoditisation process 
of the airline industry and elaborated on different airline business models, network structures 
as well as their planning processes. It has discussed how the number of passengers and rivalry 
among airlines has intensified, especially after the deregulation era, enabling different business 
models and network structures to emerge. It has also seen in the previous academic studies that 
the available network assessment methodologies are highly technical yet severely lack the 
consumers’ perspectives. Christoph Franz, ex-chief executive of Deutsche Lufthansa Airlines 
(2010) states, "The academic literature we find on network management focuses mostly on 
sophisticated computerised scheduling and resource allocation, but not on fundamental 
strategy", clearly pointing out the strategic aspect of the network concept. Consumer 
satisfaction is a strategical aspect of schedule attractiveness and network assessment. 
Therefore, this research aims to fill this gap in the literature by addressing a strategic, 
consumer-oriented perspective concerning schedules and the schedule convenience of the 
carriers. For this reason, the technical network assessment methods referred in this Chapter 
will not be used for determining network efficiency of the carriers.  
 
Airline supply (the quantity) affects market dominance and economic performance. 
However, amid the expansion of hub and spoke networks and non-operating products, the 
scope of supply has changed as the volume of connecting services and codeshare flights have 
risen tremendously. For this reason, a re-definition of product supply incorporating the 
consumers’ perspectives and shifting business models is essential, which serves as the 1st 
Objective of the research.  
 
  
106 
The literature review has also addressed the current scarce market share estimation 
models considered in current research. As discussed, the existing models are highly static and 
mathematical yet do not comply with the realities of the airline industry since passenger 
profiles and their preferences are changing rapidly. Having a pre-defined static market share 
forecast methodology hardly captures the substituting dynamics of the industry. Besides, as an 
outcome of the commoditisation process, more individuals have access to the air transport 
product than ever before, undoubtedly forming new segments of passenger profiles. From this 
perspective, the estimation models to be developed in this research focus on understanding 
passenger profiles and their varying needs. Therefore a different, consumer-centric, perspective 
of realistic market share estimation procedures is a goal which serves as the Objective 3 of the 
research. The market share estimation model to be introduced not only uses the "quantity" of 
consumer-centric capacity but also the perceived quality of this capacity. For this reason, the 
following Chapter covers consumers' preferences in their itinerary decision-making processes 
to develop an understanding concerning airlines schedule quality perceptions.  
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Chapter 4: Literature Review – Consumer Choice in Air Transport 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 presented an extensive literature review on the airline industry in general as 
well as an overview of the carriers’ business models, network structures, planning processes 
and current market performance estimation models. Since this research aimed to develop a 
passenger centric methodology for analysing the schedule and network performance of air 
services, understanding the theoretical background on consumer preferences was essential for 
designing itineraries to take into account their perceived quality and impact on purchasing 
decisions. For this reason, this Chapter covers an extensive literature review concerning the 
dynamics of consumer behaviour in the airline industry. Previous studies concerning passenger 
attitudes and perspectives towards certain itinerary attributes were invaluable for designing 
passenger survey whose results formed an integral aspect of the research’s methodology.  
 
In order to remain competitive in the market, airlines should closely watch their 
customers’ expectations and design their services accordingly. For Reilly (1996, s. 39), “a 
carrier's complete commitment to gauging, evaluating and meeting customer expectations, and 
the extent to which that commitment permeates every personnel layer in the organisation, is 
universally seen as key in customer service maintenance and improvement". Today, airlines 
know that to compete effectively, they must improve the experience and value they deliver to 
passengers. The challenge airlines face is the identification of customer requirements and the 
need to develop products and services to satisfy those requirements while also producing 
profitable returns on investment (PWC, 2015). As explained in the previous Chapter, flying 
used to be a luxury in earlier decades but has become a commodity demanded by a wider 
spectrum of society. Furthermore, the industry has multiple segments of consumers, whom 
have different expectations for the air travel product and varying priorities when making 
purchase decisions.  
 
The following section (4.2) discusses the basic service characteristics of air transport 
and analyses the link between the airline performance and consumer satisfaction. Section 4.3 
focuses on the customer segments in the industry and elaborates on the variations in the 
preferences of different segments. The final section (4.4) reviews consumer preference factors 
available in literature by categorical subheadings, including airline safety & security, schedule, 
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departure & arrival time preference, on-time performance, frequency/routing & airport, 
codeshare flights, fare and pre-flight & onboard services.  
 
4.2. Air Transport Product as a Service 
 
Kotler and Keller (2012) state that service is any act or performance that can be offered 
by one party to another, which is intangible and does not cause any ownership. Services 
represent the activities offered to consumers to fulfil their needs while ensuring satisfaction. 
They define satisfaction as the feeling of happiness or upset of consumers that emerges after 
comparing the performance of services delivered with the consumers’ expectations. According 
to Andrew (2008), service refers to the customers’ total experience from the performance of 
the people serving while satisfying their need. Meanwhile, Yoeti (2003) suggests that service 
involves economic activities whose output is not a physical product and is generally consumed 
at that time of production, providing added value in forms such as convenience, amusement, 
comfort or health. Ekinci and Sirakaya (2004) find that service quality is an antecedent of 
customer satisfaction and therefore the evaluation of service quality leads to customer 
satisfaction. Their study also indicates that consumer convenience rather than service quality 
is a better reflection of overall attitudes; as the link between attitudes and consumer satisfaction 
are reciprocal.  
 
For Wensveen (2007), the air transport product is not a physical product, but services 
that passengers find useful. He points out that the service provided by the airlines is customised, 
meaning that each passenger may perceive and experience it entirely in a different manner.  
Sanyal and Hissam (2016) find that service quality and passenger satisfaction has a direct 
impact on passenger preference; service quality and passenger satisfaction has significance for 
the management of airlines, as they need to focus on improving those aspects in order to 
increase consumer inflow. Therefore, the demand for an airline is highly impacted by the 
perceived quality of their service. Zeithaml et al. (1996) state that without exception, poor 
service in the airline industry results in a customer's change in carrier or diminished use of the 
unsatisfactory line.   
 
For many industries, creating objective metrics for benchmarking perceived quality is 
not a challenging task as the products and services can easily be deconstructed to objective 
means of sub-parameters. However, the case of the airline industry is relatively complicated. 
The definition of the air transportation product begins with a passenger’s ticket booking and 
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itinerary selection process, continues with their experience at the airport and on board, ending 
with the arrival to the final destination with all the baggage properly delivered. Thus, the 
service that passengers receive from an airline incorporates the processes before, during and 
after the flight. Passengers’ experiences in all these parameters are critical when making 
product decisions.  
 
Understanding the attraction of their product and relative position among their 
competitors is a crucial process for companies. Companies can set their revenue and 
performance expectation upon this positioning process. From the customer viewpoint, the 
positioning determines the degree of quality that they perceive and are willing to pay. Buzzell 
and Gale (1987) urge scholars and practitioners to embrace the marketing concept by 
measuring market position relative to the competition by incorporating perceived product 
quality into their decision making processes. Therefore, determining competitive advantages, 
relative superiority and performance of a product are essential both for service suppliers and 
for the consumers. It can also be argued that an airline’s market share expectations is set by 
their product’s relative service positioning versus their competitors.  
 
Lawrence and Ray (1994, s. 27) state that service quality is among the vital elements 
affecting the competitiveness of airlines. They suggest that "if the customers' experience was 
better than the expectation, satisfaction (and the quality) is high. If the experience was less than 
the expectation, satisfaction/quality is deemed to be low. If the experience equals expectation, 
satisfaction is average". Having examined quality related parameters in the US regional airline 
industry, they generated quantitative values for effectiveness based upon the Service Quality 
Model using a passenger survey. They argued that satisfaction could be used as a surrogate for 
quality-effectiveness as perceived by the consumer. They also discovered that high levels of 
quality suggest an increase in the carriers' effectiveness. 
 
4.3. Consumers in the Aviation Industry  
 
Understanding their customer portfolio is a vital process for the airlines. According to 
Shaw (2007), customers are not always consumers. If travellers books through direct sales 
channels of the airline, they can then be seen as a customer and consumer for the carrier 
simultaneously. However, in case the passengers go to a travel agent who arranges the 
reservation and booking procedures for them, then the customer would be the travel agent, and 
the consumer would be those travelling.  
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The leisure traveller segment is a significant customer for the airline industry. Leisure 
travel includes families with children (Bauernfeind, 2012) and their primary motivation is to 
take a vacation. The characteristics of leisure travellers are that they are somewhat 
inexperienced compared to business travellers and may therefore seek more advice. Swarbrook 
and Horner (2007) find that leisure travellers are extensively engaged in the information search 
and consult individuals or groups such as friends and family or travel agents, organisations and 
media reports before making a buying decision. The impact of other people during the decision-
making process can also be influential.   
 
Business travellers who fly for business purposes form a vital customer base for 
airlines. Shaw (2007) defines multiple decision-making mechanisms in the business traveller 
segment. First of all, the business travellers themselves can make the itinerary decision. If a 
traveller books the flight for him or herself, they may consider various product attributes in 
order to make a decision. This may be time-consuming for executives with limited time to 
consider all flight alternatives. Alternatively, the secretaries of the executives may make the 
travel decision on their behalf. Therefore, they can also be regarded as customers of the carriers 
given their influence in the itinerary selection. In addition to secretaries and other internal travel 
bookers within a company, Shaw (2007) refers to the contracted travel agents handling air 
travel for the company as they possess some or full power in itinerary decision making. Fowkes 
et al. (1991) suggest that the journey planning for business travel may happen in two extremes. 
In the first extreme, a company executive may dictate the journey selections, whereas in the 
other extreme the decision may be entirely made by the travelling individual. They argue that 
it is unlikely that the actual decision-making mechanism will be at the extreme points. It is 
expected that the company may enable employees some level of autonomy in their choices, 
bounded by the organisation's travel policy.   
 
There are other customer segments in the airline industry, each with different purposes 
of travelling and distinct evaluation and purchase approaches. For instance, budget-conscious 
air travellers such as students tend to be more infrequent consumers, who perceive little 
difference between airlines, whereas business travellers are usually price-insensitive and loyal 
to a brand (Market Segmentation Study Guide, 2018). Passengers may also travel to visit 
relatives and friends, abbreviated as the “VFR” segment. Although VFR and leisure segment 
can be considered to depict similar characteristics, VFR traffic is usually directed to the same 
route where relatives are located while leisure traffic can be routed to anywhere.  
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Shaw and Wright (1967) suggest that existing beliefs and perceptions about an object 
or product determines the future beliefs that are formed. In practice, a passenger who has 
previously experienced positive and good service by a carrier may be more inclined to book 
with the same airline. Festinger (1957) cited in Edwards (2011) mentions the cognitive 
dissonance theory in which conflict is thought to exists between three related cognitions 
(thoughts, beliefs and attitudes). To illustrate, if a consumer is strongly opposed to the business 
ethics of the LCC, but when booking a flight the only airline operating to the desired destination 
is the LCC airline that they dislike, dissonance may occur. The size and tension that cognitive 
dissonance procedures will be intrinsically linked to the importance that the individual attaches 
to it.  
 
4.4. Parameters Influencing Consumers Itinerary Choice 
 
 Customers hold both explicit and implicit performance expectations for attributes, 
features, and benefits of the products. Explicit expectations are mental targets which are 
quantifiable and measurable whereas implicit expectations refer to established norms of 
performance, including comparisons and benchmarks to other product alternatives (Qualitrics, 
2018). Indeed there are various parameters of choice for air travellers when making their 
itinerary selections. In Adler et al.’s study (2005), the application of a mixed logit approach 
using stated – preference survey data to produce the development of itinerary choice model is 
described in which the effects of itinerary choice of airline, airport, aircraft type, fare, access 
time, flight time, scheduled arrival time and on time performance is analysed. Their study 
shows that all service features included in the model has significant values to travellers. The 
research also suggests that current reservation and ticketing services provide information to 
prospective travellers on most of these itinerary features, excluding on-time-performance. 
Indeed today’s passengers are well informed and can easily assess information on whether a 
product alternative meets both their explicit and implicit expectations. The choice passengers 
make depends on the attractiveness of available alternatives. Attractiveness is often expressed 
in consumer utility functions, where variables such as fare, frequency, travel times, loyalty etc. 
are weighted (Veldhuis, 1997). Adli et al. (2005) identifies four non-schedule related 
categories, including tangibility, reliability, responsiveness and assurance, of which reliability 
is found to be the most critical.  The following sections present a detailed literature review for 
each major parameter feature of consumers' itinerary choice. 
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4.4.1. Consumers' Schedule & Time of Day Travel Preference 
The schedule is among the most critical factors of choice for air travellers. This 
nonphysical parameter is vital as it determines not only the day and time of the flights but also 
the connectivity between the origin and destination, thus shaping the overall convenience for 
consumers. In addition to experiences before, during and after the flight, passengers are willing 
to choose the flight that best meets their work or travel schedules at the best price. In his work, 
Carrier (2003) found in his simulations that passengers are reluctant to travel on schedule – 
inconvenient paths, and are ready to pay a higher fare in order to travel on a more convenient 
frame. According to the study of Professor Wessels at Wharton University (2006), air travellers 
identified scheduling convenience and loyalty programs as the most important parameters in 
selecting an airline. Business travellers have always been asserted as one of the most schedule 
sensitive segment of air travellers. According to his study, even for the business traveller 
segment, the ability to upgrade, quality of meals and availability of first class does not matter 
as much as price, safety and scheduling convenience. It is also an inevitable fact that due the 
commoditisation process of the air transportation and subsequent rise with the flight 
availability and alternatives, the importance of schedule convenience in the decision-making 
process of the consumers is growing for all traveller segments. Even LCCs charge a higher fare 
for convenient flights. Thus, the convenience of flight is charged by the airlines and paid by 
the travellers. According to the report of UK’s Civil Aviation Authority on consumer research 
(2015), which conducted an extensive survey to understand consumer choice with the air travel 
product, the specific airline or holiday company emerged as the lowest priority overall when 
choosing a flight. The report suggests “flight schedule” or route to be more important than the 
airline/holiday company. 47% of the survey participants reported flight schedule as a crucial 
factor of choice while this figure was reported as 29% for the airline company.  
 
Aircraft type is an element of an airline’s schedule and hence a parameter of choice in 
consumers’ decision-making process. The aircraft model, along with its amenities including 
seat type, legroom, in-flight entertainment systems, etc., have a definite effect on consumers’ 
flight convenience. De Looze et al. (2003) discuss a direct link between seat comfort and 
emotions. Given that aircraft passengers spend the majority of tflight seated, it could be assumed 
that passenger comfort may also be related to emotions. Helander and Zhang (1997) show that 
users perceived seat comfort with factors such as aesthetics, relief, wellbeing and relaxation, 
while discomfort is related to fatigue, restlessness, pain and stress. Vink et al. (2012) identified 
factors contributing to passenger comfort and determined their importance based on Internet 
reports of more than 10,000 passengers in which the overall comfort scores were obtained and 
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correlated with many factors pertaining to both the airport and aircraft experience mentioned 
in the trip descriptions. The results demonstrated higher correlations to two physical factors, 
namely legroom and seat comfort. The study also showed positive correlation of comfort with  
the age of aircraft, flight class and In-Flight Entertainment systems. 
 
An itinerary’s departure time from the origin and the arrival time to the destination 
constitutes the basic metrics of the schedule factor. The timing of the flight affects not only 
consumers' utilisation of the day but also the costs of travelling. For instance, a passenger may 
need to spend one more night in a hotel and pay extra for accommodation due to an 
inconvenient flight itinerary. According to Boeing research on passenger behaviour, 
passengers do not have a single ideal departure time; they do have a decision window which 
represents the time frame that the traveller considers convenient for their journey. The decision 
window is determined by the earliest convenient departure time and latest appropriate arrival 
time. Flights that are scheduled within the boundaries of the decision window are equivalent 
for the passengers (Boeing Airline Company, 1997). Keumi and Murakami (2012) find that the 
service level of access modes such as travel time, travel cost, waiting time and delay cost affects 
passenger’s modal choice. They find that a traveller’s willingness to pay to save time differs 
by time of day. Passengers tend to pay more in the morning time than in the afternoon. They 
argue that considering a traveller’s willingness to pay for saving time; it would not be suitable 
to set the same price for flights at different times even if they have the same service attributes.  
 
Mehndiratta (1996) investigates the effect of time of day preferences on the planning 
of business trips in US domestic journeys. The study involves an experimental/qualitative 
survey of a group of ten San Francisco-based executives’ business trips. It was found through 
the interviews with these frequent travellers that there is always a flight that fulfils their travel 
schedule expectations, even in markets with limited flight options. This finding implies that 
business travellers are ready to adapt their journey plans to the itineraries offered by airlines, 
supporting the assumption that air travellers do not possess a single specific ideal schedule but 
rather a range of preferred travel times.  
 
Fowkes et al. (1991) found that 95% of individuals prefer to travel by air over 
alternatives modes of transportation due to air travel's comparatively shorter journey times, 
which is still the case today. From this perspective, trip or journey time needs to be computed 
from the "true" origin to the "true" destination covering the flight times and the connection 
time at the hub airport, if the journey is a connecting one. On top of the actual tflight plus tconn 
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which yields to ttotal, Simpson et al. (1992) introduce fixed and schedule displacement times to 
compute the overall trip time as expressed below:  
 
𝑇 = 𝑡 (𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑) +  𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  𝑡 (𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
 
The fixed time, t(fixed), includes entry and exit times to/from airports at the origin and 
destination. These times are not likely to change in the short term and also include airport-
processing times. ttotal , which is explained in Chapter 2, covers the block time plus the 
connection time at a hub. Block time refers to the time between the scheduled gate departure 
and arrival times for a flight and thus includes the pushback and taxi time. The schedule 
displacement time, t(schedule displacement), is the time between a passenger’s desired 
departure time and actual available flight time. This concept is associated with the fact that 
there is not likely to be a flight exactly at the time each passenger is ready to depart. For 
instance, if the passengers would like to leave for their destination at 12:00, and there are two 
flight alternatives at 11:00 and 14:30, the schedule displacement time for them would be either 
1 or 2.5 hours depending on their preference. Simpson et al. (1992) assesses the schedule 
displacement time as; 
 
𝑡 (𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) =
𝐾
𝑓
 
 
where K is a constant expressed in hours divided by frequency, implying that the schedule 
displacement time would reduce as the number of frequencies and flight alternatives ascend in 
the market. 
 
 For Mackie et al. (2001, s. 94), if passengers diminish ttotal, a change in the utility 
function is provoked because other more pleasurable or useful activities can be undertaken. 
“When substituting travel time, the individual will increase only the time assigned to those 
alternative activities which are not constrained at a minimum necessary or work.” A report by 
Accent/Hague (1999) suggests that for the UK, the income elasticity of travel time saving is 
calculated as 0.5. For Stigler (1987), as GDP per capita rises, wage rates are likely to increase 
faster with fewer hours being worked. This implies that individuals are expected to use the time 
saved from journeys more for work than for leisure time. In other words, a longer journey time 
creates a cost for passengers given the fewer hours being worked. 
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According to Veldhuis et al (2002) several schedule related connection parameters are 
evident in their utility function such as tconn and the routing factor. Routing factor (rf) for a 
journey from City A to City B is calculated as 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝐶𝐵
𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐵
 where 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝐶𝐵 refers to the 
total flight time of a connecting journey from A to B via C, whereas 𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐴𝐵 symbolises the 
duration of a direct flight between A and B. For Bootsma (1997), the maximum routing factor 
is typically 1.25 and the maximum rf excludes the backtracking routes like New York – 
Moscow – Chicago.  
 
According to Theis et al.'s report (2006), network airlines traditionally attempt to 
minimise passenger connecting times at hub airports based on the assumption that passengers 
prefer minimum scheduled elapsed time for their trips. The report emphasises that the 
importance of ttotal be historically attributed to three factors: The screen position of an itinerary 
in Global Distribution Systems (GDS), the decision window model and the passenger 
preferences regarding trip length and connections. Based on the ranking in the GDS and the 
fact that around 80% of all bookings are made from the first screen (and no fewer than 50% 
from the first line), many airlines feel elapsed time is essential in passenger choice. The second 
factor refers to the decision window of Boeing described earlier. The third rationale is the 
hypothesis that passengers prefer relatively shorter ttotal. According to the report, prefer shorter 
connections and discount longer connections. Another study by Van Eggermond et al. (2007) 
finds that passengers staying at their destination only for a short period prefer itineraries both 
leaving and returning in the morning. Furthermore, the report also quotes that "departing in the 
morning is preferred by all types of passengers. Seen in the light of passenger preferences for 
a certain departure time and the high number of observations of passengers staying at their 
destination for a short period of time, this is reasonable” (Eggermond, Schuessler, & Axhausen, 
2007, s. 17). They also suggest that a more convenient departure and arrival time have higher 
monetary values from a consumer’s perspective. In Chapter 2, the departure and arrival time 
quality perceptions were parametrised through qdep and qarr respectively.  
 
4.4.2. Consumers' Frequency, Routing & Airport Preference 
According to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), consumers demonstrate demand patterns that 
are increasing in the levels of variety offered. In the aviation market, passengers prefer higher 
frequency because such choices reduce potential delay (Douglas & Miller, 1974). Additionally, 
the availability of alternative frequencies increases the likelihood for consumers to choose from 
a wider spectrum of products. In the study of Ippolito (1981), it is demonstrated that passengers' 
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utility increases in frequency which are also corroborated by the work of Adler and Hanany 
(2015), suggesting that a higher number of frequencies increases passenger utility as more 
preference options are presented to consumers.  
 
The routing of the itinerary is a definite factor of choice for passengers, especially in 
an environment where multiple alternatives compete. The routing of the itinerary constitutes 
the overall ttotal for travellers. Passengers appreciate direct routings as it significantly reduces 
the journey time. Naitho (2014) justifies this by contrasting consumers’ utility functions for 
direct and connecting services, in which non-stop flights entail the utmost convenience. Having 
implemented a survey to consumers, Flightview in its report (2005) suggests that today’s 
travellers report a willingness to pay more for convenience. Their survey finds that more than 
75% of consumers regularly experience difficulty in finding direct flights to their desired 
destination from their local airport, “and the majority of those surveyed are willing to reach 
deeper into their pockets”. According to the study, 70% of the travellers surveyed said they 
would be willing to pay even more for a direct flight from their local airport. Of that 70%, more 
than two-thirds would be willing to pay 10-15% more, with nearly a third willing to pay an 
additional 16% or higher. According to the report, there is also a segment which is ready to 
pay more than 30% for a more convenient routing. The US Government Accountability Office 
argues in its report (2004) that in case a market has non-stop service, this would be considered 
the best level of service. However, one-stop connecting services may also be a competitive 
alternative to non-stop in some markets. 
 
Since connecting journeys incur the risk of misconnection and baggage loss, direct 
flights reduce passengers’ perceived risk (Veldhuis, 1997). The report of van Eggermond et al. 
(2007) suggests that journey time and the number of transfers from origin to destination is a 
determinant of passengers' decision-making process, implying that connecting journeys have a 
negative effect on extending ttotal. Moreover, the study also finds that for connecting itineraries, 
the tconn is another critical factor of decision making. Furthermore, the detour factor (df) is 
another vital element of consumer satisfaction. As the df increases, the passenger travels a 
longer distance, and the itinerary's attractiveness diminishes. The study of Sismanidou et al. 
(2013) finds that passengers travelling on a smaller detoured route are less sensitive to tconn 
with higher detour factor as they gain from total flight time. 
 
The departure and arrival airports forms the basis of itinerary selection and therefore 
constitutes an integral aspect of the consumers’ routing preference. For Ashford et al. (1976), 
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airport facilities are an important element of passenger convenience as they highly impacts 
consumers' journey experience. They point out that the facilities of the airports may lead 
passengers facing delays, with procedures marking a deterioration in the overall travel 
experience. The study focuses on the criticalness of airport infrastructures, especially for 
connecting passengers who may suffer when interchanging their flights. Indeed, competition 
is fierce not only among the airlines but also among airports as they aim to attract passengers 
to maximise their revenues. For Graham (2013), airline choice was considered to be limited to 
particular airports because of governmental bilateral agreements; while this may still be true in 
few markets, there are now many opportunities for airports to compete for passengers, freight 
and airlines. According to Pestana and Dieke (2007), the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
airline industry have increased competition between airports sharing or competing in the same 
catchment area. The surge in demand has congested airports, resulting in slots becoming an 
important element of an airline’s network design. Airlines cannot always plan their flights in 
their desired airport and time of the day due to the slot limitations at airports. Capacity 
constraints at one airport cause spill-over effects and thus influence air travel demand served 
at other airports (Gelhausen, 2011). Furthermore, Bonzio (1996) shows that travel time to the 
airport plays a significant role, and that access time was more important for business passengers 
than for leisure travellers. Pels et al. (2001) analyses the combined choice of airport and airline, 
and find that airline choice is nested within airport choice, i.e. the competition between airlines 
departing from the same airport is more severe than between airlines departing from different 
airports.  
 
The study of consumers' airport choice has long been of interest to researchers. It is 
generally agreed that access time and ﬂight frequency are dominant factors explaining airport 
demand (Escobari, 2017). The study of Hess (2010) suggests that all else being equal, 
respondents prefer larger to smaller airports, with a preference for the airport closest to their 
home. It is inferred from this finding that even though respondents associate a higher likelihood 
of delay and other sorts of inconveniences with larger airports; they believe that if things go 
wrong, the backup options are wider and superior at the large airports in comparison to the 
smaller ones. Several factors, most notably flight frequency and in-vehicle access time, have a 
significant overall impact on airports’ attractiveness, airline and access mode transportation, 
while parameters such as fare and aircraft size have a considerable effect only in some 
population segments (Hess & Polak, 2006).  
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The proximity of an alternative airport can represent an appropriate choice should it 
offer a substitutable service. In order to assess this substitution, Frontier Economics referred to 
in IATA report (2013) carried out an empirical assessment to investigate how likely passengers 
are likely to choose an airport over the alternative substitute, and the role that relative prices 
play in influencing the itinerary selection decision. It is found in the study that passengers’ 
preference to travel from their local airport is very strong. The study alleges that for every 1% 
increase in distance, the likelihood in passengers flying from their local airport declines by 4%. 
When it comes to price, the research argues that "for every 1% increase in distance, a 1% 
change in relative prices would be needed to persuade passengers to travel to the more distant 
airport.” 
 
4.4.3. Consumers' Codeshare Flight Preference 
The literature discussing codeshare operations does not agree on a single perspective. 
The positive aspect of such agreements from the travellers' perspective is that they are not 
required to contact the operating carrier to handle their flight related processes, such as 
booking, ticketing, baggage transferring, post-flight services, etc. Additionally, travellers can 
earn loyalty program credits at their preferred operating airline even though a different carrier 
operates the journey. For Herdem (2017), there are several benefits of codeshare agreements 
for consumers. Coordinated schedules for easier connections, the ability to check on baggage 
and to obtain the boarding pass to final destination are among some benefits of codeshare 
agreements. Furthermore, wider international networks and easier methods to access those 
destinations, in addition to both the operating and marketing carriers’ resources to deal in case 
of operational disruptions, can be counted as other major benefits of the codeshare flights.  
 
Contrary to the above mentioned positive approaches towards the codeshare flights, 
there are opposite views too. In non-operating services, when expecting to travel with their 
preferred airline, a passenger may be obliged to travel with another carrier. This surprise is 
very probable as the marketing carriers display their designation in reservation systems, given 
a flight carrying a familiar airline code sells better than a flight carrying unfamiliar code 
(Goedeking, 2010). McCartney from the Wall Street Journal (2018) argues that codesharing is 
becoming more frustrating in many cases. The disconnects between connecting airlines have 
become more complicated as airlines unbundle services and create fees for things that were 
previously included in tickets, such as checked baggage and seat assignments. Back passing in 
codeshare operations is harder to manage in case of service failures with the operating airline. 
The European Commission Directorate General for Competition (2007) report finds that airline 
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code-shares in general exhibit results that are overtly-competitive. According to the report, in 
many cases, routes with codeshare contracts have shown increasing capacity and decreasing 
fares, although the evidence appears to suggests that in some cases, code-share partners on 
parallel operated routes do not compete as much as occurs on similar routes lacking such 
arrangements.  
 
Different customer segments may have varying attitudes towards non-operating 
services. For instance, whilst leisure passengers in markets with sufficient demand do not 
prefer codeshare agreements, business passengers do prefer competitive or bilateral codeshare 
agreements (Adler & Hanany, 2015). The study of Goh and Uncles (2002) indicates that some 
passengers have misconceptions concerning the ‘code-sharing’ mechanism that is commonly 
used by airlines. In their study, a survey was implemented to passengers in which 36% of the 
respondents had the mistaken belief that code-sharing meant that consumers had a better 
chance of flying on planes owned by their preferred airlines. Since perceptions influence 
consumers' expectations, it is essential to consider such misconceptions concerning codeshare 
operations. The brand image of an airline may be damaged if consumers are unknowingly 
placed on aircraft operated by alliance partners instead of their preferred airline and if standards 
of service among code-sharing airlines are variable (Driver, 1999). Therefore, marketing 
carriers should be transparent during the ticketing process and disclose the operating airline. 
Furthermore, they should also monitor the service offered by the operating carriers to avoid 
any inconvenience that may arise due to the mismatch between their customers expectations 
and the service delivered on the codeshare journey. 
 
There are conflicting findings in the literature concerning the fare of codeshare flights. 
For example, Szakal (2013) argues that fares between the regional airport and the hub airport 
are often high, but an interline ticket to the final destination is normally considerably cheaper 
than the sum of the two local fares.  However, there are studies in the literature arguing the 
opposite, demonstrating that the marketing carriers may charge higher prices than the operating 
airlines within a codeshare agreement scheme. For instance, Alderighi et al. (2004) use data on 
flights between the UK and European airports to study the effects of codeshare agreements on 
the time profile of airfares. They find that code-sharing is associated with higher fares, 
especially for early bookers. They also report higher fares by the marketing carriers. According 
to the study of Gilo and Simonelli (2014), marketing carriers involved in code sharing charge 
4 per cent more than the fares set by their code-sharing partner and almost 10 per cent higher 
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than other airlines in the same market as the marketing carriers need to generate a profit from 
the itinerary. 
 
4.4.4. Fare’s Impact on Consumer Choice 
The fare is a key parameter for consumers when making travel decisions, as it refers to 
an indication of the value of air transport product. Consumers determine a willingness to pay 
value for each product available for sale, which is defined as the maximum amount of money 
they are willing to spend for their preferred brand product over other comparable brands 
(Cameron & James, 1987). Customers agree to pay more for a better service, which maximises 
their utility. That is, when consumers have a higher perceived value in relation to the cost of 
the product, they are willing to pay a relatively high price (Miao & Mattila, 2007). The study 
of Balcombe et al. (2009) reveals that in principle passengers are willing to pay a relatively 
large amount for an enhanced service quality. Compared to short haul flights, consumers may 
be ready to pay higher for enhanced service for long-haul flights. Therefore, the quality 
perception of the product is a determinant of the willingness to pay value. The study of Juan 
Carlos Martín et al. (2008) observes the willingness of customers to pay for airline service 
quality and estimate valuations of some service-quality attributes in an airline choice context 
using stated preferences methods. They find that different characteristics of the service are 
associated with the varying values of the service.  
 
The existence of different customer segments having different needs and expectations 
from the air transport product enables the avoidance of full price competition in the market for 
the airline industry. Airlines intend to set the optimum product and price match for their target 
segments, maximising their profitability with the most appropriate product/fare positioning by 
correctly addressing the willingness to pay value of their customers. Lohmeier and Hess (2009) 
suggest that airlines should set their fare structures by analysing the market in addition to the 
demand of their relevant customer segments and their cost structure.  
 
Different customer segments may have different attitudes towards airfares. On one 
extreme, the fare could be the sole factor of choice, especially for budget constrained travellers, 
whereas in the other extreme, for business travellers with no or minimal budget constraints,  
price may rank as the least important factor over others in the decision making process. The 
study of Henderson (2016) finds fare to be the most important and influential criteria for a 
consumer segment composed of international students in New Zealand when making the 
itinerary decision, followed by stopovers, flight schedule and baggage allowance. The students 
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refer to a budget-constrained segment, therefore their fare prioritisation is within the limits of 
expectations. Price is the most important factor for price-sensitive passengers to choose LCCs 
too. As discussed in the study of Rajasekar and Fouts (2009), fare advantage is considered to 
be one of the strengths of LCCs over FSCs.  The study of Federco and Hospodka (2018) argues 
that airlines should offer "better" products with higher prices in markets where business 
traveller segments dominate, indicating that quality of the product is a more important factor 
of choice than the fare for business travellers. The demand for business travellers is relatively 
inelastic, therefore enabling airlines to charge business travellers higher prices (Driver, 
Developments in Airline Marketing Practice, 1999). While the LCCs target primarily the 
budget constrained consumers, the FSCs address consumers prioritising service quality-related 
attributes.  
 
Carrier (2006) argues that previous studies have not included fare and schedule 
convenience on a detailed level, which ultimately influences passenger choice and sees as a 
potential application area in pricing policy and revenue management. He suggests that 
heterogeneity of the behaviour is primarily driven by the underlying fare structure of the air 
transport product. Later studies have demonstrated that schedule convenience and fare 
quotations are correlated to the extent that schedule related parameters can even drive the 
demand. For instance, Escobari (2017) finds that the relatively low cross-price elasticities at 
the departure time level suggest that higher prices during peak times aimed at solving 
congestion problems are more likely to reduce the overall demand for travel than to shift 
passengers to less congested periods. As per Eggermond (2007), the fare is recognised as a 
dimension of individuals' itinerary decision making and finds that travellers have different 
sensitivity for fare over time and per duration of stay.  
 
With the recent enhancements in aviation in terms of technology, comparison-shopping 
allowed airline offerings to be benchmarked, enabling consumers to select the most appropriate 
product for their need which fits their budget constraints. The improvement in distribution 
channels gave consumers the opportunity to find lower cost alternatives, including LCCs and 
new entrants, and to make trade-offs between service and price (GRA Incorporated, 2017). The 
internet is ideal for the tourism industry due to the characterisation of its products (McCole, 
2002). Morrison et al. (2001) argue that consumers would rather book airline tickets online 
instead of through their local travel agent as they can access the details of the competing 
products on the internet transparently.  Chen and Jang (2004) identify two distinct segments of 
web searchers according to use preferences: Bargain Seekers and Utilitarian. The bargain 
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seekers represent those mainly utilising the Web as an information channel to ﬁnd low-fare air 
tickets. This segment consists of younger individuals who have a lower income. On the other 
hand, the Utilitarians represent those requiring a fast transaction, better customer support and 
sophisticated price comparison functions. It is also discussed in their study that Utilitarian 
consumers are inclined to emphasise a flexible schedule when booking on the web. For 
Fuellhart (2003), with the spread of various web tools, consumers are armed with more 
information than ever to assess fare and service differences between competing airlines and 
airports. According to GRA Incorporated’s report (2017), consumers can have a fair chance of 
finding the best air travel option available through neutral comparison shopping with the rise 
of web sales. Through the internet, the cost of assessing alternative services is diminished, and 
passengers can effectively compare each competing airline’s itinerary.  
 
4.4.5. On-Time Performance Parameter’s Effect on Consumer Choice 
An airline’s on-time performance refers to the carrier’s adherence to their published 
schedule or timetable. Surovitskikh and Lubbe (2008) identify on-time performance as one of 
the critical factors of choice for consumers, finding that on-time performance forms a crucial 
aspect of an airline’s consistency of service. As schedule convenience is a factor of choice for 
consumers, any divergence from the preferred schedule is a matter of dissatisfaction. Strydom 
et al. (2000) indicate that “punctual flights" are an essential feature of air travel. The study of 
Suzuki (2000) reveals that once experiencing flight delays, passengers are more likely to switch 
airlines. As per the Nextor report (2010), in case of delay, passengers see increases in the time 
required for travel, experience inconvenience and stress, and may face additional expenses for 
food and lodging. The costs to passengers can be in the form of added expense on top of 
decreased convenience and additional misery. Douglas and Miller (1974) define the schedule 
delay (SD) parameter as the travellers’ preferred arrival time and actual arrival time. SD is 
described as a cost for passengers. For Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999), business 
travellers are more sensitive to SD than leisure travellers. They find that SD has a greater value 
for business travellers. In their study covering personal travels, not limited to air travel only, 
Bates et al. (2001) argue that punctuality is indeed highly valued by travellers. Therefore 
inadequate levels of on-time performance may affect an airline’s market share due to negative 
passengers’ experience. 
 
There is a strong correlation between airline schedules and on-time performance. For 
instance, in order to adhere to scheduled arrival times, some airlines add time to their flight 
schedules to improve on-time performance at the expense of aircraft utilisation. Besides, while 
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some airlines adjust schedules to be as short as possible while still allowing the flights to arrive 
on time, some others try to improve on-time performance by shifting frequently late flights to 
less-congested time slots, streamlining baggage handling, and reducing the time required to 
fuel and prepare their aircraft (US General Accounting Office, 1990).  
 
On-time performance also constitutes an airline’s brand image from the consumers' 
standpoint. According to a survey conducted in the US in 2015, 75% of the respondents 
identified on-time performance as an essential factor in airline brand perception (Statista, 
2018). Since passengers cannot foresee if the flight would be delayed or not when selecting 
their itinerary, consumers would tend to base their decision regarding on-time performance in 
accordance to the brand perception of the competing airline fed by their previous experiences.   
 
While delays are a key source of inconvenience, cancellation of the scheduled services 
is another severely disruptive experience. For many passengers, waiting at the airport when the 
flight has been delayed or cancelled is a negative experience as they often do not know how 
long they will have to wait for the service recovery (Wong, McCain, & Liu, 2015). In case of 
cancellations, passengers are required to make a new journey plan and adjust their programs 
accordingly. Therefore, cancellations cause significant dissatisfaction for the consumers and 
carriers to show the utmost care to avoid such inconveniences. 
 
4.4.6. Consumers’ Perceptions Toward Airlines' Pre & Post Flight, Onboard Services 
and Brand 
  Pre and post-flight-related factors are definite factors of choice for consumers as they 
affect the time spent at the airport. Since time is a scarce source, satisfying the time 
requirements of consumers has become increasingly crucial (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2004). The 
time lapse from airport entrance to flight departure in the origin airport and the time from 
landing to airport exit at the destination airport are significant parameters that passengers 
closely watch. In this context, the length of waiting time for the service can drive future 
behaviour by shaping overall service evaluations (Dubé-Rioux, Schmitt, & Leclerc, 1989). 
Longer waiting times before the flight, namely during the check-in process and boarding 
process has a negative influence on consumer utility. Moreover, baggage handling is amongst 
the leading factors of passenger satisfaction, both for departing and arriving passengers 
(Freivalde & Lace, 2008). Therefore, both the airline’s and the airport’s performance including 
check-in, boarding, baggage delivery, security, passport control, etc. influence the time spent 
at the airport and thus affect consumers’ decision making.  In cities with multiple airports, the 
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divergences between airport processing times can be detrimental when preferring one itinerary 
over the other.  
 
 Airline customer loyalty programs are another factor of choice for the consumers. For 
Watterson et al. (2008) airlines found value in several characteristics of the loyalty programs 
including shaping customers’ travel decisions through incentives of air miles and rewards.  The 
major goals of a loyalty program are to establish and to foster customer loyalty, provide benefit 
to customers by rewarding their loyalty (Dorotic, Fok, Verhoef, & Bijmolt, 2011). Airlines 
with a loyalty program can boast a higher number of passengers carried than those that do not 
(Vilkaitė-Vaitonė & Papsiene, 2016). 
 
Many carriers have personalised their both onboard and ground services especially 
from the viewpoint of retaining satisfied consumers and attracting the new ones. In this context, 
onboard catering facilities are regarded as part of airline marketing strategies to attract business 
or leisure passengers. As per Zahari et al.'s study (2011), airlines should not ignore the catering 
element but take the opportunity to create more attractive and acceptable in-flight meals as 
effective marketing tools in attracting passengers to re-flying with them. There are also 
contradicting studies in the literature arguing that catering’s impact is very limited as a 
marketing tool. With the rise of the LCCs, passengers may not demand onboard meals should 
they wish to reduce their travel costs by choosing a no-frills airline. As per Jones (2007), food 
as a marketing tool has only a limited impact. His study refers to surveys suggesting that apart 
from the fare, passengers appear most concerned about safety, on-time performance, 
scheduling/ticketing issues, the aircraft's physical surroundings such as seat and leg comfort, 
efficient gate check-in and boarding.  This means that while food is important, it is unlikely to 
be the deciding factor in a passenger's airline choice. However, for longer journeys, onboard 
dining can indeed be an important element of consumer choice. For Zahari et al. (2011) taste, 
freshness, the appearance of in-flight meals/food served and menu choices are essential for 
passengers, especially for the long haul flight.  
 
The service delivery expectations of each carrier form an air traveller’s perception 
towards the airline brand. Gronroos (1984) argues that service quality was perceived by 
consumers via a comparison between the perceptions of actual service and the expectations of 
that service. Bitner & Hubbert (1994) define the brand as a general impression made by a 
consumer regarding the relative inferiority or superiority of the service. Zeithaml (1988) 
defines brand perception as an evaluation made by consumers on the general inferiority or 
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superiority of the service, which is affirmed by Kim (2007) who claims that brand image has 
significant positive effects on brand loyalty via marketing communication. Furthermore, the 
partnership and alliance relationships contribute to the attraction of airline brands through the 
benefits offered to consumers. For Dennis (2000), one of the major benefits of airline alliances 
to both carriers and passengers is the potential they offer to facilitate travel between an 
increased range of O&Ds around the world. 
 
4.4.7. Air Transport Product Safety and Security 
Airline safety and security are two different terms. While aviation safety refers to the 
efforts that are taken to ensure aircraft are free from factors that may lead to injury or loss, 
aviation security is only one component that may affect passenger safety. It is not so much 
related to the aircraft itself, but rather intelligence gathering, pre-boarding procedures and 
airport security personnel (Boeing, 2016). For some consumers, flying is a risk due to safety 
and security concerns. For Capafons et al. (1999), almost half of the population suffers some 
degree of fear of flying ranging from slight discomfort to very intense fear. According to their 
study, some of these people will not even fly at all. Van Gerwen et al. (2004) show that this 
has been an increasing trend related to terrorism and health concerns, September 11, 2001, 
being one of them. Ito and Lee, (2005) find evidence of an ongoing negative demand shift in 
air travel after the September 11 incident. The possible existence of a consumer's flight fear 
would not favour a specific itinerary over the other as such a fear would be linked with the risk 
of air travel phenomenon. However, the safety and reliability of a carrier are influential 
parameters for consumers, which are highly linked with service quality. Liou and Tzeng (2007) 
find that safety and reliability are the critical factors of service quality. Wen and Yeh (2010), 
on the basis of seven other studies of service quality, identify 18 factors as relevant to 
consumers in the airline industry, including safety. 
 
In the markets lacking modern aircraft, safety can even be reported as the most critical 
factor of choice for the consumers. For instance, the study of Hamidi et al. (2013) finds that 
safety is the most effective parameter in the consumer decision-making process for a sample 
of 145 Iranian individuals. Due to the sanctions on the country, the Iranian state and airlines 
cannot acquire new, modern aircraft. Therefore, Iranian passengers are obliged to travel with 
old aircraft with obsolete technology when using their national carriers for their journey. On 
the other hand, due to flight rights, only national carriers can operate in the domestic market. 
Therefore, it is natural for Iranian consumers to prioritise safety first in their decision-making 
process.  Analysts say air travel is vulnerable by nature because of all the moving parts and the 
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potential weaknesses they create (ABC News, 2017). The study of Oyewole et al. also reveals 
that the safety record of the airlines is an overriding factor of choice (2007). 
 
Due to enhancements in the aircraft technology and governmental regulations, 
significant progress has been achieved in the safety and security of air travel. According to an 
article in the Guardian (2014), as per the figures from the Bureau of Aircraft Accident Archives, 
aircraft accident rates are at a historic low despite high-profile plane crashes. Therefore, many 
passengers all over the globe may consider safety and security parameter for granted as there 
are very few injuries or fatalities recently caused by the air transport, leading consumers to be 
neutral with this factor in their itinerary choice.  However, any unexpected incidents such as 
accidents, terrorist attacks or hijacking may prioritise safety and security parameter and may 
deem it as the most important factor of itinerary choice. 
 
4.5 Identification of the Gaps in the Literature Review and Implications for This 
Research 
This Chapter covered the parameters influencing consumer decision when purchasing 
their itineraries. Undoubtedly, the importance level of each parameter differs depending on the 
individual circumstances of the travellers. For certain traveller profiles, as suggested in the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority report (2015), familiarity with the carrier and its reputation for 
providing low-cost fares and excellent customer service are paramount considerations. For 
another segment prioritising price, getting good value is more important than accessing the 
cheapest fare. As a result, consumers do not have a single preference towards each parameter 
of choice but develop their individual stance. The report also finds that consumers appeared to 
be reasonably well-informed and equipped to make their air travel choices. Passengers can now 
better access information regarding the features of the rival products and can effectively 
benchmark them. In this context, the literature review chapter has provided an essential 
contribution to understanding the consumer expectations in the airline industry as well as its 
variations among different customer segments. Moreover, the review has formed an 
indispensable step in designing the passenger survey whose results will provide the input for 
the research’s methodology.  
 
 It is verified in the literature review that the airline schedule is an essential element of 
consumer convenience and has a significant role in consumers' itinerary choice, subsequently 
affecting the airlines' overall performance. However, the literature does not address the extent 
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of these schedule-related parameters influence of on consumers' decision-making process. 
From the passengers’ perspective, the value proposition of different flight alternatives may 
fluctuate depending on the type and routing of the itinerary. The below quadrant illustrates 
passengers’ perceived utility values for different flights type and routing.  
 
Table 4.1: Consumers’ Perceived Value Parameters for Different Flight Modes. 
 Operating Flight Codeshare Flight 
Direct Flight udo  - the value of a direct 
and operating service  
udc  - the value of a direct 
and codeshare service  
Connecting Flight uco  - the value of a 
connecting  and operating 
service  
ucc  - the value of a 
connecting  and codeshare 
service  
 
It is found in literature that (i) udo > udc  and uco  > ucc ; since an operating flight is 
preferred over the codeshare alternatives and (ii) udo > uco and udc > ucc; as a direct flight is 
better preferred compared to a connecting product. However, a commonly agreed relation 
between udc and uco cannot be determined in literature to assess consumers' changing attitude 
between direct-codeshare vs operating connecting flight alternatives. On the other hand, 
although it is known that direct flights are desired over connecting ones, and online products 
are better chosen over codeshare alternatives, there exists limited studies justifying to what 
extent these propositions are true.   
 
The passenger survey that has been designed using the information retrieved from the 
literature review has quantified how these parameters affect consumer choice in order to 
develop a robust methodology quantifying the quality of the competing itineraries in a given 
market, referring to Objective 2 of the research. Specifically, the concepts introduced in 
Chapter 2 including tbuffer, qdep, qarr, MaxCT, tinconvenient, %inconvenient_time, fsplit had to be quantified 
through the passenger survey in order to fill the gap in the existing literature. In addition, the 
survey sought to identify relative values of udo, uco, udc and ucc where those figures would be 
used as an input of REMSET, corresponding to Objective 3 of the research.   
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Chapter 5: Data Sources 
 
As explained, this research aimed to develop a passenger-centric methodology to 
analyse the schedule and network performance of air services. In this context, Chapter 3 and 4 
assessed previous research and identified the gaps in the literature to ensure the application of 
a credible and contemporary methodology that fulfils the research’s aim. In addition to a robust 
theoretical basis backed by the literature review, the successful implementation of the 
research’s proposed models relies heavily on using valid and credible data. For this reason, the 
data collection process was a crucial phase of the research. This Chapter covers an in-depth 
review of the data sources as well as their collection and verification processes.   
 
Within the scope of the study, an extensive array of data from various resources were 
required. The data serves as the inputs of the proposed assessment methodologies and thus the 
reliability of the research directly links with the credibility of said input data. To determine a 
consumer-centric capacity share estimation model, which refers to Objective 1 of the study, 
the schedule information of the airlines and MCT figures of the airports were required. For 
fulfilling Objective 2, numerous research specific parameters such as tbuffer, qdep, qarr, tinconvenient, 
udo, uco, udc, ucc were needed to assess the supply quality. The REMSET model required both 
the supply shares and quality scores to estimate market performance accurately. Therefore, an 
extensive range of both primary and secondary data was needed within the scope, and the 
successful attainment of the research’s aim and objectives rely on the validity and credibility 
of the data used. The research specific parameters referred to above, including the MaxCT, 
were obtained directly from consumers by means of a passenger survey, which is covered in 
the next Chapter. This Chapter focuses on the schedule, MCT and the demand data by 
addressing their retrieval process and elaborates on the verification methods of the data used.  
 
5.1: Introduction to Schedule Data & Listed Airlines 
 
 Approximately four billion passengers fly with commercial airlines each year, implying 
at least four billion itinerary decisions are made annually by consumers.  According to IATA 
(2018), 36.8 million flights were performed in 2017 operated by more than 1,400 airlines from 
approximately 4,000 airports. Therefore, the schedule data refers to a broad range of data. 
Although the network assessment models to be introduced in the proceeding Chapters can be 
applied globally to all carriers and regions of the world, this research focuses on major carriers 
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in Europe, Middle East and Africa. As explained in Chapter 1, this regional focus ensured that 
the study is concentrated on international markets as a vital share of travel in Northern America 
and Asia Pacific is composed of domestic traffic and was therefore excluded from the scope of 
this research. Additionally, focusing on the selected regions enabled a narrowing down of the 
required set of schedule data.  
 
In this context, major airlines in Europe, Middle East and Africa were identified and 
listed for the competitive analysis, whose network performance was benchmarked in the 
following Chapters. While selecting the airlines, it was ensured that all major FSCs, LCCs and 
hybrid carriers of the regions were all included in the dataset. As explained in earlier Chapters, 
only scheduled services are considered implying that charter flights were excluded from the 
scope. The selected 36 airlines and their two-lettered designators are: Aegean Airlines (A3), 
Aeroflot (SU), Air Berlin (AB), Air France (AF), Air Lingus (EI), Air Norwegian (DY), 
Alitalia (AZ), Austrian Airlines (OS), British Airways (BA), Brussels Airlines (SN), easyJet 
(U2), El Al Airlines (LY), Egyptair (MS), Emirates (EK), Ethiopian Airlines (ET), Etihad 
(EY), Finnair (AY), Germanwings (4U), Iberia (IB), KLM (KL), Lufthansa (LH), Middle East 
Airlines (ME), Pegasus Airlines (PC), Qatar Airways (QR), Royal Air Maroc (AT), Royal 
Jordanian (RJ), Ryanair (FR), SAS (SK), Saudia Airlines (SV), South African Airways (SA), 
Swiss (LX), TAP Portugal (TP), Tuifly (X3), Tunisair (TU), Turkish Airlines (TK), Wizzair 
(W6).  This airline sample ensured a good mixture of regional and global carriers as well as 
FSCs and LCCs. U2, 4U, FR, PC, X3 and W6 are LCCs whereas AB and DY can be considered 
as hybrid carriers. The other remaining carriers are FSCs although their level of service may 
differ from one carrier to another. The listed airlines transport more than two thirds of the entire 
passenger flow in the region. Therefore inclusion of the schedule data for all 36 listed airlines 
was mandatory to run the proposed methodologies.  
 
 The REMSET model offers a tool for industry practitioners to assess schedule and 
network competitiveness of the airlines, which refers to Objective 4 of the research. 
Furthermore the research’s model can be used to track airports’ connectivity measures which 
refers to another implication of Objective 4. In order to accomplish Objective 4, historical 
schedule data of the selected carriers was required in order to observe the change in the research 
outputs (capacity share, quality scores and the realistic market share expectations) with respect 
to schedule changes. Therefore, the effect of the airline schedule related investments and 
initiatives, to enhance and widen their services, was quantitatively assessed through the 
employment of a research model using historical data in order to observe any changes from the 
  
130 
research outputs. For this reason, obtaining historical schedule data of the selected 36 airlines 
was obligatory.  
 
 In addition to airlines' historical schedule information, data concerning airports' MCT 
figures was also essential as the MCT is an aspect of schedule data which is influential in 
determining not only possible connections but also their schedule quality. 
 
5.2: Schedule Data Resources 
 
 Before the development of online platforms, it was common for carriers to print their 
schedules as handbooks. Passengers and travel agencies used these publications to check an 
airline’s timetable. Any passenger intending to purchase a ticket had to book directly with the 
airline or through an agency that had access to the airline’s inventory. With the rise of electronic 
ticketing and online sales, airlines began to post their timetables on several digital platforms. 
These platforms provide both a sales channel for the carriers and a vitrine to display their 
timetables. Through a GDS, carriers have the opportunity to reach end consumers. Subscriber 
agents can make bookings on an airline through GDSs by accessing their flight database. 
Therefore, agencies, passengers and other external parties have the opportunity to easily access 
airline schedule information.   
 
Analytics and information management companies utilise the published schedule 
information for their data delivery services sourced from the GDS platforms. In this context, 
the Official Airline Guide (OAG) appears as a credible data source. “OAG provides aviation 
information and analytical services sourced from its proprietary airline schedules holding the 
current, future and historical database of more than 900 carriers and 4000 airports. On the other 
hand, OAG supplies flight information to the GDS, e-portal and hosts airline reservation 
systems” (OAG, 2014). Directly linking to the airlines’ flight database, OAG provides correct 
and consistent schedule information, which is also used by airline network planners to analyse 
a competitor’s services on certain O&Ds. As OAG links with the inventories of the airlines and 
obtains the information directly from the carriers' system, the data provided by the OAG system 
can be regarded as “secondary data”. OAG also contains the airport information including the 
MCT.   
 
 For this reason, the listed airlines’ schedule information is obtained from OAG data in 
this research. Only historical schedule data is retrieved from the OAG database as future 
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timetables are live information with the possibility to change as airlines update their schedules. 
Therefore, although some airlines publish their schedule information and start selling tickets 
well in advance, only past schedule data from 2004 to 2016 was used throughout the research 
to ensure a fair and complete analysis. Having 13 consecutive years’ schedule data ensured an 
adequate and satisfactory volume to observe the effect of capacity changes on the research 
outputs.  
 
An airline’s schedule data is not identical for each week of the year. An airline may 
increase, reduce or cancel some services to a certain destination within a year. In practice, 
airlines have two scheduling terms: summer and winter. The summer term continues during 
the Daylight-saving time commencing in the last week of March and ending in late October. 
Within each scheduling term, an airline’s timetable is constructed on a weekly basis and 
repeated for the following weeks with minor variations within the weeks. It is therefore critical 
to determine which schedule term and specific week is referred to when discussing the schedule 
of a carrier for a specified year. It was mandatory to get a weekly snapshot of schedules which 
well represented the airline's yearly schedule. Since in summer schedules, airlines usually offer 
higher capacity and utilise their resources effectively to accommodate surging demand, 
selecting the representative week from the summer season would be a realistic approach. 
Although the weekly divergences with the schedules during the terms are usually limited, 
exceptions can be observed due to the launch of a new route or frequency increase to a certain 
destination. Moreover, actions such as the removal of a route from the network or deletion of 
certain frequencies can be the other reasons of the schedule changes within the weeks of the 
scheduling term. Additionally, codeshare agreements may become effective during the mid-
scheduling term. Due to commercial reasons, it is to the benefit of airlines to make such 
timetable changes early in the scheduling term to ensure full availability of their products 
during the term. As a result, when selecting a representative week in the schedule term, the 
selection of very early or very late phases of the summer season was avoided. In this context, 
the weeks of April, May as well as September and October were avoided. On the other hand, 
July and August is the holiday season in most of the countries in the focus regions of the study 
with most of the listed airlines usually offering additional capacity on these months. As a result, 
the weeks of July and August were also excluded. Therefore, June was selected as the best 
representative schedule month of the yearly schedule. Since the schedule information is 
organised weekly, the last week of June’s schedule data was used. Hence, the schedule 
information for each of the 36 listed airlines from 2004 to 2016 as of the relevant years' final 
June week was retrieved from the OAG database.  
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 With the OAG data, the following field attributes were retrieved for each of the 
operating and codeshare flights from 2004 to 2016 for the listed carriers:  
- Airline 
- Flight Number 
- Origin City 
- Origin Airport 
- Destination City 
- Destination Airport and Terminal 
- Domestic or International Flight: Indicates whether the flight is a domestic or 
international operation. 
- Stops: Number of stops from origin to destination.  
- Kilometre: O&D distance 
- Flight Status: Indicates whether the flight is an operating or a codeshare flight 
- Weekly Frequency: Number of weekly frequency operated for the same flight number 
- Day(s) of Flight: Days of the week that the flight is operated 
- Departure Time: Local departure time from the origin airport 
- Arrival Time: Local arrival time to the destination airport 
- Flight Time: Flight time between the aircraft’s take-off and landing time from origin to 
destination. 
- Block Time: Total time between the flight’s engine start and engine off times. Block 
time includes the flight and taxi time. 
- Aircraft Type: The assigned aircraft type for the flight. Although airlines can change 
the aircraft type depending on daily circumstances, the aircraft type assigned at the 
scheduling phase is correctly reflected to the OAG data. 
- Seat Number: Total number of seats per flight. The flight’s assigned aircraft type 
determines the physical seat count. 
 
 The below example retrieved from the OAG database illustrates the primary attributes 
of the schedule data. This is a snapshot of an Emirates (EK) flight as of June 2010 row retrieved 
from the OAG database.  
 
 1) Airline Designator Code    : EK 
 2) Flight Number    : 124 
 3) Departure Airport Code   : IST (refers to Istanbul) 
 4) Departure Terminal   : International 
 5) Departure Local Time   : 16:30 
 6) Arrival Airport Code   : DXB (refers to Dubai) 
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 7) Arrival Local Time    : 21:45 
 8) Operating Status    : Operating Flight 
 9) Total Seat Number    : 303 
 10) Day of Week    : 3 (Wednesday) 
 11) Block Time / Flight Minutes  : 255 
 12) Number of Stops    : 0 
 13) General Aircraft Code   : 772 (Boeing 770-200) 
 14) Direct Kilometres    :  3009 
 
 Using the data above, the following fields are added to the table by mapping the airport 
codes with the OAG’s airport database.  
 
 15) Arrival Airport Name   : Dubai International 
 16) Departure Airport Name   : Ataturk 
 17) Departure City Name    : Istanbul 
 18) Departure Country Code   : TR 
 19) Departure Country Name   : Turkey 
 20) Arrival City Name   : Dubai 
 21) Arrival Country Code   : AE 
 22) Arrival Country Name   : United Arab Emirates 
 23) Operation Type    : International 
 
The above mentioned sample single row data obtained from the OAG with its 23 
attributes refers to a direct operating flight of Emirates from Istanbul (IST) to Dubai (DXB) 
having flight number EK121, operated on Wednesday in June 2010 by a 777-200 type aircraft 
with an average seat capacity of 303 per flight. Since the departure country and the arrival 
country are not the same, it is deduced that this is an international flight. The flight departs 
from Istanbul at 16:30 local time and arrives at Dubai at 21:45 local time, implying a flight 
time of 255 minutes. Since this is a scheduled flight, Emirates operates this flight each 
Wednesday in the 2010 Summer timetable.  
 
If there exist additional rows in the OAG data proving the presence of EK121 flights in 
the others days of the week, which is indeed the case, EK121 is then considered to be a daily 
flight. Accessing this data on separate rows enables the observation of daily changes with the 
service if any, i.e. the seating capacity of a particular day may be different from other days due 
to the operation of another aircraft type, or departure and arrival times may differ depending 
on the day of the week.  
 
Considering that the airlines may operate more than thousands of flights per week and 
for each flight, the 23 attributes mentioned above were retrieved from the OAG database, an 
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enormous volume of schedule data was required. The below table shows the number of rows 
referring to the number of weekly operating and codeshare flights of the listed airlines for each 
year's representative week (final week of June). 
Table 5.1: Number of Operating and Codeshare Flights in the OAG from 2004 to 2016 
Number of Flight 
Rows 
Operating Flights Code-share Flights Total 
2004 25,604 14,635 40,239 
2005 29,680 17,619 47,299 
2006 32,887 20,908 53,795 
2007 34,506 21,687 56,193 
2008 38,350 24,008 62,358 
2009 38,656 26,512 65,168 
2010 40,173 35,145 75,318 
2011 42,305 44,664 86,969 
2012 45,426 45,767 91,193 
2013 48,841 49,308 98,149 
2014 50,244 52,733 102,977 
2015 51,453 54,682 106,135 
2016 52,867 62,844 115,711 
Total Rows 1,001,504 
Total Number of Attributes 23,011.592 
  
As Table 5.1 demonstrates, the schedule data of the 36 listed airlines’ representative 
weeks from 2004 to 2016 add up to more than one million records. Considering each row 
contains 23 attributes, more than 23 million secondary data was fetched from the OAG 
database. It is also observed in Table 5.1 that for some years, the number of codeshare flights 
is more than the number of operating flights. As one operating carrier can contract with 
multiple numbers of marketing airlines, it is possible to observe higher codeshare flight 
frequencies than the operating services.  
 
Since the schedule data is central to attaining the research's aim and objectives, a double 
check was required to ensure the accuracy, validity and credibility of the obtained data. 
Although OAG is a highly credible source, it is a secondary data source requiring validation 
controls. For this reason, ensuring the correctness of the OAG data is mandatory, and therefore 
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the accuracy of the OAG schedule data was checked using alternative primary and secondary 
data sources.  
 
There are publicly available tools that could assist in verifying the OAG data. For 
instance, it was possible to enquire online on the airlines’ websites and check whether their 
displayed schedules are in line with the OAG data. Moreover, most carriers' post their timetable 
booklets for download online. The information accessed from the carriers' websites is primary 
data, referring to a credible method for validation. Undoubtedly, it was nearly impossible to 
crosscheck all OAG data via these resources because of two reasons. First, an airline’s past 
schedule is not publicly available for download or viewing, as it has already expired and no 
longer available for sale. Second, including codeshare and operating flights, there were more 
than 1 million flights available from 2004 to 2016 awaiting to be checked. Therefore, validating 
this data was only possible through manual efforts by conducting random tests. In June 2016, 
the schedule information obtained through the web searches of the listed carriers’ 2016 June 
flights was crosschecked with the OAG data. For each airline at least three pairs of O&D were 
selected whose schedule details were obtained from the carriers' website, which was then 
compared with the OAG data. The three selected O&Ds had the following characteristics to 
ensure diversity:  
(i) A direct flight with either departure or arrival city is the base/hub of the airline 
(i.e. Dubai for EK or Vienna for OS at the origin or destination)  
(ii) An operating connecting O&D (i.e. London to Amman via KL) 
(iii) A non-stop or connecting O&D with at least one segment is a codeshare flight.   
 
The comparison of primary data obtained through the web searches proved a 100% 
match with the OAG data for 2016 schedules, and hence the validation was completed 
successfully. Although only 3 O&Ds for each of the listed airlines were tested through this 
method, it was convincing that the OAG data presented credible schedule information. Indeed 
OAG is commonly used in the industry and academic studies without any doubt on data 
reliability, which was re-corroborated with the manual tests.      
 
To accomplish a further credible schedule data validation, other data resources were 
explored. Similar to OAG, Innovata’s joint product with IATA Schedules Reference Service 
(SRS) offers the carriers’ schedule information too. For IATA (2014), SRS is a neutral source 
of airline schedules, and was created to provide a secure and high-quality service for the 
collection, validation, consolidation and distribution of airline schedules, also presenting robust 
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and stable historical timetable data for more than 850 companies. Therefore, SRS was used as 
the second method of validating the OAG data. Similar to OAG, SRS is formed by a set of 
secondary data fed from various direct resources like GDS, market intelligence, airline and 
airport inventory data. 
 
In order to validate OAG data and compare it with SRS outputs, certain control 
parameters at the aggregate level were defined. These control parameters included each of the 
listed airlines' 1) total weekly operating services and 2) total weekly codeshare flights. The 
values of these parameters were retrieved from the OAG and SRS databases separately, with 
the following formula calculating the match rates: 
 
1 −  
|𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑂𝐴𝐺) − 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑅𝑆)|
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑂𝐴𝐺)
 
 
Where count (OAG) refers to the number of weekly flights fetched from the OAG database 
whereas count(SRS) refers to the same parameter retrieved from the SRS database. In case of 
count(OAG) and count(SRS) are equal to each other, it could be inferred that both databases 
reported the same number of frequencies for the representative week and managed 100% match 
rate. In order to ensure the credibility of the data sources, a high match rate was essential. The 
following tables (Table 5.2 and 5.3) report the representative week’s total flight count in the 
OAG and SRS databases for the listed carriers from 2004 to 2016. 
 
Table 5.2: Number of Operating Flights OAG vs SRS and The Match Rate 
Years count(OAG) count(SRS) Match Rate 
2004 25,604 25,587 more than 99.9% 
2005 29,680 29,646 more than 99.8% 
2006 32,887 32,841 more than 99.8% 
2007 34,506 34,912 98.8% 
2008 38,350 38,124 99.4% 
2009 38,656 38,731 more than 99.8% 
2010 40,173 40,188 more than 99.9% 
2011 42,305 42,300 more than 99.9% 
2012 45,426 45,418 more than 99.9% 
2013 48,841 49,014 99.6% 
2014 50,244 50,220 more than 99.9% 
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2015 51,453 52,019 98.9% 
2016 52,867 53,276 99.2% 
 
Table 5.3: Number of Non-Operating Flights OAG vs SRS and The Match Rate 
Years count(OAG) count(SRS) Match Rate 
2004 14,635 14,252 97.3% 
2005 17,619 16,993 96.4% 
2006 20,908 20,688 98.9% 
2007 21,687 21,225 97.8% 
2008 24,008 23,883 99.4% 
2009 26,512 26,421 99.7% 
2010 35,145 35,100 more than 99.8% 
2011 44,664 44,621 more than 99.9% 
2012 45,767 45,750 more than 99.9% 
2013 49,308 49,002 99.4% 
2014 52,733 52,688 more than 99.9% 
2015 54,682 54,501 99.7% 
2016 62,844 62,254 99.0% 
 
Based on the information depicted in the tables above, count(OAG) and count(SRS) 
converged, implying high match rates of the data resources. The difference in operating flights 
was minimal, 0.4% on average whereas the figure with codeshare flights varied between 97.3% 
to more than 99.9%. The minor differences in codeshare flights might be sourced due to the 
unavailability of flight information in one of the data resource, whereas it existed in the other. 
However, it is also observed from Tables 5.2 and 5.3 that the match rates with codeshare flight 
have improved to a rate above 99.6% since 2008. As a result, it is inferred from the high match 
rates that both the SRS and OAG databases report almost similar flight counts and thus the 
credibility of the OAG data was further credited. 
 
5.3: Minimum Connection Time (MCT) Data 
 
As explained earlier, airport authorities determine the MCT duration, which may differ 
from one airport to the other. On the other hand, airports MCTs may change over time. For 
example, if an airport invests in its technical infrastructure to facilitate faster transfer 
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processing, its MCTs may decrease. Therefore, obtaining up-to-date MCT data was mandatory 
for this research.  
 
OAG provides a detailed MCT database for over 4,000 airports. In OAG, more than 
100,000 standard and carrier exceptions are contained within the MCT database. It is the single 
most comprehensive source of MCT data available in the market (OAG, 2016). It should be 
noted that airports do not necessarily need to have a single MCT duration. The MCT of an 
airport may change depending on the incoming and outgoing flight terminals, which is already 
present in the OAG database. For this reason, if the airport has more than one MCT, multiple 
MCTs were needed along with the terminal information. An example of London Gatwick is 
disclosed in Table 5.4 
 
Table 5.4: MCT Figures of the London Gatwick Airport 
Terminal Operation Type MCT 
South Terminal Domestic to Domestic 40 minutes 
South Terminal Domestic to International 45 minutes 
South Terminal The Channel Islands to Domestic 50 minutes 
South Terminal International to Domestic 60 minutes 
South Terminal International to International 55 minutes 
North Terminal Domestic to Domestic 45 minutes 
North Terminal Domestic to International 45 minutes 
North Terminal International to Domestic 45 minutes 
North Terminal International to International 45 minutes 
Between Terminals  75 minutes 
 
The MCT values of 2,455 airports, valid as of 2016, were obtained from the OAG 
database and used throughout the study. This data covered all hub airports in which the listed 
carriers offer connecting services. While determining the exact MCT of an airport with multiple 
MCTs for a given itinerary, schedule data was used to clarify the specific value. For example, 
domestic flights are identified in case the departure and arrival countries are the same and the 
corresponding MCT of domestic flights in London Gatwick airport is 45 minutes as shown in 
Table 5.4. Furthermore, the departure and arrival terminals of the flights are already contained 
in the schedule data easing to determine the specific MCT value for a particular itinerary. In 
case the terminal information was not specified in the schedule data, the highest MCT value of 
the connecting airport was used throughout the research. 
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 Although OAG confirms the actuality and accuracy of its MCT database, its credibility 
needed to be also cross-checked as the MCT information is a secondary data source too. For 
this reason, 20 airports were selected and their MCT values were obtained from other various 
resources, which were then compared with the OAG data. The selected airports were: Istanbul 
Ataturk (IST), Geneva Cointrin (GVA), London Heathrow (LHR), New York - John F 
Kennedy (JFK), Frankfurt International (FRA), Dubai International (DXB), New Delhi Indira 
Gandhi (DEL) and Johannesburg O.R. Tambo (JNB) airports. The other 11 airports were 
Milano Malpensa (MXP), Tehran Imam Khomeini (IKA), Baku Heydar Aliyev (GYD), 
Chicago O'Hare (ORD), Tokyo Narita (NRT), Bangkok Suvarnabhumi (BKK), Amsterdam 
Schiphol (AMS), Cairo International (CAI), Tel Aviv Ben Gurion (TLV), Singapore Changi 
(SIN) and Barcelona (BCN). 
 
The alternative resources for obtaining the MCTs of the selected airports included a 
mixture of primary and secondary data. Public MCT information available on airports' official 
web pages and other secondary data sources, including airline announcements, blogs and 
magazine/newspaper articles, were helpful in this context. However, not all of the selected 
airports disclosed their MCTs transparently through their official web pages and other sources. 
As an alternative solution, the airports were contacted through e-mail and phone asking for 
their MCT for academic purposes, and five of them kindly responded. As a result, OAG data 
successfully passed all validity and credibility tests, and the MCT accuracy was verified 
through alternative primary and secondary data resources.   
 
5.4: Demand Data 
 
As discussed earlier, this research was dedicated to comprehending air service 
providers' schedule and network performance, for which certain methodologies were 
introduced utilising consumer-centric supply and quality metrics as the input. Moreover, the 
study sought to introduce the REMSET model, enabling a comparison of the market 
performance for competing airlines. Therefore, demand was not a key driver of the research’s 
approach.  
 
Although demand information was not employed as an input to the research’s 
methodology, it was required to validate the accuracy of the study’s outputs. For example, the 
REMSET model yields a realistic market share estimation of the rival carriers on an O&D. In 
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order to measure the accuracy of these forecasts, actual demand figures were required to be 
compared with the REMSET models’ estimations. In case of convergence with the forecasted 
and actual market shares, it could be claimed that the methodology produced credible 
estimations. For this reason, Marketing Information Data Tape (MIDT) data was employed. 
MIDT obtains data via the booking transactions generated by the GDSs and represents the true 
total market figure and carrier performance (OAG Analytics, 2018). However, MIDT datasets 
do not capture passengers booked directly with an airline. Given the fairly low market 
penetration of the GDSs in some regions, an O&D’s true booking natures may not be accurately 
reflected in MIDT figures. Despite such drawbacks, MIDT data provides valuable competitive 
information enabling industry practitioners to make well-informed decisions (Devriendt, 
Derruder, & Witlox, 2013). 
  
 This Chapter has addressed the data sources for the schedule and the MCT information 
that was used throughout the research. The validity and credibility of the data sources was 
discussed in detail. It could be safely concluded that OAG is a credible data source for schedule 
and MCT data. Additionally, MIDT data has been chosen as a resource to perform the accuracy 
tests of the REMSET model. Besides, the research demands an extensive array of consumer 
preference data to incorporate passengers’ perspectives into the research’s methodologies. In 
order to obtain the most relevant information, primary data obtained directly from the 
passengers through a survey was used. The following Chapter addresses the survey design and 
implementation procedure in detail.  
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Chapter 6: Passenger Survey Design and Implementation 
 
 This research contributed to academic knowledge by including a passenger perspective 
on airline schedule assessment, which has not previously been quantitatively addressed in the 
academic literature. Such an extension has enabled a calculation of the ‘quality’ of itineraries 
competing on a given O&D and has made it possible to benchmark their relative performance, 
referring to Objective 2 of the study. It was therefore mandatory to develop an understanding 
of the passenger’s perception of a “good” or “bad” schedule.  Although the literature review 
has identified specific factors with a particular impact on consumer choice, those parameters 
needed to be re-validated by passengers as the expectations and priorities of consumers may 
change over time. The relative superiorities of the factors influencing the passenger purchasing 
decisions had to be comprehended, especially in the presence of alternative products with 
varying characteristics. Moreover, Chapter 2 recognised certain research-specific factors that 
may be influential in consumers’ schedule convenience perception. As the research-specific 
parameters were not available in the academic literature, they required justification and 
verification by the passengers. Hence, a passenger survey was conducted in order to [i] verify 
the factors addressed in the literature review Chapters that influence consumers’ itinerary 
choice (i.e. total journey time, departure and arrival time, routing, itinerary type, etc.), [ii] 
corroborate the research specific parameters effect on passengers’ decision making and [iii] 
quantitatively assess the relevant parameters impact on the schedule convenience. It was 
intended through the survey to gather key market intelligence information to determine relative 
schedule quality scores of the competing products in a market. By comprehending the priorities 
and preferences of consumers on schedule related metrics, the survey looked to translate 
qualitative concepts of schedule convenience into quantitative factors to accurately measure 
and benchmark a carrier’s network attraction. Therefore, the survey’s role in reaching the 
research’s aims and objectives was key, requiring a separate chapter to addresses its design and 
implementation procedures. This Chapter elaborates on the implementation method of the 
questionnaire, as well as the representative sample selection and each asked question. The 
survey results are analysed in Chapter 7, and how they were used in the consumer-centric 
capacity, quality and REMSET are discussed in Chapter 8 and 9.  
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6.1. Selection of Sample Population and Method of Implementation 
 
Although the research was focused on network attractiveness of the carriers in the 
Middle East, Europe and Africa, it is an inevitable fact that the perceptions and schedule 
preferences of consumers are global and beyond the regional level. With the further rise of 
globalisation, demand for international travel and the expansion of HS networks, today an 
airline in the Middle East, Europe and Africa can be a choice for a passenger residing in the 
Americas or Australia. Therefore, it was essential to execute the survey not only in the research 
focus regions but at a worldwide level.  
 
The survey intended to receive feedback directly from the travellers who recently made 
an itinerary decision. For this reason, it was considered that the best venue of the survey 
implementation would be the airport departure terminals, where passengers are processed for 
check-in and boarding. In order to access a broader spectrum of respondents all around the 
world, airports in different continents were identified to conduct the survey.  The selected 
airports included busy global hubs and regionally strong. The chosen airports were New York 
John F. Kennedy (JFK), Delhi Indira Gandhi (DEL), London Heathrow (LHR), Istanbul Ataturk 
(IST), Dubai International (DXB), Geneva Cointrin (GVA), Frankfurt International (FRA), 
Hong Kong International (HKG) and Johannesburg OR Tambo (JNB). These airports host a 
larger volume of international passenger movement each day. Moreover, when picking these 
airports, a mix of curfew-implementing and curfew-free airports was achieved. In order to 
achieve a satisfactory survey result set, it was concluded that collecting nearly 100 survey 
responses at each of these selected airports would be more than sufficient to report an adequate 
population set. 
 
 
The implementation of the survey across 9 different airports was a challenge in terms 
of logistics and organisation. For this reason, a detailed implementation strategy was adopted. 
First, survey administrators (or assessors or interviewers) assisted in implementing the survey 
at each airport by distributing the surveys to participants and collecting the responses. The 
assessors were chosen from the airline employees whom had access to the passenger terminal. 
Survey administrators had no contribution in the questionnaire design and analysis. The 
interviewers, were experienced in communicating with passengers regarding their itineraries, 
were the researcher’s colleagues and provided assistance voluntarily. From late January to 
March 2015, the assessors in the international terminals of the selected airports approached 
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prospective respondents and asked if they would be willing to contribute to an academic 
research with their valuable responses. Second, the survey administrators received a 
comprehensive presentation regarding the aim and objectives of the research, and were due-
diligently informed about the importance of the survey responses to the quality of the research’s 
output. The presentation also covered the principles of the survey implementation strategy.  
 
Only one assessor approached passengers in each airport, and they did not delegate their 
responsibility to anyone else. Although the survey took approximately 5 minutes to complete, 
in case the subjects were observed to be in a rush to catch their flight, they were excused from 
participating as the questions required participants’ concentration. Since conducting the 
questionnaire only at a particular time of the day might bias the analysis (for example morning 
flights may have been largely preferred by businessmen), the assessors working in shifts paid 
attention to approach passengers at different time intervals to ensure a good representative 
participant set. In order to further enhance the diversity on the participant set, the administrators 
implemented the survey on different days of the week. For instance, while a large share of 
weekend travellers could be leisure travellers, business travellers may dominate the airport early 
in the weekdays. For these reasons, survey administrators sought to collect between 100 – 120 
responses over a period of 4 to 5 weeks. This target corresponded to 4 – 6 surveys per day-shift 
on average. As each survey implementation took roughly 5 minutes, the interviewers’ duty at 
the airport was not severely interrupted, and their focus on the survey was ensured. 
 
As explained, the assessors received their brief by way of a presentation regarding the 
survey implementation procedures. In the presentation, they were trained to approach a 
balanced mix of respondents. For instance, they were instructed to approach all levels of age 
groups including senior passengers, youngsters and middle-aged adults. Passengers observed 
to be younger than 18 years were excluded from participation. Moreover, they were encouraged 
to have an equal split of male and female subjects. Although the age and sex of the passengers 
were not asked directly in the survey, the assessors showed extra care in achieving a good mix 
as they only approached 4 to 6 participants per day, easing the process. Airline employees 
travelling on stand-by tickets with concessional fares were also denied from participation since 
seat vacancy is the ultimate determinant of their journey rather than their travel plan.  
The survey was prepared and implemented in English. The survey administrators, who 
were fluent in English, excused participants who may have difficulty in understanding the 
survey due to limited understanding of the English language. In case participants demanded 
clarification about the questions, the assessors replied with the language in which they were 
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asked, mainly the local language of the city where the survey was undertaken. It should also be 
noted that the assessors approached not only to local passengers but also to foreign nationals. 
Therefore, the survey did not intend to analyse the results based on the nationality of the 
respondents.  
 
The survey participants were expected to be familiar with basic aviation related concepts 
such as connecting flights, connect time, codeshare operation, etc. to ensure full comprehension 
of the questions. Although the survey questions were drafted in a simplistic manner to avoid 
complex technical language, if the interviewers observed that the respondents had difficulty in 
understanding the questions despite their clarifications, it was regarded that the interviewee was 
unfamiliar with basic aviation-related terms and thus their responses were eliminated so as not 
to adversely influence the results set.  
 
It was highlighted to potential survey participants that their responses would be used for 
academic purposes only, not commercial. Assessors observed that the respondents appreciated 
this explanation, which increased their willingness to participate. As some airport authorities 
required pre-approval processes for survey implementation as part of their internal regulations, 
the assessors informally updated the airport management regarding the academic purpose of the 
survey.   
 
6.2. Preparation of Survey Questions 
 
Before distributing the questionnaires to assessors and starting the implementation, a 
pilot survey was carried out to enhance the effectiveness of the survey. The purpose of the pilot 
study was to test the appropriateness and language of the survey questions. The pilot survey 
was implemented directly by the researcher to 30 participants. Based on the feedback received 
from the pilot participants, the survey questions were finalised. The responses of the pilot 
participants were not included in the survey analysis.  
 
 The survey included a set of questions in different categories. The first category of the 
questionnaire intended to segment the passengers.  This categorisation enabled the participants 
to be profiled and an assessment to be made of how the responses to questions varied among 
different passenger segments. The next group of questions was about time-related parameters 
which were designed to develop an understanding concerning the respondents' departure and 
arrival time quality perception, MaxCT tolerance and buffer time request. The next set of 
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questions addressed the respondents' relative appreciation for different flight type and routing 
combinations whereas the final category was designed to comprehend consumers’ flight time 
split preference. A final version of the passenger survey is available at Appendix A.  
 
 6.2.1. Passenger Segmentation & Profiling Questions 
The survey contained four questions to segment and profile the respondents. The 
profiling questions intended to evaluate the participants’ (i) frequency of flights, (ii) previous 
positive experiences and (iii) preference priorities. The inclusion of each segment’s responses 
into the analysis invaluably contributed to the survey results and enabled an observation of the 
divergences of the findings for different segments. Additionally, as part of the profiling process, 
the jurisdiction on passenger’s itinerary selection was also asked due to the fact that in some 
cases not the individual travellers but someone else (like the company travel agency, the 
secretary or the spouse) make the travel decision. Profiling questions required the respondents 
to pick the attribute that best reflected their circumstance and positive experience. Therefore, 
they were not stated preference questions. The fourth question shown below is a conjoint 
ranking scale question in which the respondents were asked to rank the alternatives from most 
important to least preferred.  The profiling questions with their remarks are shown in Table 6.1 
with correct questioning order. The remark column clarifies the rationale behind the inclusion 
of the corresponding question into the survey. 
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Table 6.1: Survey Profiling Questions – Q1–3 
Question Remarks 
Q1- How many flights have you taken in the last 12 months? Travelling to one 
destination and back count as 1 round trip. 
 
□ No flights 
□ 1 round-trip flight 
□ 2 – 5 round-trip flights 
□ 6 – 9 round-trip flights 
□ More than 10 round-trip flights 
Helped to address how frequently the respondent 
travelled. The more the passenger travels, the more 
itinerary decisions were made. 
Q2- To what extent you are able to decide or influence the decision makers of your 
flight plans? 
 
□ I make or influence my ALL flight decisions. 
□ I make or influence MOST of my flight decisions. 
□ I make or influence SOME of my flight decisions. 
□ I RARELY make or influence my flight decisions. 
□ I NEVER make of influence my flight decisions. 
Measured to what extent the respondents had influence 
and authority on their travel decision.  
Q3- Have you taken any of these air trips in the past 5 years?  
 
□ Connecting flight 
□ Connecting flight with limited connection time (due to short connection time or late 
arrival of the first flight) 
□ Codeshare flight (booked in one airline but flown with another one) 
□ Long haul flight (more than 8 hours) 
□ Business or first class flight 
□ Premium economy class flight 
□ Low-cost airline flight 
□ Domestic flight 
Enabled understanding if the passenger had ever 
experienced and tested different flight alternatives stated 
in the question as they would be replying to questions in 
the proceeding sections that were directly associated 
with those experiences.  
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Table 6.1 (continued): Survey Profiling Questions – Q4 
Q4- Please rank the factors shaping your travel decision from the most important one to 
the least from 1 to 10. (1 / most important, 10 / least important) Use each number once 
only.  
 
__ Date and time (schedule) convenience 
__ Fare 
__ Duration of the journey 
__ Frequent flyer programme 
__ Airline reputation 
__ Departure and/or arrival airport 
__ On-board services (catering, in-flight entertainment, cabin service etc.) 
__ Before and after flight services (CIP lounge, shuttle services etc.) 
__ Availability of flight alternatives (such as higher frequency per day)  
__ On-time performance and consistent schedule times 
 
Enabled understanding the preference priorities of the 
respondents. The question also clarified the extent that 
the schedule related factors were prominent in the 
traveller’s decision-making process.  
 
 
 
Consistent schedule time refers to identical departure and arrival times of a flight under the same flight number. For instance, if XY101 
departs 10:00 on Tuesdays and Thursdays but departs at 10:40 in the remaining days of the week, XY101 is assumed not to have consistent schedule 
times within a week. 
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 6.2.2. Departure and Arrival Time Quality Determination Questions 
 As discussed in the literature review, passengers have preferences regarding their ideal 
departure and arrival times. Therefore, it was intended in the survey to develop an 
understanding concerning the most appreciated time intervals of the day to depart from the 
origin and arrive at the destination. Additionally, it was aimed to comprehend the relative 
superiorities in terms of preference among different time zones of the day. Thus, the objective 
with these questions was to understand the departure and arrival time qualities (qdep and qarr 
respectively) of the itineraries.   
 
As the initial step, time intervals of the day were identified. The smaller the duration of 
each interval, the more precise the views of the travellers but the higher the number of responses 
needed. For instance, if the time intervals were determined to be 1 hour, passengers would need 
to respond to 48 (24 for departure, 24 for arrival) questions. However, although this approach 
would offer a clear picture about the attractiveness of each hour to depart and arrive, having an 
excess number of questions might distract passengers’ concentration and thus the quality of the 
responses. On the other hand, over stretching time intervals would lead to the precision with 
the response quality, despite fewer questions. For this reason, fixing time intervals to two hours 
was found optimal. The first time interval started from the midnight and ended at 01:59 am, 
followed by other eleven time periods, resulting with 24 intervals to be rated by the participants. 
 
 The next decision factor involved rating each time interval to be assessed. Higher 
numbers of scales were avoided, as it would influence the concentration and justification 
process of the respondents. Furthermore, odd numbers of scales were avoided to prevent 
passengers from ticking the middle-value option, implying complete indifference. Since the 
survey aimed to quantify relative superiorities of each time zone, passengers’ responses should 
move away from being neutral. For this reason, a four-scale rating was utilised. The scales were 
titled “worst”, “poor", "good" and "best". This approach in a sense forced the survey 
participants to decide on the attractiveness of each time zone as a neutral-indifferent option was 
absent. Since qdep and qarr can have any numerical number and a standard definition is required 
to construct a common base for further references, the following standard qdep and qarr values 
were introduced. 
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Table 6.2: The qdep and qarr Factors with Min and Max Values and Inferences of Their Values.   
Parameter Min. Value Max. Value Explanation 
qdep 1 4 
1 refers to the worst departure time score; the 
least preferred departure time and 4 is the 
highest and best alternative.  
qarr 1 4 
1 refers to the poorest arrival time score; the 
least preferred arrival time and 4 is the 
highest and best alternative. 
 
 
 6.2.3. Maximum Connection Time (MaxCT) Determination Question 
 Although the MCTs of the airports are fixed parameters which are pre-defined by the 
airport authority, MaxCT is a subjective factor indicating the extent of passengers’ maximum 
tolerance for connecting time at the connecting airport. In other words, while the MCT is an 
absolute figure, MaxCT is a subjective, passenger-specific parameter deeming it a primary 
interest of the survey. For this reason, a direct question was placed on the survey asking the 
respondents’ MaxCT. It is an indispensable fact that there exist various factors shaping the 
MaxCT tolerance of the individuals such as airport amenities, smoking facilities, airline 
lounges, passengers’ age and purpose of travel. However, for the sake of this question, the 
passengers were merely asked their maximum tolerance, free from these factors, concentrating 
only on their perceived maximum. To ascend the lucidity of the question, a case was 
exemplified in parenthesis. The answer options were designed at the hour-level forcing the 
respondent to make an educated decision. The last answer option was for the subject for whom 
the MaxCT was not a critical parameter in their overall thought process.  
 
 6.2.4. Buffer Time (tbuffer) Request Question 
 Although the MCT refers to the minimum connection time at the hub airport, it was 
claimed in Chapter 2 that passengers might demand additional buffer time to reduce their stress 
and make their journey more comfortable. In order to verify the existence of this buffer time 
preference and its duration in case of its presence, a direct question was asked in the survey. 
The question was explained in detail to introduce the case explicitly. The ‘buffer time’ concept 
was not used in the question text but rather the idea was outlined with an explanation. 
Passengers were asked how much minimum additional time they would demand to make their 
connection less stressful through a stated preference model enquiry. The phrase ‘stress’ was 
intentionally used in the question to encourage subjects to determine the additional time 
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required to minimise their stress and maximise their convenience. The reply options were set 
to start with no additional time requirement to 1 hour with 15-minute intervals. The final option 
was included for passengers demanding more than an hour-long additional time.  
 
Table 6.3 shows above mentioned departure and arrival time quality questions whereas 
Table 6.4 displays the MaxCT and buffer time request determination questions. The question 
numbers proceed precisely as printed on the survey.  
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Table 6.3: Departure and Arrival Time Quality Question of the Survey (Q5-6) 
 
 
  
Q5 and Q6. For each time interval below, please state the degree of convenience for departures and arrivals. 1 referring to the worst, 2 poor, 3 good, 4 
the best time of the day. For example if you believe departing a city at 5 am in the morning is terrible please tick  option "1" for row 04:00 – 05:59 
for departure time section on the left, and if you believe it is good to arrive at the city at 5 am in the morning, please tick  option 3 for the arrival time 
section on the right.  
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Departure Time 
1 
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Poor 
3 
Good 
4 
Best 
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Arrival Time 
1 
Worst 
2 
Poor 
3 
Good 
4 
Best 
00:00-01:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 00:00-01:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
02:00-03:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 02:00-03:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
04:00-05:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 04:00-05:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
06:00-07:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 06:00-07:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
08:00-09:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 08:00-09:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10:00-11:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 10:00-11:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12:00-13:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 12:00-13:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14:00-15:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 14:00-15:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16:00-17:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 16:00-17:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18:00-19:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 18:00-19:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20:00-21:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 20:00-21:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22:00-23:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 22:00-23:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Table 6.4: MaxCT and tbuffer Request Question of the Survey (Q7-8) 
Questions and Remarks Remarks 
 
Q7. If you need to take a connecting flight, what would be your maximum 
tolerance to wait in the connecting airport from the landing of your first flight 
until the departure of your second flight? (E.g. You are travelling from New York 
to Rome via Heathrow. How long would you be willing to spend in Heathrow 
airport maximum?) 
 
□ Up to 2 hours 
□ Up to 3 hours 
□ Up to 5 hours 
□ Up to 8 hours 
□ Connection time is less important than other factors 
 
MaxCT determination question - The question text asks 
passengers maximum tolerance duration at the intermediary 
airport while connecting for the next flight.  
Q8. There is a minimum time required for each airport to connect from one flight 
to another. Some people find the minimum time challenging as with any 
irregularity such as the late arrival of the first flight, they may misconnect or feel 
stressed. How much minimum additional time would you prefer to have to make 
the connection less stressful? 
 
□ No extra time required 
□ Minimum time + 15 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 30 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 45 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 1 hour 
□ Minimum time + more than 1 hour 
 
tbuffer request question – The question text initially informs 
respondents regarding the existence of each airports MCT value 
and then asks their additional time demand on top of this pre-
defined duration.  
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 6.2.5. Codeshare Flight Convenience Question 
 Quantifying and benchmarking the value of a codeshare flight compared to an operating 
service is vital to determine the relative network positioning and performance of the carriers. 
Although the codeshare flights widen the airline network and offer a broader range of products, 
their value perceived by the passengers has to be well identified and reflected into the research’s 
model. As discussed in the literature review, consumers may have varying tendencies to prefer 
codeshare flights as the booked airline is not the operating carrier implying the utility of a 
codeshare flight may significantly diverge from that of an operating service. While for some 
consumers the airline operating the flight is the utmost factor of choice, some others might be 
apathetic as long as they enjoy a convenient journey. Furthermore, codeshare flights can even 
be a preference factor for some like frequent flyers aiming to gain incremental miles for their 
loyalty account.  
 
To address the dynamics of consumers’ attitude towards codeshare flights, the survey 
asked a question for assessing the circumstances when travellers’ make a non-operating 
itinerary preference. The answer options were designed to be mutually exclusive with clear 
distinctions. The first option was drafted for respondents with no tolerance to codeshare flights 
in their itineraries. The second alternative was for those who would only select the non-
operating service in case of the operating carriers’ service absence to the final destination. The 
third option was for the respondents who would only choose the codeshare flight if it is “more 
convenient”. The final option was for passengers with complete indifference to codeshare 
flights. 
 Table 6.5: Codeshare Flight Convenience Question of the Survey – Q9 
Question 
 
Q9. There are two flight alternatives to your destination, one operated by the airline of your choice 
and the other a codeshare flight where you book with the airline of your choice but travel on a 
different airline. Under which conditions would you choose the codeshare flight? 
 
□ I would never choose a codeshare flight. 
□ I would only choose it if I had no other choice.  
□ I might choose a codeshare flight if it is more convenient. 
□ It really does not matter to me. 
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6.2.6. Fare, Schedule Convenience and Flight Type Related Questions 
One of the primary objectives of this survey was to numerically quantify and benchmark 
the value of flight alternatives from the consumers’ standpoint. As discussed in the literature 
review, consumers’ willingness to pay values is a definite indicator of a product’s value. All 
parameters that are instrumental in the decision-making process of the consumer are elaborated 
in their thought process and translated into a fare that they intend to pay for the proposed flight. 
Therefore, the maximum fare that could be accepted by consumers can be used as a reference 
to assess their perceived value of the itinerary.  
 
The survey asked questions about travellers’ willingness to pay in dollars for different 
flight cases. Initially, a broader inquiry was made in Question 10 to sort the subjects’ tendencies 
between fare, flight type (operating or codeshare) and routing (direct or connecting). In 
Question 11, the interrelation between core product attributes and their relative monetary values 
were intended to be captured by referencing to a base case. Question 10 and 11 were drafted 
using stated preferences and choice modelling techniques in which the respondents were 
presented a rich set of preference as they were asked to choose between more than two 
alternatives. According to the Centre for International Economics Report (2001), this model 
allowed the analyst to estimate the extent to which individuals are prepared to trade off one 
attribute against another. Since the attributes were measured in monetary terms, it was possible 
to estimate the amount of money that the subject was prepared to pay for improving a non-
monetary attribute by one unit.  
 
Table 6.6: Fare, Schedule Convenience and Flight Type Question of the Survey – Q10 
Question 
 
Q10. Which of the flight itinerary would you prefer for your travel from City A to City B? $ signs 
are a depiction of the flight cost factor where more number of $ signs refers to a more expensive 
option. 
 
□ A direct flight of my favourite airline costing $$$$ 
□ A codeshare direct flight operated by an airline other than my choice costing $$$ 
□ A connecting (longer) flight of my favourite airline costing $$$ 
□ A connecting (longer) flight of an airline other than my regular choice costing $$ 
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Question 10 assisted to understand to what extent the respondents would compromise 
convenience in the presence of better fares. Although the number of dollar signs depicted in the 
options did not signal an exact proportional fare level, it was easily inferred by the respondents 
that the higher number of dollar signs implied a comparably higher fare. The selection of the 
first option categorised the passenger to be product quality oriented with no or limited price 
sensitivity. If the second or third option were selected, the participant provided a clear 
preference: prioritisation of a direct flight at the expense of a codeshare flight OR an operating 
flight of his choice airline at the expense of an inconvenient connecting flight. In case the final 
response was picked, the respondent was categorised to be price sensitive.  
 
Although Question 10 was instrumental in mapping itinerary characteristics in relation 
to fare in defining their relative priorities, its role remained solely conceptual and qualitative. 
The question did not assist in developing the quantitative relationship for competing itineraries 
based on their routing and type, in other words, inadequate to compute udo, uco, udc and ucc.  
 
Question 11 intended to measure the numerical value of different itinerary scenarios for 
quantifying schedule convenience by introducing a reference base case. In theory, with research 
employing stated preference, techniques rely on "hypothetical baselines" which describes a 
current state or a reference point. The researcher then poses a valuation question or choice task 
that is contingent, not on the existing status quo, but rather on the state of the world described 
in this new hypothetical baseline (Whittington & Adamowicz, 2011). For Question 11, the base 
scenario flight was determined to be an operating connecting service with 18 hours of total 
journey time for which the participant was assumed to pay 500 USD. In the proceeding set of 
questions, by consecutively altering the variables tested, passengers were requested to decide 
how much maximum they would agree to pay, referencing to 500 USD. The scales were 
determined in 50 USD intervals where the most expensive scale referred to was more than 700 
USD and the cheapest one was less than 400 USD. The tested parameters were i) flight routing 
– (direct / connecting) ii) flight time convenience (convenient / inconvenient) and iii) type 
(codeshare /online). It was expected through this question to crystallise the extent the 
passengers would pay more for the relatively advantaged (or less for the disadvantaged) 
itineraries compared to the base case and therefore to draw a roadmap for clarifying relative 
superiorities. Therefore, through this question, a concrete quantitative relation between the 
relative values of udo, uco, udc and ucc could be constructed. 
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Table 6.7: Relative Value Determination Question of the Survey – Q11 
Question 
 
Q11. Let's suppose you will fly from City A to City B by connecting through City C. This is a long haul connecting flight with INCONVENIENT departure 
and arrival times taking 18 hours for the whole journey. You paid 500 USD or this flight. Please answer the below questions taking 500 USD as the 
reference fare. 
 
How much would you pay for the below-mentioned flight alternatives from City A to City B 
referencing the above case costing 500 USD? Please tick  the value in USD or each case below. 
The leftmost column refers to less than 400 USD, where rightmost column refers more than 700 
USD. 
<
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A connecting flight with convenient flight times lasting 18 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A direct flight taking 12 hours with convenient flight times  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A direct flight taking 12 hours with inconvenient flight times.  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with convenient flight times taking 18 hours  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with inconvenient flight times taking 18 hours  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with convenient flight times taking 15 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare direct flight with inconvenient times taking 12 hours  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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6.2.7. Connecting Flight Split (fsplit) and Flight Time Percentage (%tf or %tc) Questions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, for connecting flights, in addition to the total travel time, the 
split of the journey between the first and proceeding legs may considered to be necessary as the 
existence of a relatively more extended segment would allow passengers to rest or sleep, 
limiting the stress caused by either changing or terminating the flight soon. On the other hand, 
an equal split, not ultimately stretching the duration of a leg might be a choice especially for 
smokers, rushing to find a permitted space to smoke soon after their disembarkation from the 
aircraft or for travellers having phobia avoiding excess flight times. The amenities of the hub 
airport might be detrimental to decide within this context, but the respondents were encouraged 
to reflect their general perspective concerning their best-preferred journey split for connecting 
itineraries through stated preference model questions.  
 
To ensure the clarity of the question, a connecting itinerary case with 10 hours of ttotal 
was illustrated where tconn was determined to be 1 hour. The reply options were indicated to 
have a different duration for the first and second segment where tflight summed 9 hours for each 
case. Answer options started with the first leg lasting 8 hours and the latter an hour. The 
complete symmetric with the interchanged duration of 1 hour and 8 hours for the first and 
second flight consecutively was listed in the fourth option. The second and third reply option 
involved symmetric 6 and 3 hours of flight time for the first or second flight respectively. The 
final answer alternative was placed for indifferent respondents viewing the split of the journey 
not as a vital parameter in their decision making. Respondents’ potential answers among 
symmetrical options were expected to offer an insight about their preference whether they 
would favour taking the longer or shorter flight first. 
 
The final survey question intended to understand if passengers favoured waiting at the 
hub airport rather than spending that time flying on board. This was achieved by fixing the total 
journey time and altering the tconn in the response options. The respondents were requested to 
choose between 1 hour and 3 hours of connecting time in which both routings in the itineraries 
had 12 hours of total journey time. The question assessed whether passengers would prefer 
spending 2 hours difference at the hub airport or onboard. Each option had certain advantages 
and disadvantages. Passengers preferring rather to be at the airport could enjoy more freedom 
and activities at the hub. On the other hand, some passengers could choose to stay onboard as 
they could sleep, work, watch a movie if the aircraft had an In Flight Entertainment (IFE) 
system or eat in case the airline offered free meal. Alternatively, business class passengers could 
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enjoy lounge facilities at the airport and therefore could prefer waiting at the hub airport rather 
than flying. In other words, the question aimed to understand, whether a higher %tf or %tc was 
appreciated by the participants among itineraries having equal ttotal.  
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Table 6.8: Connecting Flight Split and Flight Time Percentage Questions of the Survey – Q12–13 
Questions and Remarks Remarks 
 
Q12. For a different journey, which of the connecting flight itineraries would you prefer 
for your travel from City D to City E? Total duration of the journey from D to E is 10 
hours. 
 
□ First flight leg lasts 8 hours, the second leg lasts 1 hour and the connection time at 
the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 6 hours, the second leg lasts 3 hours and the connection time at 
the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 3 hours, the second leg lasts 6 hours and the connection time at 
the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 1 hour, the second leg lasts 8 hours and the connection time at 
the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ It does not matter to me at all. 
 
Question intended to determine the ideal split between the 
duration of connecting flight legs, having the same journey 
duration.  
 
Q13. Which of the connecting flight itineraries would you prefer for your travel from 
City F to City G. (Assuming all other parameters of choice like fares, airline preference, 
schedule are identical) 
 
□ A connecting flight with a total 12 hours of journey time of which 3 hours are 
spent at the connecting airport 
□ A connecting flight with a total 12 hours of journey time of which only 1 hour is 
spent at the connecting airport 
 
Identified whether a passenger would like to spend more on 
board or in the airport among two itineraries having 
identical total travel time.  
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 Totalling thirteen questions, the survey was printed on a two-sided page; fitting on a 
single sheet at the expense of using a smaller font. Avoiding multiple sheets was an intentional 
strategy to persuade subjects to participate in a short questionnaire. Considering that the survey 
was performed at the airport and potential respondents would take off for their destination soon, 
the pressure of outstanding passport and other formalities could have averted their participation 
unless they were convinced regarding the brevity of the survey. Soon after passengers 
completed the survey, the interviewers double-checked if any responses were missed or 
inappropriately responded. By establishing a proper coordination between the researcher and 
the survey administrators, the overall quality of the survey responses was increased. The survey 
administrators were well informed concerning the implementation strategy, and they 
approached a balanced mix of respondents on different days of the week and different times of 
the day. Such a well-informed, trained and interactive method was beneficial and hence 
significantly contributed to obtaining good quality responses. 
 
The survey intended to assess parameters including MaxCT, tbuffer, qarr, qdep, udo, uco, udc, 
ucc, fsplit,%tf, %tc which all together formed an essential input to schedule quality determination 
and the REMSET model. The following Chapter discusses the survey results and analysis. 
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Chapter 7: Passenger Survey - Results and Analysis 
 
As discussed in the earlier Chapters, the passenger survey had a central role in attaining 
the research’s aim and objectives with the incorporation of passengers’ perspective into the 
consumer-centric capacity determination, quality score computation and market share 
estimation processes. For this purpose, the survey was designed to let passengers around the 
world to present their independent and objective views concerning schedule attractiveness. The 
questionnaire addressed numerous critical factors and provided valuable results, which are 
discussed throughout this Chapter in detail.  Moreover, a number of statistical tests were 
implemented on the survey data to validate the robustness of the results.   
 
7.1. Number of Participants and the Determination of Valid Survey Responses 
 
 As addressed in Chapter 6, to ensure an acceptable level of confidence with the survey 
results, it was targeted to have a large sample size.  Each interviewer in 9 selected airports was 
asked to complete approximately 100 surveys from late January to March 2015. As securing 
additional responses would assist in granting lower error margins, the survey administrators 
were even encouraged to exceed 100 responses per airport as long as their shift enabled them 
to do so. 
 
 As the initial step, the criteria for accepting valid survey responses were identified and 
a preliminary check was performed to observe whether the responses met the primary criteria 
for inclusion in the analysis. In order for the responses to be included into the accepted survey 
set, two criteria were determined: (i) The respondents had to have a recent flight experience in 
the past 12 months and (ii) they had to report at least some interest in schedule convenience. 
Passengers without a recent flight experience were assumed to be unable to suggest credible 
and up-to-date responses as they made their most recent itinerary decision more than a year 
ago. Furthermore, as the objective of the survey was to examine schedule convenience, it was 
required that respondents place at least some degree of importance on schedule quality. The 
percentage of survey participants placing at least some importance on schedule convenience is 
an indicator of the research’s relevance, which is reported in the proceeding sections, so the 
responses of the interviewees with no interest in schedule convenience were eliminated from 
the analyses. The respondents' flight experience was asked in the first question whereas their 
attitude towards schedule convenience was examined in the third question.  Furthermore, 
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inconsistent replies (i.e. selecting more than one option for a single response question) and 
incomplete forms were also eliminated from the final set. Table 7.1 summarises the total 
number of surveys mailed by the assessors and the amount of valid surveys obtained after the 
completion of the above-mentioned procedure.  
 
Table 7.1: Number of Surveys Returned by the Survey Administrators and Valid Surveys to 
Be Included in the Results Analysis   
Airport Number of Surveys 
Returned 
Number of Valid 
Surveys 
Delhi (DEL) 110 98 
Dubai (DXB) 112 105 
Frankfurt (FRA) 130 109 
Geneva (GVA) 113 113 
Hong Kong (HKG) 132 114 
Istanbul (IST) 110 105 
Johannesburg (JNB) 123 101 
London (LON) 112 108 
New York (NYC) 111 109 
Total 1,053 962 
 
 
 As the table illustrates, among the 1,053 questionnaires mailed, a total of 962 valid 
survey responses were obtained for the analyses. Therefore, the accepted survey set which was 
used in the analysis offered more than an adequate level of confidence to ensure the validity 
and credibility of the survey findings. Among the 91 eliminated survey responses, 38 of them 
were excluded as the respondents had no flight experience in the past 12 months. Furthermore, 
25 of the passengers marked schedule convenience as the least important factor when making 
itinerary decisions, which excused their responses from the results set. This figure implies that 
among 1,053 participants, only 25 of them reported no interest to schedule convenience 
contributing to 2.37%. In other words, for the remaining 97.63% of the respondents, schedule 
convenience was found to be significant. Furthermore, 28 responses were disqualified because 
of incomplete or unreadable replies.  
 
 The following sections discuss the survey findings by incorporating the replies of 962 
valid questionnaires. The results were also analysed at the airport breakdown, whose results 
are disclosed in Appendix B. It should be noted that the survey did not address the nationality 
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or residence country of the participants. Therefore, the responses at the airport breakdown does 
not reflect the findings that are specific to the country or residents of the city where the survey 
was conducted. Undoubtedly the survey venue airport might have affected the variances with 
the responses, but it cannot be argued as the single reason of any divergence. 
 
7.2. Frequency of Flights 
 
 The first question of the survey addressed respondents’ flight frequency in the past 12 
months. Higher frequencies implied a greater number of itinerary decisions made, enabling 
passengers to provide more credible justifications towards survey questions. Table 7.2 
summarises the breakdown of the responses.  
 
Table 7.2: Replies to Question 1 of the Survey 
Options Number of 
Respondents Marked 
Per cent share 
1 round-trip (RT) flight 181 18.81% 
2 RT flights 224 23.28% 
3 - 5 RT flights 344 35.76% 
6 – 9 RT flights 145 15.07% 
More than 10 RT flights 68 7.08% 
Total 962 100.00% 
 
The above table demonstrates that, 81.19% of participants had multiple flight 
experiences in the past 12 months and the largest portion of the respondents took between 3 to 
5 RT flights. Assuming "3 - 5 RT flight" option contributes to 4 flights whereas "6 - 9 RT 
flight" maps to 7.5 flights and "more than 10 RT flights" refers to 12 RT flights, the average 
RT flights taken by respondents is calculated as follows: 
 
((1 𝑥 181) + (2 𝑥 224) + (4 𝑥 344) + (7.5 𝑥 145) + (12 𝑥 68))
962
= 4.06 
 
Therefore, an average survey participant took 4.06 RT flights in the past 12 months. This figure 
is convincing in the sense that an average respondent had at least 8 flight experiences, as a 
round-trip involves 2 flight segments minimum. The breakdown of the flight frequency per 
airport is disclosed in Appendix B. 
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7.3. Itinerary Decision Making 
 
 Although it is not a prerequisite for consumers to have full control over their travel 
plans, a higher degree of influence in their itinerary decision making would mean more time 
spent on product choice, adding up to the credibility of the findings. Table 7.3 demonstrates 
the responses to this question. 
 
Table 7.3: Replies to Question 2 of the Survey 
Options 
Number of 
Respondents 
Marked 
Per cent share 
I make / influence ALL decisions. 153 15.91% 
I make / influence MOST decisions. 401 41.69% 
I make/influence SOME decisions. 297 30.87% 
I RARELY make / influence decisions. 87 9.04% 
I NEVER make / influence decisions. 24 2.49% 
Total 962 100.00% 
 
57.6% of the respondents had a substantial degree of control over their journey plans, 
i.e. making or influencing either all or most of their travel decisions. A significant share of the 
respondents, contributing to nearly 31% of all participants, mentioned that they have some 
control over their itineraries. Less than three per cent of the surveyed individuals reported no 
power in decision making. These results added further credibility to the survey analysis in the 
sense that the survey participants had more than adequate level of control over their itinerary 
choices. The responses of the participants who completely lacked control on their itinerary 
selection were also included in the analyses of the proceeding questions as their opinions 
concerning schedule convenience matters.  The responses to Question 2 at the airport 
breakdown are also displayed in Appendix B.  
 
7.4. Previous Positive Experiences 
 
Comprehending the travellers’ previous positive flight experiences was crucial for the 
accuracy of the survey findings as the proceeding questions of the questionnaire intended to 
develop an understanding concerning the relative values of different flight options. Therefore, 
learning about the previous positive experiences of the travellers was a valuable piece of 
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information in order to conduct many various useful analyses. Table 7.4 summarises the 
responses to Question 3.  
 
Table 7.4: Previous Positive Experiences of the Respondents 
Options 
Number of 
passengers with a 
positive experience 
Positive 
experience % 
share 
Connecting flight 714 74.22% 
Connecting flight with limited connection time 305 31.70% 
Codeshare flight 286 29.73% 
Long haul flight 611 63.51% 
Business / First class flight 359 37.31% 
Premium economy flight 388 40.33% 
Low-cost airline flight 814 84.61% 
Domestic flight 793 82.43% 
 
As the table suggests, almost 3/4 of respondents had experienced a connecting flight, 
of which 305 of them had a connection with limited tconn. Almost 30% of the participants tried 
codeshare flights. 359 passengers flown business class, and 388 had a premium economy 
itinerary in the past five years. 63.51% of survey participants’ confirmed their positive long-
haul experience whereas domestic and low-cost flights were experienced by more than 80% of 
the participants. Therefore, the respondents reported an adequate volume of positive 
experiences, implying that they could adequately justify the relative values of the competing 
itineraries in the following questions. Among 962 valid respondents, 93 passengers had 
positive experiences in all of the flight options surveyed.  
 
 Among 359 passengers who had had a business or first class experience in the past five 
years, 304 of them, contributing to more than 84%, had tried a low-cost flight too. This finding 
proves that consumers may alter their product choice depending on their specific 
circumstances. For this reason, any income related segmentation of the travellers could not 
solely be attained through the responses of this question. The airport breakdown of this 
question is also available in Appendix B.  
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7.5. Importance Ranking 
 
 Question 4 sought to rank the factors that are influential in consumers’ decision making 
based on their relative level of importance. Additionally, as the prior positive experience of the 
respondents cannot be a litmus indicator of their segmentation, the question enabled the 
profiling of the respondents by analysing their most influential determinants of the itinerary 
choice. Table 7.5 shows the raw distribution of the results for each decision parameter. 
Participants marked factors between 1 (most important) and 10 (least important), with each 
score only used once. The weighted index is calculated by multiplying the factors’ importance 
values by the number of respondents giving the same rating, summed together and later divided 
by the total number of valid survey responses.  
 
 Among 962 participants, 322 of them marked “fare” as the most important decision 
factor (score “1”) when choosing their itinerary; this had the lowest weighted average score of 
3.27. Therefore the fare was marked as the most influential factor of itinerary choice. 
Passengers rated date and time (schedule) convenience as the second most vital factor of 
itinerary choice, followed by the on-time performance with 4.73 and 4.98 weighted index 
scores respectively. These findings confirmed that while schedule attractiveness indeed plays 
an important role in consumer decision after fare, how well and punctual airlines deliver their 
promised services also plays a crucial role in consumers’ choice. Airline reputation ranked 
fourth and therefore found to be “less important” in comparison to fare and schedule 
convenience factors, signifying that consumers could be flexible with their airline choice if a 
better fare and schedule combination is available.  
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Table 7.5: Passengers Importance Ranking – Collected Straight from Survey Results (1- Most Important, 10- Least Important Factor) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Weighted Index 
Date and Time (Schedule) Convenience 140 132 124 126 88 80 38 82 88 64 4.73 
Fare 322 131 171 75 85 45 50 58 12 13 3.27 
Duration of Journey 37 75 70 121 105 139 96 111 88 120 6.02 
Frequent Flyer Programme 32 75 93 104 98 82 100 113 109 156 6.24 
Airline Reputation 132 109 73 97 75 99 75 70 95 137 5.44 
Departure and/or Arrival Airport 45 50 79 93 121 92 85 133 145 119 6.30 
Onboard Services 40 99 119 87 99 88 96 130 106 98 5.83 
Before and After Flight Services 41 54 23 92 85 123 201 105 95 143 6.53 
Availability of Flight Alternatives 48 105 107 67 115 158 98 60 144 60 5.65 
On-Time Performance and Consistent Schedule Times 125 130 105 100 91 56 123 100 80 52 4.98 
 
1st important factor: Fare 
2nd important factor: Date and Time (Schedule) Convenience 
3rd important factor: On-Time Performance and Consistent Schedule Times 
4th important factor: Airline Reputation 
5th important factor: Availability of Flight Alternatives 
 
6th important factor:  Onboard Services 
7th important factor: Duration of the Journey 
8th important factor: Frequent Flyer Programme 
9th important factor: Departure and/or Arrival Airport 
10th important factor: Before and After Flight Services 
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Availability of flight alternatives ranked fifth, outperforming onboard services, 
frequent flyer programme (FFP) as well as before & after flight services (BAFS) implying that 
the variety of flight options in a market was found to be more critical than the airlines' product-
related attributes. Total journey time ranked seventh, also outpacing FFP and BAFS. Indeed, 
BAFS was nominated as the least important factor in travellers’ choice. To summarise, it is 
easily inferred from the analyses that passengers place more importance on fare, schedule 
convenience and alternative flight options in comparison to airline reputation and product-
related attributes involving FFP and BAFS. As per the responses, schedule convenience was 
even found to be a crucial factor among price-sensitive passengers.  According to 322 
passengers who chose fare as the most crucial determinant of their itinerary decision-making 
process, the weighted averages of the other factors surveyed were computed as follows: 
 
Table 7.6: Weighted Index of Other Parameters for 322 Price Sensitive Passengers for Whom 
Fare Was Ranked as the Most Important Factor of Their Itinerary Choice 
Date and Time (Schedule) Convenience 4,82 
Duration of Journey 5,97 
Frequent Flyer Programme (FFP) 6,56 
Airline Reputation 6,12 
Departure and/or Arrival Airport 6,44 
Onboard Services 5,92 
Before and After Flight Services (BAFS) 7,03 
Availability of Flight Alternatives 6,24 
On-Time Performance and Consistent Schedule Times 5,44 
 
 
The above table demonstrates that, after fare, date and time convenience was more 
important than any other factor even for the price-sensitive segment. Schedule convenience 
was followed by on-time performance and duration of the journey. This finding affirmed that 
schedule convenience related factors were found to be critical factors of choice even for the 
price-sensitive segment. It should also be noted that, the index values obtained from this survey 
question are not used as part of the REMSET model. Therefore, the exact rankings of the 
analysed factors are not critical as part of the research model and results. Although, examining 
the cross-factor effects would provide insightful findings concerning consumers’ behaviour, it 
is not examined as part of this research.   
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7.6. Departure Time Quality (qdep) 
 
 The survey asked respondents to rate the quality of each departure time interval 
throughout the day. Passengers rated departure time quality as follows: 
 
Table 7.7: Departure Time Quality Score (qdep) of Each Time Interval of the Day 
 Worst (1) Poor (2) Good (3) Best (4) 
00:00 – 01:59 313 (32.5%) 445 (46.3%) 139 (14.4%) 65 (6.8%) 
02:00 – 03:59 434 (45.2%) 376 (39.1%) 120 (12.4%) 32 (3.3%) 
04:00 – 05:59 735 (76.4%) 108 (11.2%) 112 (11.7%) 7 (0.7%) 
06:00 – 07:59 125 (13.0%) 211 (22.0%) 412 (42.8%) 214 (22.2%) 
08:00 – 09:59 89 (9.2%) 101 (10.5%) 303 (31.5%) 469 (48.8%) 
10:00 – 11:59 23 (2.4%) 85 (8.8%) 504 (52.4%) 350 (36.4%) 
12:00 – 13:59 137 (14.3%) 378 (39.3%) 340 (35.3%) 107 (11.1%) 
14:00 – 15:59 242 (25.2%) 285 (29.7%) 211 (21.9%) 224 (23.2%) 
16:00 – 17:59 80 (8.3%) 109 (11.3%) 518 (53.9%) 255 (26.5%) 
18:00 – 19:59 38 (4.0%) 43 (4.5%) 388 (40.3%) 493 (51.2%) 
20:00 – 21:59 87 (9.1%) 73 (7.6%) 358 (37.2%) 444 (46.1%) 
22:00 – 23:59 84 (8.7%) 115 (12.0%) 412 (42.8%) 351 (36.5%) 
 
 The table shows that respondents strongly preferred morning and early evening 
departures. Afternoon and mid-day flights were not found to be attractive most probably 
because such timings would disrupt the utilisation of the day. As expected, respondents did not 
welcome late night departures. Table 7.8 below shows the consolidated view of the qdep scores 
from 1 to 4 for each time interval. It is observed from the table that the worst quality time 
interval continues for 4 hours within the day, whereas poor, good and best times last 6, 8 and 
6 hours respectively.  
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Table 7.8: Consolidates View of the qdep Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.7. Arrival Time Quality (qarr) 
 
 The survey asked respondents to rate the quality of each arrival time interval throughout 
the day. Passengers rated arrival time quality as follows: 
 
Table 7.9: Arrival Time Quality Score (qarr) of Each Time Interval of the Day 
 Worst (1) Poor (2) Good (3) Best (4) 
00:00 – 01:59 411 (42.7%) 358 (37.2%) 122 (12.7%) 71 (7.4%) 
02:00 – 03:59 753 (78.3%) 174 (18.1%) 30 (3.1%) 5 (0.5%) 
04:00 – 05:59 813 (84.5%) 105 (10.9%) 41 (4.3%) 3 (0.3%) 
06:00 – 07:59 202 (21.0%) 416 (43.3%) 233 (24.2%) 111 (11.5%) 
08:00 – 09:59 18 (1.9%) 224 (23.3%) 331 (34.4%) 389 (40.4%) 
10:00 – 11:59 9 (0.9%) 243 (25.3%) 434 (45.1%) 276 (28.7%) 
12:00 – 13:59 78 (8.1%) 233 (24.2%) 299 (31.1%) 352 (36.6%) 
14:00 – 15:59 80 (8.3%) 179 (18.6%) 398 (41.4%) 305 (31.7%) 
16:00 – 17:59 84 (8.8%) 133 (13.8%) 336 (34.9%) 409 (42.5%) 
18:00 – 19:59 18 (1.9%) 255 (26.5%) 382 (39.7%) 307 (31.9%) 
20:00 – 21:59 162 (16.8%) 366 (38.1%) 288 (29.9%) 146 (15.2%) 
22:00 – 23:59 172 (17.9%) 393 (40.9%) 305 (31.7%) 92 (9.5%) 
 
The table suggests that passengers largely preferred morning and afternoon arrivals, 
and they found late night arrivals unpopular. Factors such as day utilisation, hotel check-in 
time, availability of public transport facilities were influential in determining the attractiveness 
of each arrival time interval. Table 7.10 below shows the consolidated view of the qarr scores 
Worst (Score 1)  Poor (Score 2) Good (Score 3) Best (Score 4) 
02:00 – 03:59 
04:00 – 05:59 
00:00 – 01:59 
12:00 – 13:59 
14:00 – 15:59 
06:00 – 07:59 
10:00 – 11:59 
16:00 – 17:59 
22:00 – 23:59 
08:00 – 09:59 
18:00 – 19:59 
20:00 – 21:59 
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from 1 to 4 for each time interval. It is observed in the table that the day is split evenly among 
scores.  
Table 7.10: Consolidates View of the qarr Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.8. Maximum Connection Time (MaxCT) Determination 
 
The survey asked passengers to indicate their maximum connection time tolerance 
when connecting from one flight to another at the hub airport. The split of responses was as 
follows: 
Table 7.11: Respondents MaxCT Preferences  
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Marked 
Per cent share 
Up to 2 hours 127 13.2% 
Up to 3 hours 202 21.0% 
Up to 5 hours 465 48.3% 
Up to 8 hours 138 14.4% 
Connection time is less important than other factors 30 3.1% 
Total 962 100% 
 
As per the results, almost half of the participants, 48.3% of the whole set, stated their 
maximum tolerance to be 5 hours at the hub airport, while 13.2% of passengers ticked a very 
short MaxCT duration of 2 hours. 3.1% of the participants indicated that MaxCT could not be 
an influential factor in their decision-making process. The weighted average technique was 
used to calculate the average MaxCT of the whole respondents as follows: (nominal value of 
12 hours is assumed for the last option in which 30 respondents stated no MaxCT preference.)  
 
((2 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑥127)+(3 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑥202)+(5 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑥465)+(8 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑥138)+(12 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑥30))
962
= 4.83 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠  
Worst (Score 1)  Poor (Score 2) Good (Score 3) Best (Score 4) 
00:00 – 01:59 
02:00 – 03:59 
04:00 – 05:59 
06:00 – 07:59 
20:00 – 21:59 
22:00 – 23:59 
10:00 – 11:59 
14:00 – 15:59 
18:00 – 19:59 
08:00 – 09:59 
12:00 – 13:59 
16:00 – 17:59 
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Translating 4.83 hours into minutes, it was found that passengers on average could 
tolerate an approximate maximum of 290 minutes of tconn at the hub airport. In case the nominal 
value of “connection time is less important than other factors” option was determined to be 9 
hours, the average MaxCT would be calculated as 284.3 minutes. On the other hand, if it was 
set to be 15 hours, the global average MaxCT would be equal to 295.5 minutes. In the extreme 
case, if all the respondents ticking the “connection time is less important than other factors” 
option can tolerate to wait 24 hours at the hub airport, which is very unlikely, the global average 
MaxCT would be computed as 312.4 minutes. As the survey question text refers to “up to 8 
hours” in the previous option, participants ticking this choice are expected to wait between 9 
and 24 hours. Therefore, the calculated global average of MaxCT could range between 284.3 
and 312.4 minutes and it is likely that the maximum tolerance of the 30 participants ticking this 
option would not converge to 24 hours, but rather towards 9 hours. Since the text of the 
question’s last option does not specify an exact maximum time, 12 hours can be regarded as a 
credible assumption and 290 minutes of global MaxCT can appropriately be used. 
 
Although airport-related factors like duty-free stores, CIP lounges and other amenities 
could extend or shrink the MaxCT, 290 minutes could be defined as the global average MaxCT 
value as the question did not refer to any such parameters. Furthermore, itinerary or passenger-
specific reasons like travel purpose, flight duration and etc may shape the MaxCT tolerance of 
the consumers. The survey results have shown that 14.4% of the respondents state a longer 
MaxCT tolerance than the calculated 290 minutes and 3.1% of the passengers do not actually 
seem to attach any importance to that parameter. Since the REMSET model, whose 
methodology is covered in Chapter 8 and 9 requires the MaxCT as an input parameter it was 
essential to come compute a global average MaxCT figure. However, as the REMSET model 
is designed with an adaptable scheme implying that the model could be re-run with varying 
input factors including MaxCT, the calculated global average MaxCT of 290 minutes is to be 
used as the default value of the model, as to be explained in Chapter 10. 
 
It would be beneficial to perform the same analysis for different passenger profiles in 
order to examine how their responses differed from the global average MaxCT value. The 
below table demonstrates the computed weighted average MaxCT figures for different 
passenger groups.  
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Table 7.12: Weighted MaxCT for Different Consumer Profiles 
Segment Weighted 
MaxCT 
Minutes 
Passengers who had connecting flight experience in 
the past five years 
4.77 hours ~ 286 
Passengers who had a connecting flight with limited 
connecting time experience in the past five years 
4.92 hours ~ 295 
Passengers who travelled in business and premium 
economy class in the past years 
4.17 hours ~ 257 
Passengers for whom fare is the most or second 
important decision parameter (Response 1 or 2 for 
the fare in Question 4) 
5.03 hours ~ 302 
Passengers for whom schedule convenience is the 
most or second important decision parameter 
(Response 1 or 2 for date and time convenience in 
Question 4) 
4.79 hours ~ 287 
Standard deviation (including global MaxCT) 15 minutes 
 
The table suggests that there was no significant divergence (standard deviation of 15 
minutes) between the global average MaxCT and the weighted MaxCT of the introduced 
segments. The calculated MaxCT for those prioritising flight convenience within their 
decision-making process was reported to be very similar to the global average, lasting 287 
minutes. On the other hand, passengers who had a business class and premium economy flight 
experience indicated a relatively smaller MaxCT, totalling to 257 minutes. Naturally, with 302 
minutes, the price sensitive segment reported a higher tolerance for longer connection times. 
 
7.9. Buffer Time (tbuffer) Request 
 
The survey asked respondents a direct question to investigate whether they required a 
buffer time on top of the airports’ official MCT. The responses were as follows: 
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Table 7.13: Responses to tbuffer Request Question 
 Number of 
Respondents Marked 
Share 
No extra time required 97 10.1% 
MCT + 15 minutes 216 22.5% 
MCT + 30 minutes 414 43.0% 
MCT + 45 minutes 132 13.7% 
MCT + 1 hour 60 6.2% 
MCT + more than 1 hour 43 4.5% 
Total 962 100% 
 
 Table 7.13 suggests that approximately 90% of the passengers demanded additional 
time on top of the airports’ MCT. This is indeed a critical finding, implying that a vast majority 
of the passengers did not find the airport’s official minimum connection time adequate enough 
to ensure a smooth and hassle-free connecting flight experience. A buffer time would enhance 
passenger’s convenience by inhibiting the stress they would feel due to a potential late arrival 
of the inbound flight to the hub or due to any disruption at the intermediary airport like passport 
clearance, transfer facilities, boarding pass re-printing and other formalities.  
 
 According to the results, 22.5% of the respondents demanded 15 minutes buffer time 
while 43% required at least half an hour. The share of the passengers demanding more than 
half an hour was around a quarter of the whole set (13.7% demanded 45 minutes, 6.2% one 
hour and 4.5% asked for more than an hour). Assuming the last option stating more than one 
hour refers to 75 minutes, the weighted average of the demanded tbuffer was calculated as; 
 
((0 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥97) + (15 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥 216) + (30 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥 404) + (45 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥 132) + (60 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥 60) + (75 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥 43))
962
= 29.2 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 
 
If the last option was assumed to refer to 90 minutes (instead of 75 minutes), the 
weighted average tbuffer would increase to 29.8 minutes.  It is therefore possible to conclude that 
the survey respondents demanded approximately half an hour more than the airports’ official 
MCT, on average, to mitigate the risks of missing a connecting flight and boost journey 
convenience.  Similar to the discussion in MaxCT determination, although a global average of 
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29.2 minutes of tbuffer is calculated, as per the survey results, almost a quarter of the respondents 
demand at least 45 minutes buffer time. Consumers’ preference for buffer time request may 
vary depending on their individual circumstances and their itineraries such as journey purpose. 
However, for the sake of using a default tbuffer value as part of the REMSET model, tbuffer = 29.2 
minutes is employed. Table 7.14 presents the calculated tbuffer value for different passenger 
groups. 
 
Table 7.14: Weighted tbuffer for Different Consumer Profiles 
 tbuffer 
Passengers who had a connecting flight experience 
in the past five years 
29.7 minutes 
Passengers who had a connecting flight with limited 
connecting time experience in the past five years 
30.1 minutes 
Passengers who travelled in business and premium 
economy class in the past five years 
26.3 minutes 
Passengers for whom fare is the most or second 
important decision parameter (Response 1 or 2 for 
the fare in Question 4)  
29.8 minutes 
Passengers for whom schedule convenience is the 
most or second important decision parameter 
(Response 1 or 2 for date and time convenience in 
Question 4) 
28.8 minutes  
Standard deviation (including global tbuffer) 1.39 minutes 
 
 Table 7.14 reports limited divergence within the segments; with a standard deviation of 
1.39 minutes only. Passengers who experienced a connecting journey with a limited connection 
time demanded the highest tbuffer duration of 30.1 minutes, a figure not far off the global 
average.  
7.10. Codeshare Flight Convenience 
 
In order to benchmark and quantify the value of a codeshare flight compared to an 
operating service, passengers were asked to mark under which of the following circumstances 
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presented in the table below they would favour the codeshare flights. The replies are 
summarised in Table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15: Responses to Codeshare Flight Convenience Question 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Marked 
Per cent share 
I’d never choose a codeshare flight 316 32.9% 
I’d only choose if I had no other choice 238 24.7% 
I might choose a codeshare flight if more convenient 227 23.6% 
It does not matter to me 181 18.8% 
Total 962 100% 
 
The results suggested that almost one-third of all respondents did not have a positive 
attitude towards the codeshare flights, indicating that it could never be a choice in their 
itinerary. On the other hand, 18.8% of participants stated that they are indifferent to codeshare 
flights. Approximately one-fourth of the whole set expressed that they would only prefer a 
codeshare flight in their itinerary if there were no other option whereas 23.6% of the passengers 
took a pragmatic perspective and specified that if it is more convenient, they could pick a 
codeshare flight. The below figures demonstrate the responses of the different consumer 
segments. 
 
Figure 7.1. Passengers with an Experience of a Codeshare Flight in the Past Five Years. 
 
 
 
 
 
30,4%
26,0%
23,9%
19,8%
I'd never choose a codeshare flight
I'd choose if i had no other choice
I'd choose if codeshare is more convenient
It does not matter to me
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Figure 7.2. Passengers for whom Schedule Convenience is the Most or Second Important 
Decision Parameter (Response 1 or 2 for date and time convenience in Question 4.) 
 
 Figure 7.1 and 7.2 indicate that passengers who had experienced codeshare flights in 
the past five years were not as unwilling to have such flights in their itineraries. While 34% of 
the respondents lacking a codeshare flight experience indicated that they would never choose 
a codeshare flight, this figure was 30.4% for those who had previously travelled on a codeshare 
flight. Furthermore, participants who ranked schedule convenience as one of the top essential 
decision factors of itinerary choice reported a 26.7% preference for the codeshare flights, a 
share higher than the general average of 23.6%, if it was more convenient. 
 
 It is clear from the results that compared to an online/operating flight, passengers do 
not have an equal degree of appreciation for codeshare flights. In sum, only less than half of 
participants were sympathetic to travelling on codeshare flights under limited circumstances. 
Therefore, from the consumers' standpoint, it can be stated that the perceptional value of a 
codeshare flight is not equal to the value of an operating flight.   
 
7.11. Fare, Schedule Convenience and Flight Type Relation 
 
 To develop a high-level understanding concerning the passengers’ preference over fare, 
routing and type combination, Question 10 was asked whose responses are disclosed in Table 
7.16 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32,6%
23,5%
26,7%
17,2%
I'd never choose a codeshare flight
I'd choose if i had no other choice
I'd choose if codeshare is more convenient
It does not matter to me
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Table 7.16: Responses to Question 10 – Preference on fare, routing and type combination  
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Marked 
Per cent share 
A direct flight with my favourite airline costing $$$$ 207 21.5% 
A codeshare direct flight operated by an airline other 
than my choice costing $$$ 
216 22.4% 
A connecting (longer) flight with my favourite airline 
costing $$$ 
294 30.6% 
A connecting (longer) flight with an airline other than 
my regular choice costing $$ 
245 25.5% 
Total 962 100% 
 
  
As per the table, only 21.5% of all participants would pay the highest fare for a direct 
and operating flight whereas 25.5% of the passengers marked the cheapest option offering 
longer connecting and non-operating service. Among two flight options with the same fare 
level, 294 of them contributing to 30.6% of all participants picked a longer flight operated with 
passengers' favourite airline, whereas 22.4% of the consumers preferred the shorter codeshare 
flight. This finding crystallised that the majority of respondents would accept travel on a longer 
operating flight even though a direct codeshare alternative was present at the same price level. 
In Table 7.17, different customer groups within the participant set were identified, and their 
responses to question 10 reported to observe if any variation existed among different profiles. 
 
Group 1 – Passengers for whom fare was the most or second important decision 
parameter (Response 1 or 2 for fare in Question 4) 
 
Group 2 – Passengers for whom schedule convenience was the most or second 
important decision parameter (Response 1 or 2 for date and time 
convenience in Question 4) 
 
Group 3 – Passengers who had a codeshare flight experience in the past five years 
 
Group 4 – Passengers who had a codeshare AND connecting flight experience in the 
past five years.  
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Table 7.17: Above Defined Groups' Responses to Question 10 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
A direct flight with my favourite airline costing 
$$$$ 
%19.1 %25.8 %20.6 %22.0 
A codeshare direct flight operated by an 
airline other than my choice costing $$$ 
%21.4 %23.4 %21.7 %21.9 
A connecting (longer) flight with my 
favourite airline costing $$$ 
%31.0 %28.7 %31.9 %29.8 
A connecting (longer) flight with an airline 
other than my regular choice costing $$ 
%28.5 %22.1 %25.8 %26.3 
 
 
The results show that even for the group prioritising schedule convenience over the 
other factors, barely more than 1/4th of respondents chose the most expensive direct and 
operating flight alternative. On the other hand, the cheapest connecting codeshare flight option 
was chosen by 28.5% per cent of the price-sensitive participants prioritising fare. These results 
imply that passengers’ preferences did not accumulate to their segments' suitable flight 
alternative, deeming the itinerary details in terms of routing and type to be quite crucial during 
their decision-making process. Furthermore, it was apparent with the results that for all 
customer profiles, at the same price level, a connecting but operating flight was comparably 
preferred over a direct but codeshare alternative.   
 
7.12. Values of Different Flight Options (udo, uco, udc, ucc) 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the perceived value of a flight alternative can be best 
reflected by the maximum fare the passengers are willing to pay for that product. Therefore, 
referencing a base scenario in which the price of a connecting flight from City A to City B via 
City C with inconvenient departure and arrival times, taking 18 hours, was fixed as 500 USD; 
respondents were asked to mark the maximum fare they would be willing to pay for different 
itinerary scenarios. The choices were presented as fare intervals where the cheapest option was 
shown as "< 400 USD", implying less than 400 USD and the most expensive option as "> 700 
USD", implying higher than 700 USD. In between 400 USD and 700 USD, each option was 
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determined with 50 USD intervals. The monetary value while calculating the weighted average 
fare of each alternative was assumed as follows:  
 
Table 7.18: Monetary Values of the Options for Q11 
Options Monetary Value 
< 400 USD 350 USD 
400 USD - 450 USD 425 USD 
451 USD - 500 USD 475 USD 
501 USD - 550 USD 525 USD 
551 USD - 600 USD 575 USD 
601 USD - 650 USD 625 USD 
651 USD - 700 USD 675 USD 
> 700 USD 750 USD 
 
 As Table 7.18 demonstrates, with exception to the smallest and highest fares, the 
monetary value of the preferred option was assumed to be the median value in the range. For 
the cheapest option depicted by "< 400 USD", the value was fixed as 350 USD whereas for the 
most expensive shown by "> 700 USD", 750 USD was used. The respondents were asked to 
rate following flight cases: 
 
 Case 1: A Connecting Flight with Convenient Departure and Arrival Times Taking 18 
Hours: The only variation from the base scenario was the convenience of departure and arrival 
times. This product was still a connecting itinerary with a total travel time of 18 hours, as in 
the base case.   
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Table 7.19: Participants Responses to Case 1 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 1 
400 USD - 450 USD 16 
451 USD - 500 USD 12 
501 USD - 550 USD 253 
551 USD - 600 USD 578 
601 USD - 650 USD 64 
651 USD - 700 USD 32 
> 700 USD 6 
Total 962 
 
 
Weighting the participants’ responses with the identified monetary values of the options 
depicted in Table 7.18, the average fare, and thus the value of this flight scenario, was 
calculated to be 565.61 USD. This finding implied that respondents were ready to pay 65.61 
USD more, contributing to 13.1% of the base case value, for an itinerary with better departure 
and arrival times.   
 
 Case 2: A Direct Flight Taking 12 Hours with Convenient Flight Times: This itinerary 
deviated from the base scenario, as it was a direct flight rather than a connecting one and 
therefore offered a shorter ttotal which was 6 hours less. On the other hand, unlike the base case, 
this itinerary was seen to have a better departure and arrival time quality. The maximum fares 
that respondents would be willing to pay for this itinerary are depicted in Table 7.20. 
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Table 7.20: Participants Responses to Case 2 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 0 
400 USD - 450 USD 3 
451 USD - 500 USD 2 
501 USD - 550 USD 22 
551 USD - 600 USD 79 
601 USD - 650 USD 281 
651 USD - 700 USD 332 
> 700 USD 243 
Total 962 
 
Weighting the above responses with the assumed monetary values of the options shown 
in Table 7.18, the average fare and thus the value of this flight scenario was calculated to be 
666.50 USD. It is deduced from this finding that passengers were ready to pay 166.50 USD 
more than the base case, contributing to a 33.3% rise in fare for a direct flight with better qdep, 
qarr and shorter ttotal.  
 
 Case 3: A Direct Flight Taking 12 Hours with Inconvenient Flight Times: This itinerary 
only differed from the previous scenario with respect to worse qdep and qarr.  The respondents’ 
maximum fare mapping is illustrated in Table 7.21 below: 
Table 7.21: Participants Responses to Case 3 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 4 
400 USD - 450 USD 13 
451 USD - 500 USD 79 
501 USD - 550 USD 96 
551 USD - 600 USD 167 
601 USD - 650 USD 299 
651 USD - 700 USD 187 
> 700 USD 117 
Total 962 
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The weighted average value of this flight option was computed as 615.09 USD. This 
fare was 51.41 USD less than the previous itinerary, which presented more convenient 
departure and arrival times. These finding implied that for direct flights, the survey respondents 
were ready to pay 8.4% more for better departure and arrival times (calculated by contrasting 
the result of Case 2 with Case 3). 
 
 Case 4: A Codeshare-connecting Flight with Convenient Flight Times Taking 18 
Hours: In order to assess the divergence of a codeshare flight’s perceived value in comparison 
to online flights, survey participants were presented with a scenario in which the journey would 
be carried out by a codeshare connecting flight with convenient flight times. The duration of 
the travel was presented to be identical with the base case, 18 hours. The results were retrieved 
as follows: 
Table 7.22: Participants Responses to Case 4 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 110 
400 USD - 450 USD 705 
451 USD - 500 USD 122 
501 USD - 550 USD 4 
551 USD - 600 USD 11 
601 USD - 650 USD 3 
651 USD - 700 USD 7 
> 700 USD 0 
Total 962 
 
Weighting the above responses with the assumed monetary values of the options shown 
in Table 7.22, the average fare and thus the value of this flight scenario was calculated to be 
427.33 USD. Comparing this figure with the computed value of an online connecting and 
conveniently scheduled itinerary (Case 1), respondents would pay 138.28 USD less for a 
codeshare flight, contributing to 24.4%. 
 
Case 5: A Codeshare-connecting Flight with Inconvenient Flight Times Taking 18 
Hours: This itinerary deviated from Case 4 in the quality of departure and arrival times, 
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offering a relatively unappreciated schedule. The maximum that respondents would be willing 
to pay for such itinerary was shown in the table below:  
Table 7.23: Participants Responses to Case 5 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 401 
400 USD - 450 USD 483 
451 USD - 500 USD 70 
501 USD - 550 USD 5 
551 USD - 600 USD 3 
601 USD - 650 USD 0 
651 USD - 700 USD 0 
> 700 USD 0 
Total 962 
 
These replies corresponded to an average value of 398.36 USD for a codeshare 
connecting itinerary taking 18 hours with inconvenient qdep and qarr. This figure was 101.64 
USD less than the base case, corresponding to 20.3%, where the flight was operated by the 
airline of choice, with all other parameters such as the duration and route identical, and in both 
case's qdep and qarr were unattractive. 
 
Case 6: A Codeshare Direct Flight Taking 12 Hours with Convenient Flight Times: 
Participants' responses for this itinerary was collected as shown in Table 7.24 below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
185 
Table 7.24: Participants Responses to Case 6 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 57 
400 USD - 450 USD 196 
451 USD - 500 USD 155 
501 USD - 550 USD 414 
551 USD - 600 USD 117 
601 USD - 650 USD 12 
651 USD - 700 USD 11 
> 700 USD 0 
Total 962 
  
The weighted average value of this flight option was calculated as 495.24 USD. This 
value was considerably lower than what respondents would pay for a direct online service. 
However, it is worth emphasising that the value attributed to this itinerary was 15.9% higher 
than Case 5, a connecting codeshare flight with a convenient schedule.  
 
Case 7: A Codeshare Direct Flight Taking 12 Hours with Inconvenient Flight Times: 
Participants' responses for this itinerary was reported as follows:  
Table 7.25: Participants Responses to Case 7 
Options # Marked 
< 400 USD 117 
400 USD - 450 USD 658 
451 USD - 500 USD 101 
501 USD - 550 USD 52 
551 USD - 600 USD 30 
601 USD - 650 USD 3 
651 USD - 700 USD 1 
> 700 USD 0 
Total 962 
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The weighted average of the above responses corresponded to 432.09 USD which was 
12.7% less than the previous case that presented a codeshare direct flight itinerary case with 
more convenient qdep and qarr. 
 
 The respondents' answers to the seven cases outlined above presented a clear picture 
concerning the relative values of different flight alternatives. The respondents offered the 
opportunity to assess the incremental changes in the value of a scenario when the itinerary 
changed from an inconvenient qdep and qarr to a convenient one.  On the other hand, the 
difference in the value between connecting vs direct and operating vs codeshare flights could 
be assessed quantitatively. Since the flight times in whole connecting journeys were set to 18 
hours and 12 hours for the direct trips, a clear benchmark was made to assess the relative 
superiorities and values of different flight choices. Therefore, the relative values of udo, uco, udc, 
ucc were identified for convenient and inconvenient departure and arrival times seperately. 
Table 7.26 demonstrates the perceived value of flights based on the responses above. 
 
Table 7.26: Consolidated View of the Calculated Weighted Average Fares  
  
Connecting Flight Direct Flight 
Operating Codeshare Operating Codeshare 
Convenient Time 565.61 427.33 666.50 495.24 
Inconvenient Time 500.00 398.36 615.09 432.09 
 
Indexing base case to 1.00, the above table was translated to determine the values of 
udo, uco, udc, ucc for convenient and inconvenient departure and arrival times separately as shown 
in Table 7.27 below. 
Table 7.27: udo, uco, udc, ucc Determination for Convenient and Inconvenient qdep and qarr 
  
Connecting Flight Direct Flight 
Operating (uco) Codeshare (ucc) Operating (udo) Codeshare (udc) 
Convenient Time 1.131 0.854 1.333 0.990 
Inconvenient Time 1.000 0.796 1.230 0.864 
 
7.13. Flight Time Split of the Connecting Journey 
 
For connecting journeys, the phase at which the journey is split at the connecting airport 
was argued to be a potential determinant of passenger choice. This statement was tested through 
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a question in the survey in which a long haul connecting travel case with 10 hours of ttotal was 
introduced and the tconn at the hub airport was fixed to be 1 hour. The reply options, whose 
results are presented Table 7.28 below, indicated to have varying durations for the first and 
second legs where the total flight time summed to 9 hours and the total journey time was fixed 
to be 10 hours for each option. 
 
Table 7.28: Responses to Question 12 – Flight Time Split of the Connecting Journeys 
 Number of 
Respondents Marked 
Per cent share 
First leg 8 hours, second leg 1 hour 392 40.7% 
First leg 6 hours, second leg 3 hours 72 7.5% 
First leg 3 hours, second leg 6 hours 54 5.6% 
First leg 1 hours, second leg 8 hours 335 34.8% 
It does not matter to me at all 109 11.3% 
Total 962 100% 
  
It is inferred from Table 7.28 that more than 88% of the respondents care how their 
itinerary was shaped in terms of first and second leg duration split, therefore affirming the 
hypothesis that connecting travellers care when their journey is interrupted by the connection. 
Survey participants reported a tendency to prefer itineraries that are interrupted by the 
connection either at the very initial phases or towards the very end of their journey. For a 
journey of 10 hours in which the sum of first and second legs' flight time to be 9 hours, 40.7% 
of the respondents marked that they would prefer the first leg's duration to be 8 hours while the 
second segment's is 1 hour. This was probably so that they could get sleep or work 
uninterruptedly on the first leg with no hassle of changing aircraft soon. On the other hand, 
more than one-third of participants preferred changing flights at the very early stages, by taking 
the 1-hour flight first and 8 hour-long one later. The share of respondents who preferred the 
split towards the middle phases of the journey was found to be reasonably lower.   
 
7.14. Flight Time or Connecting Time (%tf or %tc) 
 
In order to determine whether passengers would favour waiting at the hub airport rather 
than spending time on board, the survey presented a case in which the respondents chose 
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between two alternatives.  Both itineraries offered 12 hours of ttotal , where one option had 1-
hour tconn and the other 3 hours. The results were obtained as displayed in Table 7.29. 
 
Table 7.29: Participants' Response to Question 13 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Marked 
Per cent share 
Connecting flight total 12 hours of journey time of 
which 3 hours are spent at the hub airport 
498 51.8% 
Connecting flight total 12 hours of journey time of 
which only 1 hour is spent at the hub airport 
464 48.2% 
Total 962 100% 
  
It is clear from the responses that the participants did not present a clear perspective 
whether they preferred waiting at the airport rather than flying as the preference percentages of 
both options were found to be close to each other. It would also be beneficial to observe the 
variation of those responses for different segments to observe if any tendency existsed. For this 
purpose, the following groups were identified and their responses to this question was assessed 
in Table 7.30:  
 
Group 1 – Passengers for whom fare is the most or second important decision 
parameter (Response 1 or 2 for fare in Survey Question 4) 
 
Group 2 – Passengers who travelled in business and premium economy class in the 
past years 
 
Group 3 –   Passengers for whom schedule convenience is the most or second 
important decision parameter (Response 1 or 2 for date and time 
convenience in Question 4) 
 
 
Table 7.30: Above-Defined Groups' Responses to Question 13 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Connecting flight total 12 hours of journey time of 
which 3 hours are spent at the hub airport  
231 
(51.0%) 
195 
(54.3%) 
139 
(51.1%) 
A Connecting flight total 12 hours of journey time 
of which only 1 hour is spent at the hub airport 
222 
(49.0%) 
164 
(45.7%) 
133 
(48.9%) 
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The table above confirms that there was only limited divergences within the preferences 
of the defined groups. Therefore, it can be concluded that respondents did not report a particular 
preference towards %tf or %tc given the same total travel time. Appendix B includes the results 
of the survey venue airport breakdown.   
 
 7.15. General Comments on Survey Results  
 
 This Chapter has addressed the survey findings. The questionnaire revealed plenty of 
useful information, which was utilised as part of the research's proposed methodologies that 
are covered in the following Chapters.  
 
The survey analyses have also validated that schedule convenience is indeed an 
essential factor of consumers' itinerary decision. Indeed, this finding asserted the necessity of 
this research, as the study aimed to assess schedule and network efficiency from a consumer-
centric perspective. Furthermore, the goal in conducting the survey was attained as the values 
of the investigated parameters were successfully measured and quantified. Although the exact 
value of some parameters like MaxCT and tbuffer may change from one passenger to another 
depending on the specific circumstances of the consumer and the itinerary such as fare, length 
of haul, journey purpose and etc., the survey results have offered valuable insights to come up 
with single values of those parameters that are to be utilised as input factors of the REMSET 
model. As REMSET model is designed to be parametric, the impact of those parameters to the 
research outputs would easily be assessed by changing the relevant input parameters. 
Therefore, such parameter results obtained from the survey analyses have offered the default 
values of the factors that would be used as part of the REMSET model as to be covered in 
Chapter 10. The value of the analysed paramaters and the final decision concerning the 
inclusion of those parameters in the research models are summarised in Table 7.32 below.  
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Table 7.32: Summary of the Key Survey Findings 
Parameter Survey Finding  Used in the models? 
MaxCT 290 minutes Yes 
tbuffer 29.2 minutes Yes 
qdep 
1 (Worst) → 02:00 – 03:59, 04:00 – 05:59 
2 (Poor) →  00:00 – 01:59, 12:00 – 13:59, 14:00 – 15:59 
3 (Good) → 06:00 – 07:59, 10:00 – 11:59, 16:00 – 17:59, 
22:00 – 23:59 
4 (Best) → 08:00 – 09:59, 18:00 – 19:59, 20:00 – 21:59 
Yes 
qarr 
1 (Worst) → 00:00 – 01:59, 02:00 – 03:59, 04:00 – 05:59 
2 (Poor) →  06:00 – 07:59, 20:00 – 21:59, 22:00 – 23:59 
3 (Good) → 10:00 – 11:59, 14:00 – 15:59, 18:00 – 19:59 
4 (Best) → 08:00 – 09:59, 12:00 – 13:59, 16:00 – 17:59 
Yes 
udo 
Varies between 1.230 – 1.333 depending on schedule 
convenience 
Yes 
uco 
Varies between 1.000 – 1.131 depending on schedule 
convenience 
Yes 
udc 
Varies between 0.864 – 0.990 depending on schedule 
convenience 
Yes 
ucc 
Varies between 0.796 – 0.854 depending on schedule 
convenience 
Yes 
fsplit 
Passengers preferred their journey to be interrupted by the 
connection either at the very early or late stages of the flight 
Yes 
%tf and 
%tc 
Not found to be critical parameters given the same ttotal No 
 
Although the survey results have provided indispensable information concerning 
consumer preferences, they are not completely free from potential biases. First of all, as a 
significant majority of the survey administrators were working for Turkish Airlines, they 
primarily approached the carrier’s customers in the check-in queue when asking their 
willingness to participate. Although other carriers’ passengers were also surveyed, a large 
majority of the participants were Turkish Airlines customers. As the survey did not ask whether 
the participants were a loyal customer of any airline, any probable over dominance of one 
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carrier’s (loyal) passengers’ responses in the result set might have biased the survey results. 
On the other hand, the language of some questions could be considered as a source bias. For 
instance, Question 8 contains unneurtral terms like “challenging”, “irregularity”, “late arrival”, 
“misconnect”, “stressed” and “stressful”. These strong and perceptionally “negative” terms 
might have biased the responses of the participants. Additionally, this question is predicted on 
passenger knowledge on the MCT value for the corresponding airports. Although the survey 
administrators ensured that the participants have knowledge concerning the MCT, it is 
extremely likely for passengers not to know the exact MCT of the airports which might raise 
concerns regarding potential biases on the results. 
 
However, such sources of bias do not change the fact that the survey results have 
provided insightful and credible information which are to be used as integral input parameters 
of the research models.  It should be noted that, the models to be introduced in this research in 
the following Chapters are highly adaptable and therefore the survey results are to be used as 
default values of the adaptable variables, demonstrating proof of concept, rather than being 
strictly definitive in a dynamic market. Therefore, the survey responses are used to determine 
the default input parameters of the REMSET model which could later be adapted to other 
values. The next chapter focuses and elaborates on how these findings are incorporated into 
the schedule attractiveness assessment methodology.  
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Chapter 8: Network Performance Model Development – Capacity Share 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This research aimed to develop a consumer-focused methodology to analyse the 
schedule and network performance of air services. In this context, the study has contributed to 
knowledge by introducing a unique passenger perspective to the schedule efficiency analysis 
models. The previous Chapter covered the results of the passenger survey which formed an 
essential basis of the design of this research’s models. The analyses retrieved from surveying 
962 respondents in 9 different airports have provided essential inputs for an effective and 
customer-centric methodology design.  
 
The Objective 1 of this research involved the determination of a consumer-centric 
capacity share estimation model that uses airline schedule information and “consumer 
perspectives” as the input to produce consumer-centric capacity shares for each O&D as the 
output. The resulting capacity shares are not an indicator of competing airlines’ physical supply 
performance but illustrate relative performance in "sellable capacity" by identifying the 
"feasible" and "viable" products from a consumer’s perspective. The Objective 2 of the study 
was to quantify schedule quality of air services, which also required a separate methodology 
demanding the airline schedules as well as “consumer perspectives” as the input in order to 
yield schedule quality scores of each carrier as the output. The ability to compute quality scores 
enables a benchmarking of each itinerary’s relative schedule quality performance and translates 
the abstract concept of “convenient” or “inconvenient” schedule quality into numbers. Using 
consumer-focused capacity shares and quality scores, realistic market shares of airlines 
competing in a market could also be forecasted, which serves as the Objective 3 of the research. 
The realistic market share estimation tool, the REMSET, assesses the relative performance of 
an airline’s schedule & network efficiency. It is therefore a concrete parameter of consumers’ 
appreciation towards airlines’ services on certain O&Ds. Thus, the accuracy of the REMSET 
model plays a central role in attaining the research’s aim.  
 
The intended outputs from the introduced models of the research were (i) passenger-
centric supply shares, (ii) quality scores and (iii) realistic market share estimations for each 
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carrier operating on an O&D. The Objective 4 of this research was built upon these outputs and 
intended to guide industry practitioners by offering them an effective decision support tool. 
The following diagram illustrates the research's methodology concerning its input variables 
and the outputs. 
 
Figure 8.1: The Input and Outputs of the Consumer-centric Supply Share and Quality Score 
Determination Models 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The Input and Outputs of the REMSET Model 
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As depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, three methodologies were introduced in this 
research. The first methodology serves for the fulfilment of Objective 1 which results with the 
consumer-centric supply shares, whereas the second methodology serves to fulfil Objective 2 
by returning the relative quality scores of the competing itineraries. The third methodology, 
the REMSET, produces realistic market share estimations, aiming to accomplish the Objective 
3.  
 
The survey results confirmed that the schedule convenience is the most critical factor 
in passenger choice after fare. It was discussed in the literature review that the traditional 
schedule efficiency measurement methods, such as QSI, are mainly mathematical models 
severely lacking a consumer perspective, with their outputs potentially proving to be far from 
being realistic. This and the following chapter together address and introduce all of the models 
depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 which are expected to yield realistic schedule convenience 
assessments that better reflect market dynamics. Chapters 8 and 9 together iterate through the 
design steps of the proposed methodologies by employing sample schedule data. While this 
chapter elaborates on the first model by producing supply share scores of the competing 
itineraries in an O&D, the proceeding chapter covers the second model and the REMSET. 
 
The capacity share computation procedure elucidated upon in this chapter is 
considerably different from traditional methods and far from being strictly mathematical. It 
involves plenty of consumer preference metrics while defining the products available for sale 
in the market.  This chapter commences by introducing quantification of available supply and 
moves forward with capacity share calculation for each of airline contending in a market. 
 
8.2. Determination of Available Products in an O&D 
 
 There may be multiple air services of different carriers on a particular O&D. As long 
as a product is available for sale in a market, it has a capacity share which is analysed in this 
Chapter. Moreover, each available capacity in a market has a particular quality score and 
market share estimation, as presented in Chapter 9. Therefore, the definition of the itineraries 
that could be regarded as an available product on an O&D was a crucial commencement point 
of the model. In the proceeding sections, each available product in a market is categorised by 
its routing (direct or connecting) or operation type (operating or codeshare). 
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 As previously explained, a product is only available in a market if there exists either a 
direct flight or a connecting service with a connecting time (tconn) larger than or equal to the 
minimum connecting time (MCT) of the hub airport. Technically, so long as tconn is greater 
than the MCT, a hit is attained, enabling the connecting service. Although theoretically the 
maximum waiting time at a hub airport (MaxCT) for connecting journeys is not bound by a 
threshold, it would not be appropriate to expect itineraries with a very long tconn to be an 
available product in the market as such flights would not be appreciated nor preferred by 
passengers. The literature review suggested that there is an upper bound of MaxCT tolerance 
at a hub airport. The passenger survey validated this argument and calculated MaxCT to be 
4.83 hours or 290 minutes. Therefore, connecting itineraries that requires passengers to wait 
more than 290 minutes at a hub were found to be unattractive and not welcomed by the 
consumers. For this reason, the set of available connecting products competing in a market 
were needed to be adjusted to include this finding. Therefore, as part of the supply share 
determination model, although all connections that have a tconn greater than or equal to the MCT 
are valid itineraries, connections having tconn greater than 290 minutes had to be eliminated 
from the available products set. This is a major deviation of the model from the existing product 
determination methods used in the industry. Consequently, a product is valid (i) for all direct 
services and (ii) for all connecting services via a hub in which tconn is greater than the hub 
airports' MCT and less than 290 minutes. A flight combination with tconn more than or equal to 
the hub airport's MCT and less than 290 minutes is referred as a valid "hit" or “combination”. 
Only valid hits were included in total frequency and seat count computation.  
 
 The survey results have suggested that more than 90% of respondents preferred a buffer 
time (tbuffer) on top of the airports' official MCTs. The global average of the requested tbuffer was 
calculated to be 29.2 minutes. It could be argued that when determining hits, rather than using 
tconn >= MCT criteria, tconn >= (MCT +  tbuffer) could be used. However, although tbuffer is 
undoubtedly a vital matter of passenger convenience, it is a quality factor rather than a 
condition of attaining a hit. Any connection which is higher than the MCT but lower than the 
(MCT + tbuffer) is still a valid hit and available for sale by the airlines. Such connections may 
even be displayed in the higher rankings of the GDS systems. Therefore, tbuffer was used in 
defining the quality of connecting journeys rather than being used in supply determination. On 
the other hand, in case tconn is greater than the MaxCT, although a connection is still technically 
achieved and such itineraries could be sold in the reservation systems, they were not counted 
as valid products as part of this model, as the MaxCT was defined as the maximum acceptable 
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cut-off limit of tbuffer. Therefore when identifying relevant hits, MaxCT was used but tbuffer was 
not. tbuffer was used in the quality assessment of connecting itineraries. 
 
8.3. Capacity Assessment 
 
 The consumer-centric capacity share calculation methodology was expected to return 
adjusted supply shares of the carriers contending in the market among the available products 
in an O&D, abbreviated by %a_s. Letter “a” within “%a_s” refers to the “adjustment” in the 
parameter, while “s” relates to seat supply and “%” denotes that it is a percentage parameter. 
The following sections iterate through the computation steps of %a_s. Although at first glance, 
the capacity determination regarding frequency and seat supply seems like a straightforward 
mathematical process, insertion of the consumer perspective moderately complicates the 
procedure. All capacity supply assessments were made at the weekly level. Since an airline’s 
schedules is planned and repeated weekly, the performance assessments and fair market share 
estimations had to be made at the weekly level too.  
 
 8.3.1. Determination of Hits/Combination & Frequency 
 An airline’s frequency in a market is simply the sum of its physical operating flights 
and the codeshare frequencies offered on behalf of the carrier. Therefore, for an airline i, the 
weekly frequency on an O&D is formulated as: 
 
fi_O&D  =  fop_ i_O&D  + fcodeshare_i_O&D 
 
where fi_O&D is the sum of weekly frequencies for airline i on the O&D, of which fop_i_O&D 
refers to the number of operating weekly frequencies for the carrier i and fcodeshare_i_O&D is the 
weekly codeshare frequencies marketed by the airline i on the same route. The total weekly 
frequency available in a market for all airlines, fO&D, is then formulated as  
 
fO&D =  ∑ f(i_O&D)
n
i=1
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where n denotes the total number of airlines serving the selected O&D. In other words, the sum 
of distinct weekly services of all carriers in a market adds up to the total frequency count of the 
market. The following sections iterate through the calculation of operating and codeshare 
frequencies which together add up to fO&D.  
 
 8.3.1.1. Determination of Operating Frequencies 
The total weekly operating frequency of an airline i on an O&D is the sum of its direct 
and connecting frequencies, formulated as; 
 
fop_(i_O&D)  =  fop_direct (i_O&D)  + fop_connecting (i_O&D) 
 
The total operating frequency of all airlines fop_(O&D) in the market is ∑ fop_(i_O&D)
n
i=1  
where n refers to the total number of airlines operating on that particular O&D. Direct operating 
service frequency of airline i,  fop_direct_(i_O&D), denotes the number of weekly distinct direct 
frequencies from origin to destination.  
 
The computation of operating connecting service frequency, fop_connecting_(i_O&D), is 
relatively different as the frequencies of the inbound and outbound flights within an itinerary 
may differ, as one inbound flight may be connected to multiple outbound flights. As previously 
referred to, for a connection to be a successful “hit” or “combination”, tconn must be lower than 
the MaxCT, which is equal to 290 minutes, and higher than the MCT to get involved in the 
fop_connecting_(i_O&D) computation. Hence, only connections meeting tconn >= MCT and tconn <= 
290 minutes (MaxCT) criteria, are included in the frequency calculation process. In Table 8.1, 
an example connecting flight is displayed, assuming all combinations satisfy the tconn >= MCT 
and tconn <= MaxCT criteria. 
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Table 8.1: Case - Connecting Frequency Determination (Operating Flight Case) 
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
XX1 
XX2 
XX3 
Total frequencies : 3 
YY1 
Total Frequency: 1 
XX1/YY1 
XX2/YY1 
XX3/YY1 
Total Hits : 3 
AA1 
AA2 
Total Frequencies: 2 
BB1 
BB2 
BB3 
Total Frequencies : 3 
AA1/BB1 
AA1/BB2 
AA1/BB3 
AA2/BB1 
AA2/BB2 
AA2/BB3 
Total Hits: 6 
 
 
Although in the first case (row), the outbound flight numbered YY1 is the only available 
flight that can take passengers to the destination, for a traveller at the origin, the airline can 
display three different flight options and possibly three different flight fares for sale: they are 
XX1–YY1, XX2–YY1 and XX3–YY1 combinations. On the other hand, for the second case, 
the airline can display six different combinations and possibly 6 different fares as there are two 
inbound and three outbound frequencies. Supposing that one of the hits fails to meet tconn >= 
MCT and tconn <= 290 minutes (MaxCT) criteria for the second case (row), then it would not 
be considered as a valid hit and the total number of combinations would fall to 5. Therefore, 
the total number of operating connecting hits can be denoted as: 
 
∑ ∑ {
1, if MCThub  <=  tconn(x_y) and  tconn(x_y)  <= 290  
0, otherwise
y = count(f_op(i_hub/destination)) 
y = 1
x = count(f_op(i_origin/hub))
x = 1
 
 
where count(f_op(i_origin/hub))  is the count of operating inbound frequencies from origin 
to hub, count(f_op(i_hub/destination)) is the number of operating outbound frequencies 
from hub to destination, MCThub is the minimum connecting time at the hub airport where the 
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inbound and outbound flights are connected, and  tconn(x_y) is the connection time between 
flight x and y.  
 
 Different from the number of hits, the physical frequency for connecting journeys is the 
minimum of the first or second leg's physical frequency count. For the examples given in Table 
8.1, in the first case, only YY1 can take the passenger to the destination, limiting 
fop_connecting_(i_O&D) to one. For the second case, although there are 6 hits present, the physical 
frequency from origin to destination is limited to 2 as there are only two distinct flights from 
the departure city while there are three flights from hub to destination.  
 
 As previously explained, capacity related parameters are calculated on a weekly basis. 
Therefore, to assess the weekly frequency, the calculations mentioned above need to be 
performed for each day of the week and later summed up. The total weekly operating frequency 
for an airline i can be formulated as  
 
∑ fop_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
 
 
where the operating frequencies of the seven days of the week for airline i are summed together. 
Furthermore, the total weekly frequency of all airlines competing in a market can be formulated 
as 
 
∑ ∑ fop_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1   
 
which is equal to 
  
∑ ∑ fop_direct (i_O&D)  +  fop_connecting (i_O&D)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1
 
 
where n refers to the total number of airlines competing in the market.   
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 For direct flights, the simple sum of each day's physical frequencies determines the 
weekly count of fop_direct_(i_O&D). However, to calculate the weekly fop_connecting_(i_O&D), a 
more in-depth analysis is mandatory as it is essential to identify the days of the week that 
successful hits are attained. Revisiting the examples in Table 8.1, to determine the weekly 
connecting frequency, let's suppose for the first case, XX1, XX2, XX3 and YY1 are all operated 
once a day, each offering seven frequencies per week. For the second case, it is assumed that 
BB1, BB2 and BB3 are operated once daily too, but AA1 is operated twice a week on Mondays 
and Tuesdays while AA2 is operated once a week only on Fridays. Table 8.2 shows the 
connecting frequency and hit assessment under these circumstances assuming that all 
connections are valid, satisfying tconn >= MCT and tconn <= 290 minutes (MaxCT) criteria. 
 
Table 8.2: Case - Connecting Frequency and Hit Determination (Operating Flight Case) 
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
XX1 - operated daily 
XX2 - operated daily 
XX3 - operated daily 
YY1 - operated daily 
XX1/YY1 - connected daily 
XX2/YY1 - connected daily 
XX3/YY1 - connected daily 
Distinct Hits : 3 
Total Weekly Hits: 21 
Total Weekly Frequency: 7 
AA1 - Monday, Tuesday 
AA2 - Friday 
BB1 - operated daily 
BB2 - operated daily 
BB3 - operated daily 
AA1/BB1 - Monday, Tuesday 
AA1/BB2 - Monday, Tuesday 
AA1/BB3 - Monday, Tuesday 
AA2/BB1 - Friday only 
AA2/BB2 - Friday only 
AA2/BB3 - Friday only 
Distinct Hits: 6 
Total Weekly Hits: 9 
Total Weekly Frequency: 3 
 
 
In the first case, 21 different product combinations can be sold to passengers per week. 
However, since YY1 is the only available flight to the destination daily, the weekly 
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fop_connecting_(i_O&D) is equal to seven. For the second case, although BB1, BB2 and BB3 are 
all operated daily, AA1 is operated twice and AA2 once per week, only three successful 
frequencies per week is achieved as there are no available connecting products on Wednesdays, 
Thursdays and the weekends. Since on Monday and Tuesday, AA1 can be connected to all 
three outbound flights whereas AA2 can connect them only on Fridays, 9 different flight 
combinations can be offered to passengers every week. Moreover, as the inbound flight 
frequency is limited to three, the total weekly frequency is also computed to be three. 
 
 8.3.1.2. Determination of Codeshare Frequencies 
 The frequency calculation procedures for operating and codeshare flights are identical. 
From a scheduling professional’s standpoint, a service can either be in the form of an online 
flight or a codeshare one. Therefore, the methodology for assessing the non-operating flight 
frequency is indifferent in comparison to online flights and thus can be formulated as follows 
for an airline i: 
 
fcodeshare_(i_O&D)  =  fcodeshare_direct (i_O&D)  +  fcodeshare_connecting (i_O&D) 
 
It is essential to note that a codeshare frequency of a carrier is at the same time an 
operating frequency of another airline. On the other hand, an operating frequency of a carrier 
may at the same time be the codeshare frequency of one or multiple carriers. The partnered 
frequencies are displayed both in the operating and marketing carriers' inventories on the 
reservation systems. Since the total number of available frequencies in a market is composed 
of the operating and codeshare frequencies, the resulting total frequency would be more than 
the physical number of frequencies if at least one codeshare frequency is present on an O&D. 
In other words, because codeshare frequencies are simultaneously the operating frequencies of 
another carrier, the existence of at least one codeshare frequency in a market would result in 
fO&D being higher than the physical frequency supply.  
 
In case at least one segment in a connecting itinerary is a codeshare flight, then the 
whole journey was defined as a non-operating (codeshare) service by this research. As 32.9% 
of the survey respondents stated that they would not choose a codeshare flight and 24.7% 
suggested that they would only choose such flights if there were no other choice, such a 
definition would be relevant as the findings implied that consumers do not appreciate non-
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operating services. Therefore, the existence of at least one codeshare leg in a connecting 
itinerary would deem the entire journey to be a non-operating service. Table 8.3 demonstrates 
the journey type based on the status of the first and second leg.  
Table 8.3: Journey Type Mapping Table 
Leg 1: Org. to Hub 
(Inbound Flight) 
Leg 2: Hub to Des. 
(Outbound Flight) 
Whole Journey 
Codeshare Codeshare Codeshare 
Codeshare Operating Codeshare 
Operating Codeshare Codeshare 
Operating Operating Operating 
 
As Table 8.3 implies, all codeshare-codeshare, codeshare-operating and operating-codeshare 
hits are all included in total codeshare connecting frequency count formulated as;  
 
∑ ∑ {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑏  <=  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦)  <= 290  
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑖_ℎ𝑢𝑏/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)) 
𝑦 = 1
𝑥 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑖_𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛/ℎ𝑢𝑏))
𝑥 = 1
+ ∑ ∑ {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑏  <=  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦)  <= 290  
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑜𝑝(𝑖_ℎ𝑢𝑏/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)) 
𝑦 = 1
𝑥 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑖_𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛/ℎ𝑢𝑏))
𝑥 = 1
+ ∑ ∑ {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐶𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑏  <=  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑥_𝑦)  <= 290  
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑖_ℎ𝑢𝑏/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)) 
𝑦 = 1
𝑥 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑓_𝑜𝑝(𝑖_𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛/ℎ𝑢𝑏))
𝑥 = 1
 
 
 Similar to the procedure with the operating flights, non-operating frequency count is 
determined at the weekly level where the fewer number of frequencies limit the physical 
frequency supply in the O&D formulated as   ∑ ∑ fcodeshare_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1  which is 
equal to ∑ ∑ fcodeshare_direct (i_O&D)  +  fcodeshare_connecting (i_O&D)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1  
 
8.3.1.3. Determination of Total Frequency Count  
As the total number of frequencies available in a market should be reported on a weekly 
basis, it can formulated as  
 
∑ ∑ f(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1    
 
which is equivalent to  
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∑ ∑ fop_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1
+ ∑ ∑ fcodeshare_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1
 
 
where n is the total number of airlines operating in that particular O&D. The example in Table 
8.4 demonstrates the total connecting frequencies for two different cases for a specific day 
where both operating and non-operating services are present. It is assumed that all connections 
are valid hits, meeting the MCT and MaxCT criteria.  
 
Table 8.4: Total Frequency and Hit Calculation for Two Cases (Shown in Each Row) 
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
BB1 - operating 
CC1 - codeshare 
BB2 - operating 
Total frequencies : 3 
YY1 - operating 
Total Frequency: 1 
Operating Hits : 
BB1/YY1, BB2/YY1 
Codeshare Hits : 
CC2/YY1 
Total Hits: 3 
(2 operating, one codeshare) 
EE1 - codeshare 
EE2 - codeshare 
Total frequencies: 2 
UU1 - operating 
TT1 - codeshare 
TT2 - operating 
Total Frequency: 1 
Operating Hits : 
None 
Codeshare Hits : 
EE1/UU1, EE1/TT1 
EE1/TT2, EE2/UU1 
EE2/TT1, EE2/TT2 
Total Hits: 6 
(All codeshare hits) 
 
 As illustrated in Table 8.4, although there exists two physical operating frequencies in 
the first case and none for the second case, there are 3 and 6 hits available for sale within the 
carriers' inventory respectively. Assuming all flights in the table are operated daily from 
Monday to Sunday, the total weekly frequency would be 7 for the first case with three hits 
present each day. For the second case, total weekly frequency count would be 14 available for 
sale via 6 hits each day. 
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8.3.2. Determination of Seat Supply 
 Total seat capacity refers to the sum of available seats for sale on a specific O&D. 
Airlines offer seats in a market through one or multiple direct frequencies in addition to 
successful connecting hits. The physical seat supply in the market is equal to the number of 
seats supplied through the operating frequencies. However, there are also codeshare seats for 
the marketing carriers. Although codeshare seats are already included in the operating seat 
count, they are still counted in the overall seat supply count of the O&D because of the reasons 
outlined in section 8.3.2.2. Therefore total seat supply in a market for airline i is formulated as 
 
s(i_O&D)  =  sop_(i_O&D)  +  s codeshare(i_O&D) 
 
where  sop_(i_O&D) refers to the operating seat supply of the airline i and scodeshare_(i_O&D) 
denotes its codeshare seat supply.  
 
8.3.2.1. Determination of Operating (Physical) Seat Supply 
The total physical/operating seat capacity of an airline in an O&D is the sum of its 
operating-direct and operating-connecting services’ seat supply. Therefore, the total operating 
seat supply of an airline i in a market for a specific day is calculated as follows:  
 
sop_(i_O&D_day)  =  sop_direct (i_O&D_day)  +  sop_connecting (i_O&D_day) 
 
The total operating seat count of all airlines competing in an O&D for a given day is 
∑ sop_(i_O&D_day)
n
i=1  where n refers to the total number of airlines operating in that particular 
market.  
 
For direct flights, the total seat supply from a particular origin to destination can be 
extracted through available seat capacity per frequency (sf) times the frequency. The 
formulation of operating direct seat supply for an airline i on an O&D can be formulated as: 
 
sop_direct (i_O&D_day)  =  fop_direct (i_O&D_day) x  sf (i_O&D) 
 
  
 
 
205 
However, the determination of seat supply for the connecting journeys is a relatively 
complex process. The challenge in the determination of sop_connecting (i_O&D) stems from the 
fact that there is no physical capacity commitment of a connecting hit from origin to destination 
as there are no direct services between those routes. Thus, the allocation of seat capacity of 
each leg composing the itinerary is a matter of subjectivity for connecting flights. Moreover, 
sf (i_O&D) can be different for the first and second leg of a connecting itinerary. For instance, a 
wide-body aircraft can perform the inbound flight from origin to hub while a narrow-body 
aircraft with relatively fewer number of seats per frequency can be assigned to the outbound 
flight from hub to destination. 
 
 In order to address the capacity allotment challenge for the connecting itineraries, as 
previously addressed in Chapter 2, a coefficient, named connecting seat factor symbolised with 
sconn, was introduced. sconn is a value between 0 and 1, denoting the maximum percentage of 
capacity that could be allocated for a connecting destination. If sconn is zero, no seating capacity 
is assigned to connecting passengers, where in the other extreme if it is 1, all capacity is 
allocated to them. For the sake of the proposed model, a single sconn could be defined for all 
O&D pairs. It is essential to state that the capacity allotted for connecting itineraries is rather a 
definitive assumption within physical capacity which does not take away from the capacity 
allotted to direct services. For example, a flight from Oslo to Rome can welcome passengers 
from Helsinki who travelled to Oslo for a connection to Rome. The same flight can host 
passengers originating from Hamburg or elsewhere, whose intention is to fly Rome via Oslo. 
Each flight from multiple origins arriving in Oslo and attaining a successful connection to 
Rome can get a seat in the Oslo-Rome flight. Seats allocated to connecting itineraries would 
surge the calculated seat supply since the connecting capacities are not defined to take away 
from the physical capacity of the flight from Oslo to Rome.   
 
 Supposing a connecting journey from City A to City B with the following seat supply 
for the first and second leg which are connected to each other as valid hits, the connecting seat 
capacity calculation is performed as shown in Table 8.5.a, 8.5.b and 8.5.c. 
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Table 8.5.a. Available Seats of the Legs Composing the Hits from City a to City B 
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
XX1 - total seat: 100 
XX2 - total seat: 120 
XX3 - total seat: 150 
YY1 - seat: 70 
XX1–YY1 
XX2–YY1 
XX3–YY1 
 
Assuming sconn to be 10% or 0.1, the available seats for the connecting passengers travelling 
from City A to B is 10 for flight XX1, 12 for XX2, 15 for XX3 and 7 for YY1, as summarised 
in the table below: 
Table 8.5.b: The Seats Allotted to Connecting Journeys Under sconn = 10% Assumption 
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
XX1 - connecting seat: 10 
XX2 - connecting seat: 12 
XX3 - connecting seat: 15 
YY1 - connecting seat: 7 
 
It is clear from the above table that the outbound flight YY1 only has seven-seat 
capacity for passengers arriving from City A through XX1, XX2 and XX3, while in these 
flights a total of 37 (10+12+15) travellers could have arrived in a hub airport waiting to be 
transported to City B via YY1. However, as shown in the table below, the seating capacity of 
YY1 is only limited to 7, creating a bottleneck in the O&D capacity, therefore limiting the 
sop_connecting (A−B) from City A to B to only 7. 
Table 8.5.c: Final Connecting Seat Capacity for the Itinerary of the Sample Case 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
Total Connecting Seats 
XX1 – YY1 : connect seat = 7 
XX2 – YY1 : connect seat = 7 
XX3 – YY1 : connect seat = 7 
= 7 
as YY1 forms the capacity 
constraint 
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Additionally, the connecting physical frequency count from A to B is only one, as YY1 
is the sole frequency to City B. Therefore, one physical frequency is available for sale via three 
different combinations offering a total of 7 seats in the market. 
 
 The seat computation of another example for a connecting journey from City C to City 
D is shown in Table 8.6, with multiple numbers of inbound and outbound flights where all 
connections are assumed to be valid hits and sconn = 0.1. As per the case, two inbound flights 
with different seat capacities which can be connected to three distinct outbound services.  
 
Table 8.6: Available Seats from City C to City D  
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
Connecting Hits 
(From origin to destination) 
AA1  - total seats : 100 
AA2 - total seats : 120 
-- 
AA1  - connect seats : 10 
AA2 - connect seats : 12 
BB1 - total seats : 200 
BB2 - total seats : 250 
BB3 - total seats : 110 
-- 
BB1 - connect seats : 20 
BB2 - connect seats : 25 
BB3 - connect seats : 11 
AA1–BB1 : connect s = 10 
AA1–BB2 : connect s = 10 
AA1–BB3 : connect s = 10 
AA2–BB1 : connect s = 12 
AA2–BB2 : connect s = 12 
AA2–BB3 : connect s = 11 
 
For the first three hits (AA1–BB1, AA–BB2 and AA–BB3), the seat capacity of AA1 
forms the capacity-constraint. Therefore these combinations contributes by only 10 seats to the 
supply from City C to D. Although BB1, BB2, BB3 flights have adequate seats to 
accommodate more passengers to City D, AA1 can only host 10 connecting passengers 
maximum to City D. In the following two combinations, (AA2–BB1, AA2–BB2), the seat 
capacity of AA2 forms a seat constraint, limiting the maximum supply of these hits to 12 seats. 
Whilst for the AA2–BB3 hit only 11 seats can be allotted for passengers intending to travel 
from City C to City D, it does not form a bottleneck since the remaining passenger of AA2 
could either be transported by BB1 or BB2, which already has a space to accommodate the 
passenger. In sum, all those six hits offer sop_connecting (C−D) = 22 available seats from City C 
to City D.  
 
  
 
 
208 
Supposing AA2–BB1 and AA2–BB2 combinations are NOT valid hits in which a 
successful connection is not attained, the capacity of BB3 would be the capacity constraint for 
AA2–BB3 combination, limiting its seat supply to 11. Including the hits of AA1 flights, where 
their connecting seat supply was calculated to be 10 for three combinations, the available seat 
count in the market would be reduced to 21. In other words, AA2–BB1 and AA2–BB2 hits 
contribute to seat availability by only one passenger.    
 
Moving from the examples illustrated above, the pseudo formulation of an operating 
connecting seat supply for airline i on a specified O&D, soperating_connecting (i_O&D) for a given 
day can be summarised as follows: 
 
determine if the number of outbound frequencies is less than or equal to outbound flights for 
airline i 
 if the above statement is true 
  for each outbound frequency j 
   for each inbound frequency k    
    take  a = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 (𝑠𝑗 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛) 
    put  list(x) = a 
   next 
    find the maximum value in the list(x)  
    add this number to connecting seat supply 
  next 
 end if 
 else 
  for each inbound frequency j 
   for each outbound frequency k    
    take  a = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 (𝑠𝑗 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛) 
    put  list(x) = a 
   next 
    find the maximum value in the list(x)  
    add this number to connecting seat supply 
  next 
end if 
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In this pseudo formulation, 𝑠𝑗 refers to operating seat from origin to hub, and 𝑠𝑘  refers to the 
operating seat amount from hub to destination.  
 
 Similar to the frequency calculation, total seat supply is also reported on a weekly basis. 
Therefore, in order to calculate the weekly seat supply, the above calculations should be 
performed for each day of the week and later summed up. The total operating weekly seat 
supply of an airline i on a specified O&D can then be denoted as  
 
∑ sop_(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
 
 
where the operating seats of the seven days are summed together. The total weekly operating 
seat supply of all airlines competing on a route is ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑜𝑝_(𝑖_𝑂&𝐷_𝑑𝑎𝑦)
𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑑𝑎𝑦=𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1  where n is 
the total number of airlines operating on that particular O&D. Making the substitution, the total 
available operating seats in a market can alternatively be stated as follows:  
 
∑ ∑ sop_direct(i_O&D_day) + sop_conn(i_O&D_day)
day = Sunday
day=Monday
n
i=1
 
 
 Supposing flight XX1, XX2, XX3 and YY1, illustrated in Tables 8.5.a are operated 
daily under the same sconn = 10% assumption, available seats per week would be equal to 7 x 7 
= 49. Table 8.7 adjusts the case in 8.5 by assuming flights on different days of the week. 
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Tables 8.7: Weekly Timetable and Seat per Frequency for Flights from City C to D.    
Inbound flights 
(From origin to hub) 
Outbound flight 
(From hub to destination) 
AA1  - total seats: 100 
(operated Mo, Tu, Sa) 
AA2 - total seats : 120 
(operated Fri, Sa) 
-- 
AA1  - connect seats: 10 
AA2 - connect seats : 12 
BB1 - total seats: 200 
(operated Mo, We, Fri, Sa, Su) 
BB2 - total seats: 250 
(operated Mo, Tu, We, Fri, Sa) 
BB3 - total seats: 110 
(operated Mo, Tu, We, Fri, Su) 
-- 
BB1 - connect seats: 20 
BB2 - connect seats : 25 
BB3 - connect seats : 11 
 
Using the information above, Table 8.8 is constructed to demonstrate the number of 
hits, frequencies and seat count for each day of the week. As Table 8.8 shows, 54 weekly seats 
are offered from City C to City D in 6 distinct hits in 5 different frequencies, sold in 14 weekly 
combinations. 
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Table 8.8: Daily Summary of Hits, Frequencies and Seat Supply for Services from City C to D  
 Combinations Frequency & Seats 
Monday AA1/BB1, AA1/BB2, AA1/BB3 
1 frequency (AA1 bottleneck) 
10 seats (AA1 bottleneck) 
3 hits 
Tuesday AA1/BB2, AA1/BB3 
1 frequency (AA1 bottleneck) 
10 seats 
2 hits 
Wednesday N/A No frequency, seat and hits 
Thursday N/A No frequency, seat and hits 
Friday AA2/BB1, AA2/BB2, AA2/BB3 
1 frequency (AA2 bottleneck) 
12 seats (AA2 bottleneck) 
3 hits 
Saturday 
AA1/BB1, AA1/BB2, AA1/BB3 
AA2/BB1, AA2/BB2, AA2/BB3 
2 frequencies (AA1, AA2 bottleneck) 
22 seats 
6 hits 
Sunday N/A No frequency, seat and hits 
Total 
6 hits- (AA1/BB1,AA1/BB2,AA1/BB3,AA2/BB1,AA2/BB2, AA2/BB3) 
5 weekly frequency (Mo: 1, Tu: 1, Fr: 1, Sa: 2) 
54 weekly seats 
14 combinations available for sale per week (Mo: 3, Tu: 2, Fr: 3, Sa: 6) 
 
8.3.2.2. Determination of Codeshare Seat Supply 
As explained in earlier Chapters, determining the seat supply for codeshare flights is 
not a straightforward process as it is merely impossible for third parties to access and extract 
the details of codeshare agreements among carriers, which are most of the time bilateral. 
Although it is possible to determine on which routes and frequencies airlines share the capacity, 
as the marketing carriers place their designated code on the operating carriers' flights, the 
number of seats allocated to the marketing airline cannot be known by the third parties. As 
covered in Chapter 2, it is assumed that the marketing carrier cannot sell more than a pre-
specified percentage of the operating flights' seat inventory. Therefore, a coefficient, scode was 
introduced, whose value can vary between 0 and 1. A zero scode implies no seat allocation for 
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the marketing carrier, whereas if scode is equal to 1 all seat capacity of the operating flight is 
allotted for sale by the marketing airline. Therefore, while the seat supply on the operating 
carrier is equal to the actual physical capacity, the supply offered by the marketing carrier is a 
virtual supply that is available for sale.  
 
The codeshare agreements can be in soft-block space format, in which the marketing 
carrier can return the unsold seats to the operating carriers' inventory, or in hard-block space 
scheme, where the marketing carrier cannot concede the unsold seats back and are therefore 
required to pay for each allotted seat. As such details of the codeshare agreement are not 
publicly known, when analysing the airlines’ total codeshare seat supply, the capacity allotted 
to a marketing carrier cannot be deducted from the physical inventory. Since both carriers can 
sell the same capacity on codeshare flights and could even practice overbooking, seats 
distributed to a marketing airline cannot be subtracted from the operating carrier’s physical seat 
supply set when calculating the total seat supply available for sale in the market.  
 
8.3.2.3. Total Seat Count Calculation & Case Studies  
The sum of all seats available for sale for an airline i in a given market is s(i_O&D_day)  =
 sdirect (i_O&D_day)  +  sconnecting (i_O&D_day) where, 
 
sdirect (i_O&D_day)  
=  fop_direct (i_O&D_day)  ∗  sf (i_O&D)  
+  ∑ (fcode_direct (i_O&D_day)  ∗  sf (k_O&D) ∗  scode)
k=m
k=1
 
and, 
sconnecting (i_O&D_day)  =  sop_connecting (i_O&D_day)  +  scode_connecting (i_O&D_day) 
 
where 𝑓𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑖_𝑂&𝐷) refers to the operating frequency for airline i on the specified 
O&D, 𝑠𝑓 (𝑖_𝑂&𝐷) is the average seat per frequency, 𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑖_𝑂&𝐷) is the codeshare 
frequency amount, 𝑠𝑓 (𝑘_𝑂&𝐷) is the average seat supply of operating carrier k in the given O&D, 
and m is the number of codeshare flights on the given O&D. Additionally, the pseudo 
formulation for codeshare connecting seat supply calculation is identical to operating 
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connecting seat calculation except the fact that the result has to be multiplied by the 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 
factor.  
 
 To address the total seat supply on a weekly basis for all flights, including both online 
and codeshare operations, seat supply must be individually calculated for each day of the week 
and later summed up, which can be formulated as 
 
∑ 𝑠(𝑖_𝑂&𝐷_𝑑𝑎𝑦)
𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑑𝑎𝑦=𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
 
denoting the total seat count available for sale for airline i, including both operating and 
codeshare services. Therefore the total seat supply for all airlines contending in a market is 
equal to ∑ ∑ 𝑠(𝑖_𝑂&𝐷_𝑑𝑎𝑦)
𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑑𝑎𝑦=𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where n is the total number of airlines operating on 
that particular O&D. The examples below were obtained from the real schedules of the listed 
airlines and iterate through the steps of the weekly frequency and seat supply computation for 
various cases:  
 
Case 1: Lufthansa Flights from Geneva (GVA) to Dubai (DXB) as of 2016 - There were 
no direct flights of Lufthansa from GVA to DXB. However, connecting products were present 
in the market via Frankfurt (FRA), which has an MCT value of 45 minutes. Under MaxCT = 
600 minutes assumption, three hits were identified: 1) LH1213–LH630, 2) LH1215–LH630 
and 3) LH1229–LH630 connections as shown in the table below. LH1213, LH1215 and 
LH1229 flights were operated daily whereas LH630 was operated six times per week, each day 
excluding Wednesdays. Therefore, the weekly frequency count of these combinations was 
limited to 6 as all hits are connected via the LH630 flight. 
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Figure 8.3: Flight Combination from GVA to DXB Under MaxCT = 600 Minutes Assumption. 
 
 
For the LH1213–LH630 connection, passengers were required to wait 3 hours and 15 
minutes in FRA whereas for the LH1215-LH630 connection they needed to spend 1 hour and 
55 minutes. For the LH1229–LH630 connection, the transfer time at the hub was 5 hours and 
50 minutes. All these durations meet tconn >= MCT as they are all greater than 45 minutes, 
which is the MCT of FRA, and tconn <= MaxCT criterion as the tconn’s is less than 600 minutes.  
 
 The average seats offered in LH1213, LH1215 and LH1229 were 138, 139 and 139 per 
frequency respectively, whereas the average number of seats on the LH630 flight was 216. 
Therefore, the inbound service to the hub is capacity constrained in terms of seats offered. 
Assuming sconn to be 20% or 0.2, the total weekly available seats offered by Lufthansa (LH) on 
the LH1213–LH630 combination was 166 (138 x 0.2 x 6 = 165.6 rounded to 166) and for 
LH1215–LH630 and LH1229–LH630 combinations, it is 167 (139 x 0.2 x 6 = 166.8 rounded 
to 167).  However, each combination could only be connected from hub to destination via 
LH630 which is the capacity-constrained service. Therefore, when counting the total seat 
supply of LH from GVA to DXB, it is NOT possible to sum up each hit’s seat supply 
individually. Therefore, under sconn = 0.2 assumption, the total weekly seat supply between 
Geneva and Dubai can at most  be 167, which could be sold across 18 different weekly flight 
combinations.  
 
 By changing the MaxCT to 290 minutes, which was our finding in the passenger survey,  
only two hits could attain a connection from GVA to DXB via FRA, as illustrated in the image 
below: 
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Figure 8.4: Flight Combination From GVA to DXB Under MaxCT = 290 Minutes Assumption. 
 
 
A reduction in the number of hits would not diminish total seat supply in the GVA-
DXB market of LH, as LH630 is the sole capacity from the LH’s hub (FRA) to DXB. 
Therefore, under MaxCT = 290 minutes assumption, the total seat supply in the market would 
not be reduced but the number of hits that the seats could be sold would fall from 18 to 12. 
Under the new MaxCT assumption, the number of connecting frequencies in the market would 
also remain unchanged. Therefore, the summary table of LH services from GVA to DXB under 
both MaxCTs were as follows:  
Table 8.9: Consolidated Frequency and Seat Supply Table From GVA to DXB of LH Flights. 
 Operating Non - operating 
Direct N/A N/A 
Connecting 6 frequency - 167 seats N/A 
Total 6 frequencies and 167 seats 
 
Case 2: KLM (KL) Flights from Amsterdam (AMS) to Barcelona (BCN) as of 2016 - The direct 
services of the airline between AMS to BCN are displayed in the table below:  
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Figure 8.5: Direct Services of KL from AMS to BCN 
 
 
As of 2016, there existed 35 direct weekly online frequencies under 5 distinct flight 
numbers and one codeshare frequency per week. Therefore the total direct frequency between 
AMS to BCN was 36. The average direct seat capacity per frequency for KL in the AMS–BCN 
market, sop_dir_(KL_AMS/BCN) was equal to 157 whereas the physical capacity on the codeshare 
flight, KL2594 was 189. Assuming scode to be 0.3, scode_direct_(KL_AMS/BCN) is obtained to be 56 
(189 x 0.3 = 56.7 rounded down to 56). As a result, direct seats of KLM available for sale in 
the market as of 2016 was 157 x 35 + 56 = 5,551 per week, which could be sold in 36 distinct 
frequencies. 
 
In 2016, there were also connecting services of KLM from AMS to BCN. Through the 
codeshare agreements, the airline could connect the two cities via Palma de Mallorca (PMI). 
Assuming scode = 0.3, sconn = 0.2 and MaxCT = 290 minutes, the connecting hits were found as 
follows:  
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Figure 8.6: Connecting Services of KL from AMS to BCN. 
 
 
As observed in the table, KLM offered codeshare connecting services from AMS to 
BCN via PMI using 8 different combinations, each having different weekly frequency amount. 
In order to compute the weekly frequency and seat count, the operations had to be evaluated 
on a daily basis by taking the scode, sconn and the capacity-constrained flights into consideration. 
For instance, in the KL2673–KL3320 hit, the physical seats on KL2673 was 189, whereas the 
figure was 186 for KL3320. Therefore, the seats for this connecting codeshare hit 
scode_connecting_(KL_AMS/BCN)_day, was 186 x 0.2 (sconn) x 0.3 (sconn) = 11 (rounded down from 
11.16). The following table summarises the services and available seats of the hits for each day 
of the week. 
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Table 8.10: Connecting Flights of KL from AMS to BCN – daily view. 
Day Combinations & Connecting Seats 
Monday KL2675–KL3352 - 11 seats 
Tuesday KL2673–KL3334 - 11 seats 
Wednesday KL2673–KL3352 - 11 seats 
Thursday 
KL2675–KL3334 - 11 seats 
KL2679–KL3320 - 9 seats 
KL2679–KL3352 - 9 seats 
Friday KL2677–KL3334 - 11 seats 
Saturday 
KL2679–KL3320 - 9 seats 
KL2679–KL3352 - 9 seats 
Sunday 
KL2673–KL3320 - 11 seats 
KL2673–KL3352 - 11 seats 
 
As depicted in Table 8.10, on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays, there 
existed one connecting frequency per day with 11 seats available for sale. For Thursdays, 
although three hits were present, KL2679 was the capacity constrained flight, therefore limited 
the availability to 2 frequencies with a total of 20 seats for that day (11 from KL2675/KL3334 
and 9 from KL2679/KL3320 & KL2679/KL3352 hits). Although there were two combinations 
on Saturdays and on Sundays; KL2679 and KL2673 were the single flights from origin to the 
hub respectively. Therefore, only one connecting frequency was offered at the weekends per 
day where 9 seats were available for sale on Satudays and 11 seats on Sundays. Therefore, 
from AMS and BCN, KLM offered eight connecting frequencies with a total of 84 seats 
available for sale on 11 distinct combinations. The summary supply table of KLM services in 
the market under scode = 0.3, sconn = 0.2 and MaxCT = 290 minutes assumptions is as follows: 
 
Table 8.11: Consolidated services table of KLM from AMS to BCN airport. 
 Operating Non - operating 
Direct 35 frequency – 5,495 seats 1 frequency - 56 seats 
Connecting N/A 8 frequency - 84 seats 
Total 44 frequencies and 5,635 seats. 
available for sale in 35 direct and 11 connecting combinations 
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8.3.2.4. Seat Share Calculation 
 The per cent physical frequency (%f_i) and seat (%s_i) share of an airline i competing on 
a route can be calculated by identifying its per cent supply in the market. A case is illustrated 
in the table below.  
Table 8.12: Frequency, Frequency Share, Available Seat and Seat Share of Airline A and B. 
Airline Frequency Frequency Share (%f ) Available Seats Seat Share ( %s ) 
A 5 26.3% (= 5/19) 180 39.1% (=180/460) 
B 14 73.7% (=14/19) 280 60.9% (=280/460) 
Total 19 100% 460 100% 
 
The above table shows the weekly frequency and seat supply for Airline A and B on a 
particular route and assumes no other airline offers products in the market. As per the case, it 
is assumed that Airline A serves 5 frequencies per week, once in the weekdays, while Airline 
B flies twice per day. Airline A holds 26.3% of the frequencies available in the market and 
39.1% of the seats. The remaining 73.7% of frequencies and 60.9% of the available seats are 
offered by the Airline B. Assuming no schedule quality, fare and airline brand differences exist 
between Airline A and B, it would be natural to expect the market share of Airline A to be 
39.1% and Airline B to be 60.9% in an unlimited demand scenario, as the seating capacity 
would be the sole indicator of the market performance. However, the lack of Airline A’s daily 
services in the market would lead the carrier to lose some market share in case the demand is 
split to different days of the week. In this case, Airline A would gain no market share for the 
unserved days, which would be taken by its rival.  Therefore, for the sake of capacity matters, 
an adjustment needs to be performed from the daily service availability perspective.  
 
 8.3.2.5. Seat Capacity Share Adjustment Process and Methodology 
 Not all services from an origin to destination are operated daily. Airlines may prefer 
not to offer certain flights on particular days of the week due to several reasons, such as 
demand, aircraft availability, traffic rights, etc. In case the demand is distributed uniformly 
among each day of the week, and all other parameters shaping the market share of airlines 
except the capacities are identical, it would not be natural to expect carriers not offering daily 
services to report proportionate market shares parallel to their seat supply. If an airline does 
not offer a service on a particular day of the week, the demand would shift to the other airline 
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or airlines serving that day. In case no carriers perform flights on a specific day or days of the 
week, the demand would shift to other days of the week when the flights are available. 
Otherwise, if more than one carrier operates on the route, demand would not shift to other days 
of the week given the existence of alternative product.  Therefore, an adjustment needs to be 
performed with the seat supply shares depending on daily service availability. The adjusted 
seat shares are denoted as %a_s which is the final output parameter of the consumer-centric 
supply share model, the Objective 1 of this research. The adjustment can be performed using 
two distinct methodologies. 
 
 8.3.2.5.1. Adjustment by Using Daily Seat Shares 
The first capacity adjustment method can be performed by using the daily seat shares. 
If at least one airline offers daily service on an O&D and one or more airlines do not offer daily 
flights, the seat shares of the non-daily serving airlines need to be transferred to the daily-
serving carriers for the non-served days in proportion to serving carriers’ seat supply. In the 
above case shown in Table 8.12, it is assumed that Airline B’s 14 frequencies and 280 seats 
are distributed to each day of the week evenly where at least each day is served by 2 frequencies 
with 20 seats per frequency, and Airline A offers 5 frequencies per week where each served 
day gets 36 seats. Therefore, for the two days that Airline A does not offer flights, the demand 
would shift to Airline B. As a result, for the 2 unserved days of the week, Airline B would gain 
the entire market, and in the remaining 5 days, Airline B would report 58.8% share (as the 
carrier owns 20 of the 34 available seats at the weekdays) and Airline A would have 41.2% 
capacity share.  Therefore, the adjusted weekly capacity share, %a_s, for Airline B is 
(2 𝑥 100%+5 𝑥 58.8%)
7
= 70.6% where the remaining 29.4% share would belong to Airline A. The 
table then becomes as follows: 
Table 8.13: Available Seats, Seat Share and Adjusted Weekly Seat Shares of Airlines A and B. 
Airline Available Seats Seat Share ( %s ) Adjusted Weekly Seat Share ( %a_s ) 
A 180 39.1% 29.4% 
B 280 60.9% 70.6% 
  
As the distribution of demand throughout the week is out of the scope of this research, 
an even and uniform demand distribution was assumed throughout the study. The procedure 
for calculating the adjusted weekly seat share by using daily shares is straightforward. After 
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calculating the daily seat si  for each airline i in a market, the airline or airlines which do not 
offer daily services are identified. For the non-served days, those airlines would get a zero per 
cent seat share, whereas the available carriers share the hundred per cent in reference to their 
seat supply. The mathematical average of each airlines seat share from Monday to Sunday 
would finally result in the %a_s. An example follows: 
 
Table 8.14: Daily Seats of Airline C, D and E and Weekly Seat Shares (%s).  
Airline Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun %s 
C 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 54.7% 
D 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 21.9% 
E 15 15 15 15 0 0 15 23.4% 
 
Airline C and D operate daily on the route while Airline E lacks flights on Fridays and 
Saturdays. The total seat supply in the market is 320, where Airline C offers 175/320 = 54.7% 
of those seats, 70/320 = 21.9% is by Airline D and 75/320 = 23.4% by Airline E. To calculate 
the adjusted capacity shares, the seat shares are required to be calculated at the daily level as 
shown in the table below:  
 
 Table 8.15: Daily Seat Shares of the Airlines and Adjusted Seat Shares (%a_s).  
Airline Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun %a_s 
C 50% 50% 50% 50% 71.4% 71.4% 50% 56.1% 
D 20% 20% 20% 20% 28.6% 28.6% 20% 22.5% 
E 30% 30% 30% 30% 0% 0% 30% 21.4% 
 
The adjusted seat shares are computed by taking the mathematical average of the daily 
seat shares for each Airline. It is deduced that Airline E previously had a weekly seat share of 
%s = 23.4, but its share was reduced to 21.4% after the adjustment process. The two per cent 
that is taken away from Airline E is transferred to Airline C and D, in proportion to their weekly 
seats. Therefore, Airline C’s adjusted share increased by 1.4 points to 56.1%, while Airline D’s 
share raised by 0.6 points to 22.5%.  
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There exist certain drawbacks with the seat capacity adjustment model. As the model 
takes the simple averages of the daily per cent capacity shares, it does not take the divergences 
with the daily sum of seat supplies into account. Simple averaging undermines the impact of 
daily fluctuations in the total seat availabilities for the analysed O&D. On the other hand, 
because daily variations in seat capacities are not reflected into the adjustment methodology, it 
would not be plausible to argue that demand is distributed evenly among each day of the week. 
For instance, the calculations shown in Table 8.15 infers that the demand for Friday and 
Saturday is lower compared to other days of the week. Therefore, the second method for the 
adjustment called "waste capacity discount model" is introduced below. 
 
 8.3.2.5.2. Waste Capacity Discount Adjustment Model 
 The waste capacity discount adjustment model is based on two assumptions: First, the 
demand is split evenly among each day of the week. Second, if all parameters influencing 
market share expectations are identical among carriers but the capacities, airlines expect to 
obtain a market share equal to their weekly capacity shares. These two assumptions together 
dictate that airlines which do not offer a flight on each day of the week would be wasting some 
of their capacities for the days that they offer flights. For instance, if an airline X flies to a 
destination only on Mondays and offers 70 seats on that day, where the other airline Y flies to 
the same destination with 10 seats each day, although both airlines report the same weekly seat 
supply, airline X would get a low share. Since airline X operates once per week, only 1/7 of 
the carrier’s seats are to be met by the demand and 10 seats are utilised, where the remaining 
60 seats on Mondays are "wasted". Although Airline X may expect all 70 seats of the Monday 
flights to contribute to its overall market share estimation by assuming that the demand would 
shift to Mondays, that would not happen as Airline Y offers daily services. For this reason, 6/7 
of Airline X’s Monday capacity is wasted. Therefore, the total weekly supply in the market is 
80 where 10 of them belongs to Airline X and 70 to Airline Y. This implies that the adjusted 
share %a_s of airline X is calculated to be 10/80 = 12.5% and the remaining 87.5% is the 
adjusted share of airline Y under the waste capacity discount adjustment model.   
 
The adjustment procedure with the waste capacity discount model is as follows: In case 
at least one airline offers a daily service in the analysed market, the non-daily serving airline 
i’s total weekly seat capacity, si, is discounted by z/7 where z refers to the number of unserved 
days of the week. The total discounted amount is then subtracted from the total seat supply of 
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all airlines competing in the market, and the new distribution is calculated based on the 
subtracted total seat supply, forming the %a_s. In other words, while keeping the seat supply of 
daily performing airlines intact, the seat supply of the non-daily performing airlines is 
discounted which subsequently reduces the overall weekly seat count in the market. The 
adjusted seat capacity of the above case given in Table 8.14 is as follows with the waste 
capacity discount model: 
Table 8.16: Case for the waste capacity model for Airline C, D and E. 
Airline Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Physical Discounted 
C 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 175 175 
D 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 70 70 
E 15 15 15 15   15 75 53 
 
As per the table above, the total weekly physical seat supply in the market is 320 where Airline 
C holds 175 of the seats and D and E offer 70 and 75 seats respectively. Since Airline E does 
not offer services on Fridays and Saturdays, its seat capacity is discounted by 2/7 and thus 
becomes 75x(1–2/7) = 53 (rounded down from 53.5). The wasted capacity of 75 – 53 = 22 seats 
is subtracted from the 320 weekly seats, and the new seat supply in the market becomes 320 - 
22 = 298. The new capacity table and the adjusted shares are calculated in the table below:  
 
Table 8.17: Weekly Adjusted Seats and Adjusted Share for Airline C, D and E. 
Airline Original Seat (si  ) Adjusted Seats Adjusted Cap. Share (%a_s) 
C 175 175 175/298 = 58.7% 
D 70 70 70/298 = 23.5% 
E 75 53 53/298 = 17.8% 
Total 320 298 100% 
 
Although the previous daily share adjustment model took 2 points off from airline E 
and distributed this share to Airline C and D, the waste seat discount model took 5.5 points off 
from Airline E, which is then re-distributed to Airline C and D.  
 
 The S-curve model discussed in the literature survey suggested that increases (or 
reductions) in marginal flights results in a greater-than-proportional gain (or loss) of the market 
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share (O'Connor, 2001). Since the waste capacity discount model results in a more than 
proportional change in the capacity share by punishing the non-daily services, it complies better 
with the theoretical background of the S-curve in comparison to daily seat share adjustment 
model. For this reason, the waste capacity discount model was adopted throughout the research.  
 
 This Chapter iterated through the steps of %a_s which effectively benchmarks the 
relative capacity of airlines competing in a given market. It is a consumer-centric parameter 
calculated upon the research specific parameters that are verified with the passenger survey 
and factors explored in the literature review. Therefore, %a_s refers to the Objective 1 of this 
study. The next chapter addresses the schedule related quality score calculation methodology 
for each competing airline in a market for direct and connects services.  %a_s , together with 
quality-related scores, is used to compute the competing airlines realistic market share 
estimation. 
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Chapter 9: Network Performance Model Development – Quality Scores and 
the REMSET 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
 The previous Chapter introduced a consumer-centric capacity share determination 
method for all airlines competing in a market. As previously addressed, this research’s 
proposed realistic market share estimation model relies on two major input streams. The first 
input stream is the adjusted capacity shares, abbreviated %a_s, that was explained in Chapter 8. 
This Chapter focuses on schedule related quality score determination of each capacity available 
in the market, referring to the second major input stream of the REMSET model and the 
Objective 2 of the research. It was aimed that each carrier’s schedule quality is translated into 
a quantitative metric, abbreviated as qa_index_normalised. The information retrieved from the 
passenger survey was effectively used to design qa_index_normalised scores, which ensured the 
consumer-centric nature of this research. This Chapter also contains the introduction of the 
REMSET model, which incorporates %a_s and qa_index_normalised scores. The final section of this 
Chapter presents a case study by walking through the steps of the %a_s and qa_index_normalised 
calculation and then computes the final realistic market share estimation of the rival carriers by 
using the REMSET tool.  
 
 As discussed in the previous Chapters, the quality definition of the air transport product 
is highly subjective and therefore does not infer a straightforward characterisation. However, 
it is certain that the schedule-convenience of a product is determined through the combination 
of various factors. Although current literature did not emphasise a singular definition of the 
itinerary quality, the parameters that construct the overall consumer satisfaction were 
substantiated and quantified analytically through the passenger survey. Nevertheless, each 
passenger possesses varying attitudes towards these parameters, mapping those factors in their 
thought process to eventually decide the perceived quality value of the prospective itinerary. It 
is essential to reiterate that only schedule-convenience related parameters were included in 
terms of product quality throughout the scope of this research and this Chapter. Fare and 
airlines' brand related attractiveness that are influential in consumer preference were beyond 
the scope of this research and their impacts were ignored as part of the REMSET model. 
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 The parameters that determine the consumers’ overall schedule convenience are in 
abundance. Passengers do care when they depart from the origin (qdep) and arrive at the 
destination (qarr) in addition to time-related parameters, including ttotal as well as tconn, tstress, 
twaste and tflight for the connecting itineraries. Furthermore, the routing of their journey (whether 
direct or connecting) is an essential concern for consumers. The operation type of the journey 
(whether online or codeshare) is another crucial factor that passengers evaluate during their 
itinerary selection process. Moreover, the passenger survey has found that passengers do not 
prefer an evenly split journey for connecting itineraries. 
 
It is not just the airline schedule that have an impact on passengers’ perceived schedule 
convenience, but the airport facilities. Airports not only determine the MCT and subsequent 
time related parameters including tflight, tconn and ttotal, they also indicate the time of the day that 
the flights can be operated. Factors like slot restrictions and curfew implementation prove that 
airports compose a restriction on the airlines scheduling process and therefore directly affect a 
flight’s product quality. The below sections address the components of schedule-related quality 
and walk through the steps of the qa_index_normalised calculation. Similar to the procedure in the 
capacity share calculation procedure, the quality assessments are made on a weekly basis as 
the airline schedules are planned and repeated weekly. 
 
9.2. Calculation of Time Related Parameters 
 
 Time-related parameters are critical components of schedule quality. As the passenger 
survey unveiled, the perceived value of a flight that offers a relatively better timing in terms of 
flight duration, departure and arrival time is valued higher compared to its peers. Therefore, it 
was essential to develop a methodology to calculate time-related parameters of the airlines 
competing in a market. On the other hand, if multiple flights were performed in a given O&D, 
it is vital to calculate the average values of the time-related parameters for each service in order 
to form a meaningful basis of comparison and benchmark with the other carriers. The following 
subsections introduce the quantitative metrics of time-related parameters and discuss their 
calculation procedures for direct and connecting flights separately.  
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9.2.1. Calculating Time-Related Parameters for Direct Flights 
 The computation of time-related parameters for direct flights is straightforward. It is 
expected that direct flights in a given market have no or minor variances in ttotal which is equal 
to tflight as tconn = 0. Since the path for all direct itineraries available in a market is almost 
identical, tflight is not expected to change on different days of the week. The example below 
shows the departure and arrival time of a South African Airlines (SA) flight from Johannesburg 
to Nairobi numbered SA184.  
 
Figure 9.1: Timetable Information of SA184 Flight from JNB to NBO  
 
 
For SA184, the departure time from the origin and arrival time to destination is identical 
for each day of the week. The departure and arrival times are displayed in local times at Figure 
9.1. Taking the local time difference between South Africa and Kenya into consideration, the 
ttotal for SA184 was found to be 235 minutes.  
 
In some cases, minor variances of ttotal for different days of the week for the same flight 
number or route could be observed, as shown in the example below for the SV1102 flight from 
JED to DMM: 
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Figure 9.2: Timetable Information of Saudi Arabian Airlines from JED to DMM 
 
 
 As illustrated in the image above, there are three weekly flights of Saudi Arabian 
Airlines from Jeddah to Dammam under SV1102 flight number. Each day, the flight departs at 
different times. On Wednesdays and Thursdays, the flight depart at 04:55 and 04:50 
respectively, with a ttotal of 125 minutes. On the other hand, SV1102 departs Jeddah airport at 
02:30 on Sundays and arrives at Dammam at 04:40, inferring a ttotal of 130 minutes. As this 
example proves, throughout the different days of the week, there may be slight divergences in 
the duration of direct flights having the same flight number. These variances can be sourced 
from various technical or commercial reasons. Therefore, in order to compute the weekly 
average of ttotal for such flights, a particular methodology had to be adopted.   
 
To compute the weekly average ttotal for direct flights with varying flight durations 
depending on the day of the week, certain approaches could be implemented. One method 
could be taking the simple average of ttotals for each service day of the week. As each flight 
corresponds to one frequency, taking the simple average would yield to determine ttotal per 
frequency. However, this approach would undermine seat per frequency, sf. Although the 
number of frequencies is an indicator of capacity supply, the total number of seats on these 
frequencies dictates how many passengers could be transported via this product. Therefore, to 
compute the weekly ttotal for such irregular direct flights, the weighted average based on seat 
per frequency would be a more realistic approach and therefore adopted as part of the research 
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methodology. For the case shown in Figure 9.2, the ttotal computation for SV1102 is shown in 
the table below: 
 
Table 9.1: Weekly ttotal Computation for Flight SV1102  
Day ttotal of the day Seat Supply 
Wednesday 125 minutes 232 
Friday 125 minutes 298 
Sunday 130 minutes 132 
 
It is observed in the table that on Sundays, Saudi Arabian Airlines assign a smaller capacity 
aircraft for SV1102. Using the information in Table 9.1 the ttotal for SV1102 is 
 
(125 𝑥 232) + (125 𝑥 298) + (130 𝑥 132) 
(232 + 298 + 132 )
 = 126 minutes by weight-averaging each day's ttotal with the 
seat supply. 
 
The above-mentioned calculation methodology of time-related parameters covers the 
computation for each flight number. However, an airline may offer more than one direct flight 
number in a market. Under such circumstances, in order to obtain the global average ttotal_i_O&D 
for carrier i covering all of its services to an O&D, the following formula is applied; 
 
∑ (ttotal_x  ∗  sf_x)
x=n
x=1
∑ sf_x
n
x=1
 
 
where n is the number of distinct flight numbers operated and ttotal_x  refers to the total average 
flight time for flight number x, and sf_x is the total weekly seats available on flight x. Therefore 
the weighted average travel time for airline i including each of its distinct flight numbers is 
calculated in proportion to the total weekly seats associated with the corresponding flight 
number. The example below depicts the calculation of weekly ttotal for airline i between city A 
to city B.  
 
Table 9.2: Average Weekly ttotal for an Airline with Multiple Flight Numbers 
Flight Number Weekly ttotal Weekly Seat Count (s) 
I101 200 minutes 1000 seats 
I102 190 minutes 500 seats 
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Airline i offers two direct flight numbers between A and B, flight I101 and I102, with 
different weekly ttotal and seat count. The global average of the ttotal for airline i between City A 
and City B is then calculated as ttotal_i_O&D  = 
(200 𝑥 1000) + (190 𝑥 500)
(1000 + 500 )
 = 196.66 minutes. 
 
 As a result, in order to compute the airline’s total flight time in a market, two steps are 
required. In the first step, the average ttotal of each flight number is calculated by weight-
averaging each day's ttotal value with the daily seat count of the flight number. The second step 
includes taking the weighted average of all flight numbers’ average weekly ttotal based on the 
number of weekly seats for the corresponding flight number. 
 
 9.2.2. Calculating Time-Related Parameters for Connecting Flights 
 The method for computing the connecting flights' time-related parameters is very 
similar to that of direct flights in principle. The slight difference is, unlike direct flights, ttotal is 
the sum of tconn and tflight which are both non-zero values. On the other hand, while the 
calculations for direct flights are handled at the flight number level, for connecting itineraries, 
the computation process is based on the combinations that meet the tconn >= MCT and tconn <= 
MaxCT criteria. The procedure for calculating time-related parameters for the connecting 
journeys is again a two-step procedure in which at the initial phase, successful combinations’ 
time related parameters including tconn and tflight for each day of the week are identified along 
with their seat capacities, as shown in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3: Combination Hits for Airline X From City1 to City2 via a Hub. (Step 1) 
Combinations Day Time Related Parameters sO&D 
A101/A301 Monday 
tconn  = 60 minutes,  
tflight  = 120 minutes 
ttotal  = 180 minutes 
20 seats 
A101/A301 Tuesday 
tconn  = 60 minutes, 
tflight  = 120 minutes 
ttotal  = 180 minutes 
15 seats 
A101/A301 Friday 
tconn  = 50 minutes, 
tflight  = 115 minutes 
ttotal  = 165 minutes 
30 seats 
  
 
 
231 
 
For A101/A301 combination, the weekly average connecting time is, tconn = 
(60 𝑥 20) + (60 𝑥 15) + (50 𝑥 30)
(20 + 15 + 30)
 = 55.38 minutes, where the weekly average flight time is  tflight = 
(120 𝑥 20) + (120 𝑥 15) + (115 𝑥 30)
(20 + 15 + 30)
 = 117.69 minutes. Since ttotal  = tconn + tflight, the weekly average 
total journey time, ttotal , is then calculated as 55.38 + 117.69 = 173.07 minutes. Should the 
carrier have other combinations offering an itinerary on the same O&D, the above procedure 
is repeated for each hit and the time-related parameters are calculated individually for each 
combination. In the table below, the other combination of airline x offering a connection on 
the same route from City 1 to City 2 is displayed. 
 
Table 9.4: Other Combination for Airline x From City1 to City2. (Step 1 repeated for the Other 
combination A102/A301) 
Combinations Day Time-Related Parameters sO&D 
A102–A301 Monday 
tconn  = 100 minutes, 
tflight  = 120 minutes 
ttotal  = 220 minutes 
20 seats 
A102–A301 Saturday 
tconn  = 120 minutes, 
tflight  = 120 minutes 
ttotal  = 240 minutes 
10 seats 
 
Repeating the same calculations for the above-mentioned A102/A301 hit, tconn is 
calculated as 106.66 minutes, where tflight is equal to 120 minutes and therefore ttotal = 226.6 
minutes for the A102–A301 hit.  In the second-step for calculating the global average time-
related parameters of the airline, weekly combinations are listed, and the computed time-related 
factors of each hit are similarly weight averaged based on the weekly available seats. Assuming 
no other viable connections exist from City1 to City2 for airline x, we obtain the following 
table: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
232 
Table 9.5: Consolidated Hits and Time-Related Parameters for Airline x from City1 to City2. 
(Step 2) 
Combination Groups Time-Related Parameters Weekly sO&D 
A101/A301 
tconn  = 55.38 minutes, 
tflight  = 117.69 minutes 
ttotal  = 173.07 minutes 
65 seats 
A102/A301 
tconn  = 106.66 minutes, 
tflight  = 120 minutes 
ttotal  = 226.6 minutes 
30 seats 
 
In order to calculate global average time-related parameters for airline x from City1 to 
City2, the same weighting methodology is applied based on the weekly seat supply for each 
combination group resulting with tconn_x_City1&City2 = 71.57 minutes, tflight_x_City1&City2 = 118.41 
minutes and tflight_x_City1&City2 = 189.98 minutes.  
 
It should be noted that for this example, total seat availability from City1 to City2 using 
the A101/A301 and A102/A301 combinations do not merely add up to 95, as flight A301 is 
the capacity constrained flight on Mondays. Therefore, subtracting the duplicate seats for 
Monday flights, the total weekly seat available for airline x from City 1 to City 2 is calculated 
as 75. However, the final capacity determination procedure is irrelevant to the calculation of 
time-related parameters. Since the capacity constrained flight A301 can be fed by both A101 
and A102, it is essential to incorporate all possible combinations time values into the 
calculation without dismissing any combination due to the bottleneck. Although both hits share 
the same capacity belonging to A301, it is sold via two distinct itineraries on Mondays. 
Therefore, in order to come up with a realistic average time-related score, each hit’s parameters 
need to be weighted by its corresponding seat count without any capacity constraints. 
 
 Thus for a given airline, it is possible to formulate the average tconn_O&D for connecting 
journeys as the weighted average of each combination's connecting time values, based on total 
seats allotted for each combination, denoted by 
∑ (tconn_x ∗ sO&D_x)
x=n
x=1
∑ sO&D_x
n
x=1
 where n is the number of 
relevant combinations meeting tconn  >= MCT and  tconn  <= MaxCT criteria. On the other hand, 
it is also possible to formulate the average tflight_O&D for connecting journeys as the weighted 
average of each combination's flight time values based on the total seats allotted for each 
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combination, denoted by 
∑ (tflight_x ∗ sO&D_x)
x=n
x=1
∑ sO&D_x
n
x=1
  where n refers to the same notion. Consequently, 
the average weekly total time for connecting journeys is simply the sum of tconn_O&D and 
tconn_O&D. 
  
 9.2.3. Calculation of MCT Surplus, Stress Time (tstress), Waste Time (twaste)  and 
Inconvenient Time (tinconvenient)  Factor 
 
 In Chapter 2, the phenomenon of MCT Surplus, Stress Time, Waste Time and 
Inconvenient Time were introduced. These terms emerged from the fact that the tconn has a 
direct influence on consumers’ perceived schedule convenience for connecting itineraries. The 
passenger survey found that passengers demand an average tbuffer of 29.2 minutes extra, on top 
of the airports' official MCT values, to deem their journey less stressful. The ideal tconn for a 
journey is therefore equal to MCT + tbuffer. Any tconn which is less than (MCT + tbuffer) is stressful 
for consumers, whereas connecting times which are higher than (MCT + tbuffer) would lead 
passengers to wasting time at a hub airport. As the survey found ideal tbuffer to be 29.2 minutes, 
barely half an hour, 30 minutes was used as the global tbuffer value in the proceeding sections. 
It is noteworthy to mention that tstress, twaste and tinconvenient do not apply to direct flights and are 
zero for non-stop itineraries.  
 
Table 9.6: tstress, twaste  and tinconvenient Values for Different tconn Cases Under tbuffer = 30 Minutes 
Assumption 
Conecting Time Case tstress twaste tinconvenient 
tconn  < MCT + 30 min Stress MCT + 30 - tconn 0 MCT + 30 - tconn 
tconn  > MCT + 30 min Waste 0 tconn - MCT - 30 tconn - MCT - 30 
tconn  = MCT + 30 min Perfect 0 0 0 
 
 Table 9.6 shows the calculation method for tstress, twaste and tinconvenient. In the ‘stress’ 
case, the connection time is greater than the MCT but less than (MCT + 30) minutes. Therefore 
the MCT surplus is (tconn - MCT), which is less than the tbuffer, deeming the journey stressful.  
tstress is the difference between tbuffer and MCT Surplus which is equal to ( 30 - (tconn - MCT) ) = 
(MCT + 30 - tconn). In the second case, the connection time is greater than (MCT + 30) minutes. 
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Therefore, a passenger has plenty of time at the hub airport where the MCT Surplus is 
calculated to be above 30 minutes. This excess waiting time would result in wasted time, which 
could be formulated as (MCT surplus - tbuffer) or (tconn - MCT - 30). Finally, if the tconn is equal 
to (MCT + 30), then there exists neither stress nor waste time at the intermediary hub airport. 
This would be a perfect case where the MCT surplus is equal to the tbuffer. In the perfect case, 
the MCT Surplus value of 30 minutes both eliminates the stress and leaves no minutes for 
wasted time. 
 
 Figure demonstrates stress and waste time curves for different MCT Surplus values. As 
shown in Figure 9.3, passengers do not experience any further stress if their MCT surplus 
exceeds the tbuffer, which is 30 minutes. The stress is highest when the MCT Surplus is equal to 
zero, meaning there exists no buffer time. On the other hand, passengers do not waste any time 
if the MCT Surplus is more than 30 minutes. In case the MCT Surplus exceeds 30 minutes, 
each additional minute would be wasted. The passenger survey also found MaxCT to be 290 
minutes. Therefore the maximum value of MCT Surplus can be equal to (290 - MCT) minutes.  
 
Figure 9.3: Stress and Waste Time Factors in minutes with respect to MCT Surplus. 
 
 
 The inconvenient time, tinconvenient, for a connecting journey is simply the sum of tstress 
and twaste. For non-perfect connecting journeys, the itinerary involves an inconvenient time 
component sourced either through a non-zero tstress or twaste value. On the other hand, the 
inconvenient time ratio, %inconvenient, of an itinerary is the share of inconvenient time within the 
total journey time. The example in Table 9.7 illustrates the calculation of tstress, twaste, tinconvenient 
and %inconvenience of Qatar Airways (QR) hits from Athens (ATH) to Bangkok (BKK) via Doha 
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(DOH) on Fridays. There are four different flight combinations on the O&D operated by the 
carrier. The official MCT of DOH airport is 45 minutes. 
 
Table 9.7: tstress and twaste Calculation for QR for from ATH to BKK on Fridays as of Summer 
2016 Schedule.  
Combination tconn Official MCT MCT Surplus tstress twaste 
QR208/QR832 150 min. 45 min. 105 min. 0 min. 75 min. 
QR210/QR830 145 min. 45 min. 100 min. 0 min. 70 min. 
QR212/QR834 85 min. 45 min. 40 min. 0 min. 10 min. 
QR212/QR836 60 min. 45 min. 15 min. 15 min. 0 min. 
 
Using the information shown in the above table onwards, the inconvenient time and 
inconvenient time ratio computations are illustrated as follows:  
 
Table 9.8: tinconvenient and %inconvenience for the Case Shown in Table 9.7. 
Combination tinconvenient ttotal %inconvenience 
QR208/QR832 75 min. 830 min. 9% 
QR210/QR830 70 min. 820 min. 8.5% 
QR212/QR834 10 min. 760 min. 1.3% 
QR212/QR836 15 min. 740 min. 2% 
 
Although among connection alternatives the QR212/QR836 combination has the shortest flight 
time, it is not the most convenient in terms of %inconvenient as passengers are exposed to more 
inconvenient time in comparison to QR212/QR834, which reports a 1.3% inconvenient time 
ratio. In order to come up with a single %inconvenient factor for connecting QR services from ATH 
to BKK on Fridays, the procedure to follow is similar to other performance indicators and time-
related parameters, which are weight-averaging the figures with respect to available seats for 
each hit.  
 
9.2.4. Calculation of Departure (qdep) and Arrival Time Quality (qarr) Parameters 
 The passenger survey uncovered that consumers report varying degrees of appreciation 
for different departure and arrival time bands throughout the day.  Respondents marked their 
appreciation level for each time interval of the day from 1 to 4, where the lower score implied 
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the lower convenience. Therefore, it is possible to use these scores numerically to quantify both 
the average departure and arrival time score. For direct flights, the relative quality score of the 
local departure time indicates the qdep while the local arrival time indicates the qarr. For 
connecting flights, the departure time of the first flight determines qdep while the arrival time of 
the final leg dictates the qarr. For example, the qdep value of a flight departing 19:00 from the 
origin is equal to 4, the best score, as this time zone was identified to be one of the most 
preferred times of day to fly. On the other hand, if the itinerary arrives at the destination at 
02:00, qarr is equal to 1, the worst score, as this time interval is one of the least preferable arrival 
times marked by the survey respondents.  
 
 If an airline offers multiple products on a route, the calculation of average qdep and qarr 
scores of the carrier is required to form a suitable base to benchmark the values with those of 
the competitors. In order to calculate the average qdep_x_O&D and qarr_x_O&D, for airline x on a 
given O&D, a two-step procedure is again followed, similar to the calculation process of the 
time-related parameters. When translating multiple flights departure and arrival time quality 
scores into one final index, the total number of available seats is used as the key of weight 
averaging. The initial step involves the calculation of each flight hits’ weekly weighted average 
qdep and qarr score in reference to each day’s seat supply. At the second step, it is required to 
take the weighted average of each flight number or combinations' weekly qdep and qarr values 
again based on the available seats offered for that particular flight number or combination. 
Therefore, the final weekly quality value of qdep_O&D and qarr_O&D for a given airline is illustrated 
as 
 
∑ (qdep_x ∗ sO&D_x)
x=n
x=1
∑ sO&D_x
n
x=1
 and 
∑ (qarr_x ∗ sO&D_x)
x=n
x=1
∑ sO&D_x
n
x=1
 
 
respectively where n refers to the total number of available flight numbers or hits on the O&D. 
It should be noted that there is no difference in the formulations of both connecting and direct 
flights. Referring to flight SV1102 shown in Figure 9.2 from Jeddah to Dammam, the 
consolidated table containing the qdep, qarr and seat count (s) is disclosed below: 
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Table 9.9: Daily departure and arrival time qualities of SV from JED to DMM. 
Day Time Quality Related Parameters Number of Seats 
Wednesday 
Departure Time : 04:55  (qdep_wed = 1) 
Arrival Time : 07:00 (qarr_wed = 2) 
232 
Friday 
Departure Time : 04:50  (qdep_fri =1) 
Arrival Time : 06:55 (qarr_fri = 2) 
298 
Sunday 
Departure Time : 02:30  (qdep_sun =1) 
Arrival Time : 04:40 (qarr_sun = 1) 
132 
 
The weekly average of qdep_SV1102 and qarr_SV1102 scores are calculated similarly – by 
weight averaging in reference to seat count formulated as  
(𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑥 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑 + 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑓𝑟𝑖 𝑥 𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖 + 𝑞𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑠𝑢𝑛 𝑥 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑛)
( 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑+ 𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑛 )
 for the weekly average qdep and 
(𝑞𝑎𝑟𝑟_𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑥 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑 + 𝑞𝑎𝑟𝑟_𝑓𝑟𝑖 𝑥 𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖 + 𝑞𝑎𝑟𝑟_𝑠𝑢𝑛 𝑥 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑛)
( 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑+ 𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑛 )
 for the weekly average qarr. Substituting the 
abbreviations shown in the formula with the actual values as shown in Table 9.9, qdep_SV1102 is 
calculated to be 1 and qarr_SV1102 = 1.8  
 
 Supposing there is another imaginary Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah to 
Dammam numbered SV_XXX departing from JED each day at 17:15 and arriving in DMM at 
19:25, operated with 250-seated aircraft daily, the carrier’s quality scores on the JED–DMM 
market, abbreviated as qdep_SV_JED-DMM and qarr_SV_JED-DMM , would change as shown in Table 
9.10. 
 
Table 9.10: Direct Services of SV from JED to DMM. 
Flight Number Time Quality Related Parameters Weekly Seats 
SV1102 
qdep_SV1102 = 1 
qarr_SV1102 = 1.8 
662 
SV_XXX 
qdep_SV1102 = 3, qarr_SV1102 = 3  
As per the survey results, 17:15 departure 
and 19:25 arrival both correspond to 3. 
250 x 7 = 1.750 
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 Based on the information shown in Table 9.10, the general departure and arrival time 
quality of all SV services from JED to DMM is calculated in reference to the weekly seat count 
for each flight number and thus the following calculations are performed: qdep_SV_JED-DMM  = 
(1𝑥662 + 3 𝑥 1750)
(662 + 1750)
 = 2.45 and qarr_SV_JED-DMM = 
(1.8𝑥662 + 3 𝑥 1750)
(662 + 1750)
 = 2.67. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the qdep score of the SV flights from JED to DMM increased from 1 to 2.45 
while the qdep raised from 1.8 to 2.67, soon after the addition of SV_XXX flight into the 
carrier’s timetable. 
 
 9.2.5. Additional Time-Related Parameters and Their Impact on Quality 
 The passenger survey and literature review uncovered other time-related parameters 
that directly influence consumer convenience. Incorporating these findings into the quality 
score determination model enhanced this research’s methodology, providing a further realistic 
quantification of an airline’s schedule attractiveness. The below sections discuss these factors 
and elaborate on whether and how they were integrated into the model. 
 
i. The number of stops: Some direct flights to a destination are operated with 
stops. Rather than planning the flight directly to the final destination, network 
planners may introduce one or more stops in between to enhance the efficiency 
and profitability of the flight, or to refuel the aircraft or due to any other 
technical and commercial reason. Undoubtedly, increasing the number of stops 
reduces passengers' schedule convenience, as longer journey time has a definite 
adverse effect on consumer convenience.  The variation in air journey time 
depends on whether the flight was non-stop or involved an intermediate stop. 
Therefore, journey time is closely correlated to the existence or non-existence 
of an intermediate stop (Air Transport Research Group, 1997). As a result, since 
time-related parameters including tflight and ttotal were employed as an integral 
aspect of the supply quality determination methodology, in order to avoid 
repetitiveness, the number of stops in the itinerary was not used as a discrete 
and separate parameter within the schedule quality determination model.  
 
ii. Flight Time Ratio: Under similar or equal ttotal figures for the two competing 
connecting itineraries, the share of flight time was argued to be a potential 
parameter influencing passenger convenience. For some travellers, especially 
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for smokers, spending more time at a hub airport could be preferred in contrast 
to flying as smoking is strictly prohibited onboard. On the other hand, some 
others may appreciate a higher flight time ratio in case they enjoy the flight and 
onboard services like the catering, in-flight entertainment or any other service 
in the aircraft. The passenger survey did not report a clear perspective on 
whether the respondents preferred waiting at the airport rather than flying. 
Therefore the flight time ratio was not used as a parameter of schedule 
convenience assessment model. 
 
iii. Connecting Journey Flight Time Split: For connecting itineraries, the location 
of the hub airport is critical in as it determines when and where the journey 
would be interrupted by the connection. The passenger survey found that 
respondents did not prefer an equal split or equivalently similar flight time 
among the legs forming the journey. The results suggested that for longer 
connecting flights, passengers prefer itineraries that are interrupted by a 
connection either at the very beginning or towards the very end of their journey. 
Therefore, the concept of qsplit was introduced to denote the additional score that 
an itinerary would gain if the journey is split with a connection either at the very 
early or very late stage of travel. To determine whether a journey is split with a 
connection at the very early of late phase, a term denoted by %q_split was also 
introduced. If one of the legs’ flight time share among the total flight time 
exceeds %q_split, then the itineraries qualify for the qsplit. Therefore, the value of 
qsplit is either zero, referring to no extra score, or a pre-determined non-zero 
positive number for those qualifying for the additional score.  By definition, 
qsplit is zero for all direct flights. Supposing %q_split to be 0.8 or 80%, if the 
duration of one of the flight legs within an itinerary is more than or equal to 
80% of the total flight time, then the itinerary qualifies for a qsplit score. Should 
the journey be split equally between legs, then the itinerary does not qualify for 
a qsplit score since none of the legs shares of total flight time exceed %q_split. 
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9.3. Products Quality Index Score (qindex) Determination 
 
 The passenger survey found that travellers are willing to pay more for direct flights than 
the connecting services. On the other hand, it was also discovered in the questionnaire that a 
consumer’s willingness to take a codeshare flight is lower compared to an online-operating 
service. Furthermore, as argued in the literature review, airlines tend to charge more for flights 
with relatively better arrival and departure times, as consumers better appreciate such flights. 
The mathematical relationship between the values of direct vs connecting, operating vs 
codeshare and time-convenient vs inconvenient combinations were calculated in Chapter 7. 
These parameters were abbreviated as udo, uco, udc, ucc re-shown in Table 9.11 below. These 
scores were used as the basis of the itinerary’s quality index score which is denoted as qindex. 
 
Table 9.11: udo, uco, udc, ucc Determination for Convenient and Inconvenient qdep and qarr 
  
Connecting Flight Direct Flight 
Operating (uco) Codeshare (ucc) Operating (udo) Codeshare (udc) 
Convenient Time 1.131 0.854 1.333 0.990 
Inconvenient Time 1.000 0.796 1.230 0.864 
 
As the above table implies, the qindex value of an O&D is determined by mapping the 
three attributes of the product. They are 1) routing type (whether direct or connecting), 2) 
operation type (whether operating or codeshare) and 3) time convenience of the itinerary. 
Although the distinction between connecting vs direct flight, as well as operating vs codeshare, 
is clear-cut, the difference between convenient and inconvenient timing is conceptual, requiring 
further justification and quantification. For this reason, departure and arrival time quality of 
the flights were used which were formed with the qdep and qarr. On the other hand, qsplit was 
discussed to be another parameter which contributes to the time quality of the connecting 
journeys. Therefore, time convenience quality can be defined as:   
 
qconvenience =  qdep +  qarr +  qsplit  
 
The qconvenience score determines the mapping of a proposed itinerary in Table 9.11 to calculate 
the qindex value. The minimum possible value of qconvenience defines the worst possible time 
convenience, whereas at the other extreme, the highest value refers to the best timing. For qdep 
and qarr, the values were defined to be betwen 1 and 4, where 1 implied the least preferred 
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option. Besides qsplit was introduced to be a non-negative factor, deeming its minimum value 
to be zero. Therefore, the minimum of qconvenience can be 2 (1 for qdep, 1 for qarr and 0 for qsplit), 
while the maximum can be 8 + qsplit (4 for qdep, 4 for qarr). By definition, qconvenience can range 
from 2 to 8 for direct flights, as the qsplit is equal to zero for non-connecting services. 
 
After identifying the routing and the type of an itinerary, the index score range is 
obtained from Table 9.11. As an example, for a direct and operating flight, the quality is an 
index value ranging from 1.230 to 1.333 depending on the time convenience factor, qconvenience. 
If the itinerary has the lowest qconvenience score of 2, the quality value of the product would be 
1.230. On the other hand, in the reverse case, if the qconvenience is reported to be the highest, 
which is 8 for a direct service, then the quality value for the product would be 1.333. For 
itineraries with qconvenience scores in between the lower and upper bound, the qindex value would 
result in a value more than 1.230 and less than 1.333.   
 
To compute the exact qindex figures of itineraries, some assumptions were needed. First, 
the non-zero value of qsplit was determined to be 1.00, as this approach would only slightly 
contribute to the time quality of the connecting itineraries in case a leg of the journey is longer 
than the %q_split. The non-zero value of qsplit was determined as 1.00 in order not to amplify the 
impact of split score on the qsplit. Since the value of qdep and qarr ranges between 1 and 4, the 
additional split score of qsplit = 1 would have a slight but reasonable contribution to the time 
convenience score which ranges between 12.5% and 50% of the connecting journeys. In this 
case, when the qdep and qarr scores are reported to be at the minimum value, the impact of a non-
zero qsplit would contribute to ½ = 50% while at the other extreme, when qdep and qarr scores are 
reported to be at the maximum value, its impact would be limited to 1/8 = 12.5% on qconvenience. 
If the qsplit was set to be a higher score than 1, it would then undermine the impact of qdep and 
qarr within qconvenience. As per the second assumption, the impact of qconvenience on qindex was 
assumed to be linear with a definite proportional scheme. For direct and operating journeys,  as 
the qindex ranges between 1.233 and 1.333 (according to Table 9.11) and the qconvenience scores 
varies between 2 and 8 for direct flights, the relational graph between these two parameters 
under linear/proportional assumption was plotted as follows: 
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Figure 9.4: qindex vs qconvenience Scores for an Operating – Direct Service. 
 
As Figure 9.4 illustrates, for each additional point of qconvenience, the quality index score 
increases by 
( 1.333−1.230)
( 8−2 )
 = 0.0171 points. In decimals, each 0.1 increase in qconvenience increases 
the qindex score by 0.00171 points for a direct and operating flight.  
 
The calculation method differs for connecting itineraries slightly. For such journeys, 
while the minimum score of qconvenience can be equal to 2.00, the maximum can go up to 9.00, 
under the assumption of qsplit being equal to either 0 or 1.  For instance, as per Table 9.11, a 
connecting-operating service’s qindex ranges from 1.000 and 1.131 depending on the value of 
the qconvenience. Under linear distribution assumption, for such a connecting-operating itinerary, 
one additional point in qconvenience would ascends the qindex by 
1.131−1
( 9 − 2 )
 = 0.0187, and by 0.00187 
in decimals as shown in the Figure below:  
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Figure 9.5: qindex vs qconvenience Scores for an Operating – Connecting Service. 
 
Therefore, the procedure to calculate the index score for an itinerary is 1) identifying the routing 
and the type of the itinerary, 2) fetching the lower and upper bounds of the index point, 
qindex_upper and qindex_lower respectively from Table 9.11 and 3) applying the formula: 
 
qindexlower +  
qconvenience −  qconveniencemin
(qconveniencemax − qconveniencemin)
∗ (qindexupper − qindexlower) 
 
Substituting the corresponding upper and lower bounds of qconvenience, the below formula is 
obtained for direct flight as follows: 
 
qindexlower +  
(qconvenience − 2)
6
∗ (qindexupper − qindexlower) 
 
For connecting services, because of the change in the maximum qconvenience score in 
case of a non-zero qsplit score the formula is introduced as follows:   
 
𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 +  
(𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 2)
7
∗ (𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 − 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) 
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9.4. Normalising the qindex Score (qindex_normalised) 
  
As discussed earlier, qindex is a function of an itinerary’s routing, type and qconvenience 
scores. However, the qindex score is not a leg-based metric assessing the standalone quality index 
of the individual segments within a journey. It rather refers to a factor that measures the quality 
value of the entire directional itinerary as a whole. This implies that for connecting journeys, 
qindex does not reflect the impact of an inconvenient time percentage within the total journey 
time. Since qindex is the quality index value of the entire itinerary and for the connecting 
journeys, there may be inconvenient time due to stress or waste time, qindex needs to be 
discounted by %inconvenient. As there is no inconvenient time for the direct flights, such 
itineraries’ qindex scores are not discounted. The factor that is obtained after the discounting is 
called as qindex_normalised and are formulated as follows:  
 
qindexnormalised
=  {
qindex               if %inconvenient = 0 or journey is direct
qindex ∗ (1 − %inconvenient)  if journey is connecting and %inconvenient > 0
  
 
If an airline offers more than one itinerary on a given O&D, the individual qindex_normalised 
scores are weighted based on the weekly seat availability for each hit which is performed 
separately for direct and connecting combinations. Therefore, qindex_normalised_i for an airline i is 
formulated as follows,  
  
∑ sj_i x qindex_normalised_j_i
n
j=1
∑ sj_i
n
j=1
 
 
where sj_i refers to available seats of hit j and qindex_normalised_j_i is the quality score of combination 
j for airline i. In the below example, airline X operates on a market with both direct and 
connecting services whereas Airline Y, only offers connecting services in two distinct 
combinations. Table 9.12 shows the seat count and the qindex_normalised scores for each hits.   
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Table 9.12: Combination, Service Type, Weekly Seats and Normalised Quality Scores for 
Airline X and Y. 
 
Combination Service Type Weekly Seats (s) qindex_normalised 
X1 Direct 100 1.10 
X2 Direct 200 1.15 
X3/X4 Connect 50 0.90 
X5/X6 Connect 30 0.75 
Y1/Y2 Connect 20 1.00 
Y3/Y4 Connect 40 0.80 
 
As explained, an airline’s weekly weighted average qindex_normalised score is prepared 
separately for direct and connecting services. The value of weekly qindex_normalised_direct_airlineX for 
the direct services of Airline X is equal to 
(1.10 𝑥 100 + 1.15 𝑥 200)
(100+200)
 = 1.133, whereas it is equal to 
(0.90 𝑥 50+0.75 𝑥30)
(50+30)
 = 0.844 for the connecting services. The weekly qindex_normalised_connect_airlineY 
value for airline Y’s connecting services is 
(1.00 𝑥 20 + 0.8 𝑥 40)
(20+40)
 = 0.866. Table 9.13 below 
summarises the airlines weekly normalised quality index scores as follows:  
 
Table 9.13: Weekly Average Normalised Quality Indexes for Airline X and Y. 
Airline Service Type Weekly qindex_normalised 
X Direct 1.133 
X Connect 0.844 
Y Connect 0.866 
 
 
9.5. The Impact of ttotal on qindex_normalised  and the Adjustment Based on ttotal 
In the previous section, the methodology to assess each airline’s normalised quality 
score, the qindex_normalised, was covered. Although qindex_normalised is a parameter measuring an 
itinerary’s schedule related quality, it does not take the relative performance in total journey 
time into account. ttotal is a definite factor of choice for the travellers, as tghey do not appreciate 
longer journey times. Therefore, the relative advantage or disadvantage of the itinerary’s ttotal 
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was needed to be incorporated into the final schedule convenience score calculation, which is 
performed by adjusting the qindex_normalised. The adjusted normalised quality index score is 
abbreviated as qa_index_normalised and it refers to the final schedule quality (convenience) score, 
which was targeted to be the Objective 2 of this research. 
 
In order to incorporate ttotal into the final quality score calculation, each carrier i’s 
weekly average journey time ttotal_i is calculated and benchmarked as the first step. If an airline 
offers more than one combination, total journey times of each combination are weighted in 
reference to the corresponding seat supply. As the second step, normalised quality indexes 
(qindex_normalised) are discounted in reference to the shortest available product per service type to 
find the qa_index_normalised. The weekly average qa_index_normalised scores are calculated separately 
for direct and connecting services.  The procedure is shown in Table 9.14.   
 
Table 9.14: Inputs for Calculating Weekly qa_index_normalised, for Airline X and Y.  
Combination Service Type Weekly Seats (s) Total Journey Time (ttotal) 
X1 Direct 100 60 minutes 
X2 Direct 200 60 minutes 
X3/X4 Connect 50 120 minutes 
X5/X6 Connect 30 150 minutes 
Y1/Y2 Connect 20 120 minutes 
Y3/Y4 Connect 40 175 minutes 
   
 
The average weekly value of total travel time for the direct services of Airline X, the 
ttotal_direct_airlineX, is equal to 
(60 𝑥 100 + 60 𝑥 200)
(100+200)
 = 60 minutes, where the same carrier’s average 
weekly total travel time for the connecting products, ttotal_connect_airlineX,  is 
(120 𝑥 50+150 𝑥30)
(50+30)
 = 
131.25 minutes. On the other hand, the ttotal_connect_airlineY value for airline Y’s connecting 
services is 
(120 𝑥 20 + 175 𝑥 40)
(20+40)
 = 156.66 minutes. The final table summarising each airline’s 
weighted weekly average journey times and the qindex_normalised scores are as follows:  
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Table 9.15: The Consolidated Table Showing Service Type, qindex_normalised and ttotal for Airline 
X and Y.  
Airline Service Type qindex_normalised ttotal_i (minutes) 
X Direct 1.13 60 
X Connect 0.84 131.25 
Y Connect 0.86 156.66 
 
For each service type, the best-performing airline gets qa_index_normalised equal to 
qindex_normalised , where the remainings qindex_normalised are discounted in reference to ttotal_i. 
Indexing the shortest ttotal_i to 1.00, the above table is transformed as follows: 
 
Table 9.16: Transformation of Table 9.15 by Indexing the Shortest ttotal to 1  
Airline Service Type qindex_normalised ttotal_indexed 
X Direct 1.13 1.00 
X Connect 0.84 2.18 
Y Connect 0.86 2.61 
 
Since only one carrier, airline X, operates direct flights in the market, which reports the 
shortest ttotal, its indexed total journey time, the ttotal_direct_indexed_airlineX, is fixed at 1.00. On the 
other hand, the indexed value for connecting services is computed by dividing its ttotal_i values 
by the shortest flight time, which is 60 minutes. Therefore, the indexed total journey time for 
Airline X’s connecting services (ttotal_connect_indexed_airlineX) is 131.25/60 = 2.18, whereas for 
Airline Y, it is calculated to be (ttotal_connect_indexed_airlineY ) 156.66/60 = 2.61.  
 
These numbers imply that the minimum total journey time index for the direct services 
is 1.00 while it is 2.18 for the connecting services. Since airline X’s total travel time index is 
the minimum among direct services and there is no competing direct itinerary, its qindex_normalised 
is not discounted. Therefore, for airline X’s direct flights, qa_index_normalised is equal to 
qindex_normalised = 1.13. If there were another airline offering direct services with an average ttotal 
index of 1.01, then that airline’s qindex_normalised would be discounted by 1% to calculate its 
qa_index_normalised score. For the connecting services, airline X scores the lowest indexed journey 
time with 2.18 compared to airline Y’s score of 2.61. Therefore, for the connecting services of 
airline X qa_index_normalised is equal to qindex_normalised = 0.84. On the other hand, airline Y's 
  
 
 
248 
normalised quality score has to be discounted by (2.61 – 2.18)/2.18 = 19.7% as its indexed 
journey time is 19.7 per cent worse than the minimum indexed journey time available in the 
connect market. Thus the adjusted normalised quality score of Airline Y’s connecting services 
are qa_index_normalised = 0.86 x (1 – 19.7%) = 0.69.  
 
Table 9.17: The Final Table Showing qindex_normalised, Indexed ttotal_i and qa_index_normalised for 
Airline X and Y. 
Airline Service Type qindex_normalised ttotal_i (Indexed) qa_index_normalised 
X Direct 1.13 1.00 1.13 
X Connect 0.84 2.18 0.84 
Y Connect 0.86 2.61 0.69 
  
To sum up, an airline’s adjusted normalised quality score, qa_index_normalised, is calculated 
separately for direct and connect services. For direct itineraries, the minimal total travel time 
index among direct services is identified, and each airline’s qindex_normalised is discounted by the 
per cent deviation from that minimum. The same procedure is repeated for the connecting 
services, in which the minimal total travel time among connecting services is recognised and 
the subsequent discounting procedure is applied. Through this discounting mechanism, shorter 
ttotals are rewarded. While the deviation from the minimum ttotal increases, the adjusted 
normalised quality score decreases as the appreciation of the product descends in comparison 
to the competitors available in the market. 
 
The qa_index_normalised effectively benchmarks the quality score of the airlines’ itineraries 
competing in a market, referring to Objective 2 of this research. It also denotes the main output 
of the airline schedule quality determination model described in this Chapter. Furthermore, the 
qa_index_normalised is a focal input of the realistic market share estimation model, the REMSET, 
which is covered in the following section.  
 
9.6. The REMSET Model 
 
 Chapter 8 addressed the calculation methodology of the adjusted capacity share (%a_s) 
for direct and connecting services separately. %a_s is an indexed figure that successfully 
demonstrates relative supply strength or weakness of a carrier compared to its rivals on a given 
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O&D. In this Chapter, the quality score determination model for each carrier’s direct and 
connecting services, the qa_index_normalised, was introduced. As previously addressed, each 
capacity that is available for sale in the market has a quality value. Therefore, the 
qa_index_normalised score of a journey refers to the relative quality score of its supply, the %a_s. In 
other words, qa_index_normalised quantitatively assesses the relative schedule performance of each 
%a_s. As a result, the product of these parameters would result in the quality blended capacity 
scores of each carrier referring to the realistic market share expectation of the airline. In other 
words, the REMSET methodology covers the simple multiplication of %a_s and qa_index_normalised 
and its translation to percentages.  
 
Continuing from the previous example, the weekly adjusted seat amounts for Airline X 
and Y are given in Table 9.18. Supposing both airlines operate daily for all service types and 
thus no waste capacity discounting is applied with %s, implying %s = %a_s for all rows, the 
following table is fetched: 
 
Table 9.18: Service Type, Adjusted Weekly Seats, %a_s and qa_index_normalised of the Case 
Airline Service Type Adjusted Weekly Seats %a_s qa_index_normalised 
X Direct 300 68.2% 1.13 
X Connect 80 18.2% 0.84 
Y Connect 60 13.6% 0.69 
 
Multiplying %a_s with qa_index_normalised, the following quality blended capacity scores are 
handled. Translating these scores into percentages, the realistic market share estimation 
(denoted as ms) is finally calculated. 
 
Table 9.19: Final Realistic Market Share Estimation Calculation for the Case 
Airline Service Type %a_s x qa_index_normalised R. Market Share Estimation (ms) 
X Direct 68.2% x 1.13 = 0.771 0.771 / 1.018 = 75.7% 
X Connect 18.2% x 0.84 = 0.153 0.153 / 1.018 = 15.1% 
Y Connect 13.6% x 0.69 = 0.094 0.094 / 1.018 = 9.2% 
Total 1.018 100% 
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The above table implies that although the capacity share of Airline Y is 13.6%, its 
realistic market share, msy_conn, is estimated to be 9.2% as the product is relatively 
disadvantaged to Airline X’s products. While the direct service of Airline X holds 68.2% of 
the entire capacity supply in the market, because of its strength in the relative quality score, it 
is expected to gain a market share of msy_direct = 75.7%, and the remaining 15.1% of the shares 
are estimated to be owned by the Airline X’s connecting services. Using this information, the 
realistic market share estimation, abbreviated as ms, of an airline i’s direct flights is then 
formulated as: 
 
msi_direct =  
%a_s_i_direct x qa_index_normalised_i_direct
∑ %a_s_j x qa_index_normalised_j
k
j=1
 
 
and the ms of the same carrier for connecting flights is then formulated as: 
 
msi_conn =  
%a_s_i_connect x qa_index_normalised_i_connect
∑ %a_s_j x qa_index_normalised_j
k
j=1
 
 
Where k is the number of total airline and service type combination, and the 
denominators refer to the sum of each airline's adjusted seat share and quality score 
multiplication for all service types.  
 
Since the REMSET model calculates the realistic market share estimation of the 
competing carriers’ itineraries available in a market, the ability to calculate the ms refers to the 
Objection 3 of this research. A detailed case study demonstrating the step-by-step %a_s , 
qa_index_normalised and ms calculation is presented in Appendix D.  
  
 This Chapter has iterated through the schedule quality determination procedure of each 
capacity supply in the market and introduced the REMSET model for obtaining the realistic 
market shares. The REMSET methodology employs qa_index_normalised whose calculation 
procedure was outlined in this Chapter and the %a_s which was mentioned in the previous 
Chapter. Using these methodologies, it is now possible to calculate the research outputs for 
each of the analysed routes. The following Chapter covers the results using all these 
methodologies covered in Chapter 8 and 9. 
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Chapter 10: Results (Part I) – Calculation of the Research Outputs for 
Selected the Markets 
 
Chapter 8 has covered the methodology for calculating the consumer-centric capacity 
share while Chapter 9 introduced the schedule quality score determination and the REMSET 
models. It is possible to calculate the research outputs for the selected markets by running these 
introduced models with the schedule data of the listed carriers. As explained in Chapter 1, the 
research outputs are 1) the realistic capacity share (%a_s), 2) the schedule quality score 
(qa_index_normalised) and 3) the realistic market share estimation (ms) of the carriers competing in a 
route. The research outputs can be studied at various levels including airport to airport, country 
to country or region to region scale. For example, while it is possible to analyse the consumer-
centric capacity share, schedule quality and realistic market share estimation of all listed 
carriers that operate from Manchester to Beirut, the same analysis can be performed to have a 
broader look to these factors at the country level from United Kingdom to Lebanon or at the 
regional scale from Europe to the Middle East. Since all schedule information was uploaded 
into the research’s database and the methodologies were coded in the website software to 
enable a smooth, fast and transparent calculation process, the results were retrieved online 
directly from the website.  
 
 In this Chapter, it is intended to show the fulfilment of Objective 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the 
research using real schedule information of the listed carriers. In order to demonstrate the 
realisation of Objective 1 and 2 which refer to developing a consumer-centric capacity share 
and quantify the airline schedule quality, certain markets were identified and analysed in detail. 
The markets were identified at all levels, i.e. airport to airport, country-country and region to 
region. While selecting the O&Ds, the markets which are primarily served by the listed airlines 
within the focus regions of this research (Europe, Middle East and Africa) were selected. For 
instance, markets like New York – Sao Paolo were not included in the analyses as both cities 
are in the Americas which is not founded in the focus region of the study. In the New York – 
Sao Paolo market, American or Brazilian carriers might be competing intensively with each 
other. However, their schedule information was not uploaded into the research database as 
there exists no American or Brazilian carriers among the listed airlines. Nevertheless, there 
exists cases outside the research's focus region in order to assess non-operating performances 
of the listed carriers and benchmark their codeshare performance. It is noteworthy to state that, 
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the proposed methodologies of the research enabled the successful measurement of the research 
outputs for all carriers’ markets across the world as long as the schedule information of the 
airlines competing in that route and the MCT information of the hub airports were obtained. 
The methodologies proposed in this research allow any airline to get included in the listed 
airline set and enable their products to be benchmarked with the competitors.  
 
 As previously addressed, Objective 3 of the research aimed to determine a realistic 
market share estimation. In the cases introduced in Section 10.2, the ms figures of each rival 
carrier are assessed using the REMSET model for the selected O&Ds. Moreover, in some cases, 
the ms forecasts are benchmarked with the actual market shares whose information was 
retrieved using the MIDT data referred to in Chapter 5. The comparison of the estimated market 
shares with the actual figures enables evaluating whether the REMSET produces credible 
results. Furthermore, the credibility of the REMSET along with the consumer-centric capacity 
determination and quality assessment ensures the successful fulfilment of Objective 4 as a 
credible market share estimation tool to assist industry practitioners to assess schedule and 
network competitiveness effectively. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the schedule information of the following 36 airlines were 
uploaded into research database on www.phdsukru.com to perform the analysis and benchmark 
the relative performance: Aegean Airlines (A3), Aeroflot (SU), Air Berlin (AB), Air France 
(AB), Air Lingus (EI), Air Norwegian (DY), Alitalia (AZ), Austrian Airlines (OS), British 
Airways (BA), Brussels Airlines (SN), Easyjet (U2), El Al Airlines (LY), Egyptair (MS), 
Emirates (EK), Ethiopian Airlines (ET), Etihad (EY), Finnair (AY), Germanwings (4U), Iberia 
(IB), KLM (KL), Lufthansa (LH), Middle East Airlines (ME), Pegasus Airlines (PC), Qatar 
Airways (QR), Royal Air Maroc (AT), Royal Jordanian (RJ), Ryanair (FR), SAS Scandinavian 
(SK), Saudia Airlines (SV), South African Airways (SA), Swiss (LX), TAP Portugal (TP), 
Tuifly (X3), Tunisair (TU), Turkish Airlines (TK), Wizzair (W6). These airlines ensure a good 
mixture of regional and global carriers as well as service and low-cost airlines within the 
research's focus regions. Therefore, the following sections display the selected O&D’s 
performances among the list of 36 carriers in case they serve a product in the market.  
 
Before selecting the O&Ds and running the methodology over the schedule of the 
selected airlines, it was required to set the assumptions which were used as part of the %a_s, 
qa_index_normalised and ms calculation procedure. For the cases in Section 10.2, the parametric 
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assumptions used within the research methodologies were fixed to specific values which are 
covered in the following section. In Chapter 11, the cases presented in section 10.2 are repeated 
by revisiting the assumptions and also by changing the schedules, such as placing a new flight 
to assess its impact on performance parameters or introducing a codeshare agreement to 
measure the change in connectivity.   
 
10.1. Assumptions 
  
 The survey results have provided an indispensable input for the development of the 
research’s models. Although the survey results form the backbone of the capacity share, quality 
and the REMSET models, there exist other variables awaiting to be set to complement the 
methodologies. These variables were coded to be adaptable in the developed software allowing 
to re-run the model in case it was demanded to alter the variables and set them to a different 
value. The adaptable parameters and the assumed default figures of these parameters are 
introduced below.  
 
i. Connect Seat Factor (sconn): The connecting seat factor is estimated to 
be 20% by default. The maximum seats allotted to one connecting 
itinerary cannot be more than 20% of the physical capacity. (There 
might exist more than one connecting itinerary on a single physical 
flight.) As the REMSET model utilises a consumer centric capacity 
share parameter (%a_s), capacity assignment overloads are avoided 
across different O&D calculations. Therefore, the model does not use 
the calculated capacities in absolute numbers, but the percentile shares.  
  
ii. Codeshare Seat Factor (scode): The codeshare seat factor is assumed to 
be 30% by default. Non-operating services can get at most 30% of the 
physical capacity in the operating seats. (There might exist more than 
one codeshare agreement on a single physical flight.) 
 
iii. Maximum Detour Factor: Fixing the kilometre index of the shortest 
itinerary available in a market to the detour value of 1, any flights above 
1.75 detour factor, which is more 75% of the shortest path, are 
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eliminated from the available competing products. Although the 
maximum detour factor is not referred as a factor of the consumer-
centric capacity calculation model, it was required to make a maximum 
detour factor assumption to avoid long connections. For instance, for a 
journey from London to Paris, any connections via Hong Kong are 
infeasible. The quality score determination process referred to in the 
methodology chapter already involves time-related parameters which 
are correlated with the detour factor and thus already available in the 
schedule quality determination model. However, for the reporting 
purposes, a maximum detour factor of 1.75 is used to eliminate listing 
the remote connections.     
 
iv. Default MCT: The minimum connecting time of the airports were 
obtained from the OAG and SRS databases whose credibility was 
ensured through the mechanisms explained in Chapter 5. These 
databases cover almost all airports in the world and provide their MCT 
information. Although, some low-cost carriers may adopt their own 
(shorter) MCTs in comparison to the published MCT figures founded in 
the OAG/SRS database, the official MCT values in the OAG database 
are used without making any adjustment for specific carriers.  Besides, 
there may exist a few airports whose MCT information is lacking in the 
OAG and SRS databases. These are usually tiny airports with limited 
flights; some of them are military bases where civilian flights are 
occasionally operated. Although the probability of ensuring a 
connection at such airports is improbable, a default MCT was required 
to be set. Therefore, the minimum connecting time for the airports 
whose MCT information are not found in the OAG and SRS database is 
set to 45 minutes.  
 
v. qsplit: As discussed in Chapter 9, this parameter refers to a bonus score 
offered to connecting itineraries in case the duration of one leg is more 
than or equal to %q_split of the total flight time. Setting qsplit to 1 enables a 
slight but reasonable “quality” advantage to connecting itineraries in 
case one leg within the journey is long enough to enable extra 
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convenience for consumers, as found to be important for the consumers 
in the passenger survey.   
 
vi. %q_split: In order for one leg of the connecting itinerary to be considered 
long enough within a journey, this parameter is set to 80%. For instance, 
if the flight time of a connecting journey is 10 hours, in case one leg is 
longer than or equal to 8 hours, the itinerary would be qualified for an 
additional qsplit score, which is set to 1.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the waste capacity discount model is adopted while 
calculating the adjusted seat capacity. Besides, as founded in the survey results, tbuffer is set to 
30 minutes and the MaxCT to 290 minutes.  
 
10.2. Results for the Selected O&Ds 
 
In this section, the competition on the selected routes is analysed in detail by running 
the methodologies introduced in Chapter 8 and 9 over the uploaded schedule data of the listed 
carriers using the assumptions mentioned above. Each of the selected O&Ds have different 
characteristics. For instance, while some markets were selected from a business environment 
where limited competition exists, some other routes were selected among the markets having 
intense competition. A good mixture of domestic and international services are presented and 
analysed. Furthermore, while some markets was investigated directional results the others 
included the bidirectional analyses. The first eight cases were selected from O&D pairs at the 
airport/city level where the competition between the listed carriers is analysed. The following 
five cases were determined at the country to country level in which all airport to airport O&D 
pairs of the selected countries were extracted and included into the analyses. Finally, the final 
case was determined at the regional level, where all O&D pairs at the city level of each country 
in the selected regions were included into the examination to benchmark the competing 
performance of the listed carriers.  
 
Throughout the results Chapter, the directional markets are symbolised with a dash ("-
") sign. For instance, a directional market from London to Paris is symbolised as London-Paris. 
As the reverse direction indicates a different market, Paris-London is not an identical route to 
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the London-Paris market. The bidirectional markets, which refers to both directions are 
illustrated with a slash ("/"). In this case, the whole market between London to Paris and Paris 
to London are shown as London/Paris which is no different from Paris/London. On the other 
hand, in the reporting of the proceeding cases, in case the calculated figures results with a 
decimal, it is rounded to nearest integer for frequency (f) and seat supply (s). The percentages 
are displayed with 0.00 (one over hundred) sensitivity while the quality scores are reported in 
0.0000 (one over ten-thousands). The selected O&D pairs are summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 10.1: Selected O&Ds for Analysis 
Case # O&D Region Explanation 
Case 1 GVA–ZRH Intra - Europe Short-Haul Directional Domestic Route 
Case 2 DUB/SOF Intra - Europe Short-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 3 HAM/BEY Europe / M. East Short-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 4 SKG/TBS Europe / CIS Short-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 5 JED/AMM Intra – M. East Short-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 6 MAN/DOH Europe / M. East Mid-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 7 LGW/BKK Europe / Far East Long-Haul Bidirectional International Route 
Case 8 LAS/MIA N. America Mid-Haul Bidirectional Domestic Route 
Case 9 Portugal / 
Serbia 
Intra - Europe Country to Country Bidirectional Route 
Case 10 UK / Israel Europe / M. East Country to Country Bidirectional Route 
Case 11 Italy / Italy Intra - Europe Entire Italian Domestic Route 
Case 12 Turkey / 
Turkey 
Intra – Europe Entire Turkish Domestic Route 
Case 13 
Canada / India 
Vs. 
Canada / 
Pakistan 
North America / 
Asia 
Country to Country Long Haul Bidirectional 
Route Comparison 
Case 14 
South 
America / 
Middle East 
South America / 
Middle East 
Entire Regional Market from/to S. America 
and the Middle East 
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10.2.1. Case 1: GVA-ZRH 
 
The first case analyses a domestic directional route at the airport level. In this example, 
the flights from Geneva Cointrin Airport (GVA) to Zurich Kloten airport (ZRH) are assessed, 
not the other way around. Both cities are located in Europe, which is in the research’s focus 
area. The objective to study this case is to comprehend the difference between the physical 
capacity and the capacity available for sale. As of 2016 schedule data, the only operating direct 
flight from GVA to ZRH was operated by Swiss (LX) under the following flight numbers. (No 
additional carriers other than the listed 36 airlines provide a direct service from GVA to ZRH) 
The table summarises routing, total weekly frequency (f), seat supply (s) per week as well as 
the average total journey time for each flight number. 
Table 10.2: Direct Flights of LX from GVA to ZRH 
Flight Number Routing Frequency Seat per Week ttotal 
LX 2801 Direct 7 679 00:45 
LX 2805 Direct 7 1,299 00:55 
LX 2807 Direct 7 2,380 00:55 
LX 2809 Direct 7 1,177 00:55 
LX 2811 Direct 7 1,050 00:50 
LX 2813 Direct 7 679 00:55 
LX 2815 Direct 7 1,050 00:55 
LX 2817 Direct 7 679 00:50 
LX 2819 Direct 7 966 00:50 
Total 63 9,959  
  
The table implies that there existed 9,959 direct operating weekly seats from GVA to 
ZRH in total. However, some airlines have performed codeshare agreements with LX on some 
of the direct flights. For this reason, the partner airlines were enabled to sell domestic tickets 
from GVA to ZRH via the codeshare agreements and therefore could expect a market share. 
Marketing airlines and their direct non-operating seat supply per week are displayed in the table 
below. As discussed in Chapter 8, seat supply of codeshare flights is calculated by multiplying 
codeshare seat factor, the sconn, with the total seats of the operating carrier.  
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Table 10.3: Non-operating Direct Flights from GVA to ZRH. 
Airline Routing & Type Frequency Seat per Week ttotal 
AB Direct – Non-Op 14 214 00:50 
EY Direct – Non-Op 14 214 00:50 
LH Direct – Non-Op 62 2,991 00:53 
SA Direct – Non-Op 7 290 00:45 
SK Direct – Non-Op 7 204 00:55 
Total 104 3,913  
 
Table 10.3 shows that a total of 3,913 non-operating seats in 104 distinct frequencies 
were available for sale in the inventories of 5 distinct airlines as of 2016 schedules. 3,913 
codeshare seats out of 9,595 physical supply refer to 39.3% which is higher than the scode value 
of 30%. This is not an unexpected situation since more than one airline may have engaged into 
a contractual relationship with the LX which can also be verified by checking the operating vs 
non-operating frequency counts. As deduced from Table 10.2 and 10.3 the non-operating 
frequencies are higher than the physical operating frequencies in the GVA–ZRH market: 63 
operating vs 104 non-operating. It is implied from these figures that, LX has signed off 
codeshare contracts with 104/63 = 1.65 airlines on average for each direct frequency. Since 
Lufthansa (LH) has 62 non-operating frequencies from GVA to ZRH, which is only 1 less than 
the entire physical frequencies, it can be argued that LH has signed codeshare agreements for 
almost all direct frequencies of LX. Air Berlin (AB), Etihad (EY), South African Airways (SA) 
and Scandinavian (SK) also signed off codeshares for some of the LX’s direct flights from 
GVA to ZRH.  
 
 As of 2016 schedules, there also existed connecting services from GVA to ZRH. LX 
offerws connecting itineraries via LUG, Lugano. Since, the connections remained within the 
assumptions of the methodology to attain a successful hit, (i.e. tconn >= MCT (of LUG airport) 
and tconn <= MaxCT (290 minutes)), a market share could also be expected for the connecting 
itineraries too. The following table summarises, operating and codeshare connecting 
frequencies, available seats and average total time for the GVA–ZRH route. 
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Table 10.4: Connecting Operating and Codeshare Services from GVA to ZRH. 
Airline Routing & Type Frequency (f) Seat per Week (s) ttotal 
LX Connect – Op 14 213 255 minutes 
TP Connect – Non-Op 4 18 145 minutes 
Total 18 231 246.4 minutes 
 
Table 10.4 shows that LX offered operating connecting services from GVA to ZRH 
while TP offered only codeshare seats. While direct services of LX managed to transport 
passengers from GVA to ZRH approximately in 50 minutes, the ttotal of LX’s connecting 
journey time was reported to be 255 minutes. It is also observed in the table that TP’s 
connecting products were shorter in time in comparison to LX. On the other hand, the number 
of available connecting seats were fewer compared to direct services. The following table 
demonstrates the consolidated view of routing (i.e. direct or connecting), total weekly 
frequency (f), frequency share, (%f ), seat supply (s), seat share (%s) of all services in the GVA–
ZRH market as of summer 2016 schedule. 
Table 10.5: Consolidated Capacity Parameters for Carriers Serving From GVA to ZRH 
Airline Type f %f s %s 
AB Direct 14 7.57% 214 1.52% 
EY Direct 14 7.57% 214 1.52% 
LH Direct 62 33.51% 2991 21.21% 
LX Direct 63 34.05% 9959 70.62% 
SA Direct 7 3.78% 290 2.05% 
SK Direct 7 3.78% 204 1.44% 
LX Connect 14 7.57% 213 1.51% 
TP Connect 4 2.16% 18 0.13% 
Total 185 100% 14,103 100% 
 
Table 10.5 implies that the physical capacity offered by LX refered to the 34.05% of 
the total frequencies and 70.62% of the entire seats available for sale in the market. 
Furthermore, connecting seats added up to less than 2% of the whole seat availability. It is 
easily inferred from the table that the codeshare agreements demolished LX's monopoly 
position in the market and permitted other airlines to compete in the GVA–ZRH market. LX 
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might have signed off codeshare agreements with the marketing carriers to start selling tickets 
in the other markets where it was not physically present in exchange for the GVA–ZRH market. 
(Since LH owns LX, it was not beyond the expectations for the parent airline to receive a 
market share in GVA–ZRH route through codeshare contracts.) Such agreements might also 
have been an outcome of the regulatory requirements to ensure fair competition in the relevant 
jurisdictions. The following table shows the seat share (%s) and market share estimation (ms) 
of each airline & routing as fetched from the database and research software. 
Table 10.6: Seat Share and Market Share Estimation of the GVA–ZRH Route. 
Airline Type %s Ms 
AB Direct 1.52% 1.28% 
EY Direct 1.52% 1.28% 
LH Direct 21.21% 16.86% 
LX Direct 70.62% 76.88% 
SA Direct 2.05% 1.92% 
SK Direct 1.44% 1.10% 
LX Connect 1.51% 0.59% 
TP Connect 0.13% 0.09% 
 
As per the table, direct services of LX were expected to have a market share of 76.88%, 
despite 70.62% of %s. The higher market share of LX in comparison to its seat share was 
sourced due to the better quality score of its LX’s direct flights in contrast to the rivals. (The 
following cases demonstrate how the computation of adjusted seat share and the quality scores 
shape the ms.) On the other hand, connecting services of LX was expected to gain only 0.59% 
market share where the physical seat capacity share of the service was reported to be 1.51%. 
Therefore, LX was expected to own 77.47% of the market of which 76.88% gained from the 
carriers’ direct services and the remaining 0.59% via the connecting flights. LH followed LX 
with 16.86% market share expectation. While the carrier held 21.21% of the whole seats 
available for sale, it was expected to gain less market share since the "quality" of codeshare 
flights were relatively lower and therefore not equally preferred by the consumers. The other 
carriers were all expected to report less than 2% ms.   
 
 This case shows how codeshare agreements can alter the dynamics in the market and 
can change the structure of ms in favour of the marketing airline. It also proves that airlines 
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that do not operate physical flights in a market can indeed expect a market share via codeshare 
mechanism. The following cases illustrate the impact of quality on the ms estimation and 
benchmark the calculated figures with the actual market shares to test the credibility of the 
results.   
10.2.2. Case 2: DUB/SOF 
The second case analyses the services between Dublin (DUB), Ireland and Sofia (SOF), 
Bulgaria. These cities are both located in Europe. It should be noted that this case studies a 
bidirectional market; therefore the results were calculated for each direction separately and 
later merged to form the calculations in the whole market. The calculated bi-directional market 
share estimations are also compared with the real market share values retrieved from the MIDT 
data to test the accuracy of the findings. The below table shows the routing type, total weekly 
frequency (f), frequency share, (%f ), seat supply (s), seat share (%s), adjusted capacity share 
(%a_s) from DUB to SOF (directional) for each airline serving in the route as of summer 2016 
schedule.  
Table 10.7: Consolidated capacity parameters for carriers serving from DUB to SOF 
Airline Type f %f s %s %a_s 
AF Connecting 7 13.46% 126 9.35% 9.47% 
FR Connecting 7 13.46% 265 19.63% 19.88% 
KL Connecting 9 17.31% 73 4.45% 5.52% 
LH Connecting 21 40.38% 638 47.35% 47.96% 
LX Connecting 1 1.92% 20 1.48% 0.21% 
TK Connecting 7 13.46% 226 16.75% 16.96% 
 
As the table illustrates, there existed no direct flights from DUB to SOF. All services 
were offered through connections of AF, FR, KL, LH, LX and TK. The table also shows the 
difference between the physical supply and the adjusted seat supply (%s vs %a_s) which was 
sourced due to the unavailability of daily services for certain carriers. It is observed in the table 
that, except LX, each airline offered 7 or more frequencies and all days were served with at 
least one flight. Therefore the seat share of LX needed to be discounted by using the waste 
capacity discount model. As a result, although the physical seat share (%s) of LX contributed 
to 1.48% of the entire route, the consumer-centric adjusted seat share (%a_s) was 0.21%. The 
carrier lost 6/7 of its capacity share as it offered only a single connection per week. The 
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following table shows normalised quality index (qindex_normalised), time index, adjusted normalised 
quality index (qa_index_normalised), kilometre index and market share estimation (ms) for each 
carrier’s services in the DUB–SOF market.  
Table 10.8: Selected Parameters of the Carriers in the DUB–SOF Market as of 2016 Schedule 
Data. 
Airline qindex_normalised Time Index qa_index_normalised KM Index ms 
AF 1.0586 1.447 0.7314 1.023 8.41% 
FR 0.7921 1.417 0.5592 1.000 13.50% 
KL 0.7390 1.164 0.6349 1.008 4.26% 
LH 1.0331 1.000 1.0331 1.000 60.19% 
LX 0.8172 1.293 0.6319 1.014 0.16% 
TK 0.9561 1.463 0.6536 1.385 13.47% 
 
Table 10.7 and 10.8 suggest that, although the adjusted capacity share of Lufthansa (LH) was 
47.96%, the estimated realistic market share of the carrier was 60.19% as the airline scored the 
highest adjusted quality score of 1.0331 compared to its rivals. Nevertheless, LH offered the 
shortest journey time which positively affected the carries' schedule quality score. Ryanair 
(FR), scoring least in the qa_index_normalised value with 0.5592 score was estimated to be the second 
airline in the market and gain 13.5% share of the market, despite its 19.88% adjusted seat share. 
Turkish Airlines (TK) was estimated to own 13.47% of the market, lower than its %a_s due to 
the carriers relatively poor quality score. Therefore these results suggest that qa_index_normalised 
score has a direct influence on ms.  Air France (AF), KLM (KL) and Swiss (LX) are expected 
to score relatively smaller market shares from DUB to SOF with 8.41%, 4.26% and 0.16% 
respectively.  
 
 The above analysis depicted the directional results from DUB to SOF. In order to have 
an idea concerning the bidirectional market, the same computations performed above were 
needed to be reported in the reverse direction, SOF–DUB. The following table summarises the 
routing type, %a_s,  qa_index_normalised and ms for each carrier operating from SOF to DUB.  
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Table 10.9: Selected Parameters in the SOF–DUB Market as of 2016 Schedule Information 
Airline Type %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AF Connecting 5.83% 0.5030 3.63% 
BA Connecting 19.77% 0.6147 15.05% 
KL Connecting 6.03% 0.8058 6.02% 
LH Connecting 45.93% 0.9233 52.51% 
TK Connecting 22.45% 0.8202 22.80% 
 
The table implies that there also exists no direct services from SOF to DUB. FR 
(Ryanair) cannot achieve a successful connection in the market, and therefore no market share 
was estimated for the carrier. This was because FR flight from SOF to STN (London Stansted 
Airport) arrived at STN at 23:10 and the next earliest flight from STN to DUB was at 08:15. 
Since the connecting time at the STN airport was higher than the MaxCT of 290 minutes, no 
connection was attained for FR. Similarly, LX could not achieve a successful connection in the 
SOF–DUB route and no market share forecast was allotted for the carrier. However, unlike 
DUB–SOF route, British Airways (BA) offered successful connections via LHR (London 
Heathrow Airport) in the reverse market.   
 
The table below summarises the ms values produced by the REMSET model for each 
carrier in each direction. In case no market share was expected for the carrier, zero per cent 
was reported. The last column displays the average of DUB–SOF’s and SOF–DUB’s ms 
values. The flow of demand is assumed to be equal in both directions. Since demand is 
distributed to both directions equally, bidirectional ms values can be calculated by merely 
averaging ms of each direction.  
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Table 10.10: Directional Market Share Estimations of Carriers and Bidirectional ms in the 
DUB/SOF Market using the REMSET model. 
Airline DUB–SOF ms SOF–DUB ms DUB/SOF ms 
AF 8.41% 3.63% 6.02% 
BA 0% 15.05% 7.52% 
FR 13.50% 0% 6.75% 
KL 4.26% 6.02% 5.14% 
LH 60.19% 52.51% 56.35% 
LX 0.16% 0% 0.08% 
TK 13.47% 22.80% 18.14% 
   
Table 10.10 suggests that LH was expected to have the highest market share in the 
bidirectional SOF/DUB market with 56.35%, followed by TK with 18.14%. The rest of the 
carriers were expected to report less than ten per cent market share where the third largest 
carrier was forecasted to be BA with 7.52% ms. In order to check the accuracy of these 
estimations, the calculated bidirectional ms figures were compared and contrasted with the real 
market share information of 2016 retrieved from MIDT data and with the results of the 
traditional (naïve) model that simply utilises the capacity shares of the competing carriers 
illustrated in the table below: 
 
Table 10.11: A Comparison of Calculated ms and Real ms in the Bidirectional SOF/DUB Route 
Airline Naïve model ms REMSET  ms Real ms 
LH 46.6% 56.3% 55.2% 
TK 19.6% 18.2% 26.6% 
BA 9.9% 7.5% 4.3% 
AF 7.8% 6.0% 4.2% 
KL 5.2% 5.1% 4.1% 
Others 10.9% 6.9% 5.6% 
 
According to the table, as per the MIDT figures, LH has been the largest carrier in the 
SOF/DUB market, reporting 55.2% market share. Comparing this value with the forecasted ms 
value of 56.3% of LH, it can be concluded that the model produced a credible estimation. On 
the other hand, the model also correctly identified the second and third carrier which are TK 
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and BA respectively, further crediting the research’s ms calculation methodology. However, 
while the REMSET model estimated the ms value of TK to be 18.2%, the real market share 
was 26.6%. On the other hand, while BA owned 4.3% of the market, the estimation was 7.5%. 
The difference between the calculated and actual market share values are not unexpected and 
can be justified due to various reasons. For instance, the variances between the fare structures 
of the carriers as well as their market penetration and brand perception can positively affect the 
actual market performance. Moreover, while calculating the ms in a bidirectional route, simply 
the average ms values of the carriers in each direction was taken. Since BA was not expected 
to have a market in the DUB–SOF market but reported a considerable share in the reverse 
direction, the carrier may have lost traffic especially from passengers booking roundtrip tickets. 
Moreover, an unlisted airline or airlines presenting at least one itinerary in the market may have 
existed whose ms calculations were not incorporated into the REMSET model. Therefore, 
despite the minor differences between calculated and actual market shares, the research model 
has produced a credible and accurate ms estimation in the SOF/DUB market.  
 
 In order to statistically test the efficiency of the competing naïve and REMSET models, 
a paired proportion test was implemented for naïve/real and REMSET/real market shares 
datasets using the market share values of the competing carriers shown in Table 10.11 including 
other airlines at the individual carrier level. As the values to be tested are in percentage values 
and they are dependent figures for the associated airlines, the paired proportion test was decided 
to be the appropriate method. This test would return the p value which is expected to be between 
0 and 1. “p-values” simply provide a cut-off beyond which we assert that the findings are 
statistically significant; by convention, this is p<0.05. (Davies & Crombie, 2018) Therefore, 
any value of p less than 0.05 would imply significance with the results implying that there 
exists statistical difference between the measured percentages. Any p value closer to 1 would 
imply “extremely strong insignificance”.   
 
The p value for the naïve model vs. real market shares is 0.498 whereas the p value for 
REMSET vs. real market shares is 0.733. These findings imply that the results of both the 
traditional capacity-blended traditional naïve model and the REMSET model are insignificant 
to real market share data obtained from the MIDT. The naïve model’s insignificance is not 
unexpected as the capacity is naturally the major driver of the competing carriers’ market 
shares. However, as the p value of the REMSET model is higher than the naïve model, it can 
be concluded that, the REMSET model produced a stronger insignificance due to higher p 
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value, in other words a stronger accuracy in the market share predictions in comparison to the 
naïve model.  
 
 Through this case, it was shown that research’s Objective 1, 2 and 3 were fulfilled. 
First, the distinction between available seat supply share (%a) and consumer-centric adjusted 
capacity, in other words, the adjusted seat share (%a_s) was shown (Objective 1). Second, the 
quality scores of each itinerary available in the market were calculated proving the achievement 
of Objective 2. On the other hand, the ms of each carrier was assessed in the market which 
refers to the attainment of Objective 3. The estimated ms values are similar to actual market 
shares, ensuring the credibility and accuracy of the REMSET model.  
 
 10.2.3. Case 3: HAM/BEY:  
 
 The third case examines the services between Hamburg (HAM), Germany and Beirut 
(BEY), Lebanon. Different from the previous cases which only evaluated inter European 
markets, this is an intercontinental route between Europe and the Middle East. The case intends 
to show the fulfilment of quality score determination for the competing carriers (Objective 2) 
and to demonstrate the accuracy of the REMSET model (Objective 3). The below table shows 
the routing type, adjusted capacity share (%a_s), normalised quality index (qindex_normalised), and 
realistic market share estimations (ms) in the HAM–BEY and BEY–HAM routes respectively 
for each airline competing in the market as of summer 2016 schedule.  
 
Table 10.12: Figures for Airlines in the HAM–BEY Route as of Summer 2016 Schedule 
Airline Type %a_s qa_index_normalised KM 
Detour 
ms 
A3 Connecting 0.24% 0.7158 1.068 0.30% 
AF Connecting 9.18% 0.7299 1.317 11.78% 
BA Connecting 6.96% 0.7685 1.422 9.41% 
EK Connecting 26.51% 0.6845 2.360 0.00% 
LH Connecting 22.73% 0.8994 1.092 35.94% 
PC Connecting 12.36% 0.5601 1.001 12.17% 
SU Connecting 1,70% 0.5551 1.423 1.66% 
TK Connecting 20.32% 0.8045 1.000 28.75% 
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Table 10.13: Figures for Airlines in the BEY–HAM Route as of Summer 2016 Schedule 
Airline Type %a_s qa_index_normalised 
KM 
Detour 
ms 
AF Connecting 9.10% 0.5534 1.317 7.67% 
BA Connecting 9.56% 0.6233 1.422 9.07% 
EK Connecting 16.60% 0.5615 2.360 0.00% 
LH Connecting 21.31% 0.7951 1.092 25.80% 
PC Connecting 11.59% 0.5931 1.001 10.46% 
SU Connecting 1.60% 0.5260 1.423 1.28% 
TK Connecting 30.25% 0.9932 1.000 45.73% 
 
Table 10.12 and 10.13 suggest that there existed no direct flights in the BEY/HAM 
market. Furthermore, although Emirates (EK) managed successful connections in both routes; 
it was not expected to gain any market share since its KM detour was above 1.75, implying 
that passengers were required to travel a very long distance compared to rivals which would 
avert them to prefer the airline. Lufthansa (LH) was expected to obtain the highest market share 
from HAM to BEY whilst Turkish Airlines (TK) was expected to be the market leader on the 
route back. From the schedule quality perspective, in the HAM–BEY route, LH was reported 
to have the highest qa_index_normalised indicating the best quality among competitors, while in the 
BEY–HAM route TK’s quality score was reported at the top. The below table summarises the 
bidirectional market share estimation of the carriers which is simply obtained by averaging the 
ms of each carrier in both directions.  
Table 10.14: Realistic Market Share Estimations BEY/HAM Route as of 2016 Schedules. 
Airline Type ms 
A3 Connecting 0.15% 
AF Connecting 9.72% 
BA Connecting 9.23% 
EK Connecting 0.00% 
LH Connecting 30.87% 
PC Connecting 11.32% 
SU Connecting 1.47% 
TK Connecting 37.24% 
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According to the MIDT data, in 2016, TK ranked market leader with 37.8% of the entire 
market. Comparing the ms values shown in Table 10.14 with this information, it is inferred that 
the model generated a credible and accurate estimation concerning the market leader and its 
ms. (The model estimated ms to be 37.24% while the actual share was 37.8%) As per the 
MIDT, the second largest carrier in HAM/BEY market was Pegasus Airlines (PC) with 22.6% 
share while the third carrier was reported to be LH with 15.4%. However, the REMSET model 
estimated LH to rank second with 30.87% ms and PC to rank third with 11.32%. Although 
further analyses are required to fully and scientifically comprehend the difference between the 
estimated and actual market share, it could be considered that the fare structures of LH and PC 
can justify the difference. While LH is an FSC based in Germany, PC is a LCC in Turkey. It is 
certain that PC charges less for a ticket in the BEY/HAM market in comparison to LH. 
Although additional enquiries concerning the fare impact on ms are beyond the scope of this 
study, a separate analysis could be performed for the market share estimations for 2015. Since 
the schedule information of PC suggested that, the carrier has entered into BEY/HAM market 
as of 2016, running the ms estimation for 2015 schedules in the HAM/BEY route would 
eliminate the low-cost impact of the market that would assist justifying the fare impact on the 
estimated and actual market shares. The table below reviews the forecasted and actual market 
shares of the carriers in the same market as of 2015 schedules. 
 
Table 10.15: Realistic Market Share Estimations and Actual Market Shares BEY/HAM Route 
as of 2015 Schedules. 
Airline Type Estimated ms Actual ms 
AF Connecting 10.18% 7.2% 
BA Connecting 13.28% 6.4% 
LH Connecting 24.83% 27.2% 
LX Connecting 2.32% 4.3% 
SU Connecting 1.27% 3.0% 
TK Connecting 48.13% 49.4% 
Others Connecting N/A 2.5% 
 
It is observed in the table that, PC and Aegean Airlines (A3) was not offering any 
service in the market as of June 2015. Both carriers entered the market in 2016 and PC had 
gained a substantial share within its first year. As per 2015 schedules, the model correctly 
estimated TK to be the most dominant carrier in the market with 48.13% ms. The MIDT results 
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suggested a market share of 49.4% for TK, very similar to the forecast. On the other hand, the 
REMSET proposed LH to be the second carrier with 24.8% market share while the actual figure 
was reported to be 27.2%. These findings credit the argument raised while justifying the gap 
between the PC’s calculated and actual ms values as of 2016 schedules in the sense that the 
LCCs’ fare structure can significantly affect the actual market shares. As per 2015 results, the 
estimated and actual market shares for the remaining carriers were not far from each other, 
which validates the accuracy of the REMSET model.  
 
 This case showed the precision of the research’s model in terms of accurately estimating 
the leading carriers in the market and their corresponding realistic market share values, 
fulfilling Objective 3 of the research. Being able to benchmark the quality scores at the 
directional level also proved the accomplishment of Objective 2. Additionally, the case also 
showed the impact of a newcomer LCC and its influence on the competitive dynamics in terms 
of shaping the market shares. Therefore, the model provided a useful tool for airline executives 
to assess their competitiveness given the changes in the market conditions, an instrument that 
can be considered as a partial fulfilment of Objective 4 which aimed to develop a tool for 
industry practitioners to assess schedule and network competitiveness. 
 
 10.2.4. Case 4: SKG/TBS:  
In this case, the change in the competition from Thessaloniki, Greece (SKG) to Tbilisi, 
Georgia (TBS) is investigated. Different from the previous cases, this example studies the 
competition on the route beginning from 2010. Analysing the performance between 2010 and 
2016 would enable industry experts to observe the historical market development and assist 
them to design their commercial strategies using these information, serving for the fulfilment 
of Objective 4.  
 
As of 2010, the only product of the listed carriers in the SKG–TBS market was a 
connecting operating Lufthansa (LH) service via Munich (MUC). Therefore, the ms in the route 
was 100% in favour of LH. In the reverse direction, in addition to LH, Austrian Airlines (OS) 
used to offer connecting services via Vienna (VIE). The expected share in TBS–SKG was 52% 
and 48% for LH and OS respectively.  
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In the following year, in 2011, market conditions were slightly different. LH was again 
the sole carrier offering an itinerary in the SKG–TBS route, forecasted to gain the whole market 
share whereas on the way back TK replaced OS. LH was expected to own 53.90% while TK 
was expected to gain 46.10% share in the TBS–SKG market. It should be noted that since 
SKG/TBS has been a thin market where the available capacity was limited, and therefore the 
change in the schedules of the carriers significantly changed the competitive structure of the 
market. Since OS changed its schedule from TBS to VIE in 2011, no connection was attained 
to SKG, and the airline was therefore removed from the competition.  
 
 Rivalry in the market continued to further change in 2012. Aegean Airlines (A3) placed 
a flight from Athens (ATH) to TBS with two frequencies per week and therefore attained a 
connection from SKG to TBS via ATH. Moreover, OS managed a weak connection once per 
week and therefore destructed the monopole position of LH in the SKG–TBS route. The new 
entrants offered shorter journey times and thus eliminated LH's market share estimation due to 
the detour factor. The distance of the LH’s itinerary from SKG to TBS via MUC was 84.5% 
more than the shortest path in the market which belonged to A3’s connection. As of 2012, A3’s 
ms expectation was reported to be 94.19% while OS owned the remaining 5.81% estimated 
share in the SKG–TBS route. On the reverse direction, OS could not attain a hit and therefore 
could not compete in the market. Similar to SKG–TBS route LH was out of competition again 
due to detour elimination in the TBS–SKG market. Moreover, unlike 2011, TK completely lost 
its market in the TBS–SKG route due to a schedule change. The carrier changed its Istanbul 
(IST)–SKG departure time to 13:15 which used to be 10:00 in the previous year and therefore 
the connection was not attained due to high connecting time above the MaxCT. Thus, A3 
remained the only carrier offering a product in TBS–SKG route and therefore reported to own 
100% ms expectation.  
 
 In 2013, market dynamics shifted again. A3 inserted a domestic flight (flight number 
A3 127) from SKG to ATH which managed another successful connection hit to TBS. 
Moreover, LH’s services were again eliminated from the rivalry because of its longer routing, 
deeming A3 to be the only service provider in the SKG–TBS route. On the route back, a 
different carrier came onto the stage. Alitalia (AZ) did not have a flight from TBS to Rome 
(FCO) in 2012 summer but started flights in 2013 season and therefore managed a successful 
connection in the TBS – SKG route with a market share expectation of 66.24%, and the A3 
was expected to take over the remaining shares.  
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 In 2014, market conditions changed again significantly in the SKG–TBS route. A3 lost 
its market leader position and was replaced by TK with 96.86% ms estimation. Two actions of 
the carrier enabled TK to enter the market and dominate it. First, insertion of TK1894 flight 
from SKG to IST managed a successful connection to TBS. Second, the change in the departure 
time of TK1882 (flying from SKG to IST) from 15:40 to 09:40 accomplished another 
successful hit to TBS. Due to these network changes, TK's supply in the market massively 
increased with two distinct combinations and made the airline rank top with 96.86% ms 
estimation. Although the following carrier was LH in seat capacity, the methodology did not 
again qualify a market share for the carrier as the kilometre detour of the carrier is 2.14 times 
of the shortest path available in the market, which belongs to TK. In other words, LH’s itinerary 
from SKG to TBS via Munich (MUC), is 2.14 times of the distance from SKG to TBS via IST, 
which is higher than the 1.75 cap. The remaining 3.14% market share of the SKG–TBS route 
was forecasted to be owned by A3. On the route back, TK was again estimated to be the market 
leader with 91.68% ms with a single hit linking TK387 (TBS–IST flight) with TK1881 (IST–
SKG flight).  A3 was expected to obtain the remaining shares. 
 
 The schedule changes in 2015 were detrimental in the shifting ms expectations. TK was 
completely removed from the competition as TK1882’s departure time from SKG was moved 
back to 15:40, which used to be 09:40 in 2014 and thus lost connection to TBS. Moreover, 
TK1894 was cancelled. A3's connections remained intact, and no other airlines competed in 
the market. Therefore A3 was forecasted to capture the entire market from SGK to TBS. On 
the way back, AZ came back to the market since it changed its departure time of AZ734 from 
FCO to SKG to 09:20 which used to be 12:05 previous year and thus attained a connection 
with the AZ551 flight (TBS to FCO). The carrier also increased the weekly frequency of AZ734 
from 4 to 7. These changes led AZ to expect 64.75% of the market while the remaining shares 
were forecasted to be owned by A3.  
 
 In 2016, TK came back to the stage in the SKG–TBS route. TK1894 was reintroduced 
and departed SKG at 21:25 and managed a successful connection to TBS via IST. This 
connection led TK to expect 69.86% market share in the route. The remaining shares were 
estimated to be owned by A3. On the TBS–SKG route, although KL, LH and OS offered a hit, 
the carriers did not qualify for a ms expectation due to the detour factor above 1.75, which 
routed passengers longer via their hubs Amsterdam (AMS), MUC and VIE respectively. TK 
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was again estimated to be the market leader with 67.99% ms expectation while A3 held the 
remaining shares. 
 
From 2010 to 2016, no carrier placed a direct flight in the O&D, and the carriers have 
always competed via their connecting products. The following three tables summarise the 
market share of the carriers in the market from 2010 to 2016. Table 10.16 shows the figures in 
SKG–TBS route while TBS–SKG route is displayed in Table 10.17. Table 10.18 demonstrates 
the bidirectional market shares by averaging the ms values in each direction.  
 
Table 10.16: Market Share of Carriers in SKG–TBS Route from 2010 to 2016 
  
SKG–TBS 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
A3 0.0% 0.0% 94.2% 100.0% 3.1% 100.0% 30.1% 
AZ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
KL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
LH 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
OS 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
TK 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 96.9% 0.0% 69.9% 
 
Table 10.17: Market Share of Carriers in TBS–SKG Route from 2010 to 2016 
 
TBS–SKG 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
A3 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 33.8% 8.3% 35.2% 32.0% 
AZ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 66.2% 0.0% 64.8% 0.0% 
KL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
LH 52.0% 53.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
OS 48.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
TK 0.0% 46.1% 0.0% 0.0% 91.7% 0.0% 68.0% 
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Table 10.18: Market Share of Carriers in TBS/SKG Undirectional Route from 2010 to 2016 
 
TBS–SKG (undirectional) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
A3 0.0% 0.0% 97.1% 66.9% 5.7% 67.6% 31.1% 
AZ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.1% 0.0% 32.4% 0.0% 
KL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
LH 76.0% 76.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
OS 24.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
TK 0.0% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 94.3% 0.0% 68.9% 
 
 Tables 10.16, 10.17 and 10.18 imply that the market leaders have shifted over the years. 
Changes in the networks and schedules have significantly changed the competitive position of 
the airlines serving in the market. It is easily inferred from the tables that, the dominance of 
LH which was present in 2010 and 2011 had shifted to A3 and TK from 2012 onwards, except 
2015 for TK when the carrier was not projected to receive any market share. AZ was reported 
to own a considerable market share above 30% in 2013 and 2015 only, not in the other years. 
As the demand in SKG/TBS market has been thin, it can be argued that carriers did not design 
a consistent and dedicated capacity, particularly for this market. Airlines actions at the leg basis 
to and from TBS or SKG determined their capacity in the bidirectional route. Therefore, this 
case showed how airlines could analyse the outcomes of their network and schedule related 
decisions for a specific market, accomplishing Objective 4 of the research.  
 
 10.2.5. Case 5: JED/ AMM:  
For this case, the traffic between Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (JED) and Amman, Jordan 
(AMM) is selected. The case intended to demonstrate the credibility of the REMSET model by 
covering an international route within the Middle East where there existed both direct and 
connecting services. Tables 10.19 and 10.20 show the routing type, total weekly frequency (f), 
seat supply (s), adjusted capacity share (%a_s), adjusted normalised quality index (qa_index_normalised) 
and market share estimation (ms)  from JED to AMM and from AMM to JED respectively for 
each airline serving in the route as of summer 2016 schedule. Table 10.21 shows the average 
market share expectations of the competing carriers in the bidirectional market, obtained 
simply by averaging the ms expectations of the competing carriers in each direction.   
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Table 10.19: Results of the Selected Parameters from JED to AMM as of 2016. 
Airline Routing f S %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4.958 68.77% 1.2974 71.92% 
SV Direct 12 1.749 24.26% 1.2081 23.62% 
AZ Connecting 4 30 0.24% 0.7106 0.14% 
MS Connecting 14 309 4.29% 0.7277 2.52% 
ME Connecting 7 176 2.45% 0.9143 1.80% 
Total 65 7.222 100%  100% 
 
Table 10.20: Results of the Selected Parameters from AMM to JED as of 2016. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4.958 70.57% 1.2510 72.37% 
SV Direct 10 1.485 21.11% 1.2819 22.18% 
MS Connecting 14 398 5.65% 0.6987 3.24% 
ME Connecting 7 176 2.51% 1.0180 2.09% 
SV Connecting 2 40 0.16% 0.8329 0.12% 
Total 61 7.057 100%  100% 
 
 
Table 10.21:  Market Share Expectations of Carriers in the Bidirectional JED/AMM Market as 
of 2016 
Airline ms 
RJ (direct) 72.14% 
SV (direct) 22.90% 
ME (connect) 1.95% 
MS (connect) 2.88% 
AZ (connect) 0.07% 
SV (connect) 0.06% 
 
 The tables show that Royal Jordanian (RJ) offered the most number of seats in both 
routes via its 4 direct flights per day (adding up to 28 weekly frequencies). Furthermore since 
the quality score of the RJ flights were also competitive against the rivals, the carrier was 
expected to have 72.14% market share. RJ was followed by another direct service operator, 
Saudi Airlines (SV) which is expected to obtain 22.90% share of the entire market. While SV 
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sold 12 direct flights per week in JED–AMM market, the carrier offered 10 direct services on 
the reverse direction. Unlike RJ which made its aircraft to fly in JED–AMM route without any 
interruptions, (the frequency and seat supply of RJ is identical in both directions) SV flew from 
AMM to Madinah (MED) in two frequencies (on Mondays and Wednesdays) per week rather 
than flying to JED direct and offered connecting itineraries via MED. This connecting product 
of SV was expected to get 0.06% market share only as the quality of the product was profoundly 
disturbed by the connection. 
 
Alitalia (AZ) offered non-operating connecting services in the market and was expected 
to receive a negligible share in the market while the operating connecting services of the Middle 
Eastern Airlines (ME) via Beirut (BEY) was estimated to receive 1.95% of the whole market. 
Egyptair (MS) offering service via Cairo (CAI) was estimated to catch 2.88% of the market. It 
is crucial to state that, since there existed multiple numbers of flight availabilities in the JED–
AMM market, the model estimated direct flights to own approximately 95% of the shares 
which is in line with the market expectations. It is also apparent in the tables that, the quality 
scores of the direct flights were much higher than the connecting products that significantly 
impacted the ms expectations in favour of the direct flights.  
 
For state-owned carriers like SV and RJ, operational convenience can be a more 
important factor than the marketing-related concerns. Such carriers may enjoy supply 
dominance in their home market which ultimately shapes their market share estimations. As 
inferred from the analyses, unlike the European routes, Middle Eastern markets are less open 
to competition and the routes were usually protected by the governmental regulations in favour 
of the national carriers. An analysis could be performed by checking the market share 
estimations in the same market for the past years to understand whether the competitive market 
dynamics were different in the previous years. The following table summarises the ms 
expectations of the competing carriers on the same route as of 2011 and 2006.    
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Table 10.22: ms Expectations of Carriers in the Bidirectional JED/AMM Market as of 2011 
and 2006. 
 RJ  
(direct) 
SV 
(direct) 
ME 
(connect) 
MS 
(connect) 
SV 
(connect) 
2006 ms 65.73% 27.91% 0.39% 5.97% N/A 
2011 ms 73.25% 22.17% 1.11% 3.26% 0.21% 
2016 ms 72.14% 22.90% 1.95% 2.88% 0.06% 
 
 According to the table, the market structure of the route was very similar in 2006 and 
2011 when compared with the figures of 2016. RJ has always been the strongest carrier in the 
market followed by SV with minor market share estimation changes. The connecting products' 
ms expectations were again minimal in the past years. Therefore, the figures in Table 10.22 
imply that the market structure in the JED/AMM has been protected and it did not radically 
change since 2006. Table 10.23 shows the total seat supply of the active carriers in the market. 
 
Table 10.23: Total Seat Supply of the Carriers in JED–AMM and AMM–JED as of 2006, 2011 
and 2016 
 Year 
RJ 
direct 
SV 
direct 
ME 
connect 
MS 
connect 
SV 
connect 
AZ 
connect 
Total 
JE
D
–
A
M
M
 2006 1.014 873 60 203   2.150 
2011 3.068 997 169 490   4.724 
2016 4.958 1.749 176 309  30 7.222 
A
M
M
–
JE
D
 2006 1.014 873  58   1.945 
2011 3.068 937 7 53 29  4.094 
2016 4.958 1.485 176 398 40  7.057 
 
 
The table implies that total seat supply in the market has more than tripled in both 
directions from 2006 to 2016 and the market share expectations of the airlines were kept almost 
intact as shown in Table 10.22. It is inferred from these figures that, although AMM/JED 
market has been growing, it is somehow protected and dominated by the national carriers 
forming a substantial barrier for market entry and potential competition. Therefore, through the 
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employment of the research’s models and using the historical schedule information, such useful 
market intelligence material could be gathered, proving the fulfilment of Objective 4. 
 
 10.2.6. Case 6: MAN/DOH:  
The previous case covered a market where there existed both direct and connecting 
services where direct flights were dominating almost the entire market. In this case, a market 
is selected where both direct and connecting services exist again but not wholly dominated by 
the direct flight operators. The market is identified to be between Manchester, United Kingdom 
(MAN) and Doha, Qatar (DOH) where both cities are located in the research’s focus region. 
Through this case, it was targeted to assess the accuracy of the REMSET model (Objective 3) 
from another perspective: Direct and connecting products’ market shares in total. From the 
MIDT data, it is possible to measure the actual market shares of the direct and connecting 
services separately. The sum of all direct product offering airlines market share refers to “direct 
share” whereas the sum of all connecting products market shares refers to the "connect share". 
The convergence between the estimated and actual direct and connect share would attest to the 
robustness of the REMSET model. Table 10.24 belows presents the market share estimations 
of the direct and connecting services in the bidirectional MAN/DOH route as of 2016 schedule 
information. 
 
Table 10.24: Market Share Estimations of Carriers (Table Split in Direct vs Connecting 
Services View) 
Direct services Connecting Services 
QR 76.17% 
EK 17.23% 
EY 4.26% 
TK 1.11% 
KL 1.23% 
Total Direct 76.17% Total Connect 23.83% 
 
 
The table suggests that the REMSET model estimated the direct flights (which is only 
offered by Qatar Airways (QR)) to take 76.17% share of the market while the connecting 
services were estimated to obtain 23.83%. As per the MIDT data, total demand in the 
MAN/DOH route in 2016 was 24,410 passengers. Among this demand, 17,725 passengers 
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preferred direct flights whereas 7,135 travellers chose connecting itineraries. In other words, 
while 70.77% of the consumers preferred the direct flights, the remaining 29.22% chose the 
connecting services for their itineraries.  
 
Although the market share forecasts of the REMSET model and the actual shares of the 
direct and connecting services are close to the actual figures, the slight difference requires a 
justification. It can be argued that the difference between the estimated and real market shares 
of the direct/connecting services is not beyond expectations, especially considering the fare 
effect. As the survey results have suggested, the fare was found to be the leading parameter in 
consumers’ itinerary choice. The relatively higher fare structure of the direct services could 
justify the difference in favour of the connecting flights. Being the sole direct service provider, 
QR could prioritise yields and maximise its revenue through higher fares. Checking the quality 
scores of the rivals, this could be a wise strategy as the QR's  qa_index_normalised is calculated as 
1.2965 in DOH–MAN route while the second best qa_index_normalised score is 0.9517 (belonging to 
EK). Therefore, QR’s pricing strategy can be very influential in shaping the market dynamics. 
This case has also demonstrated that the airlines’ competitive advantage in the schedule quality 
can indeed be a driver of the actual market shares. Despite the slight difference between the 
estimates and actual results, the accurate expected market share estimations presents a useful 
guidance for industry experts, referring to the fulfilment of Objective 3 and 4. 
 
10.2.7. Case 7: LGW/BKK 
In this case, while one route is chosen among the research’s focus regions, London – 
Gatwick Airport, UK (LGW), the other city is chosen out of the scope region in the Far East 
identified to be Bangkok, Thailand (BKK). The analysis of this case does not cover the whole 
competition in the city-wise London/Bangkok market, but only includes the traffic between 
Gatwick Airport and Bangkok Suvarnabhumi airport. There exist multiple airports both in 
London and Bangkok. On the other hand, it should also be reminded that the analysis to be 
retrieved from the database would not fully disclose the degree of competition in the market as 
there might exist Asian carriers operating in the route whose schedule information was not 
included into the database. The case also aimed to observe non-listed carriers’ performance by 
comparing the ms of the listed carriers with the actual performances of the non-listed Asian 
carriers whose data is obtained from MIDT. Running the analysis, as of 2016, only two carriers, 
Emirates (EK) and Turkish Airlines (TK) were identified to be serving in the route solely 
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offering connecting products. Total weekly frequency (f), seat supply (s), adjusted capacity 
share (%a_s), adjusted normalised quality index (qa_index_normalised) and market share estimation (ms) 
of the listed carriers are disclosed in the table below for both directions. 
Table 10.25: Parameters for EK and TK in the LGW/BKK Market (Both Directions) 
 Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
LGW–BKK EK Connect 21 2054 81.68% 0.6668 76.84% 
TK Connect 14 461 18.32% 0.8958 23.14% 
BKK–LGW EK Connect 21 2054 81.68% 0.8112 83.39% 
TK Connect 14 461 18.32% 0.7206 16.61% 
 
Table 10.25 shows that the frequency and seat supply of the carriers were identical in 
both directions where the qa_index_normalised scores of the carriers varied depending on the direction 
of the market due to different schedule structures. While in the LGW to BKK route, TK was 
offering a relatively “better” product, on the reverse direction EK’s product outperformed the 
TK’s. Additionally, a relatively poor quality score reduced the ms of EK to 76.84% in the 
LGW–BKK market down from 83.39%, which was the ms of the carrier in BKK–LGW route. 
This finding reaffirmed that if the carrier reports a disadvantaged quality score, its market share 
expectation is negatively affected.   
 
Other carriers whose schedule was not included into the research’s scope like Cathay 
Pacific (CX) and Ukraine International (PS) were other prominent carriers functioning in the 
market. However, as those carriers were not listed, and their schedules were not uploaded into 
the database for competitive analysis, the general market share expectations were performed 
over the current computation shown in Table 10.25 by averaging the TK’s and EK’s figures. 
Therefore, in the bidirectional LGW/BKK market, ms expectation of EK was reported to be 
80.12% while the figure was 19.88% for TK. Cross-checking this information with the actual 
MIDT numbers, it is observed that EK's market share in the route has been 85% and 8% 
belonged to TK. On the other hand, PS was reported to own 5% while other non-listed carriers 
including CX were estimated to obtain the rest of the shares. 
 
This case showed that in addition to city-based competitive analysis, through the 
devised methodology, airport specific assessments of the carriers can also be achieved and 
benchmarked. Besides, the case also reproved that quality score has a direct impact on the 
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market share expectation. Concerning the accuracy of the estimated market shares, it can be 
easily deduced that the methodology produced a credible result proposing EK to be the leading 
carrier in the market in line with the MIDT results, accomplishing Objective 3. However, it 
could also be argued that the model’s performance would be better comprehended in case the 
schedule information of all carriers offering a product in LGW/BKK market is included into 
the competition database. This is not a weakness of the REMSET model; contrarily it refered 
to the strength of the methodology in producing accurate estimates as long as the schedule 
information of all carriers competing in the market is included as an input into the 
methodology. Therefore, it could easily be argued that the model can be implemented globally 
as long as the schedule information and the MCT of the airports are included into the analysis.    
 
10.2.8. Case 8: LAS/ MIA: 
 In this case, an O&D which is not in the research's focus continents, i.e. Europe, the 
Middle East or Africa was chosen. The market was selected to be within North America and a 
domestic route between Las Vegas (LAS) – Miami (MIA) in the USA. None of the listed 
carriers were American airlines; hence no operating flight was performed in the market by 
them. Therefore, this case intended to measure the non-operating flight performance of the 
listed carriers and benchmark their performance in an American domestic market.  In other 
words, this case would allow analysing the effectiveness of the codeshare agreements that were 
signed between the operating (American) carriers and the marketing (listed) airlines by 
reporting the adjusted (non-operating) seat share figures (Objective 1) as well as their quality 
scores (Objective 2). The supply and quality scores of the non-operating services would offer 
an insight to airline executives concerning the effectiveness of their codeshare agreements, 
referring to the accomplishment of Objective 4. The table below shows the airline, routing, 
weekly frequency (f), weekly seat supply (s), adjusted seat share (%a_s), adjusted normalised 
quality index (qa_index_normalised) of competing carriers in the LAS–MIA market.  
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Table 10.26: Parameters for LAS–MIA Market as of 2016 Schedule 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised 
AY Direct 3 144 1.70% 0.8754 
BA Direct 28 1393 38.33% 0.9273 
IB Direct 14 721 19.84% 0.9060 
AF Connecting 26 246 6.77% 0.7269 
AY Connecting 5 48 0.94% 0.5783 
AZ Connecting 9 82 2.25% 0.6982 
BA Connecting 64 625 17.22% 0.7019 
EI Connecting 4 32 0.50% 0.7281 
EY Connecting 7 67 1.85% 0.7747 
KL Connecting 31 288 7.93% 0.7594 
SK Connecting 6 53 0.83% 0.6925 
TP Connecting 8 78 1.84% 0.6592 
 
 The table implies that there existed both non-operating direct and connecting services 
of the listed carriers from LAS to MIA. Three airlines offered direct itineraries which all 
together formed 59.87% of the adjusted seats in the market. British Airways (BA), was reported 
to own the most number of available (marketing) seats in the route. On the other hand, BA also 
offered connecting services contributing to 17.22% of the adjusted seats. Therefore, the 
dominance of BA in the LAS–MIA market was apparent signalling its strength in codeshare 
agreements with the American carriers against its rivals. BA’s partner Iberia (IB) was also 
active in the market as the carrier offers non-operating direct services totalling 19.84% of the 
whole adjusted seat supply. Other European carriers KLM (KL) and Air France (AF) followed 
BA and IB. Therefore, European carriers outperformed the Middle Eastern and African carriers 
in terms of seat supply in the LAS–MIA market.  
 
 As expected, the quality scores of direct services were higher in comparison to the 
connecting flights in the LAS–MIA market. Although the quality score of the BA's direct 
services seemed to be the highest among the competing carriers, the carrier’s connecting 
services were not similarly attractive from the schedule quality perspective. The best quality 
score in connecting services belonged to Etihad (EY), although the non-operating seat supply 
of the carrier was very limited, contributing only to 1.85% of the adjusted seat supply. The 
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poorest quality score in the connecting products belonged to Finnair, (AY). AY’s connecting 
products’ quality score was approximately 37% less than the best quality score, and 25.5% less 
than the best connecting services’ qa_index_normalised. AY also offered direct services along the route. 
However, its direct product's quality score reported again the lowest among direct itineraries. 
Table 10.27 shows the same parameters for the reverse direction from MIA to LAS.  
Table 10.27: Parameters in the MIA–LAS Market as of 2016 Schedule 
Airline Routing F s %a_s qa_index_normalised 
AB Direct 7 393 8.58% 0.9361 
BA Direct 28 1393 30.42% 0.9581 
IB Direct 21 1057 23.08% 0.9535 
AF Connecting 23 230 5.03% 0.7435 
AZ Connecting 14 134 2.94% 0.6779 
BA Connecting 74 743 16.24% 0.7168 
EI Connecting 1 9 0.12% 0.5432 
EY Connecting 21 221 4.83% 0.6091 
KL Connecting 35 324 7.08% 0.7243 
RJ Connecting 4 38 0.48% 0.5331 
SK Connecting 9 82 0.77% 0.5924 
TP Connecting 4 37 0.46% 0.6131 
 
Table 10.27 shows that similarly, three direct product offering airlines were present in 
the MIA–LAS market. BA was again the dominant carrier in the route owning 30.42% of the 
adjusted seats via direct services and 16.24% via connecting flights, adding up to 46.66% of 
the entire adjusted seats in the market. IB again followed BA holding 23.08% of the adjusted 
seats through direct services. Unlike LAS–MIA route, AY offers neither direct nor connecting 
services in the MIA–LAS market. Instead, Air Berlin (AB) offered direct products that 
contribute to 8.58% of the %a_s. The dominance of European carriers was still apparent in the 
MIA–LAS market where the non-European carriers’ adjusted seat share was less than one per 
cent. EK, which offered the best quality score in connecting products in the LAS–MIA route, 
did not offer any service in the reverse direction.  
 
BA’s direct products were ranked top quality in the MIA–LAS route while the IB’s 
direct services’ score was not far from the BA’s. AB’s quality score is only 2.3% less than the 
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best qa_index_normalised. Among connecting products, Air France (AF) rated the best in schedule 
quality, followed by KL and BA. The worst qa_index_normalised belonged to Royal Jordanian’s (RJ) 
connecting non-operating services, the sole non-European carrier serving in the route. 
 
Reviewing the results of this case, the impact of the alliances can also be easily 
observed. Since Oneworld is the dominant alliance in the USA, Oneworld member carriers like 
BA and IB have an advantage in code-sharing with the operating airlines in the region. 
Furthermore, ms, %a_s and qa_index_normalised scores in each direction presented an insight 
concerning the effectiveness and performance of the codeshare agreements signed between the 
listed marketing carriers and non-listed American operating carriers, referring to the 
accomplishment of Objective 4. Moreover, being able to assess the adjusted seats and quality 
scores for the codeshare itineraries serves as a fulfilment of Objective 1 and 2. 
10.2.9. Case 9: Portugal/Serbia:  
In this case, an O&D at the country-to-country level is selected for examination which 
would analyse the entire traffic between two selected countries including the traffic among all 
their airports. The intention of this case was to demonstrate the strength of the research's model 
in terms of assessing supply, quality and ms estimation at a broader level, on the scale of 
countries.  The countries were selected within Europe, between Portugal and Serbia. While 
estimating the carriers’ ms values, all possible flights in the market were identified and included 
in the computation. The following table summarises the entire number hits from Portugal to 
Serbia as of 2016 schedule data shown at the O&D, flight type and routing detail.  
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Table 10.28 Flights from Portugal to Serbia as of 2016 Data 
  
Origin & Destination Non-Op Op Total 
D
ir
ec
t 
No direct flights present from Portugal to Serbia. 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
n
g
 F
li
g
h
ts
 
From: Faro 3 3 6 
To: Belgrade 2 3 5 
To: Pristina 1 
 
1 
From: Lisbon 24 8 32 
To: Belgrade 17 5 22 
To: Pristina 7 3 10 
From: Madeira 2 
 
2 
To: Belgrade 1 
 
1 
To: Pristina 1 
 
1 
From: Porto 4 4 8 
To: Belgrade 3 2 5 
To: Pristina 1 2 3 
Total 33 15 48 
 
The table suggests that there existed 48 different flight combinations from Portugal to 
Serbia and all of these services were connecting itineraries. The number of weekly frequencies 
in the route did not necessarily equate to 48 as each combination can be offered more than once 
per week. For example, a connecting flight which was operated daily is seen as a single hit in 
the table above, but that flight’s weekly frequency would add up to seven. On the other hand, 
among 48 combinations, 15 of them were operating services while the remaining majority was 
non-operating. The table also shows that 4 different cities of Portugal were mapped to 2 cities 
in Serbia through these flights. (Author’s note: As per the reporting, Pristina is shown as a city 
of Serbia, although Kosovo is recognised as a sovereign state by many countries.) While 102 
combinations originated from Lisbon, 43 of them started from Porto. The other origination 
cities were Faro and Madeira. The following table reports the same parameters in the reverse 
route: Serbia–Portugal. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
285 
Table 10.29: Flights from Serbia to Portugal as of 2016 Data 
  
Origin & Destination Non-Op Op Total 
D
ir
ec
t 
No direct flights present from Portugal to Serbia. 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
n
g
 F
li
g
h
ts
 
From: Belgrade 23 10 33 
To: Faro 3 2 5 
To: Lisbon 17 4 21 
To: Madeira 1 1 2 
To: Ponta Delgada 1 
 
1 
To: Porto 1 3 4 
From: Pristina 15 3 18 
To: Faro 4 
 
4 
To: Lisbon 9 
 
9 
To: Porto 2 3 5 
Total 38 13 51 
 
The table suggests that there existed 51 combinations from Serbia to Portugal, 3 more 
than the reverse direction. This might have occured for various reasons. For instance, the 
number of available codeshare agreements might not be equal in both directions. Furthermore, 
some connections which were available from Serbia to Portugal might not be attained in the 
reverse direction due to several reasons such as connection time-related factors or the routing 
of the flights. 2 cities of Serbia were mapped to 5 destinations of Portugal in total. The majority 
of the combinations existed on the Belgrade-Lisbon route.  Ponta Delgada which did not offer 
an outbound flight product to any Serbian city is served via codeshare flights from Belgrade. 
The following table summarises the routing, total weekly frequency (f), seat supply (s), seat 
share (%s), adjusted capacity share (%a_s), adjusted normalised quality index (qa_index_normalised) and 
market share estimation (ms)  from Portugal to Serbia as of 2016 schedule data.  
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Table 10.30: Parameters from Portugal to Serbia as of 2016 Schedule Data 
Airline Routing f s %s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AB Connecting 2 15 1.05% 0.36% 0.5606 0.30% 
AZ Connecting 11 97 6.63% 4.55% 0.6380 4.35% 
DY Connecting 1 37 2.53% 0.43% 0.7557 0.00% 
EY Connecting 25 196 13.31% 15.97% 0.6144 14.73% 
IB Connecting 1 10 0.69% 0.12% 0.7591 0.13% 
KL Connecting 11 84 5.75% 6.90% 0.7497 7.76% 
LH Connecting 27 621 42.29% 50.73% 0.7156 54.48% 
LX Connecting 4 43 2.94% 1.51% 0.5359 1.22% 
OS Connecting 6 58 3.97% 3.97% 0.5760 3.53% 
SK Connecting 16 141 9.57% 9.57% 0.4876 8.40% 
U2 Connecting 5 166 11.27% 11.27% 0.8782 5.09% 
Total 109 1,468 100% 100% -- 100% 
 
As per the table above, total weekly frequency from Portugal to Serbia was 109 while 
the total seat count was 1,468. It is also observed that there existed a notable difference between 
the airlines’ %s and %a_s values as many of the O&D based frequencies were not operated daily. 
While Lufthansa (LH) was reported to provide the highest share of seat supply in the market 
with 42.29%, its adjusted seat share increased to 50.73% as the supply for the other carriers’ 
unserved days of the week would be transferred to LH via the waste capacity discount model. 
Regarding qa_index_normalised scores, Easyjet (U2) was observed to have the best quality service 
among all competing carriers, followed by Iberia (IB).  
 
Although Norwegian Airlines (DY) offered one frequency and 37 seats in the route, it 
was not estimated to have a market share because of the high detour factor of the carrier above 
1.75. The kilometre index of DY was calculated to be 1.895 in the route. Excluding DY, ten 
carriers competed in the market where the highest market share was estimated to be owned by 
Lufthansa (LH), followed by Etihad (EY). Although Etihad is a Middle Eastern carrier based 
in the United Arab Emirates, its products were included in the market share as the carriers 
offers solely non-operating products in the market using several European cities like London 
Heathrow (LHR), Amsterdam (AMS), Rome Fiumicino (FCO) and Barcelona (BCN) as the 
hub point. Scandinavian Airlines (SK), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) and U2 follow those 
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carriers with 8.40%, 7.76%, 5.09% ms expectations respectively. The remaining carriers 
reported ms estimations below 5%. The proceeding table summarises the same parameters in 
the reverse direction, from Serbia to Portugal. 
Table 10.31: Parameters for the Serbia-Portugal Route as of 2016 Schedule Data 
Airline Routing f s %s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AB Connecting 3 23 1.26% 0.39% 0.5271 0.32% 
AF Connecting 7 65 3.57% 3.90% 0.5318 3.23% 
AZ Connecting 10 78 4.26% 2.66% 0.6595 2.73% 
EY Connecting 16 134 7.36% 8.05% 0.4401 5.51% 
KL Connecting 7 54 2.95% 3.22% 0.4615 2.32% 
LH Connecting 38 739 40.55% 44.33% 0.6784 46.80% 
LX Connecting 20 300 16.45% 17.99% 0.7590 21.25% 
OS Connecting 2 34 1.85% 0.29% 0.8193 0.37% 
SK Connecting 28 262 14.37% 15.71% 0.5291 12.94% 
U2 Connecting 4 134 7.37% 3.45% 0.8419 4.53% 
Total 135 1,823 100% 100% -- 100% 
 
As per the table above, total weekly frequency from Portugal to Serbia was 135 while 
the total seat count added up to 1,823. These figures were higher than the number of frequency 
and seat supply compared to the reverse direction. For instance, while LH offered 739 seats in 
38 frequencies from Serbia to Portugal, it only offered 621 seats in 27 frequencies in the other 
direction. The additional capacity of LH in Serbia–Portugal was reported to have longer ttotal 
with higher tconn which were still in the MCT and MaxCT boundary. However, longer ttotal 
figures reduced the qa_index_normalised score of the carrier. While the qa_index_normalised score of LH was 
0.7156 from Portugal to Serbia, on the route back, it was 0.6784. It is also observed in Table 
10.31 that, similar to the scheme in Portugal–Serbia, there was a notable difference between 
%s and %a_s as many of the O&D based frequencies were not operated daily from Serbia to 
Portugal. LH ranked top both with the number of both physical and adjusted seats followed by 
Swiss (LX) 300 seats available per week (the carrier only offered 43 on the reverse direction). 
Moreover, LX’s quality score was significantly better in the Serbia–Portugal market in 
comparison to the other direction. The best quality score among listed carriers was owned again 
by U2 in the Serbia–Portugal market. In terms of the ms forecasts, LH was expected to lead 
the market with 46.80% ms, while LX was estimated to score 21.25% ms. SK ranked third with 
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12.94%. Taking the average of the ms values in each direction, the final market share estimation 
of all carriers competing in the market are summarised in the table below.  
Table 10.32: Market Share of All Competing Carriers Operating in Portugal/Serbia Route 
(Bidirectional) 
Airline ms 
AB 0.31% 
AF 1.62% 
AZ 3.54% 
DY 0.00% 
EY 10.12% 
IB 0.07% 
KL 5.04% 
LH 50.64% 
LX 11.23% 
OS 1.95% 
SK 10.67% 
U2 4.81% 
 
As covered in the table, LH was expected to have more than half of the market where 
the following carrier was estimated to be LX with 11.23% ms. As the LH group owns LX, LH 
affiliates had significant market dominance in the Portugal/Serbia market. The third largest 
carrier concerning market share estimation was reported to be SK, while the EY, Air Serbia’s 
partner, was expected to rank fourth. It is interesting to observe that, TAP Portugal (TP) which 
is a listed carrier of the research and the home carrier of Portugal was not expected to catch a 
market share as the carrier lacked service to Serbia.  
 
This case showed that the research's models could be applied not only at the city/airport 
level but also in the country to country markets. Analysing the results, it is possible for airline 
planners to develop an understanding concerning their competitive advantages or 
disadvantages of their product in terms of supply, quality and market share estimations at the 
country to country scale affirming the fulfilment of Objective 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the research at a 
broader level.  
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10.2.10. Case 10: The United Kingdom / Israel:  
Case 10 analyses an intercontinental route within research’s focus regions at the 
country-to-country level. The traffic between all airports of the UK and Israel is analysed in 
this case. In this intercontinental route, there existed a higher level of competition in 
comparison to the previous case. As of 2016 schedule data, from the UK to Israel, there existed 
10 distinct direct flight options offering 48 frequencies per week and 209 connecting hits 
totalling to 272 connecting frequencies. On the reverse direction, the number of direct flight 
options and frequencies were identical, 10 and 48 respectively while the number of connecting 
hits were 195 totalling to 294 frequencies. Total weekly seats from the UK to Israel was 18,520 
of which 10,344 were offered through direct flights, and the remaining 8,176 were via 
connecting products. On the reverse direction, more seats (19,594 in total) were available in 
total. Although the amount of direct seats was identical in each direction, the connecting seat 
count was slightly higher adding up to 9,250 in Israel–UK market. Parameters of the competing 
carriers at the directional breakdown were displayed in the table below. 
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Table 10.33: ms Expectations at the Routing and Market Breakdown in the UK/Israel Market 
    f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
U
K
–
Is
ra
el
 
Direct Flights 48 10.344 53.49% 
 
64.84% 
   BA 14 3.507 21.33% 1.2876 26.17% 
   LY 18 4.005 17.40% 1.2754 21.14% 
   U2 16 2.832 14.76% 1.2463 17.53% 
Connecting Flights 272 8.176 46.51% 
 
34.17% 
   TK 49 1.632 9.93% 0.7742 7.32% 
   LH 29 1.111 6.76% 0.8695 5.60% 
   PC 20 751 4.57% 0.7923 3.45% 
   LX 26 6.27 3.81% 0.9186 3.34% 
   OS 14 521 3.17% 0.7114 2.15% 
   Other 12 carriers 134 3.534 18.27% 
 
12.31% 
Is
ra
el
–
U
K
 
Direct Flights 48 10.344 50.06% 
 
62.28% 
   BA 14 3.507 19.96% 1.2909 25.17% 
   LY 18 4.005 16.28% 1.2650 20.12% 
   U2 16 2.832 13.82% 1.2588 16.99% 
Connecting Flights 294 9.250 49.94% 
 
37.72% 
   TK 49 1.641 9.34% 0.7357 6.71% 
   LH 29 1.084 6.17% 0.7487 4.52% 
   PC 19 711 4.05% 0.7386 2.92% 
   OS 14 521 2.96% 0.9977 2.89% 
   BA 14 562 3.20% 0.7641 2.39% 
   Other 13 carriers 169 4.731 24.22% 
 
18.29% 
 
As per the table, three airlines operated a direct flight in both directions: British Airways 
(BA), El-Al Israel Airlines (LY) and Easyjet (U2). The weekly frequency and seat count of 
those direct service providers were identical in both routes. Although the adjusted seat share of 
direct flights accounted to 53.49% from the UK to Israel and 50.06% in the other direction, the 
market share expectations for the direct services were summed to 65.83% and 62.28% 
respectively. In other words, since passengers favoured direct flights over connecting products, 
direct services were estimated to have a market share higher than their adjusted seat shares. 
However, not all destinations of the selected countries were connected via direct services. 
Connecting services served more than one-third of the market in each direction. While BA’s 
direct services were expected to hold more than a quarter of the market, its connecting products 
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were estimated to gain a market share too. LY’s direct services were expected to rank second 
with slightly more than 20% ms expectation in both routes. The third carrier was reported to 
be an LCC; U2 was expected to catch approximately 17% of the market. The average seat per 
frequency (sf) was highest in the BA itineraries averaging to 250.5 per flight (3.507 seats 
divided to 14 frequencies), followed by LY with 222.5 seats per flight and U2 ranked third 
with 177. This implies that the BA was utilising larger aircraft having more seats in comparison 
to LY and U2. In addition to its supply with the capacity, BA’s direct flights were calculated 
to be the “best” in terms of schedule quality score which placed the carrier in the leading 
position in both directions.   
 
 Among connecting products, in each direction Turkish Airlines (TK) was estimated to 
rank top in ms estimation, 7.32% from the UK to Israel and 6.71% from Israel to the UK. TK 
was followed by LH, and the third carrier was reported to be Pegasus Airlines (PC).  18 
connecting itinerary offering carriers were forecasted to compete for the UK–Israel market in 
total, and they collectively shared 34.17% ms. On the route back, 19 airlines contested to get a 
portion from the 37.72% ms of connecting market share.  
 
As previously addressed, the above analysis was obtained using 2016 schedule 
information. Running the same analysis over historical data, it was possible to observe the 
development of the outputs. The following table summarises the total frequency, seat count 
and ms expectations for direct and connecting services in both directions from 2007 to 2016.  
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Table 10.34: Yearly Development of Direct and Connecting Frequencies, Seat Count and ms 
from the UK to Israel and From Israel to the UK. 
  
Year 
Direct services Connecting Services Total 
f s ms f s ms f s 
U
K
 –
 I
sr
ae
l 
2007 28 6,260 73.60% 121 3,393 26.40% 149 9,653 
2008 28 6,906 76.65% 125 3,111 23.35% 153 10,017 
2009 32 8,006 78.68% 125 3,123 21.32% 157 11,129 
2010 37 8,539 77.02% 134 3,739 22.98% 171 12,278 
2011 33 7,988 73.09% 153 4,254 26.91% 186 12,242 
2012 33 8,543 75.77% 154 4,057 24.23% 187 12,600 
2013 48 9,590 76.21% 183 4,975 23.79% 231 14,565 
2014 52 10,339 69.83% 249 7,022 30.17% 301 17,361 
2015 49 9,745 66.94% 258 7,466 33.06% 307 17,211 
2016 48 10,344 64.84% 272 8,176 35.16% 320 18,520 
Is
ra
el
 –
 U
K
 
2007 28 6,260 72.94% 127 3,574 27.06% 155 9,834 
2008 28 6,906 73.25% 142 3,628 26.75% 170 10,534 
2009 32 8,006 75.60% 141 3,716 24.40% 173 11,722 
2010 37 8,539 76.58% 140 3,834 23.42% 177 12,373 
2011 33 7,988 75.26% 154 4,175 24.74% 187 12,163 
2012 33 8,543 75.51% 155 4,241 24.49% 188 12,784 
2013 48 9,590 73.84% 210 5,806 26.16% 258 15,396 
2014 52 10339 67.69% 263 7,764 32.31% 315 18,103 
2015 49 9,745 64.38% 274 8,002 35.62% 323 17,747 
2016 48 10,344 62.28% 294 9,250 37.72% 342 19,594 
 
 It is observed in the above table that, the total seat count in both directions almost 
doubled from 2007 to 2016. However, the per cent rise in the connecting products exceeded 
the growth in direct capacity. Although direct seats increased from 6,260 in 2007 to 10,344 in 
2016, contributing to 65.2% rise, the percentage growth in connecting seats was 141% from 
the UK to Israel (from 3,393 in 2007 to 8,176 in 2016) and 158.8% in the reverse direction. As 
the supply in the connecting itineraries has significantly increased, the market share 
expectations have shifted in favour of the connecting itineraries too. While direct services’ 
market share was estimated to be highest in 2009 in the UK – Israel market with 78.68% market 
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share, the figure dropped to 64.84% as of 2016. Similarly, the direct services’ ms expectation 
in the Israel – UK route was highest in 2010 with 76.58%. However, it dropped to 62.28% by 
2016. On the other hand, while the average seat per frequency for direct flights was 223.5 
(calculated by dividing the total seats to frequency, 6,260 divided by 28) in 2007, it dropped to 
215.5 in 2016. Using these numbers, it can be inferred that Israel/UK market expanded both in 
favour of directing and connecting services, however, the pace of growth was reported to be 
higher in connecting products. Entry of new rivals and the insertion of new spokes in the market 
affected the capacity supply in the market positively, as the new hits added up to the number 
of products offered between the two countries.  
 
Analysing the historical data, it is also possible to observe the performance of individual 
carriers from 2007 to 2016. The table below depicts the ms expectations of the national carriers, 
BA and LY, in each direction of the market for direct services. The table also displays the 
general bidirectional ms which is obtained by averaging route based market share forecasts.  
 
Table 10.35: Yearly Development of BA’s and LY’s ms Estimation for Direct Services from 
the UK to Israel & from Israel to the UK and in the Bidirectional Market. 
Year 
UK – Israel Israel – UK UK/Israel (bidirectional) 
BA LY BA LY BA LY 
2007 38.22% 35.38% 37.76% 35.18% 37.99% 35.28% 
2008 36.17% 40.48% 34.68% 38.57% 35.43% 39.53% 
2009 34.72% 43.96% 33.11% 42.49% 33.92% 43.23% 
2010 30.71% 37.61% 29.87% 37.97% 30.29% 37.79% 
2011 34.51% 25.48% 35.31% 27.00% 34.91% 26.24% 
2012 31.86% 33.85% 31.68% 33.51% 31.77% 33.68% 
2013 27.28% 34.22% 26.35% 33.17% 26.82% 33.70% 
2014 20.52% 31.08% 19.92% 29.84% 20.22% 30.46% 
2015 30.51% 23.03% 29.30% 21.94% 29.91% 22.49% 
2016 26.17% 21.14% 25.17% 20.12% 25.67% 20.63% 
 
The table shows that both BA's and LY's direct services’ ms estimations have dropped 
over the years. The sum of both carriers’ ms estimations were more than 50% until 2016. The 
entrance of U2 into the market in 2011 heavily impacted the ms expectation of LY, reducing it 
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from 37.79% in 2010 to 26.24% the following year. The LCC entry not only impacted the ms 
estimation for direct service providers but also connecting service providers. The following 
table summarises frequency, seat count and ms estimation for legacy carriers and low-cost 
carriers in 2007 and 2016 in the bidirectional UK/Israel market. The seat and frequency count 
is reported by averaging f and s in both directions. (The low-cost carriers operating in the 
market are: U2, PC and W6) 
Table 10.36: Parameters for the LCCs and Legacy Carriers in 2007 and 2016 
Year 
Legacy Carriers Low-Cost Carriers 
f s ms f s ms 
2007 152 9.743,5 100% 0 0 0.00% 
2016 266,5 14.644,5 77.74% 64.5 4412,5 22.26% 
 
The table explicitly shows that, while there was no LCC frequency in the market as of 
2007, they were active and managed to offer a substantial capacity in the route and estimated 
to catch 22.26% share in the market by 2016. Although the capacity of the FSCs has expanded, 
they lost share against their LCC rivals. 
 
  This case showed that the quantity and the quality of the supply of all carriers operating 
in the market could be assessed at the country level demonstrating the fulfilment of Objective 
1 and 2 of the research. On the other hand, market share estimations of the competing airlines 
at the country level can be successfully calculated via the REMSET model (Objective 3), 
enabling to assess the competition with a strategic perspective in the market. Historical 
development of the parameters including supply, market share estimation, etc. enabled to 
perform useful analysis for industry experts suggesting the fulfilment of Objective 4 from 
another perspective.  
 
 10.2.11. Case 11: Italy / Italy:  
In Case 11, the Italian domestic market is examined. Only direct flights from Italy to 
Italy are studied in detail. Connecting flights are excluded from the analysis to assess direct 
flights' performance better. Since Italy is a geographically small country, it is unlikely for 
passengers to travel abroad to make a domestic journey within Italy, justifying the removal of 
connecting itineraries from the analysis.  As of 2016 schedules, there existed 1,474 different 
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flight numbers providing direct services in the Italian domestic market, contributing to 9,178 
frequencies and 866,775 seats available for sale per week. However, these numbers do not 
necessarily contribute to physical capacity as the figures include non-operating services too. 
The following table summarises the origin points ranked by frequency per operation type. 
Table 10.37: Number of frequencies and seat count per operation type and origin as of 2016 
schedules 
 
Non – Op. frequency Operating frequency Total frequency 
Rome-Da Vinci 2,009 1,029 3,038 
Milan-Linate 454 471 925 
Catania 359 298 657 
Palermo 271 276 547 
Cagliari 147 203 350 
Bari 170 178 348 
Naples 179 166 345 
Lamezia Terme 169 129 298 
Brindisi 133 129 262 
Milan-Malpensa 39 207 246 
Venice 139 73 212 
Milan-Orio Serio   186 186 
Other 22 Points 847 917 1,764 
Total 4,916 4,262 9,178 
   
 As per the table, the number of physical frequency is 4,262 originating from 34 Italian 
airports. The remaining 4,916 frequencies are available for sale via codeshare agreements. It is 
inferred from these numbers that, an extensive degree of codeshare contracts have been signed 
in the Italian domestic market which led multiple airlines to compete in the market. The table 
below shows the frequency and seat count figures at the airline and operational type 
breakdown. The market share expectations of the carriers are also displayed. (It should be noted 
that Italy based Meridiana Airlines is not listed carrier of the research. Therefore the results do 
not reflect this carrier’s market share estimations.) 
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Table 10.38: Number of Frequencies and Seat Count per Operation Type and Airline as of 2016 
in Italian Domestic Market. The Final Column Shows the ms Estimation for the Carrier.  
Airline 
Non-Operating Operating Total 
ms 
f s f s f s 
AZ   2,610 347,203 2,610 347,203 42.96% 
FR   1,264 238,896 1,264 238,896 29.59% 
KL 1,293 58,489   1,293  5.28% 
TP 929 42,472   929  3.83% 
AF 823 38,318   823  3.46% 
EY 703 28,972   703  2.63% 
U2   388 62,448 388 62,448 7.75% 
SU 541 22,581   541  2.04% 
AB 443 18,450   443  1.66% 
IB 150 7,535   150  0.68% 
SV 28 1,136   28  0.10% 
ME 5 245   5  0.02% 
OS 1 30   1  0.00% 
Total 4,916 218,228 4,262 648,547 9,178 866,775 100.00% 
 
 The table shows that among 866,775 seats available for sale, only 648,547 of them 
contribute to the physical capacity where the remaining 218,228 seats are non-operating 
services. Three airlines are reported to perform operating flights: Alitalia (AZ), Ryanair (FR) 
and Easyjet (U2). The operating services’ market share estimations add up to 80.30% where 
the remaining 19.70% is projected to be owned by the non-operating rivals led by KL and 
followed by TP. The non-operating services’ ms expectations are significantly less than their 
seat share since codeshare flights are less appreciated by consumers, as uncovered in the 
passenger survey.  It is also inferred from the table that, the total ms estimation of the LCCs 
(composed of FR and U2) adds up to 37.34% while the legacy carriers’ ms forecasts are 
62.66%. On the other hand, the forecasted ms value of the home carrier (which is AZ only) is 
42.96%, implying that non-Italian carriers are expected to own more than half of the market.  
 
This case assisted in studying the market shares of direct operators in the Italian 
domestic market and building up strategic analysis over the estimations which serves a concrete 
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fulfilment of Objective 3 and 4 of the research. The case also shows how non-operating carriers 
can reduce the market share expectations of the home carriers in a domestic market, signalling 
insightful information concerning the market's openness to competition.  
 
10.2.12. Case 12: Turkey – Turkey:  
Similar to Case 10, this section investigates a domestic route again, but in a different 
market. The Turkish direct domestic market is analysed in this case as the volume of the non-
operating services in the home market is less than many European countries. The following 
table summarises the origin points ranked by frequency per operation type. 
 
Table 10.39: Number of Frequencies and Seat Count per Operation Type and Origin as of 2016 
Schedules 
Origin Airport 
Non- Operating 
frequency 
Operating 
frequency 
Total 
frequency 
Istanbul - SAW 136 1,349 1,485 
Istanbul - IST 194 1,084 1,278 
Ankara 76 769 845 
Izmir 83 442 525 
Antalya 59 318 377 
Adana 30 239 269 
Trabzon 21 196 217 
Bodrum 12 176 188 
Dalaman 30 134 164 
Kayseri 27 115 142 
Gaziantep 7 113 120 
Other 39 Points 0 1,159 1,159 
Total 675 6,094 6,769 
  
As per the table, the number of physical domestic frequency is 6,094 operated from 50 
distinct Turkish airports while the total frequency available for sale is 6,769. Unlike the Italian 
domestic market studied in the previous case where there exists more codeshare frequency than 
the physical frequency, only 675 of the 6,769 total frequencies are observed to be non-operating 
frequencies, contributing roughly 10%. These numbers indicate that the actors in the Turkish 
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market are less welcoming to codeshare flights in comparison to the Italian market referring to 
a lower degree of competition through codeshare services in the Turkish domestic market. The 
table below shows the frequency, seat count and market share figures at the airline breakdown.  
Table 10.40: Number of Frequencies Seat Count Per Operation Type, Adjusted Normalised 
Quality Scores and ms Estimations of Each Airline in the Turkish Domestic Market as of 2016 
Schedule Information. 
Airline 
Non-Operating Operating Total 
ms 
f s f s f s qa_index_normalised 
TK   4,171 721,283 4,171 721,283 1.2941 65.04% 
PC   1,923 359,721 1,923 359,721 1.2988 32.56% 
AB 255 14,234   255 14,234 0.9421 0.93% 
SK 287 15,047   287 15,047 0.9351 0.98% 
AT 70 3,742   70 3,742 0.9501 0.25% 
TP 63 3,646   63 3,646 0.9299 0.24% 
Total 675 36,669 6,094 1,081,004 6,769 1,117,673 -- 100.00% 
 
It is deduced from the table that, unlike the Italian case, Turkish carriers dominate the 
market in domestic services. It can be argued that comparing the supply in the Turkish and 
Italian markets; the Italian domestic market is more open and less protected to other carrier’s 
competition. Turkish Airlines (TK) is the leading carrier in the market with 65.04% market 
share expectation followed by Pegasus Airlines (PC) with 32.56% ms forecast. Although TK's 
supply and market share estimation are higher compared to PC, the quality score of the carrier 
is slightly lower than its low-cost rival. TK might have focused on international flights’ 
schedule convenience rather than the domestic flights’ schedule convenience. Other 4 carriers 
offering codeshare domestic services are expected to report less than three per cent market 
share. Having the most number of non-operating seats among non-Turkish carriers, 
Scandinavian’s (SK) market share estimation is less than one per cent in the market.   
 
 This case enabled to benchmark the openness of the Turkish domestic market by 
analysing its home carriers’ supply and market share estimation. Indeed, the comparative 
analysis of the supply related parameters with the other domestic market provides invaluable 
market intelligence information concerning the level of protection in the market. Such an 
ability offers a handy guideline to airline executives when planning their network structure 
serving for the Objective 4 of the research. Being able to calculate the quality scores and the 
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market share expectations of the available carriers in the market is another demonstration of 
Objective 2 and 3 fulfilment.   
10.2.13. Case 13: Canada/Pakistan vs Canada/India:  
In this case, the traffic between two distinct markets which are out of the research’s 
focus continents are selected. They are Canada/Pakistan and Canada/India markets. The 
schedules of Canada’s, Pakistan’s and India’s home carriers are not uploaded into the research 
database. Hence the rivalry of the research’s selected airlines in an intercontinental market is 
assessed. Unlike Case 11 and 12 which analysed the competition at the domestic markets, this 
case is designed to assess the level of market protectionism by examining two distinct 
international markets. The following table summarises the total weekly frequency (f), seat 
count (s), adjusted seat share (%a_s), adjusted normalised index quality score (qa_index_normalised) 
and market share estimation (ms) from Canada (CA) to Pakistan (PK) and vice versa. 
Table 10.41: Listed Parameters of Competing Carriers from CA to PK and PK to CA as of 
2016 
    f s %a_s qa_index_normalised Ms 
C
A
 –
 P
K
 
   EK / Connecting 3 240 20.97% 0.9428 21.10% 
   EY / Connecting 3 104 9.12% 0.9259 9.02% 
   QR / Connecting 3 174 15.18% 0.8827 14.31% 
   TK / Connecting 9 313 54.73% 0.9511 55.57% 
Total 15 831 100% -- 100.00% 
P
K
 –
 C
A
 
   EK / Connecting 3 240 13.16% 0.9414 13.36% 
   EY / Connecting 3 228 12.50% 0.9525 12.84% 
   QR / Connecting 3 164 8.98% 0.9193 8.90% 
   SV / Connecting 1 68 1.25% 1.0339 1.39% 
   TK / Connecting 16 501 64.11% 0.9187 63.50% 
Total 26 1.201 100.00% -- 100.00% 
 
 Table implies that there exist no direct services between Canada and Pakistan for the 
selected airlines. From Canada to Pakistan only 4 carriers compete and Turkish Airlines (TK) 
leads the competition with 55.57% ms expectation, followed by Emirates (EK) with 21.10%. 
On the route back, 5 airlines compete where TK leads the market again with 63.50% market 
share forecast. Although the seat share (%s) of TK in both directions is below 50%, (it is 
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313/831 = 37.6% in CA–PK and 501/1201 = 41.7% in PK–CA), the adjusted seat share figures 
are higher as the carrier offers daily connections where the competitors fail to offer itineraries 
for  each day of the week. It is also inferred from the table that, none of the European carriers 
competes in the market and offers an itinerary to their consumers. (European carriers refer to 
home carriers of the EU market. As Turkey is partly located in Europe, it is not considered as 
a full European carrier.) The following table summarises the total weekly frequency, seat count, 
adjusted seat share, adjusted normalised index quality score and market share estimation from 
Canada (CA) to India (IN) and vice versa. 
Table 10.42: Listed Parameters of Competing Carriers from CA to IN and IN to CA as of 2016 
    f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
C
an
ad
a 
–
 I
n
d
ia
 
   LH / Connecting 45 2.557 35.05% 0.8692 34.95% 
   BA / Connecting 28 1.347 18.46% 0.9191 19.47% 
   AF / Connecting 24 816 11.19% 0.9833 12.62% 
   TK / Connecting 12 838 9.84% 0.8128 9.18% 
   KL / Connecting 21 609 8.34% 0.7756 7.43% 
   SK / Connecting 28 440 6.03% 0.7385 5.11% 
   LX / Connecting 9 368 5.05% 0.8806 5.10% 
   EK / Connecting 3 293 1.72% 0.9463 1.87% 
   EY / Connecting 3 228 1.34% 0.9597 1.47% 
   Other 3 Conn. 12 429 2.97% -- 2.80% 
Total 185 7.925 100.00% -- 100.00% 
In
d
ia
 –
 C
an
ad
a 
   BA / Connecting 21 1.001 20.52% 0.9497 21.97% 
   LH / Connecting 28 1.014 20.78% 0.8129 19.04% 
   KL / Connecting 16 825 16.92% 0.8784 16.75% 
   AF / Connecting 19 555 11.38% 0.9317 11.95% 
   TK / Connecting 9 592 10.41% 0.9553 11.21% 
   SK / Connecting 14 242 4.96% 0.7797 4.36% 
   IB / Connecting 14 210 4.31% 0.7518 3.66% 
   EK / Connecting 3 293 2.58% 0.9341 2.71% 
   EY / Connecting 3 228 2.00% 1.0292 2.32% 
   Other 3 Conn. 13 531 6.14% -- 6.03% 
Total 140 5.491 100.00% -- 100.00% 
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 As the table depicts, there are no direct service operators among competing carriers in 
the Canada/India market, and in both directions, 12 airlines offer connecting itineraries only. 
This refers to a higher degree of competition in comparison to Canada/Pakistan market where 
a fewer number of airlines competed as of 2016 schedules. From Canada to India, Lufthansa 
(LH) is estimated to lead the market with 34.95% ms followed by BA with 19.47% while on 
the route back BA is estimated to rank first with 21.97% while LH follows with 19.04%. On 
the other hand, Air France (AF) is calculated to offer best schedule quality from Canada to 
India while Etihad’s (EY) schedule quality is determined to be the best from India to Canada.  
 
Analysing the table, it is deduced that unlike Canada/Pakistan market, the Canada/India 
market is heavily dominated by the European carriers. However using this information only, it 
is not possible to conclude that India is more open to competition than Pakistan due to the 
market's lack of European carrier presence. There might be several other reasons justifying 
European carriers’ lack of service in the Canada/Pakistan market. For instance, many European 
carriers like BA, LH and AF suspended its flights to Pakistan due to security reasons in the 
previous years. It may also be possible that the yields in Pakistan might not be attractive enough 
to cover the costs of the European carriers. On the other hand, it is also probable for European 
carriers to miss connections in Canada/Pakistan routes whilst they attain itineraries in 
Canada/India market due to lack of demand, slot availability or any other reasons.  
 
This case showed how the degree of competition in various markets could be analysed 
using the research’s methodology. Although, comprehending the level of protectionism in the 
markets require further information that what the research methodologies offer, this analysis 
provides invaluable input to industry practitioners for their decision-making process, fulfilling 
Objective 4 of the research.   
 
10.2.14. Case 14: South America – Middle East:  
In this case, the O&D is selected at the regional level. The directional market from 
South America to the Middle East is presented in this case where the origin area is not within 
the research’s focus region. The following table presents the total weekly frequency (f), seat 
count (s), adjusted seat share (%a_s), adjusted normalised index quality score (qa_index_normalised) and 
market share estimation (ms) from South America to Middle East which is prepared by 
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incorporating all origins of the listed carriers South America and all destinations of those 
carriers in the Middle East. 
Table 10.43: Selected Parameters from South America to the Middle East as of 2016 Schedules 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
EK Direct 14 5600 25.51% 1.2337 30.32% 
EY Direct 7 2422 11.03% 1.2685 13.48% 
QR Direct 7 1813 8.26% 1.2472 9.92% 
AF Connecting 59 2298 10.47% 0.8683 8.76% 
LH Connecting 47 1793 8.17% 0.8788 6.92% 
EY Connecting 72 1475 6.72% 0.8270 5.36% 
KL Connecting 28 1283 5.84% 0.8707 4.90% 
EK Connecting 14 1120 5.10% 0.9279 4.56% 
QR Connecting 58 846 3.85% 0.9522 3.53% 
AZ Connecting 26 775 3.53% 0.8548 2.91% 
BA Connecting 19 759 3.46% 0.8190 2.73% 
Other 8 airlines Connecting 68 2009 8.06% --- 6.61% 
Total 419 22.193 100% --- 100% 
 
The table states that the listed airlines report 419 weekly direct and connecting 
frequencies from South America to the Middle East totalling 22.193 seats served by 16 carriers. 
The share of direct products in the market is estimated to be 53.72% where the remaining 
46.28% is forecasted to be held by the connecting services. Emirates (EK) is estimated to lead 
the market with 34.88% ms estimation of which 30.32% comes from its direct services and 
4.56% from the connecting itineraries. Etihad (EY) is estimated to follow EK with 14.48% 
(direct) + 5.36% (connecting) = 19.84% ms value. Another Middle Eastern carrier Qatar 
Airways (QR) ranks third in the market with 9.92% (direct) + 3.53% (connecting) = 13.45% 
ms estimation in total. It is deduced from this information that the Middle Eastern carriers, 
through their direct products, dominate the Latin America – Middle East route with more than 
2/3rd of the entire ms estimation. European carriers report ms forecasts for connecting products 
led by Air France (AF) and Lufthansa (LH). However, it should be noted that among the 
connecting products, QR’s service seems to have the best schedule quality score while for 
direct flights EY’s product ranks top. This case proves the accomplishment of the research’s 
Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4 at a broader region-to-region level. Indeed through the implementation 
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of the REMSET model, industry practitioners may conduct plenty of useful analysis at the 
regional scale similar to the example shown in this case. 
 
10.3. Discussion 
 
In this Chapter, 14 different cases are analysed at different levels including airport to 
airport, city-to-city, country-to-country and region-to-region. Through these cases, it is 
intended to show the fulfilment of research’s objectives. While calculating the results for the 
cases, the listed 36 carriers’ schedule information is used along with certain assumptions. The 
research's methodology already employs parameters which are obtained directly from the 
survey results as explained in Chapter 8 and 9.  However, some pre-defined parameters like 
connect seat factor, codeshare seat factor, maximum detour, default MCT, qsplit and %q_split are 
fixed to certain values as explained in Section 10.1. The results of the cases have proved that 
the research's objectives are successfully achieved in the sense that a consumer-centric capacity 
estimation model is developed (Objective 1), airline’s schedule convenience is quantified 
(Objective 2), the REMSET tool is successfully formulated (Objective 3) and an instrument for 
industry practitioners to assess their schedule and network competitiveness is developed 
(Objective 4). However, it should be noted that the real market share figures are influenced by 
other factors like fare, brand loyalty and etc. The statistical tests that were implemented on 
certain cases have affirmed that the REMSET model provided credible outputs. It is also shown 
in some tests that, the REMSET model have produced more credible market share estimations 
in comparison to the traditional/naïve models. Therefore, using the survey results and the 
assumptions, the research objectives are successfully achieved. A separate analysis with 
changes to the input parameters enables an assessment of the impact of those parameters on 
the research outputs involving the supply, quality and market share estimations. The following 
chapter addresses the same case studies and examines the results using different input 
parameters.  
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Chapter 11: Results (Part II) – Scenario Analyses 
11.1. Introduction to Results Chapter (Part II) – Scenario Analyses 
 
 Chapter 10 covered the outputs obtained by employing the research's consumer-centric 
capacity determination, quality assessment and REMSET methodologies in the selected origin 
and destination pairs at several layers including airport to airport, city to city, country to country 
and region to region levels. The chapter credited the methodologies and proved the fulfilment 
of the research’s objectives by using airlines real schedule information. It is also discussed in 
the Chapter that the survey results are used as the input parameters of the research 
methodologies along with some pre-defined assumptions. These input parameters and the 
schedule of the carriers are usually regarded as “fixed” parameters – limiting to analyse the 
sensitivity of these factors on research outputs. This chapter is dedicated to overcome this 
limitation and demonstrate the adaptable nature of the research’s models. It is intended to 
illustrate the impact of variations in inputs parameters on the calculated outputs which would 
be an indication of Objective 1, 2 and 3’s accomplishment.  
 
The flexible structure of the research’s models enables industry practitioners to observe 
the marginal changes in market dynamics with respect to different inputs forming an 
indispensable market intelligence tool for industry practitioners, fulfilling Objective 4 of the 
research. For example, in case an airline executive would like to place a new frequency into a 
market, running the model with the proposed schedule information including the potential 
flight, the new consumer-centric supply share, quality score and realistic market share 
expectation of the carrier would be calculated which can later be benchmarked with the base 
case where the prospective frequency is not in effect. Such an analysis would assist the airline 
executive to plan the additional flight with a strategic perspective maximising the airline’s 
commercial benefit by choosing the right aircraft type (seat supply) and timetable for the 
service. The research’s methodology can also be used as a tool to measure the effectiveness of 
the codeshare agreements. As codeshare operations are displayed as a separate flight with 
unique flight numbers in the marketing airline schedules, running the model with the timetable 
including the prospective codeshare flight and benchmarking the outputs with the base case 
that the codeshare agreement is not in place would assist to demonstrate the marginal benefits 
of such agreements.  
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In addition to the capability of measuring schedule related variations impact on the 
research outputs, other inputs’ effect on the market structure can be assessed including the fixed 
parameters obtained directly from the survey results and airports’ MCT information. For 
example, although the MaxCT is found to be 290 minutes by the survey, this value can be 
changed to observe its effect on schedule convenience scores and market share estimations. On 
the other hand, whilst the MCTs are constant values determined by the airport the 
administrations, it is possible to observe the effect of a reduced or increased MCT on research 
outputs in terms of supply, quality and market share estimations for the specified origin and 
destination pairs. Other fixed parameter assumptions mentioned in Chapter 10 like connect seat 
factor (sconn), codeshare seat factor (scode), maximum detour factor, qsplit and %q_split  can also be 
changed to observe their impact on the outputs.  
 
In this Chapter, the same O&D cases studied in the previous chapter are analysed in the 
same order with varying input parameters by introducing scenarios for each case. The results 
obtained in the previous results chapter are named as the "base status". In each case, the results 
of the scenarios are compared with the base status, and the deviations are discussed. In most 
scenarios of the cases, the base results are redisplayed in this Chapter too, for the sake of easing 
the comparison with the numbers. The inputs which are substituted with other values 
throughout to assess their impact on research outputs are as follows: scode, sconn, MCT, MaxCT, 
sf, tbuffer, %q_split and qa_index_normalised. Additionally, many cases involve changes in the schedule 
related factors including: 
 
• New frequency insertion / deletion 
• Total entrance/withdrawal of a carrier to/from a market 
• Change of aircraft type – having more or fewer seats than the base status 
• Codeshare flight (agreement) insertion / deletion 
• Change in the departure time of the flight 
• Switching airports in the same city 
• Allowing / Banning stopover in a city en route from the origin to destination  
In some of the scenarios of the following cases, certain statistical tests is undertaken to 
assess whether the research outputs differ significantly from the base case. For this reason, 
significance analyses are made employing the p values. For the testing of market share 
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estimations, the paired proportion test is used as the figures are reported in percentages.  
However, if any other numeric parameters’ significances are tested, Mann-Whitney test is used.  
 
11.2. Results for the Selected O&Ds 
 
11.2.1. Case 1: GVA–ZRH:  
In this directional Swiss domestic route from Geneva to Zurich, two scenarios are 
introduced. The first instance evaluates the removal of one carriers’ codeshare agreement with 
the operating airline where the second scenario reduces the codeshare seat factor from 30% to 
20%. Similar to the base case, the analysis is performed over 2016 schedule data. 
 
Scenario 1: For this scenario, the codeshare agreement between Swiss (LX) and 
Lufthansa (LH) is assumed to be cancelled, erasing LH’s entire GVA–ZRH services from its 
timetable. The remaining marketing carriers’ codeshare agreements with LX are kept intact. 
Since there exists 63 operating frequencies of LX in the market in which the carrier was 
partnering with LH for 62 of them in the base status, the codeshare supply in the market would 
fall extensively due to the annulment of the LX–LH codeshare partnership. The following table 
shows the frequency (f), frequency share (%f), seat supply (s) and seat share (%s) after the 
cancellation of the codeshare agreement between LX and LH in the GVA–ZRH route. 
Table 11.1: Parameters in the GVA–ZRH Directional Route as of 2016 Schedules 
Airline Type f %f s %s 
AB Direct 14 11.38 % 214 1.93 % 
EY Direct 14 11.38 % 214 1.93 % 
LH Direct 0 0 % 0 0 % 
LX Direct 63 51.22 % 9,959 89.62 % 
SA Direct 7 5.69 % 290 2.61 % 
SK Direct 7 5.69 % 204 1.84 % 
LX Connect 14 11.38 % 213 1.91 % 
TP Connect 4 3.26 % 18 0.16 % 
Total 123 100 % 11.112 100 % 
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As per the table, the removal of the codeshare agreement lessens the total frequency 
available for sale in the market from 185 to 12”3 while the seat supply is reduced to 11,112 
from 14,103. However, the physical frequency and seat supply in the market is unchanged as 
the number of operating services remains intact. This reduction in the non-operating 
frequencies and seat supply works heavily in favour of the sole operating carrier, LX, ascending 
its seat share from 70.62% in the base status to 89.62% in the scenario. The following table 
summarises the seat share (%s) and realistic market share estimations (ms) and their comparison 
with the base status. 
 
Table 11.2: Seat Share and ms for Carriers in the GVA–ZRH Route as of 2016 Schedules 
Airline Type Scenario 1 Base Status 
%s %s ms ms 
AB Direct 1.93 % 1.52 % 1.28 % 1.44 % 
EY Direct 1.93 % 1.52 % 1.28 % 1.44 % 
LH Direct 0 % 21.21 % 16.86 % 0 % 
LX Direct 89.62 % 70.62 % 76.88 % 92.95 % 
SA Direct 2.61 % 2.05 % 1.92 % 2.10 % 
SK Direct 1.84 % 1.44 % 1.10 % 1.34 % 
LX Connect 1.91 % 1.51 % 0.59 % 0.61 % 
TP Connect 0.16 % 0.13 % 0.09 % 0.12 % 
 
 LX’s cancellation of codeshare agreements with LH escalates its market share 
expectation from 76.88% to 92.95%. On the other hand, although the sum of market share 
estimation for non-operating carriers’ fall due to the withdrawal of LH from the market, other 
non-operating carriers’ market share estimation is expected to increase in comparison to base 
status as their largest non-operating rival is not competing in the market anymore. 
  
Scenario 2: In the second scenario, LX's codeshare agreement with LH is recovered 
back, but the codeshare seat factor (scode) is reduced from 30% to 20%. This adjustment reduces 
the number of non-operating seats available for sale in the market, keeping the operating 
services unchanged. The table below summarises each carriers' seat supply under the new 
conditions in comparison to the base status. 
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Table 11.3: The New Frequency and Supply of the Carriers in the Market 
Airline Type Scenario 2 Base Status 
f f f s 
AB Direct 14 214 14 143 
EY Direct 14 214 14 143 
LH Direct 62 2,991 62 1,994 
LX Direct 63 9,959 63 9,959 
SA Direct 7 290 7 193 
SK Direct 7 204 7 136 
LX Connect 14 213 14 213 
TP Connect 4 18 4 12 
Total 185 12,793 185 14,103 
  
scode’s decline from 30% to 20% reduces the total weekly capacity available for sale 
from 14,103 to 12,793. Since direct service operators, Air Berlin (AB), Etihad (EY), Lufthansa 
(LH), South African Airways (SA) and Scandinavian (SK), offer codeshare services in the 
market, their capacity shrink substantially in comparison to the base status. Furthermore, as 
TAP Portugal (TP)’s connecting service is a codeshare product, its weekly seat supply falls 
from 18 to 12. The following table summarizes the seat share (%s) and realistic market share 
estimations (ms) of the carriers competing in the GVA–ZRH directional route compared with 
the base status which demonstrates that the reduction in the codeshare seat factor enables LX 
to upsurge its market share expectation to 83.13% while LH’s, the largest non-operating carrier 
in the market, ms value declines from 16.86% to 12.15%.  
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Table 11.4: Seat Share and Market Share Expectations of the Scenario in Comparison to the 
Base Status 
Airline Type Base Status Scenario 2 
%s ms %s ms 
AB Direct 1.52 % 1.28 % 1.12 % 0.92 % 
EY Direct 1.52 % 1.28 % 1.12 % 0.92 % 
LH Direct 21.21 % 16.86 % 15.59 % 12.15 % 
LX Direct 70.62 % 76.88 % 77.85 % 83.13 % 
SA Direct 2.05 % 1.92 % 1.50 % 1.38 % 
SK Direct 1.44 % 1.10 % 1.06 % 0.80 % 
LX Connect 1.51 % 0.59 % 1.66 % 0.64 % 
TP Connect 0.13 % 0.09 % 0.10 % 0.07 % 
 
The first scenario of this case exhibited the effect of a codeshare partnership 
cancellation between two carriers into market dynamics. Furthermore, the second case 
examined the influence of the codeshare seat factor on the capacity supply in the market and 
the ms expectations. Being able to measure the effect of these variable parameters on the 
research outputs refers to a clear fulfilment of Objective 1 and 3.   
 
11.2.2. Case 2: DUB/SOF:  
The previous Chapter has addressed that the directional DUB/SOF market lacked direct 
services. The scenarios of this case introduce two scenarios which are expected to change the 
market structure and add up to the rivalry among carriers. The first scenario involves the 
insertion of a direct flight by a carrier which did not offer any service in the market in the base 
case. Furthermore, the second scenario builds on the first scenario and assumes that the new 
carrier operating direct service in the market establishes a codeshare agreement with another 
airline. In each of these two scenarios, the maximum detour factor is fixed to 1.35 (which was 
1.75 in the base status) implying that any itinerary travelling at least 35% more than the shortest 
path would be eliminated from the competition. 
 
Scenario 1: Aer Lingus (EI) places a daily operating flight between SOF and DUB with 
a 150-seat aircraft. The flight departs from DUB at 10:00 am Irish local time, and after 3.5 
hours of flight, it arrives in SOF at 15:30 pm Bulgarian local time. (The time difference between 
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Bulgaria and Ireland is 2 hours.) On the way back, the flight leaves SOF at 16:30 pm local time 
and arrives in DUB 18:00 pm local time. Running the REMSET model with this virtual flight, 
the bidirectional realistic market share estimations are computed as follows: 
Table 11.5: Bidirectional Market Share Estimation for Scenario 1 Compared With the Base 
Status as of 2016 Schedules 
Airline ms – scenario 1 (operating flight 
of EI present) 
ms – base status (no scenario EI 
flight) 
EI (direct) 61.56 % No flight present 
AF (connecting) 3.48 % 6.02 % 
BA (connecting) 3.67 % 7.52 % 
FR (connecting) 4.04 % 6.75 % 
KL (connecting) 2.27 % 5.14 % 
LH (connecting) 24.93 % 56.35 % 
LX (connecting) 0.05 % 0.08 % 
TK (connecting) 0 % (detour elimination) 18.14 % 
 
The table suggests that EI’s brand new flight is expected to obtain 61.56% ms deeming 
the carrier to become the market leader. LH’s share is expected to fall from 56.35% to 24.93% 
while TK completely lost its market presence. TK’s ms is distributed to other competing 
airlines with regard to the new quality scores and the adjusted seat shares. TK’s estimated 
removal from the market is due to the detour factor. The kilometres and the detour factor for 
all carriers operating in the market are summarised in the table below.  
Table 11.6: Kilometre and Detour Factor of the Carriers Operating in the SOF/DUB Market 
 EI AF BA FR KL LH LX TK 
KM 2487 2544 2495 2487 2508 2488 2522 3444 
Detour 1.000 1.023 1.003 1.000 1.008 1.000 1.014 1.385 
 
Table 11.6 displays each carriers’ average distance in the SOF/DUB market that is 
computed by weight-averaging each hits' kilometre with respect to seat supply. As expected, 
the inserted direct flight of EI offers the shortest path of in the SOF/DUB routes fixing the 
airline’s detour factor to 1. It is also observed in the table that, TK’s products traverse 38.5% 
more distance on average than the shortest service provider. It is apparent that TK offers the 
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most extended routing and maximum detour cap of 1.35 eliminates the carrier from the 
competition. Therefore, this scenario suggests that the placement of a direct service entirely 
changes the market dynamics and competition scheme in favour of the direct product operator. 
On the other hand, the scenario also displayed the consequence of maximum detour cap on 
market share estimations.  
  
Scenario 2: In this scenario, it is assumed that another carrier, supposing Etihad (EY), 
signs a codeshare agreement with EI in virtual the SOF/DUB direct flights described in the 
scenario above.  The new ms figures under this circumstances become as follows. (Market 
share estimations are compared with the base status and scenario 1.)  
 
Table 11.7: Bidirectional Market Share Estimation for Scenario 2 Compared with the Base 
Status and Scenario 1 as of 2016 Schedules 
Airline 
ms – scenario 2 (codeshare 
between EI and EY) 
ms – scenario case 1 
(operating flight of EI 
present) 
ms – base case 
EI 52.51% 61.56 % No flight present 
EY 12.30 % No flight present No flight present 
AF 3.23 % 3.48 % 6.02 % 
BA 3.20 % 3.67 % 7.52 % 
FR 3.84 % 4.04 % 6.75 % 
KL 2.06% 2.27 % 5.14 % 
LH 22.82 % 24.93 % 56.35 % 
LX 0.04 % 0.05 % 0.08 % 
TK 0 % (detour elimination) 0 % (detour elimination) 18.14% 
 
A codeshare agreement between EI and EY erodes EI’s ms from 61.56% in Scenario 1 
to 52.51% while EY gains 12.30% that is primarily taken away from the EI’s share. EY’s 
entrance into the market via the codeshare agreement made all competing carriers to lose some 
portion of their ms. Furthermore, TK is still expected to lack market presence as the carriers’ 
detour is still more than the maximum detour cap of 1.35.  
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The scenario analysis of Case 2 showed that the research’s model enabled to assess the 
ms impact of schedule-related variations accomplishing Objective 3 under changing market 
conditions including additional direct capacity, codeshare agreement and a lower detour index. 
Furthermore, the capability of estimating additional capacities’ quantitative effect on ms fulfils 
Objective 4 in the sense that a useful tool is offered to industry practitioners to assess schedule 
and network competitiveness in their capacity planning.   
 
 11.2.3. Case 3: HAM/BEY:  
It is referred to in the base status that, the bidirectional HAM/BEY market is fully 
served by the connecting services where multiple airlines compete through their products 
attaining a connection at their hub airports. The first scenario of this case assumes a decline in 
the maximum connection time tolerance of passengers which was found to be 290 minutes by 
the passenger survey. The change in the available capacity and competition scheme in the 
market would be recalculated after this adjustment with the MaxCT. In the second scenario, 
the MaxCT is recovered to its original level, but some hub airports' MCT values are increased 
in order to observe the impact on the research outputs. 
 
 Scenario 1: For this scenario, the MaxCT is reduced from 290 minutes to 150 minutes. 
In other words, it is now assumed that the connecting passengers can tolerate a maximum of 
two and a half hours, rather than 4 hours and 50 minutes, tconn at the hub airport. The below 
table shows the routing type (i.e. direct or connecting), adjusted capacity share (%a_s), 
normalised quality index (qindex_normalised), and expected realistic market share (ms) in HAM–BEY 
and BEY–HAM routes respectively for each airline competing in the market as of summer 
2016 schedule under the new MaxCT assumption. 
Table 11.8: Figures for Airlines in the HAM–BEY as of 2016 Schedule (MaxCT = 150 
minutes) 
Airline Type %a_s qa_index_normalised KM 
Detour 
ms 
EK Connecting 53.85 % 0.6182 2.160 0.00 % 
LH Connecting 46.15 % 0.9850 1.000 100.00 % 
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Table 11.9: Figures for the BEY–HAM as of 2016 Schedule (MaxCT = 150 minutes) 
Airline Type %a_s qa_index_normalised 
KM 
Detour 
ms 
EK Connecting 24.35 % 0.5615 2.360 0.00 % 
LH Connecting 31.27 % 0.9615 1.092 40.75 % 
TK Connecting 44.38 % 0.9932 1.000 59.25 % 
  
The above tables illustrate that the competition in the market changes significantly with 
the MaxCT’s reduction. As per the base status, in the HAM–BEY route, 8 airlines were 
competing through their connecting products. However, in this scenario, only Lufthansa (LH) 
and Emirates (EK) offer a product where the total market share is estimated to be owned by 
LH due to EK’s elimination for the longer routing. Since the itineraries offering longer waiting 
times at the intermediary airport are eliminated, the adjusted normalised index quality score of 
LH rise too, from 0.8994 in the base status to 0.9850 in the scenario.  
 
In the BEY–HAM route, while 7 airlines were competing, only 3 airlines offered a 
product with the MaxCT’s decline to 150 minutes. Among those three carriers, only Turkish 
Airlines (TK) and LH managed to acquire a market share estimation, 59.25% and 40.75% 
respectively. EK is again eliminated from the competition due to the detour cap. Whilst LH’s 
qa_index_normalised score has grown from 0.7951 to 0.9615 due to the elimination of some 
connections having tconn greater than 150 minutes, TK’s qa_index_normalised score is unchanged as all 
of its connecting products’ tconn was less than 150 minutes. The below table summarises the 
bidirectional market share estimation of the carriers which is simply obtained by averaging 
each carriers’ ms in both routes as well as its comparison with the base status.  
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Table 11.10: Realistic market share estimations BEY/HAM route as of 2016 schedules. 
Airline Scenario 1 Base Status 
ms ms 
A3 0.00 % 0.15 % 
AF 0.00 % 9.72 % 
BA 0.00 % 9.23 % 
EK 0.00 % 0.00 % 
LH 70.38 % 30.87 % 
PC 0.00 % 11.32 % 
SU 0.00 % 1.47 % 
TK 29.62 % 37.24 % 
 
Implementing the paired proportion test on the airlines market share estimation for the 
base status and Scenario 1, a p value of smaller than 0.01 is calculated implying significant 
difference between the outputs. Therefore, the MaxCT has a significant role in market structure 
determination especially in an environment where solely connecting products compete. For the 
sake of this case, as the tolerance for passengers to wait at the hub airport decreases LH's market 
share expectation increases where the other carriers suffer from losing ms.   
 
 Scenario 2: In the second scenario, the MaxCT value is recovered back to 290 minutes, 
but the connecting seat factor (sconn) is reduced from 20% to 10%. Such a decrease in sconn 
indicates supply reduction for the connecting products. The table below summarises the total 
weekly seat capacity and market share estimation for each carrier in both directions under sconn 
= 10% assumption as well as its comparison with the base status.  
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Table 11.11: Figures for Airlines in the HAM–BEY Route as of Summer 2016 Schedule 
Airline Type Seat supply (s) Market share estimation (ms) 
Scenario 2 Base Status Scenario 2 Base Status 
A3 Connecting 17 35 0.30 % 0.30 % 
AF Connecting 97 194 11.78 % 11.78 % 
BA Connecting 86 172 9.41 % 9.41 % 
EK Connecting 280 560 0.00 % 0.00 % 
LH Connecting 240 480 35.94 % 35.94 % 
PC Connecting 131 261 12.17 % 12.17 % 
SU Connecting 42 84 1.66 % 1.66 % 
TK Connecting 215 429 28.75 % 28.75 % 
Total 1108 2215 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 11.12: Figures for Airlines in the BEY–HAM Route as of Summer 2016 Schedule 
Airline Type Seat supply (s) Market share estimation (ms) 
Scenario 2 Base Status Scenario 2 Base Status 
AF Connecting 102 205 7.67 % 7.67 % 
BA Connecting 108 215 9.07 % 9.07 % 
EK Connecting 187 374 0.00 % 0.00 % 
LH Connecting 240 480 25.80 % 25.80 % 
PC Connecting 131 261 10.46 % 10.46 % 
SU Connecting 42 84 1.28 % 1.28 % 
TK Connecting 341 681 45.73 % 45.73 % 
Total 1151 2300 100 % 100 % 
 
It is observed in the tables that the seat supply of each carrier competing in the market 
is halved after the reduction of sconn from 20% to 10%. As the entire services in the market are 
connecting products, the total weekly seat supply declines by 50% in both directions. Since the 
capacity shrinks by 50% for all carriers in both directions, the ms figures are unchanged in 
comparison to the base status. In case a direct service existed in the route, the reduction in 
connecting capacity would work in favour of the direct service operator and would negatively 
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affect ms for the connecting service providers. Such a scenario is to be introduced in the 
following cases.  
 
 The scenarios of Case 3 showed the influence of MaxCT and sconn on the research 
outputs including supply, quality and market share estimations fulfilling Objective 1,2 and 3 
of the research. On the other hand, the effect of these parameters on the research outputs 
provides an essential insight to industry practitioners while designing the airline schedule and 
network strategy referring to the fulfilment of Objective 4 of the research.  
 
 11.2.4. Case 4: SKG/TBS:  
The base status has addressed the market’s historical development from 2010 onwards. 
The competitive dynamics have often changed over the years for this thin market served solely 
by the connecting products due to the entrance/exit of certain carriers as well as the capacity 
and timetable changes.  For this case, the MaxCT is increased substantially in the first scenario 
while the maximum detour factor is raised in the second scenario to observe those parameters’ 
influence on the ms for such a thin market.  
 
 Scenario 1: In this scenario, the MaxCT is increased from 290 minutes to 600 minutes 
raising the probability of connections to become a successful hit as more tconn is permitted for 
the connecting itineraries. Therefore, the number of products available for sale and competition 
is expected to be higher compared to the base case. The following sections summarise the 
market conditions as per the new MaxCT figure. 
 
 As of 2010, in the base case for SKG–TBS route, Lufthansa (LH) was the sole carrier 
operating in the market. The increase in the MaxCT enabled Austrian Airlines (OS) also to 
offer a product on the route. On the reverse (TBS–SKG) direction, the increase of the MaxCT 
did not change the competition and supply in the market in comparison to the base status. In 
the following year, in 2011, contrary to the base status, Turkish Airlines (TK) became the sole 
carrier expecting a market share in both directions. Since TK’s product was relatively shorter 
in comparison to LH and OS, those carriers lost their ms as their detour factor was reported to 
be higher than 1.75 after TK’s market entry.   
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As of 2012 and 2013, TK was not able to offer a product in the market in the base case 
as its tconn was greater than 290 minutes. The increase of MaxCT in the scenario enabled the 
carrier also to offer a product in both directions and eliminate other European rivals expect 
Aegean Airlines (A3). A3 and TK were estimated to share the market in 2012 and 2013. 
Furthermore, from 2013 onwards, TK and A3 were again the sole carriers serving in the market 
with varying market share estimations. As TK composed the shortest path in each direction, 
unlike the base case, any European airlines competing with the airline other than A3 was 
removed from the rivalry due to the detour elimination. For example, while in the base status, 
Alitalia (AZ) was expected to gain a market share in the TBS–SKG route as of 2013, the carrier 
was estimated to gain no market under MaxCT = 600 assumption as the existence of TK in the 
route removed AZ from the market due to detour elimination. The following table summarises 
the bidirectional market share estimation for this scenario from 2010 to 2016.  
 
Table 11.13: Market Share of Carriers in the TBS/SKG Route Bidirectional Route 2010 to 
2016 under MaxCT = 600 Minutes Scenario 
  
TBS–SKG (undirectional) ms 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
A3 0.0% 0.0% 13.08% 13.9% 3.7% 13.0% 23.2% 
LH 58.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
OS 41.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
TK 0.0% 100% 86.92% 86.1% 96.3% 87.0% 76.8% 
  
It is observed in the table that, the increase in the MaxCT has led the market to converge 
into a duopoly between TK and A3 as the other carriers were detached from competition due 
to detour elimination. Implementing a series of paired proportion tests for the market share 
estimations of the base case and scenario 1 for each year (from 2010 to 2016), for each test a p 
value smaller than 0.05 is computed implying significance.  Although it was expected that, the 
increase with the MaxCT would enhance the degree of competition in the market, this was not 
attained due to the detour parameter constraints and as the test implies the results differed 
significantly. The following scenario assumes a higher maximum detour to analyse higher 
MaxCT’s impact on market structure. 
 
Scenario 2: In the second scenario, the MaxCT is still kept at 600 minutes, but the 
maximum detour factor is raised from 1.75 to 2.50. Therefore, itineraries traversing a distance 
up to 2.5 times the shortest available path in the market are also included in the competition. 
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The following table summarises the kilometre and detour values of the SKG/TBS market via 
hub airports of the airlines offering at least one connection hit in the market from 2010 to 2016. 
Table 11.14: Kilometer and Detour Values of the Airlines' Path Offering At least One 
Connection in the TBS/SKG Market Between 2010 and 2016.  
Airline Connection Hub Kilometre Detour Index 
A3 Athens (ATH) 2,124 1.160 
AF (codeshare) Rome (FCO) 3,597 1.965 
AZ Rome (FCO) 3,597 1.965 
OS Vienna (VIE) 3,306 1.806 
KL Amsterdam (AMS) 5,116 2.795 
LH Munich (MUC) 3,918 2.140 
LH Frankfurt (FRA) 4,416 2.413 
TK Istanbul (IST) 1,830 1.000 
 
As per the table, since the shortest path is via IST, TK’s detour index is fixed to 1. All 
connections except AMS are below the maximum detour which is set to 2.5 for this case, and 
therefore OS, LH, AZ, A3 and TK are all able to expect a share in the SKG/TBS market. KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) is eliminated due to more extended detour factor even above 2.5. 
On the other hand, Air France (AF) is expected to gain a market share due to its codeshare 
services via Rome (FCO), not via Paris. The following table summarises the market share 
estimation of carriers from 2010 to 2016 for scenario 2.  
 
Table 11.15: Market Share of Carriers in the TBS/SKG Route Bidirectional Route 2010 to 
2016 under MaxCT = 600 Minutes Scenario and Maximum Detour = 2.5 
 
TBS/SKG (bidirectional) ms 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
A3 0.0 % 0.0 % 8.9 % 7.3 % 3.3 % 7.3 % 19.5 % 
AF 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 1.1 % 0.2 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 
AZ 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 19.2 % 1.4 % 17.0 % 0.0 % 
LH 58.1 % 56.5 % 32.2 % 27.2 % 8.1 % 25.6 % 14.9 % 
OS 41.9 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 
TK 0.0 % 43.5 % 58.8 % 45.2% 86.8 % 49.1 % 65.3 % 
 
It is observed in the table that, the increase in the maximum detour factor intensified 
the rivalry between the carriers and enabled more actors to expect a share in the market from 
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2010 to 2016. The duopoly structure between A3 and TK referred in the first scenario of this 
case is profoundly disturbed by the rise in the maximum detour factor. Therefore, as shown in 
the table, if passengers increase their tolerance to traverse a longer distance for their itineraries, 
it would contribute to the competition scheme of the market positively.  
 
 The scenario analysis of Case 4 showed the impact of MaxCT and maximum detour 
factor on the realistic market share estimation. Contrary to expectations, the sole MaxCT 
increase did not increase the competition as TK’s path advantage abolished European rivals 
from the market share estimation due those carriers’ longer routing. However, this was 
addressed by increasing the maximum detour factor such that the European airlines were able 
to join the competition. These findings confirm the accomplishment of Objective 3 and 4. 
 
11.2.5. Case 5: AMM/JED:  
The base case showed that there exists both direct and connecting services between JED 
and AMM besides the market is protected and dominated by national carriers providing direct 
services, forming a substantial barrier for new entrants. The first scenario of the case studies a 
further regulation which limits the maximum seats per frequency to a certain number. In the 
second scenario, the regulation on seat per frequency is lifted, and a new carrier that offers 
direct services is introduced to the market. 
 
Scenario 1: In this scenario, the maximum seats per frequency (sf) is fixed at 150. Such 
regulation is possible between countries to further protect their home carriers’ competitiveness. 
The below tables show the routing type (i.e. direct or connecting), total weekly frequency (f), 
seat supply (s) with the new seat per frequency figures, adjusted capacity share (%a_s), adjusted 
normalised quality index (qa_index_normalised) and market share estimation (ms) from JED to AMM 
and from AMM to JED respectively (directional) for each airline serving in the route as of 
summer 2016 schedule.  
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Table 11.16: Results of the Selected Parameters from JED to AMM as of 2016 Under sf = 150 
Assumption for Direct Services. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4,200 64.61% 1.2974 67.94% 
SV Direct 12 1,800 27.67% 1.2081 27.10% 
AZ Connecting 4 30 0.26% 0.7106 0.15% 
MS Connecting 14 309 4.75% 0.7277 2.80% 
ME Connecting 7 176 2.71% 0.9143 2.01% 
Total 65 6,515 100% -- 100% 
 
Table 11.17: Results of the Selected Parameters from JED to AMM as of 2016 under sf = 150 
Assumption for Direct Services. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4,200 66.82% 1.2510 68.73% 
SV Direct 10 1,500 23.89% 1.2819 25.18% 
MS Connecting 14 398 6.31% 0.6987 3.62% 
ME Connecting 7 176 2.80% 1.0180 2.34% 
SV Connecting 2 40 0.18% 0.8329 0.13% 
Total 61 6,314 100%  100% 
 
Table 11.18 shows the market share expectations of the competing carriers in the 
bidirectional market in comparison to base status, obtained merely by averaging the ms 
expectations of the competing carriers in each direction. 
Table 11.18: Market Share Expectations of Carriers in the Bidirectional JED/AMM Market as 
of 2016 and Its Comparison with the Base Status 
 Ms for Scenario 1 Base Case ms 
RJ (direct) 68.33% 72.14% 
SV (direct) 26.14% 22.90% 
ME (connect) 2.18% 1.95% 
MS (connect) 3.21% 2.88% 
AZ (connect) 0.07% 0.07% 
SV (connect) 0.07% 0.06% 
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It is observed in the above table that, the restriction of seat per frequency to 150, caused 
Royal Jordanian (RJ) to lose a portion of its market share expectation from 72.14% to 68.33%. 
Contrarily, Saudi Airlines (SV) flights were estimated to gain ms up from 22.90% in the base 
case to 26.14% in the scenario. These results are within expectations as in the base case sf for 
RJ was 177 and 148.5 for SV. Therefore, sf = 150 worked positively for SV but the other way 
around for RJ. Fixing sf to 150 also led the total seat supply to drop in the market. As per 2016 
schedules, while in the base case the seat supply in JED–AMM route was 7,222 and in AMM–
JED route it was 7,057, the figures were reported as 6,515 and 6,314 respectively under the 
scenario.   For connecting services, although the physical seat supply is unchanged, their market 
share estimations are reported to be slightly above the base case, as the total seat supply is 
dropped by fixing sf for direct services. It is also observed in the tables that, the quality scores 
did not change with the sf as the parameter is unrelated with the quality performance.   
 
 Scenario 2: As per the second scenario of the case, the restriction on seat per frequency 
is lifted and recovered back its original values, but a new entrant is introduced into the market 
operating daily flights. Although it is implausible for such a protected market, it is assumed 
that a virtual airline, airline XY (XY) enters the market with the following schedule 
information. The flight number of the virtual flight from JED to AMM is XY 9997 while it is 
XY 9998 for AMM–JED service. 
Table 11.19: Schedule Information of XY 9997 Simulation Flight   
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
Depart JED 01:35 15:45 15:45 01:35 15:45 15:45 01:35 
Arrive AMM 03:40 17:50 17:50 03:40 17:50 17:50 03:40 
 
Table 11.20: Schedule Information of XY 9998 Simulation Flight 
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
Depart AMM 04:45 19:00 19:00 04:45 19:00 19:00 04:45 
Arrive JED 06:50 21:05 21:05 06:50 21:05 21:05 06:50 
 
 
The simulated XY flights have different departure and arrival times depending on the 
day of the week. The timetable is reported in local times which is identical for Saudi Arabia 
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and Jordan. The flight duration is 125 minutes for each day of the week. On Mondays, 
Thursdays and Sundays, the virtual flight leaves JED at 01:35 am and arrives in AMM at 03:40 
am. The 125-seat aircraft makes a 65-minute ground time in AMM and departs the city at 04:45 
am and arrives back to JED at 06:50 am. In the remaining days of the week, the flight leaves 
JED at 15:45 pm and arrives in AMM at 17:50 pm. On Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Fridays and 
Saturdays, the aircraft is assumed to be a different (larger) type with 180 seats per frequency 
and scheduled to make a 5 minute longer ground time, totalling to 70 minutes. Therefore, the 
simulated XY flight leaves AMM at 19:00 pm and arrives back to JED at 21:05 on Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays. The varying timing scheme of the XY flight leads to 
different quality scores for the carrier, depending on the day of the week. The following table 
summarises available seats (s) and qindex_normalised for the simulated XY flight for different days of 
the week. 
Table 11.21: Available Seats and qindex_normalised Scores of the XY Simulation Flights  
 s XY 9997 qindex_normalised XY 9998 qindex_normalised 
Monday 125 1.2300 1.2644 
Tuesday 180 1.2987 1.3159 
Wednesday 180 1.2987 1.3159 
Thursday 125 1.2300 1.2644 
Friday 180 1.2987 1.3159 
Saturday 180 1.2987 1.3159 
Sunday 125 1.2300 1.2644 
qindex_normalised 1.2752 1.2982 
 
 
The weekly index quality values of XY 9997’s and XY 9998 are computed by weight-
averaging qindex_normalised with the seat availability of each day. Therefore qindex_normalised of XY 9997 
is (4 𝑥 180 𝑥 1.2987) + (3 𝑥 125 𝑥 1.23)
(180 𝑥 4)+(125 𝑥 3)
 = 1.2752 while it is (4 𝑥 180 𝑥 1.3159) + (3 𝑥 125 𝑥 1.2644)
(180 𝑥 4)+(125 𝑥 3)
 = 1.2982 for XY 
9998. Table 11.22 summarises the parameters for each direction including the brand new XY 
9997 and XY 9998 flights. In the JED–AMM route, XY’s qa_index_normalised scores are different 
than qindex_normalised since the scheduled flight time of RJ for the direct flight is 120 minutes, 
whereas it is 125 for XY and 130 for SV. Therefore, while calculating qa_index_normalised for XY, its 
qindex_normalised is discounted by referencing to the shortest direct flight duration, which belongs to 
RJ. On the way back, in the AMM–JED direction, XY’s qa_index_normalised is equal to qa_index_normalised 
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as the carrier offers the shortest direct flight duration together with SV. (Most of the RJ’s 
AMM–JED direct flights are scheduled to last 130 minutes, whereas the figure is 125 for SV 
and XY.) 
Table 11.22: Results of the Selected Parameters from JED to AMM as of 2016 Including XY 
Flight. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4958 60.02 % 1.2974 62.73 % 
SV Direct 12 1749 21.18 % 1.2081 20.61 % 
XY Direct 7 1050 12.71 % 1.2241 12.53 % 
AZ Connecting 4 30 0.21 % 0.7106 0.12 % 
ME Connecting 14 176 2.13 % 0.7277 1.25 % 
MS Connecting 7 309 3.75 % 0.9143 2.76 % 
Total 72 8272 100% -- 100% 
 
Table 11.23: Results of the selected parameters from AMM to JED as of 2016 including U2 
flight. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
RJ Direct 28 4,958 61.36 % 1.2510 62.41 % 
SV Direct 10 1,485 18.39 % 1.2819 19.17 % 
XY Direct 7 1,050 13.01 % 1.2982 13.73 % 
MS Connecting 14 398 4.92 % 0.6987 2.80 % 
ME Connecting 7 176 2.18 % 1.0180 1.80 % 
SV Connecting 2 40 0.14% 0.8329 0.09 % 
Total 68 8,107 100% -- 100% 
 
The tables suggest that, in each direction, 1.050 additional seats became available due 
to the insertion of XY flights. (125 seats on Monday, Thursday and Sundays and 180 seats 
other days add up to 1050 seats per week) Using the information displayed in the above tables, 
it is possible to obtain the bidirectional market share estimation of the carriers competing in 
the JED/AMM market by merely averaging the directional ms values as shown in the table 
below. (The ms of the scenario is contrasted with the base case in the table.) 
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Table 11.24: Market Share Expectations of Carriers in the Bidirectional JED/AMM Market 
Including U2 Flight and Its Comparison With the Base Status 
 ms for Scenario 2 Base Case ms 
RJ (direct) 62.57% 72.14% 
SV (direct) 19.89% 22.90% 
XY (direct) 13.13% N/A 
ME (connect) 1.53% 1.95% 
MS (connect) 2.78% 2.88% 
AZ (connect) 0.06% 0.07% 
SV (connect) 0.04% 0.06% 
 
Table 11.24 implies that the new entrant airline, XY, managed to expect 13.13% of the 
entire market with a single direct flight per day. The home carrier of Jordan (RJ) and home 
carrier of Saudi Arabia (SV) lost considerable market share to the new entrant. This reality 
indeed justifies the rationale behind some nation states protectionist policies aiming to keep 
the competitiveness of their carriers against rivalry. On the other hand, the ms loss is expected 
to be negligible with the connecting products. The share of connecting flights is expected to 
decrease very slightly from 4.96% in the base status to 4.41% in the scenario.  
 
 The scenarios of this case have confirmed the impact of the physical capacity change 
on the market structure. In the first scenario, an analysis is performed by altering the seat supply 
through seat per frequency parameter whereas the second scenario examined a case where a 
different carrier launched a new direct flight. Being able to assess the consumer-centric 
capacity change in the market dynamics through these parameters proves the fulfilment of 
Objective 1 while the ability to calculate the new ms figures shows the accomplishment of 
Objective 3. Moreover, airline practitioners can use this tool to investigate the effect of certain 
parameters on market structures, fulfilling Objective 4 of the research.  
 
11.2.6. Case 6: MAN/DOH:  
The base case has shown that there existed both direct and connecting services between 
DOH and MAN where connecting itineraries were expected to form approximately one-fifth 
of the market. In the base case, Emirates (EK), Etihad (EY), Turkish Airlines (TK) and KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) offered connecting itineraries in the market. The first scenario of 
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this case introduces an assumption which permits one more carrier to enter into the market 
while the second scenario extends the MCT of the competing airlines’ hub airports by 10 
minutes to observe the changes with the results. 
 
Scenario 1: In the first scenario, it is permitted for carriers to make a stop - in addition 
to connection - while reaching to the final destination. Under this assumption, British Airways 
(BA) would be able to offer a product on the route. BA has a domestic flight coded BA1385 
from MAN to Heathrow Airport (LHR) that arrives in LHR at 8 am each day of the week. On 
the other hand, BA125 flight departs LHR airport each day of the week at 11 am and arrives in 
Bahrain (BAH) where the flight makes one-hour stopover (without disembarking passengers 
from the aircraft; they remain on the plane) and then continues to DOH. Therefore, BA offers 
a product from MAN to DOH by making one connection in LHR and a stopover in BAH. On 
the way back, BA124 departs DOH at 23:20 each day, makes a stopover again in BAH and 
arrives in LHR 06:15 am every morning which then could be connected to MAN flights via 
BA1370 or BA1386. The below tables show the routing type (i.e. direct or connecting), total 
weekly frequency (f), seat supply (s), adjusted capacity share (%a_s), adjusted normalised 
quality index (qa_index_normalised) and market share estimation (ms) in the MAN–DOH and DOH–
MAN routes respectively for each airline serving in the market as of summer 2016 schedule. 
 
Table 11.25: Results of the Selected Parameters from MAN to DOH as of 2016 – Including 
BA Connections. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
QR Direct 16 5170 65.13% 1.2846 72.94% 
EK Connecting 21 1680 21.15% 0.9204 16.97% 
EY Connecting 14 434 5.48% 0.9937 4.74% 
KL Connecting 5 157 1.40% 0.9806 1.20% 
TK Connecting 8 285 3.59% 0.7738 2.42% 
BA Connecting 7 257 3.24% 0.6105 1.72% 
Total 71 7983 100% -- 100% 
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Table 11.26: Results of the Selected Parameters from DOH to MAN as of 2016 – Including 
BA Connections. 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
QR Direct 16 5170 69.14% 1.2965 76.04% 
EK Connecting 21 1550 20.64% 0.9517 16.66% 
EY Connecting 14 375 5.03% 0.8473 3.62% 
KL Connecting 5 157 1.48% 0.9296 1.17% 
TK Connecting 3 107 0.60% 0.8476 0.43% 
BA Connecting 7 233 3.11% 0.7868 2.08% 
Total 66 7592 100% -- 100% 
 
It is observed in the tables that, by allowing stopovers into the acceptable product list, 
BA offered a connection in the market. Through this addition, the total frequency was up by 7 
in each route where the total availability increased by 257 seats per week in MAN–DOH route 
and by 233 in the reverse direction. It is also observed in the table that, the BA connections 
reported a more inferior quality as its flights perform one more stop along the way which 
significantly reduces its schedule convenience score. For this reason, BA was expected to have 
a relatively lower ms in comparison to its adjusted seat share. The table below presents the 
market share estimations of the direct and connecting services in the bidirectional MAN/DOH 
route as of 2016 schedule information. 
Table 11.27: Market Share Estimations of Carriers (Table Split in Direct Vs Connecting 
Services View) 
Direct services Connecting Services 
QR 74.49% 
EK 16.81% 
EY 4.18% 
TK 1.43% 
KL 1.18% 
BA 1.91% 
Total Direct 74.49% Total Connect 25.51% 
 
As per the table, with the addition of BA services into the product list, the expected 
market share of the direct services dropped to 74.49% which was 76.17% in the base case. The 
share of connecting services is expected to increase from 23.83% to 25.51%. Indeed, these 
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results are closer to actual MIDT figures cited in the previous chapter which reported that the 
share of direct services amounted to 70.77%. Therefore, it can be concluded that, permitting 
stopover flights into the relevant product list enabled to fine-tune the methodology in the sense 
that some passengers may have no issues preferring such routing and flights. Indeed, the 
methodology suggests that BA could expect 1.91% of the passenger traffic in the market, which 
is corroborated again by the MIDT results reporting slightly above 2% market share for the 
airline in the route.  
 
Scenario 2: In the second scenario, stopovers in connecting products are not permitted 
and the minimum connecting time (MCT) of the connecting airports are extended by 10 
minutes to observe the effect of this parameter on the total consumer-centric capacity supply 
and market share estimation. The surge in the MCT of the hub airports may lead the elimination 
of certain connecting products as the flight combinations having less than 10 minutes of buffer 
time (tbuffer) would not be able to offer a product in the market under this assumption. The below 
table summarises the original and new MCT values of the airports that are used as hubs by the 
carriers offering connecting products in the market. 
Table 11.28: The Original and Assumed MCT Values of the Airports 
Airline Hub Original MCT New MCT 
EK Dubai (DXB) 75 min 85 min 
EY Abu Dhabi (AUH) 60 min 70 min 
TK Istanbul (IST) 60 min 70 min 
KL Amsterdam (AMS) 50 min 60 min 
 
The model was run by using the new MCT information displayed in the above table. In 
the MAN – DOH route, no connections are eliminated from the available product list as the 
connection time of all flight combinations is above the new MCT values of the corresponding 
airports. Therefore, the total frequency, seat supply, adjusted seat share, quality and market 
share estimations are identical to base status in the MAN–DOH direction. However, in the 
DOH – MAN route, the market structure changed slightly due to the increase with the MCT. 
One of EY’s connection hits – EY398/EY15 offering daily connections with 190 seat 
availability per week is no more included in the available products set as the tconn of this 
combination at the AUH airport is 65 minutes, which is less than the new MCT value of AUH 
airport. The following table summarises the parameters in the DOH – MAN after the 
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elimination of EY398/EY15 hit. It should be noted that EY still offers a product in the route 
via its EY390/EY21 hit which has a tconn of 4 hours and 5 minutes that is higher than the new 
MCT and less than the MaxCT.  
Table 11.29: Results of the Selected Parameters from DOH to MAN as of 2016 – Under the 
New MCT Information 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
QR Direct 16 5170 73.22% 1.2965 79.22% 
EK Connecting 21 1550 21.95% 0.9517 17.43% 
EY Connecting 7 185 2.62% 0.7663 1.68% 
KL Connecting 5 157 1.56% 0.9296 1.21% 
TK Connecting 3 107 0.65% 0.8476 0.46% 
Total 52 7169 100% – 100% 
  
It is inferred from the above table that, EY's quality score in the DOH–MAN route has 
dropped to 0.7663 which was 0.8473 in the base status and scenario 1. Since the remaining hit 
of EY reports a longer journey time and less convenient departure and arrival times, the carrier 
is expected to offer lower qa_index_normalised in the market.  Naturally, the adjusted seat share and 
ms of EY has also fallen due to the reduction in the quantity and quality of the carrier’s 
available products. The table below presents the market share estimations of the direct and 
connecting services in the bidirectional MAN/DOH route as of 2016 schedule information 
obtained by simply averaging the carriers directional ms expectations. The ms values are also 
compared with the base status and scenario 1. 
Table 11.30: Market Share Estimations of Carriers under the New MCT Information 
Carrier Scenario 2 ms Scenario 1 ms Base Status ms 
QR 76.97% 74.49% 76.17% 
EK 17.42% 16.81% 17.23% 
EY 3.26% 4.18% 4.26% 
TK 1.12% 1.43% 1.11% 
KL 1.23% 1.18% 1.23% 
BA N/A 1.91% N/A 
 
It is observed in the table that, EY’s market share estimation was reduced due to the 
increase in the MCT of the airports which affected one of the EY’s connections. Testing the 
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significance of the changed MCTs, implementing the paired proportion test on the carriers’ ms 
scores scenario 2 and base status, a p value of 0.715 is obtained implying insignificance. 
Therefore, increasing the MCTs by 10 minutes does not have a significant effect on the market 
share estimations for the sake of this case. However, this finding should not infer that increasing 
MCT by 10 minutes does not always have a significant effect on market share estimation of 
the REMSET model. For a different O&D pair and competition scheme, such a scenario of 
increased MCT might have a significant effect on ms forecasts. Being able to assess the ms 
impact of the changing MCTs is a definite accomplishment Objective 3 and 4. Additionally, 
the model enabled the measurement of the supply and quality impact of this change for the 
carrier which serves as attainment of Objective 1 and 2 of the research.  
 
11.2.7. Case 7: LGW/BKK:  
The base case has studied the traffic between London’s Gatwick Airport and Bangkok 
Suvarnabhumi airport which was found to be served by two of the listed carriers, Emirates 
(EK) and Turkish Airlines (TK). The scenarios of this case examine the traffic between other 
London airports and Bangkok Suvarnabhumi (BKK) airport as of 2016 schedules. The first 
scenario analyses the traffic between Heathrow Airport (LHR) to Bangkok where the second 
scenario examines the traffic between Stansted (STN) and BKK.  
 
Scenario 1: This scenario investigates the LHR/BKK market. Unlike the LGW airport, 
the volume of competition between LHR and BKK is intense. The following table shows the 
total frequency, seat supply and the number of airlines competing in the market for each 
direction. The table also contrasts these values with the base case.  
Table 11.31: Total Number of Airlines Competing in the Market, Weekly Frequency (f) and 
Seat Supply (s) for Each Direction and Comparison with the Base Case 
 Competing Airline Count Frequency (f) Seat (s) 
LHR – BKK 17 191 12,978 
BKK – LHR 18 187 12,583 
LGW – BKK (base status) 2 35 2,515 
BKK – LGW (base status) 2 35 2,515 
 
It is observed in the table that, for each direction, London Heathrow airport offer 
approximately 5 times more frequency and seats to BKK compared to Gatwick airport. On the 
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other hand, 15 more carriers in comparison to the base case operate from LHR to BKK while 
there exists 16 more airlines flying from BKK to LHR. In the base case, EK was the dominant 
carrier in both directions with 76.84% ms in the LGW – BKK route and 83.39% in the BKK – 
LGW. The table below displays the top 5 carriers’ market share estimation by averaging the 
figures in each direction in LHR/BKK with a comparison to the base status.  
Table 11.32: Top 5 carriers’ ms values in LHR/BKK market and its comparison with 
LGW/BKK. 
 LHR/BKK LGW/BKK 
EK 21.59% 80.12% 
BA 25.46% N/A 
QR 16.19% N/A 
EY 10.27% N/A 
TK 5.65% 19.88% 
 
It is observed in the tables that, in the LHR/BKK market, the Middle Eastern carriers 
are reported to have a considerable market share expectation. EK reported being the market 
leader with 26.93% and 23.99% market share estimation in the LHR inbound and outbound 
services respectively. On the other hand, whilst TK was second in the LGW/BKK market, the 
carrier ranked fifth in LHR/BKK.  
 
 Scenario 2: In this scenario, another London airport, Stansted (STN) was selected to 
study its competition level to/from BKK route. However, as of 2016 schedule data, none of the 
listed carriers was able to offer a product from STN to BKK. On the reverse direction, only one 
carrier, Austrian Airlines (OS) operated a codeshare flight only on Thursdays where the seat 
availability of the carrier was limited to only 9. Due to this negligible capacity, it can be 
concluded that there existed almost no service in the STN/BKK market as of 2016 schedules. 
 
The scenarios of this case showed that different airports of the cities might have 
different competitive dynamics which needs to be taken into account by the airline practitioners 
while designing their network and scheduling strategies. This process indeed refers to the 
fulfilment of Objective 4 of the research.  
  
11.2.8. Case 8: LAS/MIA:  
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As studied in the previous chapter, LAS/MIA is an American domestic market where 
listed carriers only operate through their codeshare services. The first scenario of this case 
includes the assumption of an additional codeshare agreement while the second scenario 
involves the reduction of tbuffer from 30 minutes to 10 minutes, implying that passengers demand 
less time on top of the MCT to deem their journey more convenient and less stressful.  
 
Scenario 1: For this scenario, a carrier which does not offer a codeshare product in the 
market is assumed to settle a codeshare deal with an American carrier in both directions. For 
this scenario, Qatar Airways (QR) signs off a codeshare deal that enables the carrier to offer 
direct non-operating services in both directions with 45 seats available on each route. The 
codeshare flight is scheduled to depart LAS at 10 am local time in the morning and arrive MIA 
at 19:45 local time. On the other direction, the codeshare flight of the QR leaves MIA at 19:30 
local time and arrives in LAS at 21:30 local time. The tables below show the airline, routing, 
weekly frequency (f), weekly seat supply (s), adjusted seat share (%a_s), adjusted normalised 
quality index (qa_index_normalised) and market share estimation (ms) of the competing carriers 
including QR’s brand new non-operating flight in the LAS – MIA market and MIA – LAS 
markets respectively. 
Table 11.33: Parameters for LAS–MIA Market as of 2016 Schedule Including QR Flight 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AY Direct 3 144 1.56% 0.8754 1.62% 
BA Direct 28 1393 35.27% 0.9273 38.70% 
IB Direct 14 721 18.25% 0.9060 19.56% 
QR Direct 7 315 7.98% 0.9362 8.84% 
AF Connecting 26 246 6.23% 0.7269 5.36% 
AY Connecting 5 48 0.87% 0.5783 0.60% 
AZ Connecting 9 82 2.07% 0.6982 1.71% 
BA Connecting 64 625 15.84% 0.7019 13.16% 
EI Connecting 4 32 0.46% 0.7281 0.40% 
EY Connecting 7 67 1.70% 0.7747 1.56% 
KL Connecting 31 288 7.30% 0.7594 6.56% 
SK Connecting 6 53 0.77% 0.6925 0.63% 
TP Connecting 8 78 1.69% 0.6592 1.32% 
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It is observed in the table that, the new non-operating QR flight is estimated to be the 
best schedule quality product in the market and is expected to gain 8.84% ms. It is also observed 
in the table that the qa_index_normalised of the competing carriers are identical to base status as the 
new joined QR flight does not offer the shortest ttotal of the available itineraries in the market. 
Since qa_index_normalised is computed in reference to the lowest total journey time for direct and 
connecting services separately, QR’s ttotal which is not the smallest in the market keep 
qa_index_normalised intact for the competing carriers. In LAS – MIA route, among the listed carriers, 
the shortest ttotal belongs to IB for direct flights, with 4 hours and 49 minutes while it is 5 hours 
for QR. The following table summarises the same parameters in the reverse direction. 
 
Table 11.34 Parameters in the MIA–LAS market as of 2016 schedule 
Airline Routing f s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AB Direct 7 393 8.03% 0.9234 8.66% 
BA Direct 28 1393 28.46% 0.9451 31.41% 
IB Direct 21 1057 21.59% 0.9406 23.71% 
QR Direct 7 315 6.44% 0.9690 7.29% 
AF Connecting 23 230 4.70% 0.7435 4.08% 
AZ Connecting 14 134 2.75% 0.6779 2.18% 
BA Connecting 74 743 15.19% 0.7168 12.71% 
EI Connecting 1 9 0.11% 0.5432 0.07% 
EY Connecting 21 221 4.51% 0.6091 3.21% 
KL Connecting 35 324 6.62% 0.7243 5.60% 
RJ Connecting 4 38 0.45% 0.5331 0.28% 
SK Connecting 9 82 0.72% 0.5924 0.50% 
TP Connecting 4 37 0.43% 0.6131 0.31% 
  
 
It is inferred from the table that, qa_index_normalised scores for direct service carriers (AB, BA 
and IB) have slightly dropped. This is due to newly added QR flight which offers the shortest 
ttotal in the market among the listed carriers. While ttotal of QR is 5 hours, the following shortest 
itinerary belongs to BA and IB with 5 hours and 4 minutes. QR is again calculated to offer the 
best schedule quality score in the market and is expected to gain 7.29% of the market despite 
its 6.44% adjusted seat share.  
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 Scenario 2: In this scenario, the codeshare agreement of QR is cancelled and the buffer 
time request of passengers is reduced from 30 minutes to 10 minutes. Such an adjustment 
implies that passengers need less additional time on top of the MCT to make their journeys less 
stressful and more convenient. The below tables summarises the %a_s, qa_index_normalised and ms 
parameters under the new tbuffer in each direction and includes the comparison with the base 
status. 
Table 11.35: Parameters for LAS–MIA Market as of 2016 Schedule Under tbuffer = 10 Minutes 
Assumption 
Airline Routing Scenario 2 Base Status 
%a_s qa_index_normalised ms %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AY Direct 1.70% 0.8754 1.79% 1.70% 0.8754 1.78% 
BA Direct 38.33% 0.9273 42.84% 38.33% 0.9273 42.45% 
IB Direct 19.84% 0.9060 21.67% 19.84% 0.9060 21.47% 
AF Connecting 6.77% 0.6990 5.70% 6.77% 0.7269 5.88% 
AY Connecting 0.94% 0.5554 0.63% 0.94% 0.5783 0.65% 
AZ Connecting 2.25% 0.6688 1.81% 2.25% 0.6982 1.88% 
BA Connecting 17.22% 0.6953 14.43% 17.22% 0.7019 14.43% 
EI Connecting 0.50% 0.7001 0.42% 0.50% 0.7281 0.43% 
EY Connecting 1.85% 0.7454 1.66% 1.85% 0.7747 1.71% 
KL Connecting 7.93% 0.7253 6.93% 7.93% 0.7594 7.19% 
SK Connecting 0.83% 0.6648 0.67% 0.83% 0.6925 0.69% 
TP Connecting 1.84% 0.6455 1.43% 1.84% 0.6592 1.45% 
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Table 11.36: Parameters for MIA - LAS Market as of 2016 Schedule under tbuffer = 10 Minutes 
assumption 
Airline Routing Scenario 2 Base Status 
%a_s qa_index_normalised ms %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
AB Direct 8.58% 0.9361 9.46% 8.58% 0.9361 9.37% 
BA Direct 30.42% 0.9581 34.33% 30.42% 0.9581 34.01% 
IB Direct 23.08% 0.9535 25.92% 23.08% 0.9535 25.68% 
AF Connecting 5.03% 0.7248 4.29% 5.03% 0.7435 4.36% 
AZ Connecting 2.94% 0.6553 2.27% 2.94% 0.6779 2.33% 
BA Connecting 16.24% 0.6967 13.33% 16.24% 0.7168 13.59% 
EI Connecting 0.12% 0.5236 0.07% 0.12% 0.5432 0.08% 
EY Connecting 4.83% 0.5899 3.36% 4.83% 0.6091 3.43% 
KL Connecting 7.08% 0.6990 5.83% 7.08% 0.7243 5.98% 
RJ Connecting 0.48% 0.5170 0.29% 0.48% 0.5331 0.30% 
SK Connecting 0.77% 0.5730 0.52% 0.77% 0.5924 0.53% 
TP Connecting 0.46% 0.5937 0.32% 0.46% 0.6131 0.33% 
 
Table 11.36 and 11.36 suggest that decreasing tbuffer does not impact the adjusted seat 
share and quality scores for direct services as the parameter is only concerned with the 
connecting itineraries. Furthermore, it does not affect %a_s for connecting services too as the 
criteria of being a valid hit is not concerned with the tbuffer but related with the MCT and the 
MaxCT. The reduction of tbuffer to 10 minutes is expected to change the quality scores of the 
connecting products depending on the MCT surplus figures of the itineraries. The adjusted 
quality score of the carriers would increase in case the stress time would fall due to the 
reduction with the tbuffer. Since tbuffer is set to 10 minutes, it is now impossible for carriers to 
report a stress time greater than 10 minutes. On the other hand,  qa_index_normalised would decrease 
for the carriers whose waste time at the hub airport would increase due to the reduction of the 
tbuffer. For instance, an itinerary having 1 hour of MCT surplus time would have the waste time 
of 30 minutes under tbuffer = 30 minutes. The reduction of tbuffer to 10 minutes would increase 
the waste time of this itinerary to 50 minutes which has a negative effect on passenger 
convenience and thus the qa_index_normalised score. For this scenario, all connecting service 
providers’ adjusted indexed quality score dropped after the reduction of tbuffer as the waste time 
of the itineraries has increased.  
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Implementing Mann-Whitney tests on the qa_index_normalised scores of the carriers for base 
status and scenario results, offering connecting products for both directions, a p value of 0.008 
is calculated. Therefore, reducing tbuffer by 20 minutes would have a statistically significant 
effect on the schedule convenience scores of the competing connecting carriers in the 
LAS/MIA market. Although a reduction in the buffer time request does have a statistically 
significant effect on the quality scores of the connecting carriers, it is deduced from the tables 
that, it had a limited effect on market share estimation of the carriers. Implementing paired 
proportion test on the market share estimations of all carriers present in the route, a p value of 
0.866 is observed implying insignificance with respect to the base status. As direct service 
operators dominate the market in terms of supply and their quality scores are unchanged in 
response to reduced tbuffer, observing a statistically insignificant change with the market share 
results is not unexpected. The ms change was positive for all direct service operators as the 
relative quality of connecting services worsened in comparison to the base case due to the 
longer waste time. The minor change in the ms estimation should not infer that tbuffer does not 
have a big effect on the market share estimation. tbuffer’s influence on ms might have been 
higher under different circumstances. Along with the absolute value of the tbuffer, parameters 
such as the number of competing airlines, their seat supply and MCT surplus figures shape the 
magnitude impact of tbuffer on the ms either positively or negatively depending on the specific 
conditions of the itinerary. 
 
 This first scenario of this case has shown that the effectiveness of an additional 
codeshare agreement can be analysed quantitatively in terms of the research outputs: %a_s, 
qa_index_normalised and ms, fulfilling Objective 1, 2 and 3 of the research. Being able to assess these 
outputs offers an indispensable tool for airline planners in the sense that they could maximise 
the benefits of their codeshare agreements referring to the accomplishment of Objective 4. 
Furthermore, the second scenario demonstrated the effect of tbuffer on the quality scores and 
market share forecasts, further crediting the contentment of the research objectives. 
 
11.2.9. Case 9: Portugal/Serbia:  
The base case has shown that there existed no direct services between Portugal and 
Serbia and the home carrier of Portugal (TP) lacked service in the market.  The first scenario 
of this case introduces a direct daily flight of TP between Lisbon and Belgrade with a narrow-
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body aircraft having 180 seats while the second case involves the upgrade of the aircraft type 
for the newly added flight from a narrow body to a wide-body jet having 300 seats. 
 
Scenario 1: In this scenario, TAP Portugal Airlines (TP) places daily flights between 
Lisbon (LIS) and Belgrade (BEG) with a narrow-body aircraft having 180 seats. The flight 
leaves LIS at 07:30 am Portuguese local time and arrives to BEG at 11:40 am Serbian local 
time. After 80 minutes of ground time, the aircraft departs from BEG at 13:00 pm local time 
and arrives in LIS at 15:15 pm local time. The following table summarizes the routing, total 
weekly frequency (f), seat supply (s), seat share (%s), adjusted capacity share (%a_s), adjusted 
normalised quality index (qa_index_normalised) and market share estimation (ms) from Portugal to 
Serbia and Serbia to Portugal as of 2016 schedule data including the newly added flight of TP. 
 
Table 11.37: Parameters from Portugal to Serbia as of 2016 Schedule Data Including TP 
Service. 
Airline Routing f s %s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
TP Direct 7 1260 43.62% 47.08% 1.2815 62.30% 
AB Connecting 2 15 0.53% 0.16% 0.5422 0.09% 
AZ Connecting 11 97 3.37% 2.08% 0.6667 1.43% 
EY Connecting 25 196 6.77% 7.31% 0.5982 4.51% 
IB Connecting 1 10 0.35% 0.05% 0.7591 0.04% 
KL Connecting 11 84 2.92% 3.16% 0.5991 1.95% 
LH Connecting 27 621 21.51% 23.21% 0.7360 17.64% 
LX Connecting 4 43 1.50% 0.69% 0.5571 0.40% 
OS Connecting 6 58 2.02% 1.87% 0.5968 1.15% 
SK Connecting 16 141 4.87% 5.26% 0.5450 2.96% 
TP Connecting 7 197 6.81% 7.35% 0.7951 6.04% 
U2 Connecting 5 166 5.73% 1.77% 0.8153 1.49% 
Total 122 2888 100% 100% -- 100% 
 
It is observed in the table that; the new direct flight of TP is estimated to receive 62.30% 
of the market from Portugal to Serbia. On the other hand, TP’s addition of direct flights from 
LIS to BEG led some connecting traffic to occur from Portugal to Serbia as the domestic flights 
of Portugal could be connected to this new flight. For instance, TP1921 leaving Porto and 
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arriving in Lisbon is connected to the new flight and offered a product from Porto to Belgrade. 
The connecting services of TP which are created due to the addition of the virtual LIS–BEG 
direct flight are estimated to obtain 6.04% of the market. Therefore, by inserting one direct 
flight, TP is expected to get 68.04% of the entire traffic from Portugal to Serbia. The following 
table summarises the same parameters on the reverse (Serbia-Portugal) direction.  
Table 11.38: Parameters for the Serbia-Portugal Route as of 2016 Schedule Data Including TP 
Service.  
Airline Routing f s %s %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
TP Direct 7 1260 38.27% 40.17% 1.2987 55.88% 
AB Connecting 3 23 0.70% 0.21% 0.5144 0.12% 
AF Connecting 7 65 1.98% 2.08% 0.6327 1.41% 
AZ Connecting 10 78 2.36% 1.42% 0.6977 1.06% 
EY Connecting 16 134 4.08% 4.28% 0.5447 2.50% 
KL Connecting 7 54 1.63% 1.71% 0.5064 0.93% 
LH Connecting 38 739 22.46% 23.57% 0.7167 18.08% 
LX Connecting 20 300 9.11% 9.56% 0.7221 7.40% 
OS Connecting 2 34 1.02% 0.15% 0.7182 0.11% 
SK Connecting 28 262 7.96% 8.36% 0.5724 5.12% 
TP Connecting 7 209 6.34% 6.66% 0.7890 5.63% 
U2 Connecting 4 134 4.08% 1.84% 0.8926 1.76% 
Total 149 3292 100% 100% -- 100% 
 
 It is observed in the table that the TP’s direct service is estimated to receive 55.88% of 
the market while the connecting products formed through the addition of this direct flight is 
forecasted to obtain 5.63% of the market. Therefore, TP’s flight made the airline to obtain 
61.51% of the traffic from Serbia to Portugal. The following table summarises the bidirectional 
market share estimation of this scenario calculated by averaging each direction's ms values. 
The table also compares the computed figures with the base status. 
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Table 11.39: Bidirectional Market Shares in Portugal/Serbia Bidirectional Market 
 ms for Scenario 1 Base Case ms 
TP (direct) 59.09% N/A 
AB (connect) 0.11% 0.31% 
AF (connect) 0.70% 1.62% 
AZ (connect) 1.25% 3.54% 
EY (connect) 3.50% 10.12% 
IB (connect) 0.02% 0.07% 
KL (connect) 1.44% 5.04% 
LH (connect) 17.86% 50.64% 
LX (connect) 3.90% 11.23% 
OS (connect) 0.63% 1.95% 
SK (connect) 4.04% 10.67% 
TP (connect) 5.84% N/A 
U2 (connect) 1.62% 4.81% 
 
Table 11.39 shows the bidirectional market share estimation in the Serbia/Portugal 
market where the newly added frequency of TP leads the carrier to get 59.09% + 5.84% = 
64.93% of the market through direct and connecting itineraries. Therefore, the addition of a 
single frequency by TP would yield the carrier to expect a very high market share. This is 
indeed a critical finding for the industry practitioners that refers to the accomplishment of 
Objective 4 of the research. Additionally, being able to track the whole airlines’ consumer-
centric capacity, schedule quality score and market share estimations after the addition of TP 
flights is a clear accomplishment of Objective 1, 2 and 3.  
 
 Scenario 2: The previous case has analysed the changing market dynamics after the 
insertion of daily TP flight with a narrow-body aircraft having 180 seats. In this scenario, TP's 
additional flight is upgraded to a wide-body aircraft having 300 seats while all other parameters 
including the departure and arrival times as well as the daily operation scheme are kept intact. 
The following table summarises the bidirectional market share estimation of this scenario 
calculated by averaging each route’s ms values given the wide-body operation of TP. The table 
also compares the figures with the base status and scenario 1. 
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Table 11.40: Bidirectional Market Shares in Portugal/Serbia Bidirectional Market 
 ms for Scenario 2 ms for Scenario 1 Base Case ms 
TP (direct) 70.61% 59.09% N/A 
AB (connect) 0.07% 0.11% 0.31% 
AF (connect) 0.51% 0.70% 1.62% 
AZ (connect) 0.89% 1.25% 3.54% 
EY (connect) 2.51% 3.50% 10.12% 
IB (connect) 0.01% 0.02% 0.07% 
KL (connect) 1.03% 1.44% 5.04% 
LH (connect) 12.82% 17.86% 50.64% 
LX (connect) 2.84% 3.90% 11.23% 
OS (connect) 0.45% 0.63% 1.95% 
SK (connect) 2.92% 4.04% 10.67% 
TP (connect) 4.18% 5.84% N/A 
U2 (connect) 1.16% 1.62% 4.81% 
 
It is observed in the table that, the upgrade of TP's direct services from a 180-seat 
narrow-body aircraft to 300-seat jet leads the ms of the carrier to increase from 59.09% to 
70.61%. Although the per cent rise in the seat capacity is (300-180)/180 = 66.66% daily and 
weekly (as the flight is operated daily), the rise in the market share expectation is only limited 
to (70.61-59.09)/59.09 = 19.5% which is significantly less than 66.66%. Therefore, this 
scenario confirms that the return on capacity investment in terms of market share estimation is 
not proportional to the supply affirming the S curve principle mentioned in the literature 
review. 
 
The scenarios of this case have demonstrated that the research methodologies can be 
implemented for different scenarios at the country-to-country market level. Being able to 
numerically assess the effect of a direct service insertion on the market dynamics accomplished 
Objective 1 (as the new capacity shares of the competing carriers were calculated) and 
Objective 3 (as the ms figures were successfully retrieved). Moreover, Objective 4 was also 
achieved as the methodology offered a distinctive tool for industry experts to review the market 
scheme at a broader level.  
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 11.2.10. Case 10: The United Kingdom / Israel:  
The base case has shown that multiple airlines competed through their direct and 
connecting services between the UK and Israel. While direct service operators, British Airways 
(BA), El – Al Israel Airlines (LY) and Easyjet (U2) composed a significant portion of the 
market, more than 16 airlines in each route competed for the remaining shares via their 
connecting products.  
 
Scenario 1 & 2: The first scenario of this case increases the connecting seat factor, sconn, 
from 20% to 100% implying that all seats of a flight can be allotted to connecting itineraries 
while the second scenario reduces the same parameter to 5%. %a_s, qa_index_normalised and ms of the 
competing carriers for both directions are displayed in the table below. 
 
Table 11.41: ms Expectations at the Routing and Market Breakdown in the UK/Israel Market 
as of 2016 Schedule Data for Scenario 1 (sconn = 100%) and Scenario 2 (sconn = 5%). 
 
 
Scenario 1 
(sconn = 100%) 
Scenario 2 
(sconn = 5%) 
Base Status 
(sconn = 20%) 
%a_s ms %a_s ms %a_s ms 
U
K
–
Is
ra
el
 
Direct Flights 18.70% 26.94% 82.14% 88.06% 53.49% 64.84% 
BA 7.46% 10.87% 32.75% 35.54% 21.33% 26.17% 
LY 6.08% 8.79% 26.72% 28.71% 17.40% 21.14% 
U2 5.16% 7.28% 22.67% 23.81% 14.76% 17.53% 
Connecting 
Flights 
81.30% 73.06% 17.86% 11.94% 46.51% 34.17% 
TK 17.36% 15.22% 3.81% 2.49% 9.93% 7.32% 
LH 11.81% 11.63% 2.59% 1.90% 6.76% 5.60% 
PC 7.99% 7.17% 1.75% 1.17% 4.57% 3.45% 
LX 6.67% 6.93% 1.46% 1.13% 3.81% 3.34% 
OS 5.54% 4.46% 1.22% 0.73% 3.17% 2.15% 
Other 12 carriers 31.93% 27.65% 7.03% 4.52% 18.27% 12.31% 
Is
ra
el
–
U
K
 
Direct Flights 16.70% 24.82% 80.04% 86.85% 50.06% 62.28% 
BA 6.66% 10.03% 31.92% 35.10% 19.96% 25.17% 
LY 5.43% 8.02% 26.03% 28.06% 16.28% 20.12% 
U2 4.61% 6.77% 22.09% 23.69% 13.82% 16.99% 
Connecting 
Flights 
83.30% 75.18% 19.96% 13.15% 49.94% 37.72% 
TK 15.58% 13.37% 3.73% 2.34% 9.34% 6.71% 
LH 10.29% 9.00% 2.47% 1.57% 6.17% 4.52% 
PC 6.75% 5.82% 1.62% 1.02% 4.05% 2.92% 
OS 4.95% 5.76% 1.18% 1.01% 2.96% 2.89% 
BA 5.34% 4.76% 1.28% 0.63% 3.20% 2.39% 
Other 13 carriers 40.39% 36.47% 9.68% 6.58% 24.22% 18.29% 
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  Table 11.41 proves that depending on the sconn value, the adjusted seat share and market 
share expectations of the carriers change significantly especially for a market like UK/Israel 
where a vast number of connecting products compete. As the sconn drops, direct service 
providers dominate the market and obtain further additional market shares. The following table 
illustrates the bidirectional adjusted seat shares and market share estimations obtained by 
averaging the directional results.  
Table 11.42 Bidirectional Adjusted Seat Share and Market Share Estimation as of 2016 
 Scenario 1 (sconn = 100%) Scenario 2 (sconn = 5%) Scenario 2 (sconn = 20%) 
 %a_s ms %a_s Ms %a_s ms 
Direct 17.70% 25.88% 81.09% 87.55% 51.78% 64.05% 
Connecting 82.30% 74.12% 18.91% 12.45% 48.22% 35.95% 
 
As per the MIDT data, slightly more than 68% of the entire UK/Israel market was 
owned by the direct service providers while connecting products served the remaining 32%. 
As per the above results in Table 11.42, setting sconn to 100%, the market share estimation for 
direct service carriers are calculated as 17.7% while the figure is 81.09% in case sconn is set to 
5%.  The real market share of the direct service operators are 68% which is accurately estimated 
as 64.05% assuming sconn to be 20%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the base case reported 
a closer market share estimation to the actual figures in comparison to scenario 1 and scenario 
2, crediting the sconn = 20% assumption in comparison to sconn = 100% and sconn = 5% 
assumptions. However, the scenarios of this case have successfully shown the impact of sconn 
on %a_s and ms, fulfilling Objective 1, 3 and 4 of the research. 
 
11.2.11. Case 11: Italy / Italy:  
The base case has studied the Italian domestic direct market and addressed that many 
non-Italian carriers competed in the market through their non-operating services. The scenarios 
of this case analyse the changing market dynamics in codeshare operations which forms an 
integral aspect of the Italian domestic market. 
 
Scenario 1: The first scenario of the case entirely cancels the codeshare agreements by 
setting scode to 0%. Therefore any carriers lacking physical domestic flights within Italy are 
excluded from the competition. The following table summarises the frequency, seat count and 
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market share expectations of the competing carriers under scode = 0% assumption along with a 
comparison with the base case.  
Table 11.43: Weekly Frequency, Seat Count and Market Share Estimation of Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 1 Base Status 
f s ms f s ms 
AZ 2,610 347,203 53.54% 2,610 347,203 42.96% 
FR 1,264 238,896 36.83% 1,264 238,896 29.59% 
U2 388 62,448 9.63% 388 62,448 7.75% 
Others 0 0 0 4,916 218,228 19.70% 
Total 4,262 648,547 100% 9,178 866,775 100% 
  
Table 11.43 suggests that the whole capacity available for sale in the market would be 
equal to the physical capacity under scode = 0 assumption. Therefore, the elimination of the 
codeshare agreements enables Alitalia (AZ), Ryanair (FR) and Easyjet (U2) to obtain the entire 
Italian domestic market where AZ is estimated to hold more than half of the market. Compared 
to the base case, the elimination of codeshare operations increases AZ’s ms by 10.58 points 
while the figure is calculated to be 7.24 points for FR and 1.88 for U2.   
 
 Scenario 2: The second scenario enables the full capacity of the operating carrier to be 
sold by the marketing airline which is achieved by setting scode to 100%. The following table 
summarises the frequency, seat supply and market share estimation figures under scode = 100% 
assumption, compared again with the base status. 
 
 Table 11.44: Weekly Frequency, Seat Count and Market Share Estimation of Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 Base Status 
f s ms f s ms 
AZ 2,610 347,203 16.96% 2,610 347,203 42.96% 
FR 1,264 238,896 8.03% 1,264 238,896 29.59% 
U2 388 62,448 0.55% 388 62,448 7.75% 
Others 4,916 727,429 74.46% 4,916 218,228 19.70% 
Total 9,178 1,375,976 100% 9,178 866,775 100% 
 
 Enabling marketing carriers to sell the entire capacity of the operating airline 
enormously enhances the total weekly capacity available for sale above 1.3 million, despite the 
physical seat capacity of 648,547. On the other hand, the sum of market share estimation for 
the operating service providers (AZ, FR and U2) is expected to fall from 80.30% to 25.54%. 
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 As per the MIDT data, as of 2016, slightly above 85% of the Italian domestic market 
was owned by AZ, FR, U2 and Meridiana Airlines. (Meridiana is not a listed carrier.) As the 
methodology assumed scode to be 30% by default, and the sum of AZ’s, FR’s and U2's ms is 
computed to be 80.30% excluding Meridiana’s shares, it can be inferred that scode = 30% is a 
credible assumption justified by the MIDT results. Being able to assess the change in the 
airlines’ ms values under different scode assumptions, is a clear achievement of Objective 1 and 
3. Moreover, the scenarios of this case have demonstrated the impact of codeshare seat factor 
on market dynamics, offering an essential decision-support tool for the industry practitioners, 
fulfilling Objective 4.   
 
 11.2.12. Case 12: Turkey / Turkey:  
The base case has studied direct domestic Turkish market and demonstrated that unlike 
the Italian case, it was less open to competition in terms of codeshare agreements. The 
following scenarios investigate the variations with the ms in case the adjusted indexed quality 
scores of some carriers were altered. 
 
 Scenario 1: In this scenario, it is assumed that the codeshare operators ameliorate their 
adjusted index quality scores by 10% while all other supply related parameters remain intact. 
The increase with the adjusted index quality score could be achieved through several methods 
such as changing the timetable of the flights, shortening journey times or assuming a higher 
value perception concerning the codeshare flights (udc). Therefore, qa_index_normalised figures of Air 
Berlin (AB), SAS Scandinavian Airlines (SK), Austrian Airlines (AT) and TAP Portugal (TP) 
were escalated by 10%. Turkish Airlines’ (TK) and Pegasus Airlines’ (PC) qa_index_normalised are 
assumed to remain unchanged. The following table summarises the weekly frequency, seat 
supply, former and ameliorated indexed quality scores and market share estimations compared 
with the base case. 
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Table 11.45: The Parameters for the Turkish Domestic Market for Each Airline as of 2016 
Schedule Information, Their Market Share Estimation and the Comparison with the Base Status 
 
Scenario 1 Base Status 
f s qa_index_normalised ms f s qa_index_normalised ms 
TK 4,171 721,283 1.2941 64.88% 4,171 721,283 1.2941 65.04% 
PC 1,923 359,721 1.2988 32.48% 1,923 359,721 1.2988 32.56% 
AB 255 14,234 1.0363 1.03% 255 14,234 0.9421 0.93% 
SK 287 15,047 1.0286 1.08% 287 15,047 0.9351 0.98% 
AT 70 3,742 1.0451 0.27% 70 3,742 0.9501 0.25% 
TP 63 3,646 1.0229 0.26% 63 3,646 0.9299 0.24% 
Total 6,769 1,117,673 -- 100.00% 6,769 1,117,673 -- 100.00% 
 
It is observed in the table that, as the qa_index_normalised scores of the carriers increased, so 
did the market share estimations of the codeshare operators by taking away from the shares of 
the operating carriers. While in the base case, the total sum of market share estimations for 
codeshare operators, AB, SK, AT and TP, was equal to 2.40%, a 10% increase with the 
qa_index_normalised score enabled these airlines to increase their market share estimation to 2.64%, 
contributing to 0.24 points increase or 10% surge in the estimated market share. Therefore, a 
10% rise in the quality scores of the marketing carriers contributed to their ms sum by 10% 
proportionally.  
 
 Scenario 2: The second scenario of the case recovers the qa_index_normalised scores of the 
codeshare operators to their original values but decreases the operating airlines’ qa_index_normalised 
scores by 10% and keeps all the remaining supply related parameters intact. Therefore only 
Turkish Airlines (TK) and Pegasus Airlines (PC) quality scores were affected under in this 
scenario. The reduction of the adjusted normalised quality scores for the operating services 
might have happened due to various reasons like a worse timetable or consumers’ decreasing 
value perception towards direct and operating services (udc).  The table below depicts the 
frequency, seat count and qa_index_normalised scores for Scenario 2 and its comparison with the base 
case.  
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Table 11.46: Parameters for Scenario 2 for Turkish Domestic Market as of 2016 Compared 
with the Base Case 
 
Scenario 2 Base Status 
f s qa_index_normalised ms f s qa_index_normalised ms 
TK 4,171 721,283 1.1647 64.87% 4,171 721,283 1.2941 65.04% 
PC 1,923 359,721 1.1689 32.47% 1,923 359,721 1.2988 32.56% 
AB 255 14,234 0.9421 1.04% 255 14,234 0.9421 0.93% 
SK 287 15,047 0.9351 1.09% 287 15,047 0.9351 0.98% 
AT 70 3,742 0.9501 0.27% 70 3,742 0.9501 0.25% 
TP 63 3,646 0.9299 0.26% 63 3,646 0.9299 0.24% 
Total 6,769 1,117,673 -- 100.00% 6,769 1,117,673 -- 100.00% 
 
 Table 11.46 suggests that a 10% reduction in the adjusted index quality score of the 
operating carriers led to a very slight decrease with the market share estimation of those 
carriers. Although the sum of TK’s and PC’s market share summed to 97.6% in the base case, 
the figure is reduced to 97.34% in this scenario, contributing to 0.26 points of drop, referring 
to 0.27% decline. Although the first scenario suggested that, 10% rise in the quality score 
increased the market share expectations of those carriers proportionally by 10%, the second 
scenario proved that 10% drop in qa_index_normalised scores for operating carriers did not lead a 
similar and proportional 10% drop with the ms due to the overwhelming capacity of the direct 
services. It is also observed in Tables 11.45 and 11.46 that, the market share estimations of the 
carriers are almost identical in the first and second scenarios. Therefore it is implied that a 10% 
rise in the qa_index_normalised scores for codeshare operators produced the same market share 
estimation results where the qa_index_normalised scores of operating carriers were reduced by 10%.  
 
 The scenarios of this case have shown the impact of changing the adjusted indexed 
quality scores on the market share estimation, accomplishing Objective 3 of the research. 
Having such a powerful tool enables airline executives to review the schedule quality and the 
competitiveness of their product among rivals – a fulfilment of Objective 4.  
 
 11.2.13. Case 13: Canada/Pakistan vs Canada/India:  
The base case has contrasted the competition level in Pakistan (PK) and India (IN) by 
analysing both countries market structure to/from Canada where only connecting products 
existed for the listed carriers. The first scenario of this case involves the cancellation of a 
carriers’ entire products from/to Canada (CA) to observe the change in market structure in the 
aftermath of an airlines’ withdrawal. The second scenario assumes a different connecting 
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journey flight time split ratio to observe the factors’ impact on the competing airlines’ quality 
score.    
 
Scenario 1: In this scenario, Turkish Airlines (TK) cancels all of its flights to Canada 
and therefore loses all connections in the Canada/Pakistan and Canada/India markets. The 
following table summarises the %a_s, qa_index_normalised and ms of the scenario along with a 
comparison with the base status for Pakistan (PK) and India (IN) respectively. 
 
Table 11.47: Listed Parameters of Competing Carriers from Canada to Pakistan and Pakistan 
to Canada as of 2016 
  Airline 
Scenario Base Status 
%a_s qa_index_normalised ms %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
C
A
 –
 P
K
 EK 46.34% 0.9761 47.49% 20.97% 0.9428 21.10% 
EY 20.07% 0.9606 20.24% 9.12% 0.9259 9.02% 
QR 33.59% 0.9152 32.28% 15.18% 0.8827 14.31% 
TK 0.00% -- 0.00% 54.73% 0.9511 55.57% 
Total 100% -- 100.00% 100% -- 100.00% 
P
K
 –
 C
A
 
EK 34.28% 0.9414 34.02% 13.16% 0.9414 13.36% 
EY 32.57% 0.9525 32.70% 12.50% 0.9525 12.84% 
QR 23.43% 0.9193 22.70% 8.98% 0.9193 8.90% 
SV 9.71% 1.0339 10.58% 1.25% 1.0339 1.39% 
TK 0.00% -- 0.00% 64.11% 0.9187 63.50% 
Total 100.00% -- 100.00% 100.00% -- 100.00% 
  
TK's removal from the market enabled Emirates (EK) to lead the market with a 47.53% 
market share expectation from Canada to Pakistan and 34.02% on the route back. It is also 
observed that the adjusted index quality score of all carriers have improved slightly from 
Canada to Pakistan. Because TK was the shortest itinerary offering carrier in the CA-PK 
market, the removal of the carrier from the market made EK's duration shortest and the other 
carriers'  qa_index_normalised scores were computed referencing to the EK’s journey time index. In 
the PK – CA market, since QR offered the shortest product, the removal of TK from the market 
did not change the qa_index_normalised scores of the competing airlines. The following table displays 
the same analysis in the Canada/India market.  
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Table 11.48: Listed Parameters of Competing Carriers from Canada to India and India to 
Canada as of 2016 
  Scenario 1 Base Status 
  %a_s 
qa_index_normalised ms %a_s qa_index_normalised ms 
C
an
ad
a 
–
 I
n
d
ia
 
LH 38.88% 0.8692 38.48% 35.05% 0.8692 34.95% 
BA 20.47% 0.9191 21.43% 18.46% 0.9191 19.47% 
AF 12.41% 0.9833 13.90% 11.19% 0.9833 12.62% 
TK 0.00% -- 0.00% 9.84% 0.8128 9.18% 
KL 9.25% 0.7756 8.17% 8.34% 0.7756 7.43% 
SK 6.69% 0.7385 5.62% 6.03% 0.7385 5.11% 
LX 5.60% 0.8806 5.62% 5.05% 0.8806 5.10% 
EK 1.91% 0.9463 2.06% 1.72% 0.9463 1.87% 
EY 1.49% 0.9597 1.62% 1.34% 0.9597 1.47% 
Other 3 3.29% -- 3.10% 2.97% -- 2.80% 
Total 100% -- 100% 100% -- 100% 
In
d
ia
 –
 C
an
ad
a 
BA 22.90% 0.9497 24.74% 20.52% 0.9497 21.97% 
LH 23.19% 0.8129 21.45% 20.78% 0.8129 19.04% 
KL 18.89% 0.8784 18.87% 16.92% 0.8784 16.75% 
AF 12.70% 0.9317 13.46% 11.38% 0.9317 11.95% 
TK 0.00% -- 0.00% 10.41% 0.9553 11.21% 
SK 5.54% 0.7797 4.91% 4.96% 0.7797 4.36% 
IB 4.81% 0.7518 4.11% 4.31% 0.7518 3.66% 
EK 2.88% 0.9341 3.06% 2.58% 0.9341 2.71% 
EY 2.23% 1.0292 2.61% 2.00% 1.0292 2.32% 
Other 3 6.85% -- 6.78% 6.14% -- 6.03% 
Total 100% -- 100% 100% -- 100% 
 
 It is inferred from the above table that, the impact of TK’s removal from the market has 
increased the market share expectation of all carriers competing in the Canada/India market. 
However, the surge in the ms expectation of the airlines is not vast compared to 
Canada/Pakistan market as there exist more players in the Indian market. Furthermore, the 
quality scores of the carriers were unchanged as TK did not offer the shortest itinerary in both 
directions.  
 
 Scenario 2: In this scenario, TK’s flight to Canada are recovered back and the 
connecting journey flight time split ratio (%q_split) is changed from 80% to 50%. Such a change 
implies that in case one leg of the journey is greater than or equal to 50% of ttotal, the itinerary 
qualifies for an additional quality score (qsplit). Practically, setting %q_split to 50% enables all 
connecting itineraries to qualify for qsplit as at least one leg of the connecting itinerary is longer 
than or equal to 50% of the total flight time. The following table analyses the adjusted indexed 
quality scores and the market share estimations of this scenario for Canada/Pakistan market. 
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Table 11.49: Listed Parameters of Competing Carriers from Canada to Pakistan and Pakistan 
to Canada as of 2016 
 Airline 
Scenario Base Status 
qa_index_normalised ms qa_index_normalised ms 
C
A
 –
 P
K
 EK 0.9428 20.84% 0.9428 21.10% 
EY 0.9354 8.99% 0.9259 9.02% 
QR 0.8935 14.30% 0.8827 14.31% 
TK 0.9683 55.87% 0.9511 55.57% 
Total -- 100.00% -- 100.00% 
P
K
 –
 C
A
 
EK 0.9414 13.18% 0.9414 13.36% 
EY 0.9648 12.84% 0.9525 12.84% 
QR 0.9305 8.89% 0.9193 8.90% 
SV 1.0513 1.39% 1.0339 1.39% 
TK 0.9338 63.69% 0.9187 63.50% 
Total -- 100.00% -- 100.00% 
 
 As per the table above, although the adjusted index quality score of EK is unchanged, 
EY’s, QR’s and TK’s qa_index_normalised scores improved slightly. The minor change with the 
quality scores led EY, QR and TK to report marginally higher ms scores in comparison to the 
base status. It is also observed in the table that only TK has managed to increase its market 
share estimation under the new %q_split assumption. 
 
 The scenarios of this case showed the impact of the research outputs in the aftermath 
of a carriers’ exit from the market (Scenario 1) and the decrease of %q_split from 80% to 50% 
(Scenario 2) – serving as the fulfilment of Objective 2 and 3. Being able to observe such 
variations in the market quantitatively also proved the accomplishment of Objective 4 as a 
significant guidance is offered for industry practitioners.   
 
 11.2.14. Case 14: South America – Middle East:  
The final case evaluates a directional market at the regional level, namely from South 
America to the Middle East. Since the case covers a broader range of available products 
competing in the market, a scenario having a wider assumption is introduced: All direct service 
providers’ seat capacities are raised by 10% whereas all connecting carriers’ seat capacities are 
reduced by 10%. The frequency and timetable of the flights are kept identical to the base case. 
The following table summarises the parameters under this assumption. 
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Table 11.50: Selected Parameters from South America to the Middle East as of 2016 Schedules  
  Scenario Base Status 
Airline Routing s %a_s ms s %a_s ms 
EK Direct 6,160 28.43% 32.89% 5,600 25.51% 30.32% 
EY Direct 2,664 12.36% 14.70% 2,422 11.03% 13.48% 
QR Direct 1,994 9.18% 10.73% 1,813 8.26% 9.92% 
AF Connecting 2,068 9.53% 7.76% 2,298 10.47% 8.76% 
LH Connecting 1,614 7.43% 6.12% 1,793 8.17% 6.92% 
EY Connecting 1,328 6.09% 4.72% 1,475 6.72% 5.36% 
KL Connecting 1,155 5.30% 4.33% 1,283 5.84% 4.90% 
EK Connecting 1,008 5.62% 4.89% 1,120 5.10% 4.56% 
QR Connecting 761 3.49% 3.12% 846 3.85% 3.53% 
AZ Connecting 698 3.20% 2.56% 775 3.53% 2.91% 
BA Connecting 683 3.13% 2.40% 759 3.46% 2.73% 
Others Connecting 1,808 7.24% 5.78% 2,009 8.06% 6.61% 
Total 21,941 100% 100% 22,193 100% 100% 
  
 According to Table 11.50, direct service provider airlines’ market share estimation 
increased from 53.72% in the base case to 58.32%. The additional market share was transferred 
from connecting operators to direct service providers due to the relative increase of the adjusted 
seat share in favour of Etihad (EY), Emirates (EK) and Qatar Airways (QR). It is also observed 
that the total capacity in the market shrank by 1.13%. Despite the 10% growth with the direct 
seat capacity, the rise with the ms score of the direct carriers was summed to 4.60 points 
contributing to 8.56% (calculated as (58.32-53.72)/53.72). In other words, the per cent increase 
in the market share estimation was less than the per cent increase in capacity for the direct 
service operators. The supply changes worked best in favour of EK as the carriers’ estimated 
market share increased from 30.32% to 32.89%. On the other hand, as expected, the ms figures 
for the connecting airlines have dropped in the region substantially. Being able to assess the 
macro level capacity changes’ impact on ms, as achieved in this case, is an influential tool for 
airline executives in guiding their executive decisions, fulfilling Objective 3 and 4 of the 
research.   
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11.3. Discussion 
 
 In this Chapter, various scenarios were introduced for the cases addressed in Chapter 
10. Each scenario of the cases built certain assumptions and analysed the results of the outputs 
involving supply, quality score and market share estimation. The assumptions included 
different schedule scenarios for particular carriers such as the addition of virtual flights or 
codeshare agreements as well as their removals from the timetable. Different capacity related 
parameters’ impact on the research outputs were also assessed including aircraft type, sconn and 
scode. Besides, quality related input parameters were also parametrised in the scenarios to 
compute their quantitative effect on the research outputs. Some of these scenario results are 
statistically tested in comparison to the base status to comprehend the parameters’ significance 
on the research outputs. While the change with the input parameters have reported significant 
differences with the research outputs in comparison to the base status, some cases have 
produced insignificant results. These findings imply that, any changes with the input 
parameters may lead to varying results specific to the markets and competition scheme. 
Furthermore, the statistical tests on certain cases (i.e. Case 10) have affirmed that, the base 
assumptions for certain parameters like sconn were accurately set.  
 
The adaptability of the consumer-centric capacity, schedule convenience and REMSET 
models successfully enabled to observe the deviations with the research outputs under different 
scenarios. This capability assisted to evaluate and justify the changing market dynamics and 
competition quantitatively. While some scenarios aided to fine-tune the results of the research 
methodology as addressed in Scenario 1 of Case 6, the scenarios of Case 10 and 11 proved that 
the adaptable research input assumptions discussed in Chapter 10 were accurate and in line 
with market realities. The reliable results of the scenarios discussed throughout this chapter 
also proved that the research objectives were accomplished under differing market situations. 
It was also confirmed that the inputs of the research model are adaptable – enabling industry 
experts to observe the results under varying market conditions.  
 
The scenarios analysed in this Chapter showed that Objective 1, 2 and 3 were fulfilled 
under varying input parameters. The effect of any changes with scode, sconn, MCT, MaxCT, sf, 
tbuffer, %q_split or qa_index_normalised as well as the schedule related variations could be assessed using 
the research’s methodologies. Furthermore, the scenario analysis of the case studies has 
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verified that being able to compare the results with the base case under different input 
parameter assumptions enabled to accomplish Objective 4 that can provide a unique 
commercial application for industry practitioners.   
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Chapter 12: Results - The Connectivity Analysis of the Selected Hubs 
 
12.1. Introduction to the Connectivity Analysis Chapter 
 
 While Chapter 10 covered network performance results in the selected O&D pairs, 
Chapter 11 introduced scenarios on the same routes by altering the input parameters to observe 
the outputs’ deviation from the base status. Unlike Chapter 10 and 11 which contrasted the 
airlines relative performance in terms of the research outputs in the selected O&Ds, namely, 
consumer-centric capacity, quality scores and realistic market share estimation, this Chapter 
aims to contrast the hub performance of the listed airlines with regard to schedule-convenience 
scores and frequency depth for connecting itineraries at a broader region-to-region level. 
Therefore, the Chapter assists in contrasting not only the airlines’ connectivity quality but also 
their hub airports’ attraction for the connecting passengers.  
 
 Certain airports were identified to run the research’s models for testing their 
performance: Paris Charles De Gaulle – CDG (AF), Amsterdam Schiphol – AMS (KL), 
Brussels International – BRU (SN), London Heathrow – LHR (BA), Frankfurt International – 
FRA (LH), Munich International – MUC (LH), Zurich Kloten – ZRH (LX), Istanbul Ataturk –  
(TK), Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen –  (PC), Dubai International – DXB (EK), Abu Dhabi 
International – AUH (EY), Vienna Schwechat – VIE (OS), Cairo International – CAI (MS) 
and Doha Hamed – DOH (QR). The airports were selected among the focus regions of the 
study. While determining the selected airports, major hubs in the Gulf region were chosen. 
Likewise, historically larger European hubs (i.e. AMS, LHR, FRA, MUC, CDG) and emerging 
transits (i.e. IST, SAW) were included into the set. Additionally, all of those selected airports 
serve as a hub for a listed carrier which is shown within the parenthesis following the three-
letter code of the airport. Therefore, the analyses in this Chapter reflects not only the hub 
airports’ performance but also the connection effectiveness of the airlines using these airports 
as their hub location. 
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12.2. Performance Results of the Hub Airports 
 
Using the methodologies of the research, it is possible to benchmark the frequency 
share (%f) and adjusted normalised quality (qa_index_normalised) scores of the selected hub airports 
using the base assumptions referred in Chapter 10. For this reason, the qa_index_normalised score of 
the airport can be regarded as the hub’s connection quality score as the factor indicates the 
average quality score of the itineraries using the airport as the transfer point. The %f is 
calculated by rebasing the percentages in reference to the sum of connecting frequencies 
available at the selected hub airports. %f and qa_index_normalised are reported by including both the 
operating and codeshare itineraries. Since these factors are examined to assess the connectivity 
efficiency of the competing airlines' hub airports, only connecting flights were included in the 
analysis, eliminating direct services. The connectivity index, denoted by CI, of the competing 
hub airports can be calculated by  
 
𝐶𝐼 =  %𝑓 x 𝑞𝑎_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥_𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 
 
As discussed in the literature review (Section 3.4.4.2.4), although there exists other 
connectivity measures used commonly in the industry such as Netscan and ACI Europe, the CI 
parameter deviates from these models due to the consumer-specific nature of the qa_index_normalised 
factor. ACI’s connectivity index is calculated by weighting the schedule related parameters 
only like the f, MCT and tconn. Similarly, the Netscan utilises schedule, transfer time MCT and 
great circle distance. However, different from existing mdoels, the qa_index_normalised and 
subsequently the CI is calculated by directly integrating the consumers’ perspectives and 
preferences regarding schedule convenience.  
 
Being able to assess the CI and the qa_index_normalised of the listed airlines’ selected hub 
airports contributes to attaining Objective 4 of the research. Industry practitioners would be 
able to use these information as an integral market intelligence while conducting their high-
level analyses. In the following sections, the %f, qa_index_normalised and CI scores are reported for 
the regional O&D pairs as of 2016 schedules for the selected hubs. The results of the selected 
O&Ds are reported in bidirectional form implying that both routes’ %f, qa_index_normalised and CI 
scores were included in the analysis. As the majority of the listed airlines and the selected hub 
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airports are located in Europe, the studied regions of the Chapter were selected from/to that 
continent.  
 12.2.1. Europe/Middle East 
 The frequency share, quality and CI scores of the competing airlines’ hubs are reported 
in Table 12.1 for the Europe/Middle East market. (Turkey, Iran and Egypt are reported in the 
Middle East.) As per the table, the best schedule-convenience score for the connecting 
itineraries are actualised at VIE airport by OS flights followed by ZRH airport which is used 
as the hub airport of LX. Both airports central location in Europe, as well as OS's and LX's 
scheduling strategy, enable these carriers to get rank top with qa_index_normalised scores. However, 
as observed in Table 12.1 the airports frequency share is relatively disadvantaged in 
comparison to the rival hubs in the region.  
Table 12.1: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports between Europe and 
the Middle East. 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
IST 30.6% 0.7685 23.52 
FRA 12.2% 0.8128 9.92 
DXB 8.6% 0.7354 6.32 
CAI 7.0% 0.7223 5.06 
VIE 4.9% 0.9093 4.41 
MUC 5.3% 0.7945 4.22 
CDG 6.2% 0.6747 4.19 
SAW 6.2% 0.6549 4.07 
AMS 4.7% 0.7786 3.66 
DOH 4.5% 0.7867 3.54 
ZRH 3.6% 0.8709 3.12 
AUH 2.8% 0.6079 1.70 
BRU 1.6% 0.8023 1.28 
LHR 1.9% 0.6471 1.23 
 
As per Table 12.1, the qa_index_normalised is lowest at AUH airport in the bidirectional 
market. The geographical location of Abu Dhabi is relatively disadvantaged in comparison to 
other hubs located in Central or Eastern Europe for the itineraries in the Europe/Middle East 
region. Furthermore, the location of LHR is also disadvantaged for the connections in the 
market as the geography of London is not ideal for connections between Central (or Eastern) 
Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, the network structure of BA puts LHR in a 
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disadvantaged position, ranking the carrier one before the last in the qa_index_normalised score and the 
last in the CI performance. 
 
 The frequency share and the CI score is highest at the IST airport. The ACI Europe 
report on airport connectivity (2017) suggests that IST has joined the major connected airline 
group replacing LHR as the 4th best connected European hub in the past decade. Indeed, this 
finding is in agreement with the CI score of the IST airport as TK reports a significant share of 
the Middle East/Europe connections. Furthermore, SAW airport of Istanbul, the base of an 
LCC, (PC) reports a considerable CI score, despite its poor qa_index_normalised score due to its 
advantage in the %f. The high frequency share of the SAW airport confirms that the 
geographical location of Istanbul which is located in between the two continents could be 
regarded as a crucial factor of effective connectivity in the Europe/Middle East axis. The 
advantage of Istanbul’s geographical position in hub connectivity was justified in the work of 
Nenem and Ozkan-Gunay (2012). 
 
12.2.2. Europe/America 
The parameters are reported separately for the bidirectional North America / Europe 
and South America / Europe markets in Tables 12.2 and 12.3. Regarding adjusted index 
normalised quality scores, VIE reports the best performance in North America while LHR's 
qa_index_normalised is the highest in South America. Similar to results of the Europe/Middle East 
market, ZRH is again ranked second following VIE to/from North America. In the 
Europe/South America market, it seems that no connections were attained from VIE. LHR and 
CDG are found to have the best qa_index_normalised scores in the Europe/South America market.  
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Table 12.2: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports from Europe to 
North America. 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
LHR 20.60% 0.8002 16.48 
FRA 17.10% 0.8318 14.22 
AMS 17.50% 0.7174 12.55 
CDG 17.40% 0.7055 12.28 
MUC 7.90% 0.8444 6.67 
ZRH 7.50% 0.8548 6.41 
VIE 4.90% 0.9421 4.62 
BRU 4.10% 0.8401 3.44 
IST 2.10% 0.7259 1.52 
DOH 0.90% 0.6179 0.56 
DXB 0.00% 0 0.00 
AUH 0.00% 0 0.00 
CAI 0.00% 0 0.00 
SAW 0.00% 0 0.00 
 
Table 12.3: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports from Europe to 
South America. 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
LHR 27.0% 0.8152 22.01 
AMS 22.0% 0.7922 17.43 
CDG 19.7% 0.8012 15.78 
FRA 10.4% 0.7421 7.72 
ZRH 6.5% 0.7232 4.70 
AUH 4.0% 0.5982 2.39 
IST 3.3% 0.6883 2.30 
DOH 2.8% 0.6223 1.73 
DXB 2.2% 0.6122 1.36 
MUC 0.0% 0 0.00 
VIE 0.0% 0 0.00 
BRU 0.0% 0 0.00 
CAI 0.0% 0 0.00 
SAW 0.0% 0 0.00 
 
Between Europe and America (North and South), LHR’s CI score ranks the highest. 
The hubs in the Gulf region namely DXB, DOH and AUH, are relatively disadvantaged in the 
Europe/America market due to their geographical location. It would be inconvenient for 
passengers to travel to the Middle East for a connection from Europe to America and vice versa. 
Furthermore, unlike its performance in the Europe/Middle East market, IST does not have a 
competitive connectivity pattern also due to the geography of the airport. The relatively poorer 
connectivity performance of IST and hubs in the Gulf were also confirmed in the ACI report 
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(ACI Europe, 2017). Furthermore, the supply advantage of the BA, LH and AF/KL assisted 
LHR, FRA, AMS, MUC and CDG to report higher CI scores. It is observed in Table 12.2 and 
Table 12.3 that BA via LHR offer the highest number of connecting frequencies in the North 
America. Besides, thanks to its partnership with IB, BA via LHR also reports the highest 
frequency share to/from South America. The geographic location of London between Europe 
and America is another aspect of LHR significant advantage in the connectivity for the market.  
 
12.2.3. Europe/Africa 
%f, qa_index_normalised and CI scores are disclosed for Europe/North Africa and Europe/Sub 
Saharan Africa markets separately in the Tables 12.4 and 12.5 ordered by the CI score. It is 
observed in the tables that LH via its hubs FRA and MUC offers the most number of connecting 
frequencies from/to North Africa while AF via CDG has the highest connecting frequency 
share from/to Sub Saharan Africa followed by its partner KL via AMS. Concerning adjusted 
index normalised quality scores, LX's hub, ZRH, reports the best performance in qa_index_normalised 
score despite its lower frequency share in the entire Europe/Africa market. BRU’s qa_index_normalised 
ranks second following ZRH in both North and Sub Saharan Africa. This finding is in line with 
the SN Brussels business strategy concerning the carriers’ active presence in the African 
continent.  
Table 12.4: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports in Europe / North 
Africa Market 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
FRA 14.1% 0.8171 11.52 
CDG 15.5% 0.6856 10.63 
LHR 12.5% 0.7065 8.83 
IST 9.3% 0.6688 6.22 
CAI 9.8% 0.6212 6.09 
AMS 7.9% 0.6144 4.87 
ZRH 5.5% 0.8831 4.85 
DOH 5.8% 0.5998 3.47 
AUH 5.5% 0.5648 3.10 
VIE 3.0% 0.8611 2.63 
MUC 3.4% 0.8005 2.68 
BRU 2.1% 0.8651 1.85 
SAW 3.0% 0.5544 1.69 
DXB 2.4% 0.5212 1.27 
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Table 12.5: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports in Europe / Sub 
Saharan Africa Market 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
CDG 20.7% 0.6968 14.42 
AMS 21.6% 0.6504 14.05 
BRU 12.5% 0.7402 9.25 
IST 11.4% 0.6159 7.00 
FRA 7.7% 0.7095 5.46 
LHR 5.1% 0.6903 3.52 
CAI 4.6% 0.6829 3.11 
DOH 5.2% 0.5984 3.11 
AUH 4.1% 0.6146 2.52 
MUC 2.9% 0.6922 2.01 
DXB 2.5% 0.5407 1.36 
ZRH 1.4% 0.7499 1.07 
VIE 0.4% 0.5225 0.18 
SAW 0.0% 0 0.00 
  
The work of Logothetis and Miyoshi (2018) finds that TK provides more transfer 
opportunities between Europe and Africa, but EK attains considerably higher hub efficiency. 
TK’s superiority in transfer opportunities are verified in Table 12.4, and 12.5 as TK's %f scores 
are more significant than the EK’s. However, unlike Logothetis and Miyoshi’s findings, TK’s 
connectivity index and CI scores were calculated to be relatively higher than the EK’s values. 
Additionally, in the Europe/Sub Saharan Africa market, DXB’s qa_index_normalised score was 
calculated to be inferior to the connectivity index of AUH although both airports are located in 
the same country and are only 123 kilometres away from each other.  Therefore, it could be 
concluded that, although the the qa_index_normalised is influenced by the geography of the airports, it 
is not the sole parameter that shapes the connection quality of the hub airport.  
 
12.2.4. Europe/South Asia & Far East 
 In the bidirectional Europe/South Asia & Far East market -which includes India but 
excludes Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and Australia-, OS via VIE is 
calculated to report the best qa_index_normalised score again, and TK via IST is estimated to have 
the highest %f share and the CI score as depicted in the table below.   
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Table 12.6: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports from Europe to the 
South Asia & Far East 
Airport %f qa_index_normalised CI 
IST 13.7% 0.8670 11.88 
DOH 12.7% 0.9089 11.54 
DXB 13.5% 0.8112 10.95 
FRA 12.7% 0.8191 10.40 
AMS 12.2% 0.8150 9.94 
LHR 10.4% 0.8008 8.33 
AUH 8.6% 0.8056 6.93 
CDG 7.4% 0.7669 5.68 
ZRH 5.0% 0.8583 4.29 
MUC 1.8% 0.8022 1.44 
BRU 0.9% 0.6500 0.59 
VIE 0.6% 0.9666 0.58 
CAI 0.5% 0.9128 0.46 
SAW 0.0% 0 0.00 
 
 According to Table 12.6, in the Europe/Far East market, the CI of the top-ranking 
airports are not far from each other, and the dominance of the Gulf hubs (DOH, DXB) and IST 
in the market is apparent. ZRH again reported a relatively superior qa_index_normalised score in 
comparison to many other European hubs while CDG and BRU did not report a competitive 
quality score. FRA, MUC and AMS’s qa_index_normalised were found to be very similar to each 
other. Although CAI reported an attractive qa_index_normalised score like VIE, the airport almost 
reported no CI score due to its inadequate level of traffic in comparison to the rival hubs.  
 
12.2.5. Europe/Europe 
 In the bidirectional intra-European connections, the results are overwhelmingly 
influenced by the domestic flights as shown in Table 12.7. 
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Table 12.7: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports from Europe to 
Europe 
Airline %f qa_index_normalised CI 
FRA 32.5% 0.8043 26.14 
MUC 14.7% 0.8432 12.4 
CDG 13.0% 0.7421 9.65 
ZRH 8.9% 0.8821 7.85 
AMS 9.5% 0.7766 7.38 
LHR 8.2% 0.7224 5.92 
VIE 5.1% 0.8511 4.34 
IST 4.9% 0.6761 3.31 
BRU 1.9% 0.7021 1.33 
SAW 0.7% 0.5831 0.41 
CAI 0.6% 0.6652 0.4 
DXB 0.0% 0 0 
AUH 0.0% 0 0 
DOH 0.0% 0 0 
 
 As per Table 12.7, Europe/Europe connections are dominated by the LH group due to 
its relatively larger domestic market. Additionally, FRA’s and MUC’s central location in the 
European continent is another advantage of those airports in achieving comparably higher CI 
scores. As expected, the hubs in the Gulf region can not report a CI score due to the 
geographical inconvenience of those airports. In terms of the qa_index_normalised scores, ZRH ranked 
top, followed by VIE and MUC.  
 
12.2.6. Europe/CIS 
 The results for the bidirectional Europe/CIS route (CIS countries include Russia and 
ex-Soviet Union countries) is shown in Table 12.8 below. 
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Table 12.8: %f, qa_index_normalised and CI Scores of the Selected Hub Airports from Europe to CIS 
Airline %f qa_index_normalised CI 
IST 33.5% 0.9086 30.44 
FRA 24.9% 0.8765 21.82 
CDG 6.8% 0.8007 5.44 
SAW 6.9% 0.7321 5.05 
AMS 6.4% 0.7763 4.97 
MUC 4.2% 0.7654 3.21 
ZRH 3.8% 0.7965 3.03 
VIE 2.8% 0.8128 2.28 
LHR 3.0% 0.7569 2.27 
CAI 2.8% 0.5609 1.57 
BRU 1.7% 0.7075 1.20 
DXB 1.6% 0.6769 1.08 
AUH 1.0% 0.6534 0.65 
DOH 0.6% 0.6888 0.41 
 
 As observed in Table 12.7 TK via IST and LH via FRA have a significant advantage in 
the market due to their vast frequency share in comparison to rivals. Additionally, IST is 
reported to have the highest qa_index_normalised in the market followed by VIE. Due to geographical 
inconvenience, the hubs in the Gulf region did not produce competitive connectivity indexes 
in the market.  
 
12.3. Discussion 
 
 It is shown in the cases of this Chapter that, the research’s methodologies can be applied 
to benchmark the effectiveness of the listed airlines’ hub airports from a consumer-centric 
perspective. While the qa_index_normalised score of the itineraries was used as a metric of 
connectivity quality, %f was used to reflect the volume of traffic in terms of frequency at the 
hub airport. The qa_index_normalised and %f score together composed the connectivity index (CI) of 
the airports which referred to a capacity blended hub quality performance.  
 
 By using the calculated qa_index_normalised scores referred in the tables of section 12.2, it is 
possible to develop the aggregate Europe/world-wide quality index score of the competing 
hubs. This has been achieved by simply averaging the each selected hub airports’ qa_index_normalised 
shown in Table 12.1 to 12.8. The average qa_index_normalised are depicted in Figure 12.1 below. As 
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Europe/Australia is not routinely served one-stop, the Australian continent was not included in 
the computation. (The zero values of qa_index_normalised are not included in the average.) 
 
Figure 12.1: Worldwide Average qa_index_normalised Scores of the Selected Hubs (Europe/World 
Market) 
 
 
 It is observed from Figure 12.1 that VIE and ZRH scored the best average qa_index_normalised 
scores while the hubs of LH, FRA and MUC ranked third and fourth respectively. LHR, AMS, 
IST and CDG were placed at the middle rankings as the competitiveness of these hubs in 
qa_index_normalised scores varied depending on the analysed market route. The Gulf hubs ranked 
lower primarily due to their geographical location. The relatively lower qa_index_normalised scores for 
the Gulf hubs do not necessarily imply that those airports lack good quality connections. Indeed 
airports like IST, DOH, AUH and DXB are not in an ideal location to connect in the 
Europe/America or Europe/Africa. However these airports can offer better connection quality 
in other markets.  
 
As per the results, although VIE and ZRH were reported to offer “high-quality” 
connections, the carriers using those airports as hubs (OS and LX respectively) were 
disadvantaged in the volume of supply which led those airports’ CI score to be relatively less 
in comparison to their rivals. IST was found to be a competitive hub in the Europe/Middle East 
and Europe/Far East connections whereas the hubs in the Gulf region were discovered to be 
advantaged in the Europe/South Asia & Far East axis. Furthermore LHR was relatively 
competitive in both Europe/North America and Europe/South America connections. 
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Additionally, AF/KL group was found to be relatively active in the Sub Saharan Africa market 
although BRU’s performance was conspicuous in the region too.  
 
In order to observe the effect of frequency volume in the connectivity of the hubs in the 
bidirectional Europe/World market, it is possible calculate the percentage CI (denoted as %CI) 
of each airport.  %CI could be calculating by summing each airports CI values shown in Table 
12.1 to 12.8 and then diving it with the total sum of all CI’s. Therefore, %CI of an airports refers 
to its share of the CI scores in the selected markets. The %CI values of the selected hubs in the 
Europe/World market is depicted in Figure 12.2 below. 
 
Figure 12.2. %CI Values of the Selected Hubs in the Europe/World Market 
 
 
Table 12.2 illustrate that FRA holds the highest share of %CI in the Europe/World 
market, followed by IST and CDG. Despite their advantage with the qa_index_normalised scores VIE 
and ZRH could not report a higher %CI share as the airports are relatively disadvantaged in 
terms of their frequency supply. As expected, the Gulf hubs reported a lower %CI below 4% 
sourced primarily due to their geographical position. 
 
The results of this Chapter have shown that the volume of traffic in frequency, 
scheduling quality and geographical position of the hub airports determined their connection 
quality and connectivity index. The qa_index_normalised which is an essential component of the CI 
was calculated by incorporating the direct feedback of the consumers whose methodology was 
covered in Chapter 9. From this perspective, the research not only presented a practical tool for 
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airline executives to assess their networks' efficiency from the passengers’ perspective but also 
to airport authorities anticipating to benchmark their hubs’ relative performance and 
connectivity. The ability to assess the competing hub airports’ %f, qa_index_normalised and the CI 
performance is a clear achievement of the research’s Objective 4.  
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Chapter 13: Conclusion 
 
13.1. Introduction 
 
“The airline industry is complex, dynamic and very competitive. Decisions need to be 
taken every day by the whole organisation” (Aracs MIS, 2018, s. 1). Airline executives must 
make timely and wise decisions to remain competitive in the market. The content of these 
decisions ranges from recruiting the right human resources to selecting the best and most recent 
technological infrastructures to adapt to rapidly changing industry dynamics. Air carriers’ 
decisions are key to ensure their success, especially in an environment that eliminates 
uncompetitive firms from the market. 
 
“Structurally, the airline industry is characterised by high fixed costs, 
cyclical demand for its services, intense competition, and vulnerability 
to external shocks. As a result, airlines have been more prone to failure 
than many other businesses, and the sector’s financial performance has 
continually been very weak” (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2005, s. preface). 
 
As addressed in Chapter 3, competition in the airline industry has intensified, especially 
amid deregulation. Liberalisation and deregulation of the sector facilitated the entry of new 
firms, positively impacting competition and innovation (OECD, 2018). The high volume of 
LCC entries into the market has significantly altered the competitive structure of the sector. In 
this situation, strategic, tactical and responsive decisions of the airlines have helped them 
maintain their competitiveness. In the post-deregulation era, therefore, the focus has turned 
from operations to passengers as airlines had to prioritise customer satisfaction to be successful.  
 
The rise in competition has positively influenced consumers as passenger numbers have 
soared globally. As the air transport product has been commoditised, even the lower-income 
social groups have begun to afford air travel. Today, with the increased competition in the 
airline industry, passengers have multiple flight options, and their ability to access information 
about competing products has risen tremendously. Through the use of the Internet and web 
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marketing, carriers can openly publish their products and fares. Previously, passengers had to 
contact travel agencies to search for flight options and enquire fares. Today, passengers can 
quickly access information about factors beyond products and fares that can detrimentally 
influence their itinerary decision making. For instance, they are better informed about airlines’ 
on-time performance indicators, safety record, in-flight amenities and the timetable. Therefore, 
compared to previous decades, today’s consumers are better informed about possible itineraries 
on the shelf before making their purchasing decisions.  
 
While designing network arrangements, airlines need to consider consumers’ 
convenience to compete effectively. The airline network determines the timetables, so how the 
network is organised heavily affects the consumer welfare. Each itinerary has its characteristics 
determining the level of convenience for passengers. For instance, while a passenger intending 
to fly from City A to City B might conveniently travel direct and non-stop via Airline 1, another 
carrier, Airline 2, could offer a connecting service between those cities routed through City C. 
However, Airline 1’s departure time from City A and arrival time in City B might be 
unattractive if it requires the passenger to pay for an extra night at a hotel, and in this case, 
Airline 2’s departure and arrival time might well fit with the consumer’s expectations. 
Furthermore, Airline 1’s direct service might be a codeshare flight operated by an airline other 
than the consumer’s preferred choice, while Airline 2’s flight might be an online service 
provided by the consumer’s favourite airline. Therefore, each itinerary derived from the 
carriers’ network has its own characteristics that determine consumer convenience. For these 
reasons, this research was aimed at developing a solid understanding of the relationships among 
airlines’ network efficiency, schedule convenience and consumer welfare affecting their 
purchasing decisions. 
 
13.2. Revisiting the Aim and Objectives of the Research 
 
This research focused on airline network and schedule efficiency from a consumer-
centric perspective. As the carriers' network arrangement is a key driver of its business model, 
revenue and cost structure, its efficient organisation is an element of the airline’s performance 
that also impacts consumers’ schedule convenience. Undoubtedly, as airlines’ primary 
objective is to maximise profitability, they must also design their network with the objective 
of maximising revenues and minimising costs. For this reason, airline executives must plan 
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their network arrangement to enable the highest levels of passenger traffic and thus revenue. 
Whilst the cost of establishing an efficient network arrangement and its revenue expectation is 
beyond the scope of this research, the efficiency and commercial performance is parametrised 
through the market share estimation scheme.  
 
13.2.1. The aim of the Research – To Develop a Passenger Centric Methodology for 
Analysing the Schedule and Network Performance of Air Services 
This study aimed to analyse the effectiveness of airline schedule/networks and their 
impact on consumer choice. Throughout the research, the relationship between airlines' core 
product, the schedule and consumer choice was elaborated in detail. In this context, a passenger 
survey was implemented to understand the key drivers of the schedule convenience. The survey 
was designed carefully after a detailed review of the literature and involved a large and wide-
ranging sample of passengers. The analysis of approximately a thousand questionnaire 
responses verified that schedule is indeed a critical attribute of consumer decision making and 
has a central role in making purchasing decisions. It was also found that schedule-convenient 
flights are valued higher by the consumers and they are willing to pay more for the “better” 
services.  
 
In broad terms, the research has developed a model using the survey findings to study 
the effectiveness of airline networks and their effect on consumer choice. The introduced 
methodology required the schedules of airlines to compute their relative supply and quality 
related scores. The relative scores were then used as the inputs to the REMSET model to 
produce market share estimation of each carrier competing in a market. While the schedule 
information of the listed airlines was retrieved from the OAG database, relative supply and 
quality related scores are developed as part of the study’s model. Therefore, the aim of the 
research was attained by the development of the relative supply and quality determination 
scores as well as the REMSET model.  
 
13.2.2. Objective 1: To Determine a Consumer-Centric Capacity Share Estimation 
Model 
The first objective involved the determination of a consumer-centric capacity share 
estimation model which is one of the key inputs of the REMSET. The capacity is a key 
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determinant of product supply available for sale in the market. The research brought a fresh 
perspective to the capacity determination in the sense that a consumer perspective was inserted 
into the physical capacity. Since for non-direct and non-operating flights, the physical capacity 
determination is not a straightforward process, using the inputs retrieved from the survey 
results, a new passenger-centric approach was brought to the supply determination process. 
Additionally, for connecting services, not all flight connections were counted as a viable 
product in case an itinerary is reported to be beyond the scope of “schedule convenience”. As 
iterated in Chapter 8, the capability of computing consumer-centric capacities enabled the 
benchmarking of capacity shares of different carriers competing in a market. If all other 
parameters influencing consumer decision were identical, the expected market share of the 
airlines would be equal to their capacity shares. However, in practice, this is extremely unlikely 
as each carrier operating in a market has different schedule characteristics or in other words 
each has a different quality. 
 
13.2.3. Objective 2: To Quantify Airline Schedule & Network Quality 
The second objective covered the quantification of airline network quality. The first 
objective was related to the quantity of the available capacity which was customised based on 
consumers’ expectations. The second objective in broad terms was concerned with the quality 
of the supply available for sale. Chapter 9 was dedicated to the quality score determination 
methodology. The abstract concept of “good” or “bad” schedules was translated into numerical 
values enabling the benchmarking of relative superiorities of competing itineraries in terms of 
schedule quality.  
 
13.2.4. Objective 3: To Determine A Realistic Market Share Estimation Tool (REMSET) 
The REMSET required two inputs: Supply and quality scores. The capacity share and 
quality scores of the prospective itineraries competing in a market were calculated as part of 
the first and second objective respectively. The third objective covered the modelling of the 
REMSET using consumer-centric supply and quality scores. As referred in Chapter 9, the 
REMSET adjusted the supply share with respect to the relative quality scores of each capacity; 
deeming the output of the model to be an indication of the airline’s relative performance against 
rivals present in an O&D.  
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13.2.5. Objective 4: To Develop A Tool for Industry Practitioners to Assess Schedule 
and Network Competitiveness in Their Route and Capacity Planning 
Market share is an indispensable performance indicator for company executives that 
enable them to comprehend and benchmark their company’s competitive position. Given their 
schedules, airline executives can forecast their potential market share by utilising the REMSET 
model. Since the market share parameter incorporates both the carriers’ network efficiency and 
their product’s level of appreciation from the consumers’ standpoint, higher market share 
estimations refer to better relative positioning of the service provider against competitors while 
the opposite case signals less likelihood for that product to be selected by the passengers for 
their journeys. 
 
This research also aimed to offer a tool for industry practitioners to conduct  scenario-
based analyses. By referring to scenario analysis, the impact of any changes in the airline’s 
network structure is stated. Such changes may involve parameters like variations in the 
departure/arrival times, introduction or cancellation of frequencies, changes with the aircraft 
type, addition or withdrawal of a codeshare agreement, launching a new destination or 
removing one from the network map and etc. The application of the consumer-centric schedule 
and network performance assessment models enabled certain comparative analyses including 
the connection quality and connectivity indexes for the selected hubs.  The airline and airport 
executives can use such analysis as a decision support tool to gain a competitive advantage 
over their rivals. 
 
13.3. Results and Discussion of Fulfilling Research’s Aim and Objectives 
 
By scanning the literature, an in-depth understanding of airline schedules and networks, 
as well as its central role in the planning process of the company, was developed. Additionally, 
the commoditisation process of the air transport product was examined, and the dynamics 
influencing consumer choice in itinerary decision making were studied in detail. The literature 
review was essential to comprehend the theoretical framework of airline networks and 
understand consumer perspectives towards the elements of airline schedules. The passenger 
survey was designed carefully which incorporated the previous findings available in the 
literature. The survey questions not only intended to test whether the parameters discussed in 
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the literature survey indeed had an impact on consumer decision making but also intended to 
quantify the level of impact of those parameters. The survey results offered credible responses 
which were in line with the previous literature and also market insights. Furthermore, the 
results of the survey formed the basis of the research’s methodology in the sense that relative 
capacity share and quality determination models used the survey findings as ingredients to the 
REMSET model.  
 
The schedule information of the 36 listed carriers totalling over a million rows of data 
having more than 23 million attributes in total were uploaded into the web environment 
(www.phdsukru.com), and all the methodology concerning the capacity share, quality and 
market share estimation was coded. This programming enabled fast and error-free computation 
for the metrics of the listed carriers. The web environment enabled the running of the analyses 
on any O&D pair which could be at the level of airport-to-airport, country-to-country and 
region-to-region.  In Chapter 10, fourteen different cases were introduced at different levels, 
and the outputs were studied in detail. In the following Chapter, specific scenarios were 
introduced to those 14 cases to observe the variations with the research’s outputs.   
 
Objective 1 of the research was achieved. The parameter, adjusted seat share, %a_s, 
successfully measured the consumer-centric capacity share of a carrier in a given market. The 
total physical frequency (f), seat supply (s) and seat share (%s) can be calculated for each flight 
route using the consumer-centric capacity determination model. Different from %s, %a_s refers 
to the adjusted form of the seat share referencing the relative capacity share of the competing 
carriers. Moreover, as part of the methodology, the seat supply of the connecting services and 
codeshare flights were calculated in a unique consumer-centric manner where adaptable 
parameters like sconn and scode were used. As addressed in Chapter 10, the adaptable sconn and 
scode parameters’ default values were set to certain pre-defined values. These values were 
changed in Chapter 11 to observe their impact on capacity related variables such as s, %s and 
%a_s. The scenarios of the cases in Chapter 11 credited the default values of sconn and scode. As a 
result, the consumer-centric capacity share computation model was developed successfully and 
implemented into the real schedules as addressed in Chapter 10 and 11. 
 
Objective 2 of the research was accomplished as the quality scores of the competing 
itineraries were calculated. The qa_index_normalised score provided a concrete indication of the relative 
quality performance of a carrier. While the highest qa_index_normalised referred to the most superior 
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product available in the market regarding schedule convenience, the worst ones corresponded 
to the minimum qa_index_normalised score. The quality determination methodology covered numerous 
factors including time related parameters (ttotal, tflight, tconn, tstress, twaste, qarr, qdep etc) as well as 
flight type (online or codeshare) and flight routing (direct or connecting) specified by udo, uco, 
udc and ucc. Survey results enormously the shaped quality score calculation model in the sense 
that the willingness to pay values retrieved from the questionnaire offered direct insight about 
the perceived value of different flight options. The cases that were shown in Chapter 10 and 11 
illustrated the relative quality performance of competing itineraries. Therefore, the abstract 
concepts of good and bad schedules were successfully translated into numerical values 
enabling benchmarking and the ranking of carrier’s performance. 
 
Objective 3 of the study was attained as the REMSET tool was prepared and produced 
credible and consistent forecasts. In Chapter 10, the market share estimations (ms) of several 
cases were undertaken using the model. The forecasts were then contrasted with the actual 
market share values obtained from the MIDT data. The comparison of the forecast and actual 
market shares has shown that the model generated accurate estimations. Therefore, the validity 
and credibility of the REMSET model were cross-checked and tested using actual market share 
data of the airlines operating on the route. As addressed previously, although there exist 
parameters other than capacity share and schedule quality that shape the actual market shares 
of the carriers, it was inferred from the cases in Chapter 10 that the quantity and quality of the 
supply formed an integral aspect of the actual market shares which can be accurately estimated 
by the REMSET. The other influential parameters other than the quantity and quality of the 
supply can assist to enhance the model. 
 
Objective 4 was also achieved as a unique tool is offered to industry practitioners 
enabling to assess schedule and network competitiveness.  The tool assisted in measuring 
competitive performance through the outputs covering %a_s, qa_index_normalised and ms. Chapter 11 
covered scenarios that were built upon the cases covered in Chapter 10. Each of the scenarios 
introduced a variation from the base status and the changes with the research outputs were 
observed with respect to changing schedule and network arrangements. Being able to assess 
supply, quality and market share estimations under changing network arrangements offered a 
unique decision support mechanism for industry practitioners. Airline executives can measure 
the impact of their potential schedule and network related decisions in terms of supply, quality 
and market share estimations by comparing these values with the original figures before any 
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changes are made to their network structure. Therefore, the preparation of a tool enabling to 
run simulations over the airlines’ network arrangement offered a unique commercial decision 
– support mechanism for industry practitioners. 
 
Moreover, as the past timetables of the listed carriers were also uploaded into the 
research database, the airlines’ performance development over the years were observed by 
running the research models for different years. Indeed, this capability aids airline executives 
to analyse their competitive performance development in return for their network investments. 
The historical information also assisted a deeper analysis of the competitive situation over the 
years, which indeed serves as a critical market intelligence information. 
 
Being able to use the research methodologies to evaluate and benchmark the hubs’ 
competitiveness in terms of connection quality and connectivity indexes was another 
accomplishment of Objective 4.  The tool enabled the relative performance of the carriers’ hubs 
to be contrasted and provided a benchmark analysis to rank the overall quality for connecting 
itineraties. As per the analysis performed in Chapter 12, in the bidirectional Europe/World 
market, VIE and ZRH airport offered the best quality connections as of 2016 schedules. 
However, the inadequacy of the connecting frequencies available at these airports reduced their 
connectivity index (CI) figures. On the other hand, while FRA and IST airport did not present 
the best connection quality qa_index_normalised scores in comparison to rival hubs, their competitive 
advantage in the frequency supply placed these airports in the top two rankings of the CI scores. 
It was also covered in the cases of Chapter 12 that the geographic location of the hubs are an 
essential component of their qa_index_normalised and CI scores. For instance, the hubs at the Gulf 
region such as DXB, AUH and DOH are relatively disadvantaged in the Europe/America 
market due to the higher detour ratios.   
 
 In sum, each of the research’s objectives were successfully achieved and thus the aim 
of the research was attained. In this context, the effectiveness of the airline schedule and 
networks were successfully measured, and their impact on consumer choice was formulated 
through solid parameters whose validity, credibility and accuracy were tested and cross-
checked with the actual market realisations. As part of the study, the strong correlation between 
network performance and consumer choice was observed and framed. The findings were also 
in line with the previous literature confirming that schedule convenience is a crucial parameter 
of consumer decision making while booking their itineraries. Additionally, the developed 
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methodologies of the research were formulated in an adaptable manner in which both the 
parameters and input variables could be changed to observe their impact on the outputs 
providing a unique decision support tool for industry practitioners.  
 
13.4. Contribution to the Literature & Achievements 
 
The literature review has addressed the existence of mechanisms and methodologies 
offering an option to benchmark the service level of different flight options by quantifying 
consumer behaviour. In this context, the QSI (Quality Service Index) was discussed as the 
industry norm. However, the weaknesses associated with the QSI model was covered in 
Chapter 3. The weaknesses of the QSI stemmed from the fact it is a strictly mathematical model 
severely lacking consumer’s attitudes towards schedule and network efficiency. The existing 
models that enable a comparison of relative superiorities of different carriers’ products 
primarily rely on physical capacity supply and therefore lack an in-depth understanding of the 
consumers’ needs and priorities. This research’s focus on determining consumers’ schedule 
related expectations and incorporating those factors into the model was a unique approach. The 
study’s model was developed both using the theoretical framework retrieved from the previous 
literature and real consumer feedback obtained directly from the passengers. In other words, 
the methodology was constructed with the primary data gathered directly from the survey 
responses. 
 
The consumer-centric capacity share determination methodology calculated not only 
the physical capacity supply available in a given market but also commercially viable capacities 
which were adjusted based on consumer preferences. As part of the model, the physical 
capacity offered by the airlines were not directly included in the available product set; they 
were customised based on the characteristics of the supply where infeasible seats were 
eliminated. This approach is also unique and has a substantial contribution to the literature.  
 
The translation of schedule and network quality concept into numbers was another 
distinctive outcome of this study. Consumers’ schedule quality perception was transformed 
into quantitative values enabling benchmarking of the relative performance of the competing 
carriers. Using survey findings, the methodology converted all the metrics that shape the 
attractiveness of an itinerary into a single unique index. The research model was developed 
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using adaptable parameters implying that the model could be adjusted or modified with respect 
to changing priorities of different customer segments. Therefore, airlines can quantify the 
quality of their schedule's quality from the consumers' perspective and benchmark that value 
with those of the competitors in addition to the capability of measuring consumer-centric 
supply share. 
 
REMSET is a significant contribution of this study both to academic literature and for 
the industry. The tool not only replaces the traditional QSI but also brings a fresh passenger 
focus to airlines’ competitive performance analysis. The tool assists airline executives in their 
network design process allowing them to measure the impact of any capacity and route 
investment quantitatively. Moreover, they can study the effect of any schedule related change 
in capacity share, quality scores and market share estimation. In this context, the tool also 
provides an insight for the revenue management while setting the fares as the understanding of 
their product performance in comparison to the rivals may assist in correct positioning and 
pricing. Furthermore, changing conditions beyond airlines’ control could also be captured 
using the research’s methodologies.  For instance, an airport may extend or shrink its MCT 
which could affect the connections from/to that airport. Such a change could be handled within 
the models as the MCT of the airports were dynamically retrieved from the OAG database and 
all relevant computations can be performed automatically over the newest data obtained from 
the database. Additionally, as addressed in the quality determination process, the changes in 
consumer preferences can also be handled as part of the REMSET mechanism as the quality 
score forms an input the market share estimation procedure.   
 
Apart from the objectives that achieved significant contributions to the literature, the 
survey findings offered distinctive academic findings. Before preparing the survey questions, 
papers were submitted to Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) in 2013 and 2014 held in 
Italy and France respectively. Both papers were accepted and presented. The papers received 
significant attention from the participants and the feedback of the society fine-tuned the 
intended survey questions. After the implementation of the survey, the results were drafted as 
two separate papers that were submitted to ATRS conferences held in Greece in 2016 and 
Belgium in 2017. The papers were presented in the conferences and the results were found 
exciting and convincing by the society. The participants confirmed that the study addressed a 
gap in the literature. Therefore, four different papers were submitted to the ATRS. Each of the 
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papers was accepted and presented at the conferences. All the presentations received significant 
attention from the society. 
 
The passenger survey has confirmed that the schedule convenience is among the 
essential factors of choice while making itinerary decisions. The survey analysis assisted in 
quantifying consumers' preference with certain schedule related factors. For example, it 
discovered that passengers can tolerate no more than 290 minutes connection time at the hub 
airport. The survey participants also expressed that, they demand an additional 30 minutes tbuffer 
on top of the MCT for their connecting itineraries in order to experience a less stressful journey. 
Moreover, respondents reported different levels of appreciation for different departure and 
arrival time intervals. They preferred morning departures and afternoon arrivals and avoided 
journeys departing or landing at the midnight hours.  The survey findings affirmed that 
codeshare flights are less likely to be preferred in comparison to operating itineraries and the 
direct services were reported to be “better” than connecting trips. The survey findings also 
quantified the relative values of itineraries depending on the itineraries’ type and routing. 
Therefore, the survey results presented interesting findings which present invaluable 
information for industry practitioners while designing their products.    
 
13.5. Limitations of the Research 
 
Although the research’s aim and objectives were fulfilled successfully and the 
REMSET methodology produced credible and valid estimations corroborated by the MIDT 
data, it had some limitations worth covering. The limitations are grouped into four distinct 
categories discussed in the sections below.  
 
13.5.1 Limitations Concerning Survey Design and Results 
The survey was designed after a detailed review of the literature and receipt of valuable 
feedback from the ATRS society. The questions forced respondents to mark their answers that 
did not permit them to write their ideas, suggestions or comments if they had any. Therefore, 
the survey had no room for qualitative feedback which might have been useful to receive. The 
survey questions were designed to complete the model and fill up the parametric gaps in the 
model. In case, there existed a chance to interview the survey participants or get further 
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feedback from them via open-ended questions; it might have been possible to reach different 
information concerning their decision-making process that might have been incorporated into 
the research’s methodology. On the other hand, open-ended questions might have assisted to 
address the language bias of the survey question text that has been discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
The survey was conducted in 9 different airports where 962 valid responses were 
recorded and included in the analysis of the results. As described in Chapter 6, survey 
administrators (or the assessors) based at the airports assisted in implementing the 
questionnaire and collecting the responses. They approached potential participants and 
enquired if they would be willing to take part in an academic study. The assessors did not take 
a role in the design and analyses of the survey. Their contribution was limited to the distribution 
and collection of the questionnaire handouts. Survey administrators were trained regarding the 
content of the questions and made clarifications in case the respondents demanded 
explanations. They were also trained to approach different segments and split the survey 
implementation to different time zones of the day and different days of the week to ensure a 
balanced harmony. Although the assessors were well informed concerning the procedures of 
the survey implementation and the questions’ content, any incompliance to these procedures 
or any misleading information or instruction from the assessors to the respondents posed a risk 
that could bias survey results. Furthermore, as the survey assesors were an employee of Turkish 
Airlines, they have approached primarily to Turkish Airlines passengers and asked for their 
participation. However, the ultimate level of effort was shown to mitigate these risks by 
continuously being in contact with the survey administrators and by immediately responding 
to their questions or requests in case they looked for the assistance.  
 
As in the case for all surveys, the participant sample’s appropriate representation of the 
passengers was another concern. This representation issue was sourced due to several reasons. 
First, since the respondents were selected in no particular manner by the assessors at the airport, 
their responses might have been influenced by any inconvenience during their experience at 
the airport. Second, the assessors might have approached respondents having no or very limited 
interest to schedule convenience, or those with no recent flight experience or they may have 
approached to an unbalanced mix of age, sex and occupation group. This representation related 
risks were managed by taking several precautions. First of all, the sample set was kept large 
including 1,053 valid responses. 91 surveys were eliminated from the analysis (962 remained) 
if the participant did not have travel experience in the past 12 months or did not place at least 
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some importance to schedule convenience. Unreadable surveys were also eliminated from the 
analysis. Therefore, it was ensured that the respondents of the survey had at least one flight 
experience in the past year and they reported at least some interest to schedule convenience. 
Among 1,053 survey results, only 25 respondents marked that schedule convenience as not an 
important parameter of itinerary decision at all, contributing to 2.37% of the entire set. 
Moreover, the survey was implemented in 9 different international locations which ensured a 
good representative harmony. Besides, the survey administrators approached different 
customer segments at the different time of the days and different days of the week and they did 
their best to diversify the customer segments they approached. The survey did not ask any 
question concerning the profile of the participants including sex, age, nationality or occupation. 
Therefore, it was not possible to report concerning the profile of the participants.  
 
13.5.2 Limitations Concerning the Scope of the Listed Carriers 
The models developed within the course of the study are global and can be implemented 
to any market and airline operating in that market. However, the cases of the research focused 
on Europe, the Middle East and Africa in order to focus more on international traffic as the 
predominant markets in Northern America and the Asia Pacific are domestic routes. In this 
context, the schedule information of 36 listed carriers in these focus regions was included in 
the research database. The listed airlines were chosen among major FSC, LCC and hybrid 
carriers operating in Europe, Middle East and Africa and they cover the major portion of the 
traffic flow in the selected regions. Therefore, throughout the cases in Chapter 10 and the 
scenarios of those cases in Chapter 11, the performance of those 36 listed carriers were 
contrasted and benchmarked. However, other carriers whose database information was not 
added into the research database and therefore not included in the benchmark analysis might 
operate in the markets analysed. In this case, the research outputs would only be calculated in 
reference to the listed carriers’ schedule data without including the non-listed airline timetable 
into the computation. This limitation could be mitigated by including the relevant carriers’ 
schedule information into the research database. The research methodology does not have a 
limitation on the number of carriers to be analysed. Therefore, although the inclusion of only 
36 carriers limits the competition analysis to be bounded by these carriers only, it does not 
affect the accuracy and credibility of the research’s model as any airline’s schedule could be 
inserted into the database for calculation.  
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13.5.3. Limitations Concerning the Data Sources 
The schedules of the airlines were uploaded into the research database by taking a 
weekly snapshot from the summer schedules. Since airline scheduled services are repeated 
every week, a representative week was selected for the carriers. In this context, for each year, 
the final week of June was chosen. Therefore, it was assumed that the final week of June for 
each year is a well representative of the yearly schedules. It is a fact that airlines usually form 
two schedule seasons: winter and summer. They often increase capacity in the peak (summer) 
season and cut supply in the low (winter) seasons. June which is part of the summer term may 
have greater capacity in comparison to the winter schedule season; it is not the “peak of peak” 
season as in the case of late July or August – therefore a good term to pick as the representative 
week. However, there might exist some minor concerns over this selection for different 
reasons. For example, some of the listed airlines such as South African Airlines are based in 
the Southern hemisphere with reverse seasonality. Moreover, for some carriers, the peak, off-
peak and shoulder seasons might not match with the other airlines. For instance, while June 
may be one of the peak seasons for the European carriers, it may not be the case for the Middle 
Eastern carriers like Saudi Arabian Airlines or EgyptAir celebrating Ramadan season (which 
also shifts by some days each year) when the demand for air travel falls.  
 
13.5.4. Limitations Concerning the Coverage of the Methodology 
The research was focused purely on schedule and network efficiency analysis of the 
airlines. For this reason, the deviation from the schedule, (namely the on-time performance) is 
kept out of the research’s scope as passengers do not base their decisions with regard to delay 
expectations. Any positive or negative reputation of a carrier in terms of on-time performance 
was evaluated within the context of brand perception and thus was excluded from the analysis 
as the product, and brand related factors were not embedded into the research model. There 
also exists other influential parameters effective in the itinerary selection which were not 
included within the scope of the research’s methodology. For instance, although it was verified 
in the survey results that, the fare is an important decision-making factor for the consumers 
(actually it was reported to be the most important one), it was not taken into account while 
designing the model. As the research’s hypothesis relied on schedule convenience, the fare 
parameter was excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, although the supply formed an integral 
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aspect of the designed methodologies, demand was not considered to be part of the developed 
model as the research intention was not focused on advising the ideal capacity in a market.  
 
13.6. Recommendations to the Industry 
 
This research managed to demonstrate a stable positive relationship between schedule 
convenience, network efficiency and consumer welfare. As the airlines' commercial 
performance is highly linked with network performance and customer satisfaction, the research 
provided an indispensable decision support mechanism for the airline executives implying a 
commercial application of the study. On the other hand, due to the addition of a brand-new 
customer-centric perspective to network efficiency, supply determination, quality scores and 
market share estimation, a significant contribution to academic literature was attained. Airline 
executives can utilise this methodology as a decision support mechanism during their planning 
processes. Through the research’s tool, they can assess the market performance effect of: 
- Inserting or removing a frequency in an O&D 
- Inserting or removing a new destination into the network 
- Adjusting the departure and arrival time of a flight 
- Changing the aircraft assigned to an O&D 
- Adding or removing of a codeshare agreement 
- The entrance or withdrawal of a competitor 
- Allocating less or more capacity for connecting passengers 
- Amending a codeshare agreement to sell/buy less or more capacity 
- Extending or a reducing the hub airport’s MCT 
- Changing passenger views towards schedule related parameters 
Industry practitioners can conduct scenario-based analyses for each of the cases mentioned 
above and observe the changes in the market performance through the REMSET model.   
 
 Not only the airline executives but also the airport authorities can benefit from the 
findings of the research. For example, it is invaluable information for airport management that 
the connecting passengers experience stress in case their first flight to the hub is delayed, which 
is the principal rationale behind their additional 30 minutes request (referring to tbuffer) as 
uncovered in the survey. On the other hand, extending the MCT would lead the airport to lose 
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certain connecting traffic. Therefore, the decision makers in the airport authorities can 
quantitatively assess the trade-off in terms of airline traffic in case they extend or shrink the 
MCT. Moreover, it was also found in the survey that the majority of the passengers cannot 
tolerate more than 290 minutes of connection time (referring to MaxCT) at the hub airport. The 
airport authorities can use this market intelligence information while planning the facilities of 
the airport. Furthermore, the connection quality and the connectivity index (CI) values of the 
hub airports provide essential key performance indicators for the industry practitioners. Hence, 
this research can be utilised by several parties including airline executives, airport management 
and other industry practitioners for their organisation's strategic goals. Likewise, academics 
can benefit from this study and contribute to the model with the further research areas 
summarised below.  
13.7. Further Research Areas 
 
The methodologies introduced in this study can be enhanced with further research. First 
of all, a fare component can be injected into the model but the objective of the research was 
not to assess the fare impact. The realistic market share estimation calculations at the O&D 
basis can be customised with respect to the fare levels of the competing airlines. In this context, 
secondary data sources that present average fares of the rival carriers at each market (such as 
Infare) could be utilised. Such a study would also require the customisation of the model based 
on different consumer segments and market routes to be analysed. On the other hand, airlines’ 
efforts to attract new passengers or retain the existing ones may have positive outcomes which 
may supersede schedule convenience or any factors including fare. Therefore, separate studies 
at the airline/brand level may be conducted to further enhance the credibility of the outputs or 
recognise the underlying dynamics in case a significant divergence exists between the 
estimated and actual market share figures. Thus, the REMSET model could be customised with 
respect to the airline brand by utilising secondary data sources. In this context, several 
institutions’ quantitative metrics on brand such as Skytrax can be used to adjust the 
qa_index_normalised scores. Skytrax offers extensive ratings of the airlines for various dimensions 
which could be integrated into the REMSET model. Moreover, other sources of secondary data 
could be obtained (like developing another survey to quantify airline brand related metrics) to 
integrate the results into the REMSET model.    
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It is discovered in the passenger survey that punctuality has a central role in the 
decision-making processes of the consumers. Throughout this study, punctuality has been 
referred to as a component of airlines’ brand image. However, as an area of further research, 
by employing secondary data sources concerning the airlines’ punctuality, the REMSET model 
could be enhanced by adding an “adherence to schedule” parameter. The lower performance 
of an airline with the on-time-performance parameter should negatively impact the 
qa_index_normalised scores. Although the brand related factors and the on-time-performance are not 
orthogonally evaluated by passengers, halo effects do pertain as interactions between 
parameters which could be analysed with further research.  
 
Consumers’ schedule related expectations and priorities may change over time. For this 
reason, passengers’ needs and preferences should continuously be monitored and airlines 
should redesign their network strategies by considering this valuable information. As the 
models introduced in this research are formed through adaptable parameters, the model can be 
readjusted to accommodate the changing needs and priorities of the consumers.  
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Appendix A – Passenger Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
The passenger survey that was used in this research is presented in the following 2 pages. 
 
Thank you for accepting to participate in our survey. Please help us to understand your views on your travel preferences. Your 
responses will only be used for academic purposes. Your personal information is not required as part of this survey. 
 
How many flights have you taken in the last 12 months? 
Travelling to one destination and back count as 1 round trip. 
 
□ No flights 
□ 1 round-trip flight 
□ 2 – 5 round-trip flights 
□ 6 – 9 round-trip flights 
□ More than 10 round-trip flights 
To what extent are you able to decide or influence the decision makers 
of your flight plans?  
 
□ I make or influence my ALL flight decisions. 
□ I make or influence MOST of my flight decisions. 
□ I make or influence SOME of my flight decisions. 
□ I RARELY make or influence my flight decisions. 
□ I NEVER make or influence my flight decisions.  
Have you taken any of these air trips in the past 5 years? 
(Please check any if your answer is YES) 
 
□ Connecting flight 
□ Connecting flight with limited connection time (due to 
short connection time or late arrival of the first flight) 
□ Codeshare flight (booked in one airline but flown with 
another one) 
□ Long haul flight (more than 8 hours) 
□ Business or first class flight 
□ Premium economy class flight 
□ Low-cost airline flight 
□ Domestic flight 
Please rank the factors shaping your travel decision from the most 
important one to the least from 1 to 10. (1 / most important, 10 / least 
important) Use each number once only.  
 
__   Date and time convenience 
__   Fare 
__   Duration of the journey 
__   Frequent flyer programme 
__   Airline reputation 
__   Departure and/or arrival airport 
__   On-board services (catering, in-flight entertainment, cabin service 
etc.) 
__   Before and after flight services (CIP lounge, shuttle services etc.) 
__   Availability of flight alternatives (such as higher frequency per day)  
__   On-time performance and consistent schedule times 
 
For each time interval below, please state the degree of convenience for departures and arrivals. 1 referring to the worst, 2 poor, 
3 good, 4 the best time of the day. For example if you believe departing a city at 5 am in the morning is terrible please tick  option 
“1” for row 04:00 – 05:59 for departure time section on the left, and if you believe it is good to arrive at the city at 5 am in the 
morning please tick  option 3 for the arrival time section on the right.  
 
D
ep
ar
tu
re
 T
im
e 
Departure Time 1 Worst 
2 
Poor 
3 
Good 
4 
Best 
Ar
riv
al
 T
im
e 
Arrival Time 1 Worst 
2 
Poor 
3 
Good 
4 
Best 
00:00-01:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 00:00-01:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
02:00-03:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 02:00-03:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
04:00-05:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 04:00-05:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
06:00-07:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 06:00-07:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
08:00-09:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 08:00-09:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10:00-11:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 10:00-11:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12:00-13:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 12:00-13:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14:00-15:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 14:00-15:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16:00-17:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 16:00-17:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18:00-19:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 18:00-19:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20:00-21:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 20:00-21:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22:00-23:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 22:00-23:59 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
If you need to take a connecting flight, what would be your 
maximum tolerance to wait in the connecting airport from the 
landing of your first flight until the departure of your second 
flight? (E.g. You are travelling from New York to Rome via 
Heathrow. How long would you be willing to spend in Heathrow 
airport maximum ?) 
 
□ Up to 2 hours 
□ Up to 3 hours 
□ Up to 5 hours 
□ Up to 8 hours 
□ Connection time is less important than other factors 
There is a minimum time required for each airport to connect from one 
flight to another. Some people find the minimum time challenging as 
with any irregularity such as the late arrival of the first flight, they may 
misconnect or feel stressed. How much minimum additional time 
would you prefer to have to make the connection less stressful? 
 
□ No extra time required 
□ Minimum time + 15 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 30 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 45 minutes 
□ Minimum time + 1 hour 
□ Minimum time + more than 1 hour 
There are two flight alternatives to your destination, one 
operated by the airline of your choice and the other a 
codeshare flight where you book with the airline of your choice 
but travel on a different airline. Under which conditions would 
you choose the codeshare flight? 
 
□ I would never choose a codeshare flight. 
□ I would only choose it if I had no other choice.  
□ I might choose a codeshare flight if it is more convenient. 
□ It really does not matter to me. 
Which of the flight itinerary would you prefer for your travel from City 
A to City B ? $ signs are a depiction of the flight cost factor where 
more number of $ signs refers to a more expensive option.  
 
□ A direct flight of my favourite airline costing $$$$ 
□ A codeshare direct flight operated by an airline other than my 
choice costing $$$ 
□ A connecting (longer) flight of my favourite airline costing $$$  
□ A connecting (longer) flight of an airline other than my regular 
choice costing $$ 
 
Let's suppose you will fly from City A to City B by connecting through City C. This is a long haul connecting flight with 
INCONVENIENT departure and arrival times taking 18 hours for the whole journey. You paid 500 USD or this flight. Please answer 
the below questions taking 500 USD as the reference fare.  
How much would you pay for the below-mentioned flight alternatives from City 
A to City B referencing the above case costing 500 USD? Please tick  the 
value in USD or each case below. The leftmost column refers to less than 400 
USD, where rightmost column refers more than 700 USD. 
< 
40
0 
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40
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0 
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0 
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1 
–7
00
 $
 
>7
00
 $
 
A connecting flight with convenient flight times lasting 18 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A direct flight taking 12 hours with convenient flight times ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A direct flight taking 12 hours with inconvenient flight times. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with convenient flight times taking 18 hours  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with inconvenient flight times taking 18 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare connecting flight with convenient flight times taking 15 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A codeshare direct flight with inconvenient times taking 12 hours ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
For a different journey, which of the connecting flight itineraries 
would you prefer for your travel from City D to City E? Total 
duration of the journey from D to E is 10 hours. 
 
□ First flight leg lasts 8 hours, the second leg lasts 1 hour and 
the connection time at the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 6 hours, the second leg lasts 3 hours 
and the connection time at the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 3 hours, the second leg lasts 6 hours 
and the connection time at the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ First flight leg lasts 1 hour, the second leg lasts 8 hours and 
the connection time at the connecting airport is 1 hour. 
□ It does not matter to me at all. 
Which of the connecting flight itineraries would you prefer for your 
travel from City F to City G? (Assuming all other parameters of 
choice like fares, airline preference, schedule are identical) 
 
□ A connecting flight with a total 12 hours of journey time of 
which 3 hours are spent at the connecting airport 
□ A connecting flight with a total 12 hours of journey time of 
which only 1 hour is spent at the connecting airport 
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Appendix B: Survey Responses by Airport 
 
Survey Question #1: Frequency of Flights 
 
Table B1: Responses to Survey Question 1 – Frequency of Flights per Airport Surveyed 
Airport 
Number of Round Trip Flights 
1 RT 2 RT 3 - 5 RT 6 - 9 RT > 10 RT 
Delhi 38 20 16 18 6 
Dubai 14 14 51 19 7 
Frankfurt 10 40 40 11 8 
Geneva 12 33 45 21 2 
Hong Kong 14 36 50 12 2 
Istanbul 42 32 21 6 4 
Johannesburg 31 20 33 11 6 
London 10 16 47 23 12 
New York 10 13 41 24 21 
Total 181 224 344 145 68 
 
Table B2: Weighted Average RT Flights Per Year 
RT DEL DXB FRA GVA HKG IST JNB LON NYC 
Weighted 
Average 
3.56 4.50 3.93 3.88 3.50 2.69 3.53 5.06 5.79 
 
Survey Question #2: Itinerary Decision Making 
 
Table B3: Itinerary Decision Making per Airport Surveyed 
Airport 
Power on Itinerary Decision Making 
ALL MOST SOME RARELY NEVER 
Delhi 14 (14.3 %) 37 (37.8 %) 29 (29.6 %) 15 (15.3 %) 3 (3.0 %) 
Dubai 9 (8.5 %) 40 (38.3 %) 40 (38.0 %) 12 (11.4 %) 4 (3.8 %) 
Frankfurt 25 (22.9 %) 48 (44.1 %) 30 (27.6 %) 4 (3.6 %) 2 (1.8 %) 
Geneva 28 (24.8 %) 45 (39.8 %) 31 (27.4 %) 9 (8.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
Hong Kong 19 (16.7 %) 51 (44.8 %) 32 (28.0 %) 11 (9.7 %) 1 (0.8 %) 
Istanbul 12 (11.4 %) 46 (43.8 %) 37 (35.3 %) 6 (5.7 %) 4 (3.8 %) 
Johannesburg 8 (7.9 %) 39 (38.6 %) 33 (32.7 %) 16 (15.9 %) 5 (4.9 %) 
London 17 (15.7 %) 53 (49.1 %) 30 (27.8 %) 6 (5.5 %) 2 (1.9 %) 
New York 21 (19.3 %) 42 (38.6 %) 35 (32.1 %) 8 (7.3 %) 3 (2.7 %) 
Total 153 401 297 87 24 
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Survey Question #3: Positive Previous Experience 
 
Table B4: Positive Previous Experiences per Airport Surveyed 
  Delhi Dubai Frankfurt Geneva Hong Kong Istanbul Johannesburg London New York 
Connecting Flight 75 (%76,5) 80 (%76,2) 90 (%82,6) 81 (%71,7) 73 (%64,0) 77 (%73,3) 87 (%86,1) 71 (%65,7) 80 (%73,4) 
Connecting Flight with 
Limited Connection Time 33 (%33,7) 29 (%27,6) 60 (%55) 57 (%50,4) 45 (%39,5) 26 (%24,8) 14 (%13,9) 26 (%24,1) 15 (%13,8) 
Codeshare flight 22 (%22,4) 17 (%16,2) 44 (%40,4) 35 (%31,0) 37 (%32,5) 26 (%24,8) 15 (%14,9) 46 (%42,6) 44 (%40,4) 
Long Haul Flight 67 (%68,4) 77 (%73,3) 63 (%57,8) 52 (%46,0) 80 (%70,2) 58 (%55,2) 69 (%68,3) 73 (%67,6) 72 (%66,1) 
Business / First Class 
Flight 21 (%21,4) 39 (%37,1) 48 (%44,0) 62 (%54,9) 35 (%30,7) 25 (%23,8) 30 (%29,7) 41 (%38,0) 58 (%53,2) 
Premium Economy Flight 45 (%45,9) 20 (%19,0) 71 (%65,1) 38 (%33,6) 55 (%48,2) 14 (%13,3) 26 (%25,7) 61 (%56,5) 58 (%53,2) 
Low Cost Flight 88 (%89,8) 75 (%71,4) 102 (%93,6) 103 (%91,2) 78 (%68,4) 103 (%98,1) 87 (%86,1) 93 (%86,1) 85 (%78,0) 
Domestic Flight 94 (%95,9) 72 (%68,6) 98 (%89,9) 95 (%84,1) 76 (%66,7) 98 (%93,3) 69 (%68,3) 92 (%85,2) 99 (%90,8) 
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Survey Question #4: Importance Ranking 
Table B5: Weighted Index of Importance Rankings Scores per Airport Surveyed (Lower Score Implies Higher Importance) 
  Delhi Dubai Frankfurt Geneva 
Hong 
Kong Istanbul Johannesburg London 
New 
York Average 
Date and Time Convenience 5,11 5,06 4,62 4,12 4,94 5,08 5,12 4,41 4,24 4,73 
Fare 2,62 3,22 3,56 3,91 3,42 2,87 2,70 3,49 3,53 3,27 
Duration of Journey 6,07 6,13 6,01 6,00 5,88 6,11 6,16 5,89 5,95 6,02 
Frequent Flyer Programme 5,14 5,95 6,54 6,94 6,15 6,08 5,11 6,89 7,15 6,24 
Airline Reputation 4,87 4,99 5,72 5,82 5,55 5,22 4,87 5,93 5,82 5,44 
Departure and/or Arrival Airport 6,57 6,71 6,12 6,56 6,92 5,78 6,33 5,77 5,95 6,30 
On-board Services 6,44 4,88 5,99 5,65 5,39 5,99 6,22 6,01 5,98 5,83 
Before and After Flight Services 6,89 6,61 6,30 5,97 6,28 6,79 7,00 6,57 6,45 6,53 
Availability of Flight Alternatives 5,61 5,74 5,65 5,53 5,65 5,88 5,60 5,89 5,35 5,65 
On Time Per. and Consistent Schedule Times 5,71 5,70 4,44 4,50 4,79 5,21 5,92 4,19 4,53 4,98 
 
Survey Question #5: Departure Time Quality 
Table B6: Mostly Selected Departure Time Scores for Time Intervals per Airport Surveyed.1 (Worst), 2 (Poor), 3 (Good), 4 (Best) Time.  
  Delhi Dubai Frankfurt Geneva Hong Kong Istanbul Johannesburg London New York Average 
00:00 – 01:59 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 
02:00 – 03:59 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
04:00 – 05:59 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
06:00 – 07:59 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 
08:00 – 09:59 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10:00 – 11:59 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
12:00 – 13:59 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
14:00 – 15:59 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
16:00 – 17:59 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
18:00 – 19:59 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
20:00 – 21:59 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
22:00 – 23:59 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 
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Survey Question #6: Arrival Time Quality 
 
Table B7: Mostly Selected Arrival Time Scores for Time Intervals per Airport Surveyed. 1 (Worst), 2 (Poor), 3 (Good), 4 (Best) Time of the Day.  
  Delhi Dubai Frankfurt Geneva Hong Kong Istanbul Johannesburg London New York Average 
00:00 – 01:59 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
02:00 – 03:59 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
04:00 – 05:59 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
06:00 – 07:59 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
08:00 – 09:59 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 
10:00 – 11:59 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 
12:00 – 13:59 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 
14:00 – 15:59 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 
16:00 – 17:59 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
18:00 – 19:59 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 
20:00 – 21:59 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
22:00 – 23:59 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
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Survey Question #7: Maximum Connection Time (MaxCT) Determination 
 
Table B8: Computed Weighted Average MaxCT per Airport Surveyed 
MaxCT DEL DXB FRA GVA HKG IST JNB LON NYC 
minutes 305 304 268 277 294 304 307 277 271 
Standard deviation 16.2 minutes 
 
Survey Question #8: Buffer Time (tbuffer) Request 
 
Table B9: Computed Weighted Average tbuffer per Airport Surveyed 
 DEL DXB FRA GVA HKG IST JNB LON NYC 
minutes 30.4 29.7 27.3 26.7 29.5 28.8 29.2 31.1 30.2 
Standard Deviation 1.42 minutes 
 
Survey Question #9: Codeshare Convenience Question 
Table B10: Responses to Codeshare Convenience Question at the Survey Airport Level 
 Never 
choose 
codeshare 
Choose only 
if no other 
choice 
Can choose 
if codeshare 
flight more 
convenient 
It does not 
matter at all 
Delhi 33 (33.7%) 25 (25.5%) 19 (19.4%) 21 (21.4%) 
Dubai 46 (43.8%) 32 (30.5%) 19 (18.1%) 8 (7.6%) 
Frankfurt 30 (27.5%) 24 (22.0%) 36 (33.0%) 19 (17.5%) 
Geneva 30 (26.5%) 28 (24.8%) 33 (29.2%) 22 (19.5%) 
Hong Kong 35 (30.7%) 25 (22.0%) 24 (21.0%) 30 (26.3%) 
Istanbul 39 (37.0%) 26 (24.8%) 20 (19.1%) 20 (19.1%) 
Johannesburg 46 (45.5%) 31 (30.7%) 17 (16.9%) 7 (6.9%) 
London 30 (27.8%) 23 (21.3%) 32 (29.6%) 23 (21.3%) 
New York 27 (24.8%) 24 (22.0%) 27 (24.8%) 31 (28.4%) 
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Survey Question #10: Fare, Schedule Convenience and Flight Type Relation Question 
 
Table B11: Responses to Question 10 at the Survey Airport Breakdown 
  
Direct, 
operating, 
$$$$ 
Direct, non-
operating, 
$$$ 
Connecting, 
operating, 
$$$ 
Connecting, 
non-operating, 
$$ 
Delhi 18 (%18.4) 19 (%19.4) 35 (%35.7) 26 (%26.5) 
Dubai 25 (%23.8) 24 (%22.8) 28 (%26.7) 28 (%26.7) 
Frankfurt 30 (%27.5) 24 (%22.0) 29 (%26.6) 26 (%23.9) 
Geneva 24 (%21.2) 25 (%22.1) 30 (%26.6) 34 (%30.1) 
Hong Kong 25 (%21.9) 26 (%22.8) 35 (%30.7) 28 (%24.6) 
Istanbul 21 (%20.0) 24 (%22.8) 34 (%32.4) 26 (%24.8) 
Johannesburg 15 (%14.9) 21 (%20.8) 37 (%36.6) 28 (%27.7) 
London 26 (%24.1) 30 (%27.8) 33 (%30.5) 19 (%17.6) 
New York 23 (%21.1) 27 (%24.8) 33 (%30.3) 26 (%23.8) 
 
Survey Question #13: Flight Time or Connecting Time (%tf or %tc) 
 
Table B12: Responses to Question 13 at the Survey Airport Breakdown 
  ... of  which 3 hours is spent at hub airport 
... of  which only 1 hour is 
spent at hub airport 
Delhi 46 (%46.9) 52 (%53.1) 
Dubai 61 (%58.1) 44 (%41.9) 
Frankfurt 62 (%56.9) 47 (%43.1) 
Geneva 51 (%45.1) 62 (%54.9) 
Hong Kong 65 (%57.0) 49 (%43.0) 
Istanbul 49 (%46.7) 56 (%53.3) 
Johannesburg 46 (%45.5) 55 (%54.5) 
London 58 (%53.7) 50 (%46.3) 
New York 60 (%55.0) 49 (%45.0) 
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Appendix C: Screenshots From www.phdsukru.com 
 
 The listed airlines’ schedule, the airports MCT information, survey findings and research 
methodologies were uploaded to www.phdsukru.com. All the computations performed as part of 
this research were conducted via using this web platform to ensure error-free, fast and efficient 
computations. The following sections include some screenshots from www.phdsukru.com. 
  
Image C1: Login Page 
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Image C2: Schedule Search 
 
 
Image C3: Schedule Search Results 
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Image C4: Direct Flight Itinerary Reporting 
 
 
Image C5: Connecting Services Search Results 
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Image C6: Connecting Services Itinerary Reporting 
 
 
 
Image C7: Analysing a Route GYD – AMS Market 
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Image C7: Flights Summary in the GYD-AMS Market 
 
 
 
 
 
Image C8: Market Share Estimation in the GYD-AMS Market 
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Image C9: Country Based Search from Germany to Japan 
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Image C10: Adding a Simulation Flight 
 
 
 
Image C11: Parameter Setting Page 
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Appendix D: Case Study 
 
Having iterated through all steps of the REMSET in Chapter 9, this appendix introduces 
a case study from 2016 schedule data. As part of the case study, the competition from Almaty, 
Kazakhstan (ALA) to Milan-Malpensa, Italy (MXP) is analysed. 
 
D.1. Capacity Share (%a_s) Calculation of the Case Study 
As per the schedule database of the listed airlines as of 2016, there were no direct 
services present from ALA to MXP. Considering the MaxCT to be 290 minutes as discovered 
in passenger survey, three airlines offered online connecting services: Lufthansa (LH) via 
Frankfurt (FRA), Aeroflot (SU) via Moscow-Sheremetyevo (SVO) and Turkish Airlines (TK) 
via Istanbul (IST). Daily seat availabilities for each combination under sconn = 0.2 assumptions 
were as follows: 
 
Table D.1: Daily Seat Availabilities from ALA to MXP for LH, SU and TK Combinations. 
 Via Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
LH647/LH248 FRA  34  34  34 34 
SU1947/SU2612 SVO 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
TK351/TK1895 IST 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
TK353/TK1875 IST   34  34  34 
 
The above table shows four distinct hits, fetched from the daily capacities of the 
individual legs composing the connections. The daily seat capacities of the individual legs are 
shown in the table below.  
Table D.2: Seat Capacities of Individual Legs Composing the Combinations. 
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
LH647  216  216  216 216 
LH248 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
SU1947 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
SU2612 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
TK351 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
TK1895 178 178 178 178 178 180 178 
TK353   169  169  169 
TK1875 180 178 178 178 178 178 178 
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For LH, the LH647 frequency was the limitation as it was only operated four times a 
week, while LH248 was operated daily. On the other hand, the seating capacity of the ALA–
MXP connection was limited by the LH248’s capacity as its seats were less than the seat count 
of LH647 (capacity constraint). Therefore, the seating capacity of the LH647–LH248 
combination was equal to (sconn x sLH248) for the days that LH647 flight was operated. Since 
LH248 operated with a 168 seat capacity aircraft, the number of connecting seats in the route 
was then calculated to be 168 x 0.2 =33.6 (rounded up to 34 in Table 9.20), operated on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays. For the SU combination, the frequency was not 
limited as both legs were operated daily. However, connecting seats were bottlenecked by the 
SU2612 flight as its capacity was less than SU1947. The number of available seats for the SU 
connection was therefore equal to (sconn x sSU2612 ) = 140 x 0.2 = 28, for each day of the week. 
For the TK connections, there existed two combinations. The TK351-TK1895 combination was 
operated daily, where TK351 formed the seat constraint, therefore presenting sconn x sTK351  = 
169 x 0.2 = 33.8 (rounded to 34 in Table 9.20) seats daily. Moreover, the TK353-TK1875 
combination was operated three times a week since TK353 only operates on Wednesdays, 
Fridays and Sundays. TK353 constrainted the combination in terms of seat availability, offering 
169 x 0.2 = 33.8 (rounded up to 34 in Table 9.20) seats for those days. Therefore, the final table 
summarizing weekly frequencies and seat availabilities of the competing airlines in the ALA–
MXP market were as follows: (Rounded numbers of available seats at the daily level are not 
summed together in order not to over escalate weekly capacity. Instead, daily figures are 
summed in decimals and then rounded up or down.)  
 
Table D.3: Consolidated Frequency and Available Seat Table from ALA to MXP. 
Airline Frequency/week Available Seats/week 
LH / Lufthansa 4 134 (rounded down from 134.4) 
SU / Aeroflot 7 196 
TK / Turkish Airlines 10 
237 from TK351/TK1895 (rounded 
up from 236.6) and 101 from 
TK353/TK1875 (rounded down from 
101.4) therefore 338 seats in total 
Total 21 frequencies 668 seats 
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 As of the 2016 schedules of the listed carriers, there were 21 distinct frequencies from 
ALA to MXP offering a total of 668 seats. The capacity per cent shares in terms of weekly 
frequencies and available seats were calculated as follows: 
 
 
Table D.4: Frequency and Available Seat Share of Carriers Offering Services from ALA to 
MXP. 
Airline Frequency Share (%f) Available Seat Share (%s) 
LH / Lufthansa 19.05% 20.06% 
SU / Aeroflot 33.33% 29.34% 
TK / Turkish Airlines 47.62% 50.60% 
 
As observed in the above table, an airline’s frequency share and seat share may differ 
because of divergences with the seats per frequency factor, sf which is directly linked with 
parameters such as aircraft size, itinerary type and capacity constraints for the connecting 
services. In the case of ALA–MXP, the divergences with the sf are sourced because of the 
different aircraft size of each carrier. It is inferred from Table 9.22 that SU offered the fewest 
seats available per frequency in the market, which was equal to 196 / 7 = 28. Seat per frequency 
for LH and TK was 33.5 and 33.8 respectively. It is also observed in the table that LH did not 
offer daily connections from ALA to MXP. It was operated only four days a week, whereas the 
other airlines offered daily services. Thus, an adjustment in seat capacity was required, 
employing waste capacity discount model. This adjustment intended to calculate effective seat 
supply for each airline serving in the market. 
 
To calculate the effective seats, LH’s seat count was needed to be discounted by 3/7, 
which corresponds to a decrease from 134 to 76.5 seats. Since 57.5 seats were wasted, for the 
sake of the adjusted capacity share calculation, the total amount of the available seats was 
reduced from 668 to 610.5 seats. Using the effective seats, the adjusted capacity share for each 
airline is calculated in the table below: (Numbers are not rounded, shown in decimals.)  
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Table D.5.: Adjusted/Effective Seats and Corresponding Percent Shares of Carriers Operating 
from ALA to MXP. 
Airline Effective Seats (s) Adjusted Capacity Share (%a_s) 
LH / Lufthansa 76.5 76.5/610.5 = 12.53% 
SU / Aeroflot 196 196/610.5 = 32.11% 
TK / Turkish Airlines 338 338 / 610.5 = 55.36% 
Total 610.5 100% 
 
 Up to this point, the capacity shares of each airline competing in the market were 
calculated. The next set of procedures intended to quantify the corresponding schedule related 
quality scores of those available capacities.   
 
 D.2. Quality Calculation of the Case Study 
 
D.2.1. LH Flights: For the single LH647/LH248 combination, the below table shows 
the scheduled timetable of the individual legs composing the connecting itinerary. 
  
Figure D.1: Schedule Information of LH Combination from ALA to MXP. 
 
 
The connecting LH service departs ALA at 03:50 and arrives in FRA at 07:00 in the 
morning. After 130 minutes of connecting time at FRA airport, the flight to MXP departs at 
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09:10 and arrives in final destination at 10:20. These timings are consistent for each of the four 
frequencies offered within the week, where all timings are local. Therefore this journey is 
completed in 10 hours and 30 minutes in total. In other words, ttotal = 630 minutes. Of the 630 
minutes, tconn is calculated to be 130 minutes (2 hours and 10 minutes) and the remaining 500 
minutes (8 hours and 20 minutes) is the tflight. Since the daily seat capacity for each four days 
of the connections is identical, these figures are all the same for the weekly analysis of the 
LH647/LH248 combination.  
 
The connecting time for the LH647/LH248 combination is greater than the sum of 
passengers’ buffer time request and the MCT of FRA airport. The MCT of Frankfurt airport is 
45 minutes and tbuffer was found to be 30 minutes by the passenger survey. Therefore, with tconn 
= 130 minutes, travellers would be wasting some time at FRA airport. The wasted time is twaste 
= tconn – MCT - tbuffer = 130 – 45 – 30 = 55 minutes. Since the waste time is a non-zero parameter, 
passengers travelling from ALA to MXP via FRA with the LH connecting service do not 
experience any stress, deeming tstress to be 0 minutes.  
 
Since for each day of the week, the same seat capacity and departure - arrival times 
exist, weekly average values of tstress and twaste are also equal to 0 and 55 minutes respectively. 
Weight averaging with respect to seat supply would equate daily figures with the weekly 
averages, as both timings and seat supply within the days of the week are identical. With this 
information in mind, weekly average tinconvenient for the LH647–LH258 hit is equal to (tstress + 
twaste) = 55 minutes. Therefore, inconvenient time ratio %inconvenience is (tinconvenient / ttotal) = 55 / 
630 equal to 8.73%.  
 
LH passengers depart from ALA at 03:50 local time to their hub destination FRA. The 
survey found that such a timing is one of the least preferred time intervals to depart a city, 
scoring qdep = 1. The passengers’ local arrival time to MXP from FRA is 10:20. As per the 
survey results, this is a better timing compared to the departure time, scoring qarr = 3. Moreover, 
it is required to determine if the itinerary qualifies for an additional qsplit score. To be able to 
accomplish this calculation, the following table is prepared: 
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Table D.6: Flight Time Duration of LH647/LH248's Legs and Their Corresponding Per Cent 
Share Within tflight 
Flight Duration % within tflight 
LH647 430 minutes 86% 
LH248 70 minutes 14% 
Total tflight 500 minutes 100% 
 
Under %q_split is 0.8 or 80% assumption, it is deduced that the longer flight leg (LH647) 
composing the itinerary exceeds %q_split, therefore qualifying for an additional qsplit score which 
is set to be 1. Therefore time convenience quality, qconvenience, for this combination is computed 
as (qdep + qarr + qsplit) = 1 + 3 + 1 = 5. Again the weekly average of qconvenience is still equal to 5, 
as the departure-arrival times are unchanged within the days of the week.  
 
  To assess the quality index value of this combination, Table 9.11 is to be referred to. 
Considering the itinerary is a connecting service where both legs are operating flights of LH, 
as per the table, qindex value changes between 1.000 and 1.131. The lowest qconvenience (which is 
equal to 2) would result in a qindex of 1.000 where the highest (that is equal to 9) would deem 
the figure to be 1.131. Assuming qindex is distributed linear within these boundaries, qindex is 
calculated as (1.000 +  (ହିଶ)
଻
∗ (1.131 − 1.000)) = 1.0561 as qconvenience is equal to 5. In the next 
step, it is required to normalise the quality index as the itinerary encapsulate an inconvenient 
time ratio of 8.73% implying that qindex needs to be discounted by 8.73% to calculate the 
qindex_normalised. Therefore qindex_normalised is measured as 1.0561 x (100% - 8.73%) = 0.9639. 
 
D.2.2. SU Flights: For the single SU1947/SU2612 combination, the below table shows 
the scheduled timetable of the individual legs composing the connecting itinerary.  
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Figure D.2: Schedule Information of SU Combination from ALA to MXP. 
 
 
For each day of the week, the flight departs from ALA at 05:50, arrives at SVO at 07:45 
local time. Daily seat capacities are also identical where 28 seats are offered each day. 
Therefore, the calculations performed at the daily level from here onwards also refers to weekly 
average values for all parameters. 
 
After 205 minutes of tconn at SVO airport, SU2612 flight departs 11:10 and arrives at 
MXP at 13:45 local time. Therefore, the total journey time is 715 minutes (11 hours and 55 
minutes). The tflight is equal to 715 – 205 = 510 minutes. As of 2016, considering the MCT for 
international connections at SVO airport is 95 minutes, MCT Surplus is calculated as 205 – 95 
= 110 minutes. Since MCT Surplus is greater than tbuffer, travellers flying from ALA to MXP 
via SU would be wasting (MCT Surplus - tbuffer ) = (110 – 30) = 80 minutes at SVO airport. 
Since no stress time is created with this itinerary, total inconvenient time is equal to 80 minutes. 
The inconvenient timeshare, %inconvenient, within ttotal is calculated as 80 / 715 = 11.2% 
 
 Passengers travelling on this itinerary depart from ALA at 05:50, the most unpopular 
time to leave the city referring qdep = 1, whereas they land to MXP at 13.45, the most convenient 
time to arrive, implying qarr = 4. On the other hand, since the first leg’s duration is 4 hours and 
55 minutes and the second flight takes 3 hours and 35 minutes, none of the legs exceed %q_split  
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of 80%, and hence no flight qualifies for an additional qsplit score. Therefore, the qconvenience score 
is 5.  
 
Since the SU itinerary is a connecting service where both legs are operating flights, as 
per Table 9.11, qindex value changes between 1.000 and 1.131. The lowest qconvenience (which is 
equal to 2) would result in a qindex of 1.000, where the highest (that is equal to 9) would deem 
the figure to be 1.131. Assuming qindex is distributed linear within these boundaries, qindex is 
calculated as (1.000 +  (ହିଶ)
଻
∗ (1.131 − 1.000)) = 1.0561. As the inconvenient time ratio of 
the SU product is reported to be 11.2%, 1.0561 is to be discounted by %inconvenient and 
qindex_normalised is then calculated to be 1.0561 x ( 1 – 11.2%) = 0.938.  
 
D.2.3. TK Flights: The timetable and parameter calculations for each two combinations 
of TK are displayed below:  
 
Figure D.3: Schedule Information of TK351/TK1895 Combination from ALA to MXP. 
 
 
 The combination offers the same arrival and departure time as well as capacity supply, 
34 seats for each day of the week. Therefore, weight averaging would result in daily figures 
equal to weekly averages. Going through the same procedures, for the TK351/TK1895 
combination, tconn equals 115 minutes while the tflight is 545 minutes and ttotal is then 11 hours 
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(660 minutes). Considering Istanbul airport’s MCT is 1 hour, the MCT surplus is calculated as 
55 minutes, also implying a waste and inconvenient time of (55 - tbuffer) = 25 minutes. %inconvenient 
is equal to 25/660 = 3.8%. Departing at 06:45 is rated 3 while arriving at MXP is rated as one 
best time intervals scoring 4. Since none of the flight legs’ durations exceed %q_split, no flight 
qualifies for an additional qsplit score. Therefore, the qconvenience score is 7. Being an operating 
and connecting flight, as per Table 9.11, qindex value changes between 1.000 and 1.131. 
Assuming qindex is distributed linear within upper and lower boundaries of qconvenience, it is 
calculated as follows: (1.000 +  (଻ିଶ)
଻
∗ (1.131 − 1.000)) = 1.0935. Discounting this number 
with %inconvenient, qindex_normalised  is calculated to be 1.052.  
 
 The schedule information of the second TK combination, TK353/TK1875, is as follows: 
It should be noted that the departure and arrival times, as well as daily seat supplies, are identical 
in this combination too. 
 
Figure D.4: Schedule Information of TK353/TK1875 Combination. 
 
 
 Using the same procedures, time-related parameters and inconvenient time calculation 
of the TK353/TK1875 combination are reported as follows:  
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Table D.7: TK353/TK1875 Combination's Time-related Parameters, Inconvenient Time and 
Inconvenient Time Ratio Values.   
tconn tflight ttotal MCT MCT surplus Inconvenient. Time %inconvenient 
225 min 550 min 775 min 1 hr 165 min. 
135 min. 
(Waste Time) 
17.4% 
 
 Both the departure and arrival time qualities of this itinerary score 3 with no extra qsplit 
points, therefore resulting with a qconvenience score equal to 6. Since both TK353 and TK1875 are 
operating flights, the whole itinerary is an operating product too. Therefore, qconvenience, equals 
to (1.000 +  (଺ିଶ)
଻
∗ (1.131 − 1.000)) = 1.074. Discounting this figure by %inconvenient, 
qindex_normalised  is calculated as 0.888.  
 
While the qindex_normalised  score for TK351/TK1895 is 1.052, it is calculated to be 0.888 
for TK353/TK1875 combination. Since the calculation of a single quality score is required for 
all connecting services for a given airline, the weighted average of  qindex_normalised  by the 
available seat numbers has to be computed for each combination, as displayed in Table 9.27 
below.  
 
Table D.8: TK Combinations’ Weighted Average qindex_normalised Calculation Table using 
Available Seats and Individual qindex_normalised  Values of The Combinations 
Combination Available Seats Normalised Quality - qindex_normalised 
TK351/TK1895 237 1.052 
TK353/TK1875 101 0.888 
Weighted Average qindex_normalised =
(ଵ.଴ହଶ ௫ ଶଷ଻)ା(ଵ଴ଵ ௫ ଴.଼଼଼)
(ଶଷ଻ାଵ଴ଵ)
 = 1.003 
 
 With all airlines’ qindex_normalised scores computed, the final adjustment in quality scores 
in reference to total journey time is carried out to obtain each carrier’s qa_index_normalised  as the 
final step before implementing the REMSET. The below table summarises ttotal, qindex_normalised  
and calculates qa_index_normalised. 
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Table D.9: Each Airlines Average ttotal And Normalised Quality Indexes 
Airline ttotal Normalised Quality - qindex_normalised 
LH 630 minutes 0.9639 
SU 715 minutes 0.9380 
TK 
(଺଺଴ ௫ ଶଷ଻)ା(଻଻ହ ௫ ଵ଴ଵ) 
(ଶଷ଻ାଵ଴ଵ)
 = 694 min. 1.0030 
 
For airlines offering a single combination from ALA to MXP, the ttotal value of the 
combination is at the same time the average total journey time for the airline. Therefore, average 
ttotal_LH is 630 and ttotal_SU is 715 minutes for LH and SU respectively. For TK, since there are 
two hits, to compute ttotal_TK each combination’s ttotal needs to be weight-averaged by the 
corresponding seat supply. Making the necessary calculation as depicted in Table 9.28, ttotal_TK 
is found to be 694 minutes. Therefore, LH offers the shortest journey time available in the 
market. SU’s average journey time is 13.4% worse than LH, while this figure is 10.1% for TK. 
Therefore, for LH qa_index_normalised = qindex_normalised. For SU and TK, their qindex_normalised needs to 
be discounted by 13.4% and 10.1% respectively to calculate their qa_index_normalised as shown in 
the table below. 
 
Table D.10: Indexed Total Journey Time and Final qa_index_normalised Values 
Airline ttotal Indexed ttotal qindex_normalised qa_index_normalised 
LH 630 min 1 0.9639 0.9639 
SU 715 min 1.135 0.9380 
0.9388 x (1-13.5%) = 
0.8264 
TK 694 min 1.102 1.0030 
1.0030 x (1-10.2%) = 
0.9096 
 
The above table shows that the schedule quality of LH is the best among competing 
airlines from ALA to MXP, with an adjusted and normalised quality index score of 0.9639. TK 
follows LH with qa_index_normalised = 0.9096, with SU reporting the lowest quality score. 
  
D.3. Final Realistic Market Share Calculation of the Case by Using the REMSET Model 
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 In the initial section of the analysis, adjusted capacity shares (%a_s) of each combination 
is assessed followed by adjusted normalised quality score (qa_ndex_normalised) calculation. These 
figures are relative scores and indicate the comparative performance of the airlines. Therefore, 
as previously outlined, the procedure to calculate the realistic market share proceeds by 
multiplying %a_s  with  qa_ndex_normalised for each airline’s routing type (direct or connecting) 
combination. Translating these numbers into percentages produces the final market share 
estimation of each carrier. The final table summarising the capacities and normalised quality 
scores of all services from ALA to MXP is as follows: (Please note that since there are only 
connecting services in the market, no row is shown for direct flights.) 
 
Table D.11: Final Realistic Market Share Computation of the Case 
Airline Routing Type %a_s x qa_index_normalised Market Share Estimation (ms) 
LH Connect 12.53% x 0.9639 = 0.121 0.121 / 0.890 = 13.6% 
SU Connect 32.11% x 0.8264 = 0.265 0.265 / 0.890 = 29.8% 
TK Connect 55.36% x 0.9096 = 0.504 0.504 / 0.890 = 56.6% 
Total 0.890 100% 
  
The above table suggests that although the adjusted seat share of LH is 12.53%, its 
expected market share is slightly higher than this figure, which is 13.6% since the carrier 
reported a better quality index compared to the rivals. Remembering that LH offers 20.06% of 
the physical seat supply in the market, this is not proportionally reflected in the adjusted seat 
share and the realistic market share estimation as it only operates four days a week, whereas the 
competitors offer daily services. Although TK owns 50.6% of the entire physical seat supply in 
the market, due to LH's non-served days, its adjusted capacity share is raised to 55.36%. 
Incorporating the quality index figure with the adjusted capacity share, TK’s ms is found to be 
56.6%. Finally, although SU reports an adjusted capacity share of 32.11%, due to the relative 
disadvantage in the schedule quality of the SU flights, its market share is estimated to be 29.8%. 
 
 
